ML18152A297
| ML18152A297 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 03/31/1989 |
| From: | Fredrickson P, Holland W, Larry Nicholson, York J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18152A298 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-89-06, 50-280-89-6, 50-281-89-06, 50-281-89-6, NUDOCS 8904180340 | |
| Download: ML18152A297 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1989006
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W._
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos.:
50-280/89-06 and 50-281/89-06
Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Glen Alleri~ VA
23060
Dock.et Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281
License Nos.: DPR-32 and DPR-37
Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted:
January 29 - March 4, 1989
r* h
. _,,,,. ,t7 /ff/'. , _- .
Inspectors: ~/
./'/' V--c:~L---*- /J'* Cl/~
Scope:
Results:
W. E. Holland', S~enior.Resident Inspector
<;?~ ~<;;t:-
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,Cb,('
Date S1gned
y] ~?*?C
--~ /
0 7*
Date
i gned
. *?,/Jif;S7
Date igned
. '
SUMMARY
This routine resident inspection was conducted on site in the areas
of plant operations, plant maintenance, plant surveillance, licensee
event report review, installation and testing of modifications, and
licensee action
on
previous
inspection findings.
A special
evaluation of the licensee 1 s program used to walk. down selected
systems prior to unit(s) restart was documented in last month 1 s
report, and this ~nspection effort continues as documented in this
inspection report.
Certain tours were conducted on back.shifts or week.ends.
Back.shift or
week.end tours were conducted on January 29, 30, 31, February 5, 8, 9,
16, 18, 20; 26, and March 2.
During this inspection period, three violations, one
item*, and t~o inspector followup items were identified.
are listed below.
unresolved
These items
One violation was identified (paragraph 3.f(3)) for fallure to
provide adequate procedure for testing of systems involving nuclear
safety of the station (280/89-06-01).
This violation meets the
8904180340 890403
ADOCK 05000280
G
PNU
2
criteria s~ecified in Section V of the NRC Enforcement Policy for not
issuing a Notice of Violation.
The *second violation was identified
(paragraph
9.a) for failure to take prompt corrective action on
potential wetting of safety-re*lated components (280,28l/89-06-02).
The third violation was identified (paragraph 9.b) for failure to
take adequate corrective action on purging potential unqualified
parts from the site supply system (280,281/89-06-03).
This violation
closes Inspector Follow-up Item 280,281/88-51-04.
One inspector followup item was identified (paragraph 4.a) for review
of audits and weaknesses concerning drawings and design change
control (280, 281/89-06-04).
A second inspector followup item was*
identified (paragraph 5.b) for followup on the licensee commftment to
refurbish all safety-related 4160 volt breakers prior to respective
unit restart (280, 281/89-06-05).
One unresolved item was identified (paragraph 5.c) for additional
inspector review bf licensee requirements for returning to service,
after maintenance or modification, systems involving nuclear safety
of the station (280/89-06-06).
- Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to
determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations .
REPORT DETAILS
1..
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
R. Bilyeu, Licensing Engineer
- R. Blount, Superintendent of Technical Services
- D. Christian, Assistant Station Ma~ager
D. Erickson, Superintendent of Health Physics
- E. Grecheck, Assistant Station Manager
- M. Kansler, Station Manager
- J. McCarthy, Superintendent of Operations
- G. Miller, Licensing Coordinator, Surry
- J. Ogren, Superintendent of Maintenance
- T. *sowers, Superintendent of Engineering
- J. Price, Site Quality Assurance Manager
Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators, shift *
technical advisors, shift supervisors and other plant personnel.
- Attended exit meeting.
The newly assigned NRC Region II Projects Division Section Chief, visited
the Surry Power Station on February 23, 1989.
The Section Chief was taken
on a tour of the plant, including the low level intake structure, by the
resident inspectors.
He also met with licensee management.to discuss
the current status of issues and other matters of mutual interest .
. On February 28, 1989, NRC senior management personnel from headquarters
and the Region II offices visited the Surry Power Station.
The senior
managers were given a tour of the station by the resident inspectors.
After the touri NRC senior management met with licensee management.
The
licensee also provided a presentation on the current issues and their
status.
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
2.
Plant Status
Units 1 and 2 began the reporting period in cold shutdown.
The units
remained in cold shutdown.for the duration of the inspection period while
substantial operational reviews and maintenance activities were being
conducted .
3.
2
Operational Safety Verification
(71707)
a.
Daily Inspections .
b.
C.
The inspectors conducted daily inspections in the follow*ing areas:
Control
room staffing, access, and operator behavior; operator
adherence to approved procedures, technical specifications, and
limiting conditions fo~ operations; examination of panels containing
instrumentation and other reactor protection system elements to
determine that required channels are operable; review of control room
operator logs, operating. orders, plant deviati_on reports, tagout
logs, jumper logs, and tags on components to verify compliance with
approved procedures.
Weekly Inspections
The inspectors conducted weekly inspections in the following area~:
verification of operability of selected ESF systems by valve
alignment, breaker positions, condition of equipment or component(s),
and operabi 1 i ty of instrumentation and support i terns es sent i a 1 to
system actuation or performance. Pl ant tours were conducted which
included observation of general plant/equipment conditions, fire
protection and preventative measures, control of activities * in
progress, radiation protection controls, physical security controls,
plant housekeeping conditions/cleanliness, and missile hazards.
The
inspectors routinely monitor the temperature
Qf
the auxiliary
feedwater pump*discharge piping to ensure steam binding is prevented.
Biweekly Inspections
The inspectors conducted biweekly inspections in the following areas:
verification review and walkdown of safety-related tagout(s) in
effect; review of sampling program (e.g., primary and .secondary
coolant samples, boric acid tank samples, plant liquid and gaseous
samples); observation of control room shift turnover; review of
implementation
of
the
plant
problem
identification
system;
verificati-0n of selected portions of containment isolation lineup(s);
and verification that notices to workers are posted as required by
d.
Plant Tours
Inspections fncluded areas in the Units 1 and 2 cable vaults, vital
battery rooms, steam safeguards areas, emergency switchgear rooms,
diesel generator rooms; control room, auxiliary building, Units 1 and
2 containments, cable penetration areas, independent spent fuel
storage facility, low level intake structure, and the safeguards
valve pit and pump pit areas. Reactor coolant system leak rates were
reviewed to ensure that detected or suspected leakage from the system
e.
3
was
recorded,*. investigated, and evaluated; and that appropriate
actions were
taken,
if required.
The
inspectors
routinely
independently calculated RCS leak. rates using the NRC Independent
Measurements Leak Rate Program ( RCSLK9).
_On a regular basis, RWPs
were reviewed and specific work activities were monitored to assure
they were being conducted per the
RWPs.
Selected radiation
protection instruments were periodically checked, and equipment
operability and calibration frequency were verified.
Monthly Inspections
In the course of monthly activities, the inspectors included a review
of * the licensee I s physical security program.
The performance * of
various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of
daily activities to include: protected and vital areas access
controls; searching of personnel, packages and vehicles;
badge
issuance and retrieval;*escorting of visitors; and patrols and
compensatory posts.
f.
Licensee 10 CFR 50.72 Reports
(1)
On January 29, 1989, the *licensee made a report to the NRC in
accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 with regards to degradation to the
insulation of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 inside recirculation spray
pump motor leads.
The degraded conditions were id~ntified as
extending into the motor sealing material making the motor seal
suspect.
In addition, it _was found that the motor lead lugs may
have been improperly crimped.
The licensee has shipped all four
pump motors to the pump vendor (General Electric) facility for
evaluation of the condition and repair as nec*essary.
Evaluation
of pump condition * and repair effort was ongoing when the
inspection period ended.
(2)
On February 5, 1989, the licensee made a report to the NRC in
accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 with regards to loss of normal
power to the*
11 F
11 bus.
This bus was supplying normal power to
the Unit 1
11 H
11 bus and the Unit 2
11J
11 bus. Loss of power to the
Unit 1
11 H
11 bus resulted in an automatic start of the Unit 1
- emergency diesel generator and loading of the 11 H11 bus onto the
generator.
Loss of power to the Unit 2
11J
11 bus resulted in an
automatic start of the No. 3 emergency diesel -generator and
loading of the "J". bus onto the generator.
All safety systems
performed as designed.
The cause of the loss of power to the
11 F11 bus was traced to improper closure of the tie breaker (25C2)
for backfeed of the bus from the Unit 2 unit. service
transformers.
The 1 icensee inspected and cleaned the suspect
breaker
and
then
tested
the
breaker
several
times
satisfactorily. The breaker was then placed back into service
and performed satisfactorily during power realignment to -the 11 F
11
bus.
Maintenance activities associated with this breaker are
discussed in paragrap~ 5 .
4
(3)
On February 8, 1989, the licensee made a report to the NRC in
accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 with regards to a spurious safety
injection on Unit 1.
The safety injection occurred during
special testing on Unit 1 i'n accordance with ST-241.. "Unit 1.A
Train Bus Deactivation Test
11 *
The actuation occurred when
circuit No. 29 on vi ta l bus 3A was deenergi zed in accordance
with procedure.
The SI resulted due to removal of the
11block
11
condition on-the low pressure SI bistables. All safe~y-related
components that were available performed as designed.
Initial
evaluation of the event concluded that.the test procedure was
inadequate in that it did not provide for special controls to
prevent the SI during deenergization of protection channel
- cjrcuits.
The licensee revised the proceduie to prevent
recurrence.
The inspector reviewed the above event and considers that it is
a violation of Technical Specification 6.4, Failure to provide
adequate procedure for testing of systems involving nuclear
safety of the station (280/89-06-01).
However, this violation
meets the criteria specified in Section V of the NRC Enforcement
Policy for not issuing a Notice of Violation and is not cited.
Within the areas inspected, one violation was identified.
4.
Operational Readiness Program Review
(71710)
a.
Drawing System Verification ( RAI 88-01)
An audit was made of the control room and TSC drawings.
The drawings
available to the operators in the control room consist of half-size
mylars of the flow diagrams and electrical schematics.
Common
systems that apply to both units are included in the Unit 1 set and
have been transposed to a n~w CAD format to aid in legibility. The
basic difference in the new drawings for Unit 1 and the old-style
st i 11 used for Unit 2 is- that each page has been expanded to several
pages to reduce the amount of information per page. Although the new
drawings are easier to read, the operators *are familiar with the
old-style drawings and generally do not consider them a -problem.
A
program to convert the Unit 2 drawings is ongoing.
A full set of
station aperature cards is maintained by the operations department in
, the adjacent control room annex and the TSC:
The inspectors selected the following drawings to ascertain that
current drawings and related information are comparable in both the
control room and the TSC:
Unit 1
Drawing No.
11448-FM-072A
11448-FM-072D
1
11448-FM-073A
11448-FM-086A
11448-FM-089A
11448-FM-064A
11448-FM-0688
11448-FB-041A
11448-FE-lAA
11448-FE-010
Unit 2
Drawing No.
11548-FM-064A
11548-FM-068A
11548-FM-071A
11548-FM-072A
11548-FM~07 SJ
11548-FM-084A
11548-FM-0848
11548-FM-086A
11548-FM-0868
11548-FM-088A
11548-FM-0888
11548-FM-088C
11548--FM-089A
11548-FM-0898
11548-FM-1058
5
Design
Sheet No.
Rev. No.
Change
2
2
1
1
3
4
1
2
1
3
12
19
21
17
30
29
17
13
3
13
87~29
86-03
86-15
85-31
88-33-3
Design
Sheet No.
Rev. No.
Change
1
1
1
1
l
1
1
1
2
1
2
3
1
2
l
29
26
24
13
13
24
4
15
17
9
21
18
27
19
24
84-60
88-07
86-11
88-02
85-31 80-98A
System
Component Cooling
Component Cooling
Bearing Cooling
Reactor Cooling
Safety Injection
Chilled Water
App. R-Electrical
4160 Voltage Diagram
System
Circulating Service
Water
Component Coolfng
Instrument Air
Recirculation Spray
Reactor Cooling
Reactor Cooling
Chem.& Vol. Control
Chem.& Vol. Control
Chem.& Vol. Control
Safety Injection
Safety Injection
Chem.& Vol. Control
No discrepancies were found with the Unit 1 drawings.
On Unit 2,
drawing number 11548-FM-1058 had the wrong revision in the control
room, i.e., Revision 24 in the control room, and Revision 25 on the
aperature card in the technical support center. In addition, drawing
numbers 11548-FM-064A and -0848 had the design change number noted on
the aperature card but not on the drawing in the control room.
The
ommi*ssion of the design change number on the control room drawing
does not affect operability as discussed later in this paragraph.
The incofrect revision is a problem and will be addressed in the
followup inspection for the !FI listed below .
6
The inspectors reviewed all or portions of the following station
administrative procedures which affect the drawing system:
SUADM-ENG-03
SUADM-ENG-01
SUADM-ADM-11
SUADM-LR-01
SUADM-0-11
Design Changes, dated 7-14-88
Engineering Work Request, dated 11~03-87
Station Drawing Revision and Distribution, dated
4-11-88
Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Comm., dated
10-14-87
Temporary Modifications, dated 11-22-88
A review of these procedures revealed that the licensee doej not
use advance change notices or marked up ( red-1 i ned) copies to flag
the operators of a system change.
Instead, a revision to the drawing
is issued and hand carried to the control room in parallel with the
technical review of the ~odification and the return of the system to
service, Controlled station drawings are, however, annotated with a
stamp to reflect when a design change has been issued for that
system. This stamp pro vi des no information to the contro 1 room
operator since they use the tagout and work order system to control
the system operabi 1 i ty status.
A system is not to be returned to
service following a full or partial modification until the required
drawings are revised and a technical review of the* modification* is
approved by SNSOC.
The annotation of the design change on the
drawing should not affect operability of the system because of these
controls.
The inspectors identified in paragraph 5.c an example
where a system was returned to service without the proper drawing
revision and technical review.
The inspectors reviewed design change packages 86-15 ( Unit 1) and
86-16 (Unit 2). These packages covered modifications to the reactor
coolant system level instrumentation to prevent loss of shutdown
cooling during midnozzle operadon.
On Unit 1, the inspectors
reviewed two design change technical reviews, one for mechanical and
one for electrical.
The request for drawing changes related to the
.design changes was reviewed.
Drawings and date of revisions on the
appropriate drawings .in the control room were noted.
The inspectors
concluded that the proper procedura 1 steps were taken before the
modification (install~tion of a standpipe and instrumentation) was
used during the Unit 1 refueling operation.
Station admi ni strati ve procedure SUADM-ADM-11 states that any person
~ay request that a change be made to a-controlled station drawing.
This drawing change request is reviewed by the cognizant supervisor
possessing expertiie in the particular area.
The request is
forwarded to the Station Supervisor for Plant Engineering for
concurrence and then forwarded to the drawing update group.
The
inspectors reviewed the method for identifying and correcting station
drawing discrepancies and expressed concern that the program does not
7
mandate a timeframe for correcting known drawing problems that. are
identified .outside the desig*n change and EWR process~
In addition;
the station drawing ch_ange requests are not assigned a*unique number*
and/or entered into a formal system for tracking and auditing.
Discussions with the licensee personnel responsib_le for making the.
drawing revisions revealed that the requests are entered into an
informal computer program (i.e. not covered by a procedure) upon
receipt into the drawing update group.
A review of the previous
drawing change requests that had been submitted to this drafting
group and entered into * their tracking system indicated that
approximately 80 percent of the 600 requests were corrected within 90
days., The above concern was identifi~d as a programmatic weakness
and will_be included in the IFI listed below (280, 281/89-06-02).
The inspectors re~iewed QA auditi in the area of dr~wing control.
Preliminary indications from an unfinished QA audit *(Audit No.
S89-16) indicated that the auditor found three (3) out of the
approximately 246 total drawings in the control rooms which were not
the latest revised dra~ing.
Several other potential que~tions were
raised such as receipt of controlled drawings and the list used for
selecting control room drawings.
The findings from this ongoing
audit and the review of additional audits previously performed in
this area will be followed by the inspectors.
This item and the
previously discussed items will* be identified as an Inspector
Followup Item, Review of audits and .weaknesses concerning drawings
and design change control (280, 281/89-06-04).
b.
Plant Configuration Confirmation (RAI 88-01)
Jhe inspectors reviewed the approximately 260 drawing discrepancies
identified to date by the system engineers during their Unit 1
walk.downs.
The *resident inspectors had evaluated part of this
ongoing effo.rt during the previous inspection period (ref. NRC-
Inspection Report 280, 281/88-51).
THe intent of these walkdowns are
stated as follows:
--
In sure that components a re physically 1 ocated in the system as
per the station drawings .
. Insure
that
proper identification is provided
for
the
components.
Insure that components are in proper orientation (e.g., check
valves in proper direction).
Insure that discrepancies are identified and addressed.
A majority of the items identified involved either an inaccurate
location of vent and drain valves or a failure to reflec~ the pipe
caps installed* downstream of the valves.
The licensee has st.:eit~d
that the system walkdowns have not identified*~ny ~iscrepanties that
would affect operability of a system or train. The inspector review
of the findings to date supports this conclusion.
- In addition to the system walkdowns by cognizant system engineers,
the assessment of outstanding issues for each system includes a
review of outstanding temporary modifications and/or jumpers, station
deviations,
commmitment
items,
outstanding safety-related work
orders, outstanding EWRs and open Type I engineering evaluations.
The system engineers have been tasked with reviewing the above items
pertaining to their particular system and evaluating if closure of
the item is possible prior t~ unit startup.
For those items that
will not be closed prior to startup, a justification for not
completing the
i tern
must
be completed and approved by the
Superintendent of Technical Services.
The overa 11 status of the engineering work as of February 28, 1989,
for Unit 1 was as follows:
Restart
No. Identified
No. Reviewed
Resolutions
Walkdown Deviations
3181
1543
60
Commitments
727
277
54
Engr. Work Requests
598
0
0
Engr. Evaluations
.312
213
69
Temp. Modifications
16
16
5
The appropriate system engineers were just starting their document
review when the inspectio.n period ended.
The inspectors will
continue these inspection efforts by following a representative
sample of each of the above subjects thr9ugh the system engineers and
on to final disposition.
In. addition, the inspectors will continue
to perform some additional wa l kdowns of systems as we 11 as observe
selected deficiencies that have been identified.
Within the areas inspected, no violations ~r deviatioris were identified.
5.
Maintenance Inspections. (62703)
During
the
reporting period,
the inspectors *reviewed maintenance
activities to assure compliance with.the appropriate procedures.
a.
Maintenance of Emergency Service Water Pump
On February 1, 1989, the inspectors witnessed maintenance on the
diesel driver for the emergency service water pump 1-SW-P-18. This
work was authorized by work order 635872 and performed in accordance
with maintenance procedure TMMP-C-SW-293,
11 Emergency :service Water
b.
C.
-
9
Pump Diesel Engine Exhaust Manifolds/Overspeed Govenor Trip Mechanism
Gasket Replacement".
The inspectors reviewed-the job site paperwork
and *discussed- the work with the mechanics.
In addition, the
inspectors observed maintenarice engineers at the job site to evaluate
a broken stud in the diesel exhaust manifold.
No discrepancies were
noted.
Maintenance on 4160 Volt Breaker 25C2 (Isolation Breaker for Bus 2C
and Unit 2 Station Ser~ice Transformer)
On February 4, 1989, the subject breaker failed to close during
electrical realignments to support special testing.
Failure of the
breaker to close resulted in loss of offsite power to tie bus F and
a 1 so resulted in a loss of power to two vi ta 1 * busses (iH and 2J).
The licensee inspected the suspect breaker and determined that the
mechanical
linkage for the- breaker was dirty and not working
properly~
The licensee cleaned the mechanical portion of the breaker
mechanism, _tested the breaker satisfa*ctorily, and returned the
breaker to service.
However, further licensee evaluation of the
problem concluded that additional inspection of other breakers was
warranted. The licensee is currently in the process of shipping all
safety-related breakers. to a local
refurbishment facility for
inspection and overhaul.
Information received on the first three
breakers (!TE-BBC TYPE HK) indicates that the closing mechanisms were
dirty and needed cleaning and relubrication.
The inspectors closely monitored the licensee actions to date. They
have reviewed the licensee's procedures for breaker maintenance,
inspected a breaker to understand the problems encountered, and
reviewed the refurbishment facility reports on the first three
breakers.
The inspectors consider that refurbishment of all 4160
volt safety-related breakers is warranted based on these reports and
the licensee has committed to refurbish all. safety-related breakers
prior to restart of the respective unit as part of the Confirmation
of Action Letter dated March 9, 1989.
Followup on the licensee
commitment to refurbish all safety-related 4160 volt breakers prior
to respective unit restart is identified as an Inspector Followup
Item (280, 281/89-06-05).
Gas Binding of HPSI Pumps/Surry/Units 1 and 2
In August 1988,
the licensee identified
a potential
problem
associated with gas voids located in high point piping for safety
injection flowpaths to the suction of the HPSI pumps.
Licensee
corrective action for these problems' included the installation of
high point vents in these lines to allow for proper fill and vent of
this* system.
The installation of the high point vents was
accomplished in accordance with EWR 88-440.
The EWR was accomplished
for Unit 2 as required by work order 3800074880. . The inspector
10
reviewed the completed EWR and also verifjed the installation of the
new vents fbr both Units 1 and 2.
The inspector also reviewed the
control room drawings for Unit 2 and verified that they were updated
as required.
However, during review of the. drawings for Unit l on
February 2*2, 1989, the inspector noted that the applicable*control
room drawings had not been updated to agree with actua 1 pl ant
configuration.
Furthermore, the inspector noted that the portion of
the system in which the high point vents had been installed was in
service providing a suction flowpath to an operating charging pump.
Additional licensee review in this area concluded that the techri~cal
review for Unit 1 had not been completed prior to. returning the
system to an operable status. The licensee completed the appropriate
technical review for Unit 1 o*n- February 28, 1989.
The inspector
reviewed the final technical* review for Unit 1 and confirmed that all
requirements had been completed.
The licensee also concluded during review of *this* issue that the*
administrative procedure die not provide adequate guidance to assure
that systems were not returned to service prior to completion of
- required reviews.
The licensee has instituted corrective actions on
February 28, 1989, to insure that the administrative procedure
provides for adequite guidance for completion of technic~l reviews
prior to returning systems to operation. The inspector verified that
appropriate action was initiated in the above case; however, the
inspectors were in the process of reviewing additional EWRs for
similar problems when the inspection period ended.
This issue is
therefore identified as an Unresolved Item (280/89-06-06), pending
additional inspector review of licensee requirements for r~turning to
service, after maintenance or modification, systems involving nuclear
safety of the station.
d.
Overhaul of HPSI Pumps
The inspectors reviewed work to overhaul and repair the damage that
occurred when the HPSI
pump 1-CH-P-lC was operated dry* for
approximately two minutes .. The inboard **pt.imp seal and bearing
displayed extensive damage and the pump casing was deter-mined to be
.warped.
This work was authorized by work order #76962 and invoked
maintenance procedure MMP-C-CH-089,
11Chargi ng Pump/High Head Safety
Injection Pump 11 , dated 12-14-87.
This inspection also included.the
applicable RWP (#1474) and station tag.gi"ng record (TIO #045293).
No
discrepancies ~ere noted.
Within the areas inspected,. no violations or deviations were
identified .
6.
11
Su~veillanci Inspettions (61726)
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed various surveillance
activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedures as
follows:
Test prerequisites were met.
Tests were performed in accordance with appro~ed procedures.
Test procedures appeared to perform their intended function.
Adequate coordination existed among personnel involved in the test.
Test data was properly coilected and recorded.
Inspection areas included the following:
a.
Low Head Safety Injection Pump
b.
On February 14, the ,nspectors reviewed the completed results of
periodic test 1-PT-18.1, "Low Head SI Component Test and Flushing of
Sensitized Stainless Steel Piping", performed on pump 1-SI-P-lA. The
test results were adequately documented and appeared to meet the
acceptance criteria.
No discrepancies were noted .
Motor Operated Valves
On February 20, the inspectors witnessed testing of various Unit 1
motor operated valves in accordance with the following test
procedures:
l-PT-18.lOJ, dated 8/2?/87, "Verification of Local & Remote
Valve
Position
Indications of Safety Related Valves
in
Safeguards Valve Pit Area".
l-PT-18.lOH, dated 9/29/88, "Verification of Local & Remote
Valve Position Indications of Service Water Valves in Safeguards
Area and Turbine Building".
l-PT-18.lOM, dated 11/20/87, "Verification of Local & Remote
Valve Position* Indication of RWST Chemical Addition Tank and
Containment Systems in Safeguards Area".
The above testing stroked the valves from the main control room and
verified the corrett local and control
room valve position
indication, as well as the valve position indicated on the emergency
response facility computer. In addition, an operator was stationed at
the 480 volt switchgear as an operational check of the breakers. The
' -
12
inspectors o_bS-Brved testing ih progress and discussed the test
results . with the SRO conducting the test_.
No discrepancies were
noted.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified:
. 7.
Installation and Testing of Modifications (37828)
The inspectors reviewed Design Change 88-36-3, "Control Room Envelope HVAC
Interim Modification 11 , to verify that modification activities are in
conformance with the requirements of the Technical Specifications, 10 CFR
50.59, and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III.* This design change*
- upgrades the ventilation system that provides cool air to the emergency
switchgear and control rooms during normal and post-acciderit co~dititins.
The inspection effort included a review of the approved work package
safety analysis,
10
CFR
50.59 analysis,
and
various additional
calculations pertaining to Appendix R and seismic requirements.
In
addition,
the
inspector
reviewed
the
post
modification
testing
requirements and walked down p6rtions of the modifications in the field
with craft personnel
to verify compliance with the appropriate
instruction~.
No discrepancies were noted.*
8.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Review
(92700)
The inspectors reviewed the LER's listed below to ascertain whether NRC
reporting requirements were being met and to determine appropriateness of
the corrective action(s). The .inspector's review also included followup on
implementation of corrective action and review of licensee documentation
that all required corrective actions were complete.
LERs that identify violations of regulations and that meet the criteria of
10 CFR, Part 2, Appendix C,Section V shall be identified a.s Licensee
Identified Violations (LIV) in the following closeout paragraphs.
LIVs
are considered first-time occurrence* violations which meet the .NRC
Eriforcement Policy for exemption from i*ssuance of a Notice o~Violation.
These items are identified to allow for proper evaluation~ of corrective
actions in the event that similar events occur .in the future.
(Closed) LERS 280/88-02, 06, 10, 24, and 26; 281/88-03, 07, 12, 16, and
20, Inoperable Individual Rod Position Indicators Due to Instrument Drift.
The* issue involved drift of more than one !RPI, which is contrary to
Technical Specification 3.12.E .. Immediate correcti~~ action in eac~ case
was to adjust the affected IRPis to read within the required technical
specification tolerence. Additional corrective action was to submit .a
technical specification change request to provide relief from this known
generic condition. The *inspector verified that the licensee complied with
technical specification requirements in each case, verified that the
licensee had submitted a technical specification change request, and
reviewed the change request.
These LERs are closed.
. 9.
13
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701) *
a.
(Open) IFI 280,*281/88-45-02, Weaknesses identified in the licensee's
program to identify and correct conditions adverse to quality.
The
issues* involved repeated.wetting of auxiliary feedwater pump motors_
during periods of heavy rainfall over an extended period of time, and
inadequate evaluation of the failure mechanism of a containment
isolatfon valve during repair.
After further review by the NRC
staff, the AFW wetting issue has been classified as a violation for
failure to take prompt corrective action *to preclude wetting of
safety-related ~omponents (280,281/89-06-02).
The issue associated
w1th inadequate failure mechanism evaluation will be reviewed along
with the licensee's root cause program; therefore, this IF! remains
open.
b.
(Closed) 280,281/88-51-04, Followup on Ucensee eval.uation of r,eplica
parts issue.
This issue involved inadequate licensee. action to
remove unacceptable safety-related parts from warehouse inventory in
1983. After further review by the NRC staff, the* replica" parts issue
has been_ classified as a violation for failure to take prompt
corrective action to* ensure that safety-related components are
repaired using only qualified replacement parts (280,281/89-06-03).
-This !FI is closed.
. Within the areas *inspected, two violations were identified.
10.
Exit Interview
The ~nspection scbpe and findings were summarized on March 6, 1989, with
those individuals identified by an asterisk in paragraph 1.
The following
new items were identified by the inspectors during this exit:
One violation was identified (paragra.ph 3.f(3)) for failure to provide
adequate procedure for testing of systems involving nuclear safety of the
station (280/89-06~01).
This violation meets the criteria specified in
Section V of the NRC Enforcement Policy for not issuing a Notice of
Violation.
One inspector followup item was identified (paragraph 4.a) for review of
audits and weaknesses concerning drawings a~d design change control (280,
281/89-06-04).
One inspector followup item was identified (paragraph 5.b) for followup on
the li_censee commitment to refurbish all safety-related 4160 volt breakers
prior td respective unit restart (280, 281/89-06-05).
One unresovled item was identified (paragraph 5.c) for additional
inspector review of licensee requirements for returning to service, after
maintenance or modification, systems involving nuclear safety of the
station (280/89-06-06).
14
On March 28, 1989, the following two additional items were identified to
the Station Manager:
One violation w~s identified (paragraph 9.a) for failtjre to tak~ prompt.
- corrective action on potential wetting of _safety-related components
(280,281/89-06-02).
One violation was identified (paragraph 9.b) f~r fail~re to take adequate
corrective action on purging potential unqualified parts from the site
supply system (280,281/89-06-03).
This violation closes Inspector
Followup Item 280,281/88-51-04).
The licensee. acknowledged the inspection findings. with no dissenting
comments.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the
materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this
inspection.
11.
Index of Acronyms and Initialisms
ANSI
cc
ccw
CFR
cw
DP!
DR
EMP
RA!
SNSOC
SRO .
TS
vs
.,.
-
Auxil_iary Feedwater
AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS INSTITUTE
ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURE
COMPUTER AIDED DESIGN
COMPONENT COOLING
.
COMPONENT COOLING WATER
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
CIRCULATING WATER
DELTA PRESSURE INDICATORS
DEVIATION REPORT
ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
RESIDENT ACTION ITEM
REGULATORY GUIDES
REACTOR OPERATOR
REACTOR.PROTECTION SYSTEM
RECIRCULATION SPRAY SYSTEM
RADIATION WORK PERMIT-
REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK -
SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT
SAFETY INJECTION
STATION NUCLEAR-SAFETY AND OPERATING COMMITTEE
SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR
-
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
UNRESOLVED ITEM -
VENTILATION SYSTEM