ML18152A313
| ML18152A313 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 10/26/1990 |
| From: | Fredrickson P, Holland W, Tingen S, York J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18152A314 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-90-28, 50-281-90-28, NUDOCS 9011090307 | |
| Download: ML18152A313 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1990028
Text
R~port Nos.:
50-280/90-28 and 50-281/90-28
Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company
5000 Domi_nion Boulevard
Glen Allen, VA
23060
Docket Nos.:
50-280 a~d 50-281
License Nos.:
Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted:
September 2 through 29, 1990
Inspectors: d ~
~
w.E.ocf~sident Inspector
J.~~ctor
S. G. ~i
1
,JWJ,
.e ,~de~tg_ ~
Approved by:
( /
- -~
Scope:
P. E: Fredrickson, Section Chief
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
This routine resident inspection was conducted on site in the areas of plant
operations, plant maintenance, plant surveillance,* licensee event report
closeout, and action on previous inspection findings:
During the performance
of this inspection, the resident inspectors conducted review of the licensee 1 s
backshift or weekend operations on September 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 24, 25, 26,
and 28.
Results:
In the area of maintenance both a weakness and a strength were identified. The
weakness involved incorrect understanding of the internal configuration of a
valve
positioner
by
during
initial
troubleshooting
activities.
(paragraph 4.a). The strength involved the repair of emergency service water
pump 1-SW-P-lC (paragraph 4.b.).
Two noncited violations were identified.
One was for failure to follow the
requirements of a radiat1on work permit (paragraph 3.d).
The second noncited
violation was for failure to provide an adequate procedure for troubleshooting
a Unit 1 containment system pressure instrument (paragraph 6) .
,:,ci *t 1. c,*:,;,o:~:q.7_
F' f.1 \\;;:
(-1 Du i_. \\-: ..
I)
1.
Persons Contacted
Lice~see Empl6yees_ *
REPORT DETAILS
- W. B~nthall, Supe~visor, Licensing
~R. Bilyeu, Licensing Engineer
- 0. Christian*, Assistant Station* Manager
- J. Downs, Superintendent of Outage and Planning
D. Erickson, Superintendent of Health Physics
W. Gross, S1Jpervisor, Shift Operations
"'*R .. Gwaltney, Superintendent of Maintenance
- M. Kansler, Station Manage~
l. Kendzia, £upervisor, Safety Engineering
- J. McCarthy, Superinte~dent of Operations
- L. Morris, Superintendent of-Radiation Waste
- A. Price, Assistant Station Manager
- E. Smith; Site Quality Assurance Man~ge~
- T. Sowers, Superintendent of Engineering
- Attended.exit inte~view on October 3, 1990.
- Attended exit interview on October Bi 1990.
Other licensee employees contacted included c6ntrol room operators, shift
technical advisors, shift supervisors and other plant personnel.*
Acronyms and iniiialisms used through~ut this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
2.
Plant Status
Unft 1 *began. the reporting period at approximately 78%. power.
On
Se~tember 19i the unit experienced unexpected load swings due to erratic
- operation of the EHC system.
This event is. further discussed in*
paragraph 3.d. * The Llnit continued to operate in a coa~tdown m6de at power
during the period and was operating at approximately 57% power when the
inspection period ended.
-
Unit .2 began the reporting period at _power.
The unit operated at power
for the duration of the inspection period.
3.
Operational Safety Verification
(71707 & 42700)
a.
Daily Inspections
The inspectors conducted daily inspections in the following areas:
control
room staffing, - access,. and operator behavior; operator
adherence to approved procedures, TS, and LCOs; examination of panels
2
containing instrumentation and other reactor protection syst~m
elements to determine that required channels ~re operabl~; and review
of control room operator logs, operating orders, plant deviation
reports, tagout logs, temporary modification logs, and tags on *
componen~s to verify compliance with approved procedures.* The
inspectors also routinely accompanied station management on plant
tours and observed the effectiveness of their influence on a*ctivities
being performed by pl ant personnel. *
b.
Weekly Inspections
The inspectors conducted weekly inspectioris in the following areas:*
operability verification of selected ESF systems by valve alignment,
breaker ,positions,
condition of equipment
or component,
and
. operability of instrumentation and support items essential to system
actuation or perfo~mance.
Plant tours were conducted which included
observation of general plant/equipment conditions, fire protection
and preventative measures,
control of. activities in progress,
radiation protection controls, physical _security controls, plant
housek~eping
conditions/cleanliness,
and
missile hazards.
The
inspectors routinely noted th~ temperature of the AFW pump discharge
piping to ensure increases in temperature were being properly
monitored and evaluated by the licensee.
c.
Biweekly Inspections
The inspectors conducted biweekly inspections in the following areas:
verification review and walkdown of safety-related tagouts in effect;
review of sampling program (e.g., primary and secondary coolant
samples, boric acid tank samples, plant liquid and gaseous samples);
observation of control room ~hift turnover; review of implementation
of the plant problem identification system; .verification of selected
portions of containment isolation lineups; and verification that
notices to workers are posted as required by 10 CFR 19.
d.
Other Inspection Activities
Inspections included areas in the Units 1 and 2 cable vaults, vital
battery rooms, steam safeguards areas, emergency switchgear rooms,
diesel generator rooms, control room,
auxiliary building, cable
penetration areas, independent spent fuel storage facility, low level
intake structure, and the safeguards valve pit and pump pit areas.
RCS leak rates were reviewed to ensure that detected or suspected
leakage from the system was recorded, investigated, and evaluated;
and that appropriate actions were taken, if required. The inspectors
routinely independently calculated RCS leak rates using the NRC
Independent Measurements Leak Rate Program (RCSLK9).
On a regular
basis,
RWPs were reviewed,
and specific work activities were
monitored to assure they were being conducted per the RWPs.
Selected
radiation protection instruments were peri odi ca lly checked, and
equipment operability and calibration frequency were verified.
3
During
this
inspection
period, "licensee
radiation* protection
personne 1 i dent i fi ed a condition where. an operator had entered a
locked high radiation area on two different occasions without a
survey instrument.
The applicable RWP required a survey instrument
for entry into a locked high radiation area.
The inspectors reviewed these events with the HP Superintendent and
operations supervision.
The licensee stated that the operator in*
question was confused as to the requirements for entry into the
locked high* radiation *area due to the posting of the area at that
time.
The posting of the radiation area indicated that a DAD, survey
instrument, or HP coverage was required for entry.
However, the RWP
in use for entry into a locked high radiation area required a survey
instrument.
Station supervision informed the inspectors that they
considered the event was
an isolated occurrence; however, they
implemented corrective actions that were directed at all operations
personnel.
These corrective actions included supervisory discussions
with shift crews on the requirements of following the applicable
RWPs.
In addition, an entry was made in the operations shift orders
log reviewing the event and addressing RWP requirements.
Also, the
HP department reviewed postings to radiation areas and clarified any
signs which might have been misleading.
The in specters were provided with a copy of the deviation report
which identified the violation of RWP requirements and a copy of the
radiological deficiency report.
They reviewed these reports and the
licensee's corrective actions and consider that the problem was
appropriately addressed.
This item is identified as an NCV (280,
281/90-28.-01) for fa-i lure to fo 11 ow the requirements of the RWP for
en-try in.~_6-a Jocked high radiation area.
This licensee identified
violati6n fs .-not being cited because criteria specified in Section
V.G.l of the NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfi~d.
On
September 19, Unit l
experienced problems with the turbine
generator governor valve EHC system resulting in a sudden increase of
turbine generator output from 550 to 590 Mwe, fo 11 owed by a sudden
decrease of turbine generator output from 550 to 250 Mwe, and a
subsequent sudden increase of turbine generator output from 250 to
380 Mwe.
These swings in turbine generator output occurred over a 22
minute period and while the swings were occurring, operators
attempted to regain control by changing the modes of turbine
generator control and increasing or decreasing the output as
necessary.
Turbine generator output was decreased to 240 Mwe and
remained stable.
Inspection of the No. 3 governor valve revealed
that the nut securing the EHC LVDT feedback arm in the valve's EHC
linkage vibrated loose causing the arm to become disenga~ed from the
LVDT resulting in a loss of turbine generator control.
EHC fluid to
the No. 3 governor valve was isolated and turbine generator control
was restored.
4
The turbine* generator load swings created transients that caused
several steam leaks. in the A main steam dump header.
Packing blew
out of main ste~m_du~p valv~ TCV-MS-105A.
T~ stop the steam leak, -a
leak sealing material(furmanite) was injected in the packing area. A
sec~nd steam leak occurred whe~ a pressure gage isolation valve blew
off. A damage control plug was tempo~arily installed in the opening
to stop the steam 1 eak. * During this event !RPI for rod 1(-6 drifted
to 14 steps abo~e the _demand counter exceeding the TS limit. of 12
steps .. The applicable TS action statement was entered and adjust-
ments were made to correct the indication discrepancy ... Following
this event, the licensee reinstalled the No. 3 governor valve LVDT
feedback arm.
The licensee _inspected the remaining Units 1 and 2
- governor valves I
LVDT feedback arms and verified that the_
. fasteners ~ere secure.
The inspe~tors monitored this event from the
control. room and turbine *building.
e.
Physical Security Program Inspections
In the course of monthly activities, the inspecto*rs included a review*
of the licen-see 1 s physical *security program.
The performance of
various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of
daily activities to include: protected and vital areas access
controls;
searching of personnel, packages and vehicles; badge
issu*ance and retrieval; escorting of v.isitors; *. and patrols. and
tompen~at~ry posts~
No discrepancies w~re noted.
- f.
Licensee 10 CFR 50_.72 Reports
On September 2, the licehse~ mide a rep~rt*in accordanc~ with 10 CFR
,.50.72 concerning an event involving the inadvertent closure of two of
the four Unit l circulating water inlet valves. This condition is
_considered outside the design basis of the plant.
op*erators noticed
the valves clos,ing * and took manual control in order to ma_intain
condenier vacuum and prevent a uhit trip. They deenergized*the power
supplies for the :motor operated va_lves in question and placed these
power suppli~s under administrative control. The valves are designed
to close on_ an ESF s1gnal associated with a loss of off site power in
coincidence with a Hi-Hi CLS condition. The problem was diagnosed to
be defective circuitry which caused a makeup of the logic of the
turbine building flood protection syst~m.
After corrective actions
were accomplished to the turbine building flood protection circuitry,
(within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />), normal powe~ was restored to. the two circulating
water MOVs.
During the time that the valves were without power, all
plant conditions were normal.
On September 26; the licensee made a call to the NRC retracting the
10 CFR 50.72 report that was made on Septembe~ 2.
The retraction
stated that further analysis of the. plant conditions at the time of
this event led to the conclusion that reacto~ operators had ade9uate
5
time to identify and execute cl6sure of the two circulating water
valves.
Administrative.controls were initiated tb ensure that plant
conditions .did not* exceed any de~ign bas-is.* The inspectors re-wiewed
th~ initial call and actions taken by the operators and consider that
adequate control of the valves in question were maintained throughout
the event.
g.
Extension of Testing Requirements
On September 14, 1990 the licensee requested a one-time exemption
from type C testing requirements as specified in 10 CFR 50,
Appendix J,Section III.D.3 until June 30, 1991 for Surry, Unit 2.
A
temporary waiver was granted from the requirement by the NRC on
September 18, 1990; and a one-time exemption of the requirements was
granted- by the NRC on September 26, 1990.
Within the areas inspected, one NCV was identified.
4.
Maintenance Inspections (62703 & 427CJ)
Ouri~g
the
reporting
period,
the
inspectors
reviewed
activities to assure compliance with
the
appropriate
In~pection areas included the following:
maintenance
procedures.
a.
Repair of Unit 2 Pressurizer Spray Valve (2~RC-PCV-2455A) Positioner
During the latter part of the last inspection period, the licensee
identjfied a problem with the subject valve in that when the valve
received a full-close demand signal, it remained partially open.
Work order 3800099504 was issued on August 24, 1990 to troubleshoot
the valve controller and adjust the demand signal as necessary. This
work required
containment entries at power be made in order to
accomplish troubleshooting/repair activities.
Between August 24 and September 13, the licensee made a total of 10
containment entriei to troubleshoot/repair 2-RC-PCV-2455A positioner.
Difficulities with respect to inadequate vendor manuals and incorrect
use of repair parts contributed to repeated unsuccessful attempts to
fix the problem.
On August 24, the first containment entry was made by I&C personnel
to check out the controller.
During that entry, the technicians
determined that with less that a 3 psi E/P signal the valve dome was
receiving approximately a 9 psi signal.
For any E/P signal equal to
or less than 3 psi the dome signal should have been approximately 0
psi and the valve should remain shut. After making minor adjustments
and concluding that the valve was closed, the technicians left
containment.
Later that evening, operations reported back to I&C
that the valve was still not going fully shut.
A containment entry
6
was made that night by I&C personnel who determined that the
same
problem existed.
During this entry, instrument air was isolated to
the valve and the valve was observed to go fully shut.
On August 25, a containment entry was made by I&C technicians to
check the valve air fittings for leaks and check. tightness of
screws.
No air l eak.s were found.. Pictures were taken of the
valve controller configuration prior to le~~ing containment.
On August 28, a containment entry was made to change out valve
internals associated with
mounting the pilot valve to the
positioner.
The troubleshooting instructions required the
removal of three 0-rings and installation of new O-rings. After
completion of the work, the valve controller problem was still
evident.
Following this attempt to correct the problem, I&C
requested *maintenance engineering support and contacted the
valve positioner vendor for additional help.
On August 30, a containment entry was made to remove the bottom
0-ring installed during the August 28 entry and to replace this
0-ring with a foam plug.
This work did not correct the valve
controller problem.
On August 31, a containment entry was made to remove the valve
positioner from the valve and to bring the compo_nent out of
containment for further troubleshooting and corrective action.
The positioner was taken to the station hot shop for additional
work.
On September 1, the licensee reinstalled the foam plug in the
pilot valve and conducted additional check.outs and setup in
accordance with maintenance engineering instructions. All work,
which was accomplished in the hot shop, indicated that the
positioner was working properly.
On September 4, the 1 i censee made a containment entry to
reinstall the valve positioner. However, after reinstallation,
the positioner exhibited the same original problem.
Instrument
air was i so 1 a ted to the valve and I&C personnel left contain-
ment.
On September 6, a containment entry was made to troubleshoot the
positioner again and replace selected components.
I&C was
unable to correct the positioner problem and left containment.
On September 7, a containment entry was again made to remove the
valve po~itioner from the valve and bring the component out of
containment for further troubleshooting and corrective action.
The positioner was taken to the stati~n hot shop for additional
work.
7
On
September 8,
during positioner disassembly,
the
technicians, working with maintenance engineering, observed that
the foam plug was incorrectly positioned sideways and that a
piece of a hard rubber material was lodged under the pilot valve
port containing the foam plug.
From these observations and
additional testing, it was
concluded that the valve was
ma l fun ct i oni ng because the pilot va 1 ve port was not properly
sealed with a hard rubber plug.
Additionally, it was concluded
that the cause of the original valve problem was air leakage
past the failed pilot valve port hard rubber plug.
On September 12, I&C refurbished the positioner in the hot shop
using new parts which incfoded a new hard rubber plug.
After
refurbish~ent, the positioner was tested using a special
procedure prepared by maintenance engineering.
Test results
were satisfactory.
On September 13, a containment entry was made to reinstall the
refurbished positioner. After completion of the reinstallation
and checkout of the operation of the valve, 2-RC-PCV-2455A was
declared operable and returned to normal service.
The* inspectors began to follow the maintenance/troubleshooting
activities associated with this valve early in this inspection
period.
The inspectors reviewed all documentation associated with
this job and concluded that the final troubleshooting by I&C and
maintenance engineering that was accomplished on September 8 properly
determined the cause of the problem and a 11 owed for adequate *
corrective action.
The inspectors also noted the following observa-
tions:
After maintenance engineering became involved in the process,
the identification of the problem was better documented and
corrective action for the problem, including adequate retest
prior to final reinstallation, was accomplished.
I&C did not have a detailed vendor manual which could have
allowed for better understanding of the problem.
The inspectors
were provided a copy of Bailey Product Instructions, Section
P92-9 for positioner PT.
No .. 5311450.
The inspectors were
informed that this manual was a generic manual for use in
understanding. this type of valve; however, no specific valve
manual was available.
The inspectors also noted that positioner
supplemental drawing No.
Ll32155, Revision 3, was used in
conjunction with the manual to troubleshoot the valve positioner
condition. The inspectors consider that more detailed technical
instructions are warranted when vendor manuals do not provide
required information to accomplish troubleshooting of problems .
8
The inspectors noted that on August 28, the craft install~d an
o~ring in a valve port which required the installation of a
plug.
They also noted that a foaM plug was installed in place
of the 0-ring on August 30.
On September 12, a hard rubber plug
was installed in place of the foam plug.
The licensee wrote
deviation report S2-90-492 on
September 12
identifying a
condition where the vendor supplied the incorrect plug for the
valve positioner application.
This incorrect plug was used on
August 30, 1990.
The inspectors consider that the licensee
action* for identification of the incorrect part into their
corrective action program wi 11 a 11 ow for. adequate review and
resolution as to why the vendor supplied the incorrect part.
However, the incorrect use of a part on August 28 identified an
I&C weakness with regards to their understanding of the internal
configuration
of
the
subject
positioner
early
in
the
troubleshooting process.
The inspectors discussed the sequence of events with both I&C
supervision and station management and were informed that the
maintenance activity would be reviewed by" I&C to determine if any
lessons-learned from this job could be used to improve other
troubleshooting work.
The inspectors attended the meeting in which
the maintenance activity was reviewed and listened to general
discussion in *the* area of how the job was accomplished.
I&C.
supervision discussed lessons-learned from* the problems associated
with this job.
The inspectors a 1 so reviewed their findings with management and
concluded that continuing management attention is necessary in order
to effectively convey expectations to I&C with regards to correct
understanding of component configurations during troubleshooting
activities. Maintenance and station management stated that they had
recognized that the station had a problem with regards to insuring
that ade~uate vendor/technical instructions were available in ordef
for the craft to perform proper maintenance activities.
They also
stated that the ongoing configuration management
program was
addressing this concern.
b.
Maintenance on Emergency Service Water Pump 1-SW-P-lC
During a routine inservice test of pump 1-SW-P-lC, the pump's flow
rate was below the test procedure's minimum acceptable limits.
Testing of the pump is further discussed in paragraph 5.a.
The
inspectors monitored the licensee's maihtenance activities to restore
the pump I s fl ow rate.
Maintenance on pump 1-SW-P-l C started on
September 10 and was
completed on
September 13.
Work order 38000101101 and procedure MMP-C-SW-093, Overhaul of Emergency Service
Water Pumps, dated October 25, 1989, were utilized to accomplish this
maintenance .
C.
9
The pump
1 s components that are below the water line wer~ removed and
inspected.
The in~pection revealed that the pump exterior. casing and
endbell were heavily covered with barnacles and hydroids.
Hydroids
which are a biological growt~ that ~ccurs in the James River are only
present in a flowing water environment and are not present in
stagnant water conditions. The lower side of the pump 1 s impeller was
heavily covered with barnacles. The internal components of the pump
were lightly covered with barnacles. The lower end of the pump was
disassembled, cleaned, reassembled, and the pump was reinstalled and
tested.
The pump
1 s flowrate was significantly higher than the
previous test and was within acceptable limits.
The licensee concl~ded that the six to twelve inch long hydroids
present in the suction area of the pump were folding over into the
pu'mp suction path during pump operation and impeding the pump 1s
suction. The barnacles on the impeller also disrupted the pump 1 s flow
characteristics. Because the internal components of the
pump
contained stagnant water the marine growth was minimal. Corrective
actions to prevent reoccurrence are discussed in paragraph 5.a.
The
inspectors reviewed the work package associated with the
maintenance of pump 1-SW-P-lC, frequently visited the job sight to
observe work in progress, held discussions with the maintenance
engineer, system engineer, and craft supervisors, and certified
compliance with TSs and station adminstrative procedures.
The
inspectors consider that this maintenance was completed in an
efficient manner, and there appeared to be good cooperation between
system engineering, maintenance engineering, operations, and craft
personnel. This evolution was identified as a strength in the area
of maintenance.
Repair of Intake Canal Level Indicator
The in specters observed the rep 1 acement * of can a 1 1 eve 1 probe No.
2-CW-LS-202 on September 17.
There are four of these canal level
indicators, two on each unit.
Each *of the level indicators is
connected to an intake canal level high-low level alarm which
annunciates in the main control room.
If three out of four of the
annunciators are energized, then both units would receive an
automatic reactor trip signal.
The annunciator from level probe
No. 2-CW-LS-202 was energized and the channel was placed in trip.
The level probe was four.d to be defective and was replaced.
The work
was
performed on work order No.
380009~986
using
procedure
2-PT-2.21A,
Function Test of Low
Level Canal Circuity, dated
February 27, 1990.
In addition to reviewing the procedure and observing part of the
probe rep 1 acement effort, the inspectors reviewed the component
failure evaluation results. This report stated that the probe failed
10
due to water intrusion that resulted in a false o~tput voltage. The
report recommended that additional actions be taken to extend probe
life.
One recommendation resulted in the request for an
EWR to
explore the possibility of another method for sealing the probe. The
CFE al so stated that the amount of mar*ine. growth found at the probe
could affect the response time, and recommended that the marine
growth on these probes be removed at regular intervals.
The in specters consider the CFE and re 1 a-ted recommendations to be
adequate, and no discrepancies were noted in the maintenance on the
probe.
The inspectors noted that on September 17, periodic tests
were performed satisfactorily on all four of the canal level probes
indicating no apparent inleakage bf ~oisture.
Within the areas inspected, nn violations were identified.
5.
Surveillance Inspections
(61726 & 42700)
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed various surveillance
activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedures as
follows:
Test prerequ~sites were met .
Tests were performed in accordance with approved procedures.
Test procedures appeared to perform their intended function.
Adequate coordination existed among personnel involved in the test.
Test data was prop~rly collected and recorded.
Inspection areas included the following:
a.
ESW Pump Testing
On September 6, the licensee tested ESW pump 1-SW-P-lA in accordance
with procedure l-PT-25. 3A, Emergency Service Water Pump (1-SW-P-lA),
dated October 10, 1989.
The purpose of this test is to verify pump
operability in accordance with the requirements of ASME Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI. The pump 1 s flow rate was 12,500 GPM
which was less than the test procedure
1s minimum acceptable flowrate
limit.
As a result, the pump was declared inoperable. TS 3.14.B
action statement was entered allowing continued unit operation with
one of the three ESW pumps being i noperab 1 e for a period not to
exceed seven days.
To restore the pump 1 s flow rate, a diver cleaned
the external surfaces of the pump 1 s suction area and the pump was
operated for several hours to remove any obstructions in the pump or
pump discharge piping.
On September 7, pump 1-SW-P-lA was retested
- -
11
in accordance with procedure 1-PT-25.3A.
This testing was witnessed
by* the inspectors. The flow rate obtained during this testing was
16,832 GPM which was within the test procedures acceptable flow rate
limits.
The licensee considered that the pump was operable and
exited the TS 3.14.B action statement.
Because pump 1-SW:-P-lA
degradation had occurred, th~ licensee e*xpedited testing of the
remaini~g two ESW pumps, 1-SW-P-18 and 1-SW-P-lC.
On
September 8, pump 1-SW-P-lB was tested in accordance with
procedure 1-PT-25.38, and the inspecto~s witnessed this testing. The
pump's flow rate obtained during this testing wis 16,024 GPM which
exceeded the test procedures minimum acceptable flow rate limits but
wa~ lower than the flow rates previously obtained for the same pump.
The licensee considered that the pump was operable but had degraded.
On September 19, a diver cleaned the exterior surfaces of pump's
1-SW-P-18 suction area and the p~mp was retested in accordance with
procedure l-PT-25.38.
The pump's flow rate obtained during this
testing was 16,733 GPM which was an improvement from the previous
test results.
At this flow rate, the pump was no longer considered
to be in a degrad~d condition.
On
September 9,
pump 1-SW-P-lC was tested in accordance with
procedure 1-PT-25.3C.
The inspectors witnessed this testing.
The
flow rate obtained during this testing was 14,961 GPM which was less
than the test procedure's minimum acceptable flow rate limits,
therefore, the pump was declared inoperable and TS 3.14.B action
statement was entered. Actions to restore the pump's flow rate were
previously discussed in paragraph 4_.b.
On September 13, pump
1-SW-P-lC was test~d following repairs in accordance with procedure
1-PT:...25.3, and the* inspectors witnessed this testing.* The pump's
flow rate obtained during this testing was
17,619 GPM which
significantly exceeded the test procedure's minimum acceptable flow
rate limits. At this flow rate, the pump was no longer considered to
be in on inoperable condition and the TS action statement was exited.
The licensee has increased the surveillarice test interval for
the ESW pumps from quarterly to monthly until a permanent solution
for the marine growth pump degradation can
be resolved.
The
inspectors did not identify any discrepancies during review of the
test procedures or when witnessing pump testing.
b.
Flux Mapping of Unit 2 Core.
On September 26, 1990, the inspectors witnessed part of the flux
mapping for the Unit 2 core using periodic test 2-PT-28.2, Reactor
Core Flux Maps, dated February 1, 1990.
The purpose of this test is
to monitor the core neutron flux gradients to ensure TS compliance.
The inspectors observed the reactor engineer recording data from the
delta flux meters, and the upper and lower nuclear instrumentation
.meters.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed the signed-off steps of
the procedure.
No discrepancies were identified.
12
Within the areas inspected, np viblations were identified.
6 .. Licensee Event Report Review
(92700)"
The inspector reviewed the_ LER 1s listed below to ascertain whether NRC
reporting requirem~nts were being met and to evaluate initfal adequacy of
the* cotrective actions. The inspector's revie~ also included followup on
implementation of c6rrective action and review of licensee documentation
that all required corrective actions were complete.
.
.
'
.
.
.
(Closed) LER 280/90-05, Containment Pressure Channel. Rendered Inoperable
a~d Not Placed in Trip Conditiori Due to ~rocedure !nadequacy.
The issue
involved a failure to maintain the minimum degree of redundancy for*
containment pressure monitoring instrumentation required by TS due- to
inadequate procedures.
The problem occurred during craft troubleshooting
of a* co~tainm~nt vacuum system pressure instrument and was specifically
caused by an
i_mproper venting evolution being attempted using an*
inadequately revised. procedure.
After discovery of the problem by the
operators, the proper TS LCO was entered and the instrument was returned
to an operable status. An additional action. included reinstruction of*
procedure writers and reviewers to thoroughly review 'procedure revisions
and changes for impact on interacting systems.*. In a_ddition, .the specific
procedures for v~nting containment leakage monitoring lines were ch~nged
to include requirements for placing the affected channel in the tripped
condition.
The inspector verified .that the licensee 1 s corrective action
was imp.lemented.
This item is identified as an NCV (280/90-28-02) for
fa~lure to provide adequate procedure for evolutions affecting required
- minimum degree of redundancy as required by TS.
This licensee identified
- violation fs not being cited because criteria specified in Section V.G.l
of the. NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
(Closed) LER 280/90-0~, Inoperable.Contain~ent Vacuum Pump Flow Paths Due*
to Failures of Process Vent Normal Range Radiation Monitor; During both
times that this event occurred (once on August 10 and again .on August 29,
1990) containment vacuum system flow paths for both units beca.me
inoperable when containment vacuum pump discharge va_lves automatically
closed as a result of the failure and ~ubsequent lockout of the.process
vent normal range radiation monitor, RM-GW-130-1.
The licensee determined
that the August 10 event was caused by a* defective flow switch and* the
August 29 event _was caused by a failed CPU card.
These events were*
considered to be isolated occurrences.
The inspectors consider the
licensee's corrective.actions to be adequate.
Within the areas inspected, one NCV was identified.
7.
Aciion on Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)
a.
(Closed) Violation 280,281/89-24-05, Failure to Take Appropriate
Corrective Action for Past Problems Identified During Performance of
Maintenance Activities.* The issue involved examples where corrective
13
action for past problems associated with foreign material exclusion,
torquing of fasteners, and orientation of flow orifices had been
ineffective.
The licensee, in their response to the violation dated
December 21, 1989, stated that a lack of appropriate management
controls with regards to a station administrative procedure governing
the use of standing orders existed.
Corrective action included an
administrative procedure revision to address requirements, a meeting
with maintenance persohnel emphasizing the importance of adhering to
requirements, and implementation of inclusion of foreign material
requirements in upgraded maintenance procedures.
The inspectors
verified that licensee corrective actions were implemented.
b.
(Closed)
Inspector Followup
Item 280,281/89-24-08,
Followup on
Licensee Review of.Inteinal Station Communications Issue.
The is~ue
involved the licensee 1s review of internal station communication
issues in the area of the Gai-tronics system, i.e. improvement of the
system and decrease in the number of open work orders.* Gai-tronics
is a five channel public address and intercom system.
The licensee
had a vendor representative on site from March 22 to April 13, 1990,
to adjust and balance this communications system.
The inspectors
believe that this effoft improved the sound quality.
In 2ddition,
the inspectors noted that the number of outstanding work orders had
decreased. ftom 30 to 13 over the past two months .
C.
(Closed) Violation 281/89-31-01, Failure of Operations .Personnel to
Follow Procedure.
The issue involved two instances where ~perators
failed to follow procedures.
The first instance resulted in
incorrect system alignment during testing of an auxiliary feedwater
pump and the second instance resulted in an unplanned dilution of the
Unit 2 reactor coolant system without proper establishment of
containment integrity.
The licensee, in their response to the
violation dated December 28, 1989, stated that both events were due
to a failure of operators to operate equipment in accordance with
approved procedures.
Management took the necessary actions to'
emphasize that procedural adherence and attention to detail were
expected from all personnel.
The inspectors have continued to
monitor operator performance and consider that strict procedural
adherence has been properly conveyed to all operations personnel.
d.
(Closed) Violation 280,281/89-34-03, Failure to Sample the Service
Water Effluent of the CCW Heat Exchangers as Required by Technical
Specifications.
The issue involved a repeat failure to sample
service water effluent from the CCW heat exchanger as required by TS.
The licensee
1 s response to the violation dated February 6, 1990,
stated that one of the corrective actions was to change the liquid
waste control room operator's log to include a section which
sp'ecifical ly identifies the time and date the heat exchangers were
last sampled and the time by which the next sample must be taken.
)
8.
14
The inspectors reviewed the section in the log and verified that the
sampling is being properly performed.
Additional corrective steps
invplv~d the replacement of the temaining three CCW heat exthangers.
The new design for these heat ex-changers includes a radiation monitor
that is mounted in a dry well. With the new radiation monitors;* it
will not be necessary to take the twice~daily grab samples currintly
required.
Two of the heat exchangers are scheduled to be replaced
during the Unit 1 outage starting in October, 1990, and the final
heat exchanger is scheduled to be replaced during the Unit 2 outage
. starting in April, 1991.
The inspectors considered that adequate
corrective actions have either been implemented or are scheduled.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and results were summarized on October 3 and 8, 1990
with those individuals identified in paragraph 1.
The following summary
of inspection activity was discussed by the inspectors d~ring this exit.
In the ~rea of maintenance both a weakness a~d a strength were identified.
The weakness involved I&C not correctly understanding the internal
configuration of a valve
positioner during early troubleihooting
activities. The strength involved the repair of emergency service water
.pump 1-SW-P-lC .
Two noncited violations were identified.
One was for failure to follow
the requirements of a radiation work permit and the second was for failure
to provide an adequate procedure
to troubleshoot a U~it 1 containment
system pressure instrument.
The licensee acknowledged the inspection conclusions wi_th no dissenting
comments.
The
1 icensee did not identify as proprietary any of the
materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this
inspection.
Licensee management was informed of the items closed in paragraphs 6
and 7.
9.
Index of Acronyms amd Initialisms
-
ASME -
ccw
cw
CFE
CFR
CLS
CPU
DAD
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERS
COMPONENT COOLING WATER
CIRCULATING WATER
COMPONENT FAILURE EVALUATION
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
CONSEQUENCE LIMITING SAFEGUARD
CENTRAL PROCESSING UNIT
DIGITAL ALARMING DOSIMETRY
-
E/P
-
ESF' -
-
-
GPM
-
GW
LER
-
-
!RPI -
LCO. -
LVDT -
MMP
-
-
Mwe
-
-
NRC
-
-
-
-
-
TCV -
TS
15
ELECTRICAL TO PNEUMATIC
ENGINEERED SAF~TY FEATURE
EMERGENCY SERVICE-WATER
ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST
GALLONS PER MINUTE.
GASEOUS WASTE
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
HEALTH PHYSICS
INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL
INDIVtDUAL ROD POSITION INDICATION
LIMITING CONDITIONS OF OPERATION
LINEAR VARIABLE DISPLACED TRANSDUCER
MECHANICAL MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
MOTOR OPERATED VALVE
MEGAWATTS- ELECTRICAL
NON-CITED VIOLATION
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE
PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE
PERIODIC TEST
POUNDS PER SQUARE INCH
RADIATION WORK PERMIT
TEMPERATURE CONTROL VALVE
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS