ML18152A277
| ML18152A277 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 06/01/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18152A278 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-98-04, 50-280-98-4, 50-281-98-04, 50-281-98-4, NUDOCS 9806160226 | |
| Download: ML18152A277 (19) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1998004
Text
Docket Nos.:
License Nos. :
Report Nos. :
Licensee:
Facility:
Location:
Dates:
Inspectors:
Approved by:
.9806160226 980601
ADOCK 05000280
G
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
50-280, 50-281
50-280/98-04. 50-281/98-04
Virginia Electric and Power Company CVEPCO)
Surry Power Station, Units 1 & 2
5850 Hog Island Road
Surry, VA
23883
March 22 - May 2. 1998
R. Musser, Senior Resident Inspector
K. Poertner, Resident Inspector
R. Haag, Chief. Reactor Projects Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure 2
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Surry Power Station. Units 1 & 2
NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-280/98-04. 50-281/98-04
This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations. engineer-
ing, maintenance. and plant support.
The report covers a six-week period of
resident inspection.
Operations
Licensee actions with respect to a residual heat removal system through-
wall flaw demonstrated a good safety perspective and conservative
decision making.
Technical Specification requirements concerning decay
heat removal loops were met.
The decision to remove the flaw intact to
try to determine the root cause was appropriate (Section 01.2).
A violation was identified concerning an inadequate operating procedure
revision which fafled to properly adjust the steam generator power
operated relief valve setpoints. The failure to identify the procedure
inadequacy prior to and while performing the procedure demonstrated a
lack of attention to detail oh the part of the operator. other members
of the operating crew involved with the setpoint change, and the
procedure writers (Section 01.3).
Unit 1 startup activities were accomplished in accordance with approved
procedures in a thorough and controlled manner.
The operating crew
exhibited good communications during the startup activities and
distractions in the control room were minimized (Section 01.4).
The licensee's actions related to spent fuel storage pool issues were in
accordance with commitments made to the NRC.
The inspectors verified
that a change to the pool high temperature alarm and operational
procedural enhancements have been made.
The one remaining commitment.*
providing emergency power to the spent fuel pool cooling pumps. was
scheduled for completion by the end of February 1999 (Section 01.5).
The licensee performed an inadequate tagout on the bearing cooling water
system which demonstrated a lack of sensitivity to the tagout process.
Based on this event and previous problems the inspectors are concerned
with the declining performance by some operations department personnel
in regards to the tagout process and configuration control (Section
01.6).
The Unit 1 manual Auxiliary Feedwater System isolation valves inside
containment were properly aligned for normal operation and were properly
identified (Section 02.1).
Maintenance
A non-cited violation was identified concerning maintenance personnel
failing to verify that they were working on the proper component before
starting preventive maintenance activities.
As a result. work to be
performed on the B charging pump normal suction valve was performed on
2
the pump's normal discharge valve.
Identification and corrective
actions for this matter were prompt and thorough (Section Ml.1).
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's plans for the replacement of the
Unit 1 pressurizer manway access cover and found them to be adequate.
Although a steam leak had been present, the inspectors verified that the
pressurizer clad manway seating surface was fully intact (Section Ml.2).
Emergency Diesel Generator Number 3 alarm relay replacement activities
were accomplished in accordance with the work package. i nstructi ans.
The
electricians performing the work were knowledgeable of how to perform
the activities. The tagout for the work was acceptable (Section Ml.3).
Surveillance activities for a containment radiation monitor were
performed in accordance with procedure requirements and the
instrumentation and control technicians performing the procedure were
knowledgeable of the procedure requirements (Section Ml.4).
A non-cited violation was identified for application of a higher than
specified torque for the body to bonnet fasteners on two safety
injection check valves.
An incorrect pressure/torque conversion chart
for the torquing device was used to apply an approximate torque valve of
4500 foot-pounds in lieu of the specified 2600 foot-pounds of torque
(Section Ml. 5).
Engineering
Safety Evaluation 98-0040 and Engineering Transmittal 98-0058 adequately
justified a temporary modification to plug a leaking reactor coolant
pump thermowell (Section El.l).
Plant Support
Health physics practices were observed to be proper (Section Rl).
Security and material condition of the protected area perimeter barrier
were acceptable (Section Sl) .
Report Details
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 commenced the reporting period in a shutdown condition for a
maintenance outage.
The unit was returned to service on March 31. 1998. and
operated at power for the remainder of the reporting period.
Unit 2 operated at power the entire reporting period.
I. Operations
01
Conduct of Operations
01.1 General Comments (71707. 40500)
The inspectors conducted frequent control room tours to verify proper
staffing, operator attentiveness. and adherence to approved procedures.
The inspectors attended daily plant status meetings to maintain
awareness of overall facility operations and reviewed operator logs to
verify operational safety and compliance with Technical Specifications
CTSs).
Instrumentation and safety system lineups .were periodically
reviewed from control room indications to assess operability. Frequent
plant tours were conducted to observe equipment status and housekeeping .
Deviation Reports (DRs) were reviewed to assure that potential safety *
concerns were properly reported and resolved.
The inspectors found that
daily operations were generally conducted in accordance with regulatory
requirements and plant procedures.
01.2 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System Leakage
a.
Inspection Scope (71707)
The inspectors reviewed l{censee actions associated with a through-wall
leak in the Unit 1 RHR system discharge piping.
b.
Observations and Findings
On March 22. 1998. with Unit 1 in intermediate shutdown and with the RHR
system in service, the licensee identified a through-wall leak in the
common RHR discharge piping upstream of RHR flow element 1-RH-FE-1605.
The leak was identified due to boron buildup on the piping.
When the
boron was removed to inspect the piping, slight weepage was identified
from a small 1/32 inch pit in the pipe surface.
The licensee declared
the RHR system inoperable based on the through-wall leakage.
requires that a minimum of two non-isolated loops consisting of any
combination of reactor coolant loops or RHR loops be operable with
Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature less than 350°F.
At the time
of discovery, the RCS loops were operable.
With the RHR system
inoperable. the licensee was unable to continue with the plant cooldown
and depressurization for the scheduled maintenance outage.
2
The inspectors observed the RHR system leakage.
The leakage was
characterized by a slight localized buildup of moisture on the piping
surface following cleaning of the pipe surface.
The licensee performed
ultrasonic testing on the piping adjacent to the through-wall leak and
did not identify any wall thinning or flaw.
Based on the Non-
Destructive Examination (NOE) performed. the licensee requested a one-
time schedule relief from the American Society of Mechanical Engineers
(ASME) code for Section XI pressure boundary leakage corrective action
and flaw evaluation requirements.
The relief would allow the RHR system
to be considered operable with the defect in the discharge piping and
the plant could continue with the shutdown to cold shutdown conditions.
In the relief request the licensee agreed to repair the piping prior to
returning Unit 1 to service. The NRC approved the relief request and
the RHR system was declared operable at 5:00 p.m .. on March 23. 1998.
The RCS was depressurized and pressurizer level was maintained at
approximately 22 percent to support the outage activities. Following
depressurization of the RCS. the RHR system weepage stopped.
Following completion of the Unit 1 outage activities. the licensee
removed the RHR system from service to repair the RHR piping.
The
licensee removed the flawed area using a two-inch hole saw and installed
a socolet and plug.
The licensee also inspected the inside of the RHR
piping by removing an adjacent RHR system flow element.
No
discrepancies were noted during the inspections.
The inspectors
monitored repair activities and discussed NOE requirements with
cognizant licensee personnel.
The inspectors determined that the NOE
performed met ASME Code requirements.
RHR system repairs were completed
on March 29. 1998.
The flaw was removed intact from the RHR piping.
The licensee performed a preliminary visual evaluation of the flaw and
determined that a detailed metallurgical analysis was required to
determine the failure mechanism.
The licensee had not completed the
evaluation as of the end of the inspection period.
Review of the
licensee's failure analysis is identified as Inspection Followup Item
50-280/98004-01.
c.
Conclusions
Licensee actions with respect to a RHR system through-wall flaw
demonstrated a good safety perspective and conservative decision making.
TS requirements concerning decay heat removal loops were met.
The
decision to remove the flaw intact to try to determine the root cause
was appropriate.
01.3 Steam Gerierator (SG) Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Setpoint
Discrepancy
a.
Inspection Scope (71707)
The inspectors reviewed SG PORV setpoint requirements prior to RHR
system maintenance activities .
3
b.
Observations and Findings
C.
On March 28. 1998, the inspectors observed control room activities
during the initial mode change above 200°F to commence repair of a
pinhole leak in the Unit 1 RHR system.
During review of controlling
procedure 1-GOP-1.2. "Unit Startup, RCS Heatup from 195 to 345." the
inspectors observed a discrepancy between Step 5.3.3 and an implementing
substep 5.3.3.c. Step 5.3.3 required that the SG PORV controllers be
verified or adjusted to 50 psig prior to exceeding 212°F in accordance
with substeps a through g.
However. substep 5.3.3.c specified a
setpoint of 1035 psig.
The licensee was notified of the discrepancy and
the SG PORV setpoint controllers were subsequently adjusted from 1035
psig to 50 psig prior to exceeding 212°F.
The PORV setpoint was reduced
to decrease the required SG steam pressure that would be needed to
support RCS decay heat removal.
With a setpoint of 50 psig, the RCS
heatup would be much less than required for a SG PORV setpoint of 1035
psig.
The SG PORVs were intended as a backup to the condenser dump
valves for SG steam removal.
The inspectors discussed the problem with cognizant personnel.
Licensee
management had determined that additional controls (reduction of SG PORV
setpoint to 50 psig) would be prudent while the unit was in an unusual
configuration for an extended period during the RHR work.
On March 26.
- a One-Time-Only (OTO) Procedure Action Request (PAR) to 1-GOP-1.2 was
issued to set the SG PORV controllers at 50 psig. Although Step 5.3.3
was revised, the procedure writer and reviewers failed to identify that
substep 5.3.3.c also needed revision.
During the pre-job brief the
change to the SG PORV setpoint controllers was not discussed.
The
operator performing Step 5.3.3 and substep 5.3.3.c failed to detect the
discrepancy and signed Step 5.3.3 as being complete after having
verified that the SG PORV controllers were set at 1035.
The inspectors
were concerned that several members of the plant staff demonstrated a
lack of attention to detail which resulted in controls identified for a
special evolution involving an unusual plant configuration not being
adequately implemented into procedures.
In addition. the operator
performing the step had an opportunity to identify the discrepancy
between step 5.3.3 and substep 5.3.3.c but failed to recognize this
error.
TS 6.4.A.1 requires that detailed written procedures and appropriate
instructions be provided for normal startup. operation. and shutdown of
a unit and all systems and components involving nuclear safety of the
station. The failure to revise substep 5.3.3.c of procedure 1-GOP-1.2
during implementation of a OTO PAR to change the SG PORV setpoint to 50
psig is identified as Violation 50-280/98004-02
Conclusions
A violation was identified concerning an inadequate operating procedure
revision which failed to properly adjust the steam generator power
operated relief valve setpoints. The failure to identify the procedure
inadequacy prior to and while performing the procedure demonstrated a
4
lack of attention to detail on the part of the operator. other members
of the operating crew involved with the setpoint change, and the
procedure writers.
01.4 Unit 1 Restart Activities
a.
Inspection Scope (71707)
The inspectors observed portions of the Unit 1 restart from a
maintenance outage.
b.
Observations and Findings
C.
The inspectors observed rod withdrawal to criticality and portions of
the initial power increase to place the turbine generator on line.
Control room activities were conducted in a thorough and controlled
manner.
Procedures were in use and followed during startup activities.
The operating crew exhibited good communications during the startup and
distractions in the control room area were minimized.
The unit was
returned to service on March 31, 1998.
Conclusions
Unit 1 startup activities were accomplished in accordance with approved
procedures in a thorough and controlled manner.
The operating crew
exhibited good communications during the startup activities and
distractions in the control room were minimized.
01.5 Review of Spent Fuel Storage Pool Issues
a.
Inspection Scope (71707)
b.
The inspectors performed a review of the status of the licensee's
actions related to spent fuel storage pool issues.
Observations and Findings*
In 1996. the NRC identified a number of issues related to the
reliability of spent fuel pool decay heat removal system and the
maintenance of an adequate spent fuel coolant inventory in the spent
fuel pool. A review was conducted to identify plant-specific and
generic areas for regulatory analyses.
One issue was identified at
Surry related to the absence of an on-site power supply for systems,
capable of spent *fuel pool cooling. This matter was brought to the
attention of the licensee in a letter from the NRC dated September 19.
1996. Subsequent responses from the licensee. dated November 21. 1996.
November 27. 1996, and March 28. 1997. discussed the intended actions
the licensee planned to perform to resolve this matter. These actions
included lowering the spent fuel pool high temperature alarm from 140°F
to ll5°F, implementing additional procedural controls that provide
further actions to be taken to restore cooling to the spent fuel pool in
5
the event of a loss of offsite power. and to provide emergency power
feeds to the spent fuel pool cooling pumps by the end of 1999.
The inspectors reviewed these actions.
The licensee lowered the spent
fuel pool high temperature alarm from 140°F to ll5°F. This was
reflected in the annunciator response procedure, O-VSP-A4. "Spent Fuel
Pit Hi Temp." Revision 2.
However. drawing 11448-ESK-14A6. sheet 13 had
not been updated to reflect this change and still reflected the old
setpoint of 140°F. This matter was discussed with the licensee who
submitted a deviation report to document and track the matter to
resolution (DR S-98-1159).
In addition, the inspector reviewed
procedures (1-AP:10.07. "Loss of Unit 1 Power." and O-AP-22.02. "Loss of
Spent Fuel Pit Level") and determined that adequate procedural guidance
was in place to provide further actions to operators to restore cooling
to the spent fuel pool in the event of a loss of offsite power.
This
included guidance to perform a feed and bleed operation of the pool and
instructions on evaluating alternate power sources to the spent fuel
pool cooling pumps.
Specific procedures do not exist on providing
alternate power sources to the spent fuel pool cooling pumps.
Each
individual scenario would have to be evaluated and a temporary power
routing would have to be performed based on the availability of power.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's schedule to implement the
modification to provide emergency power feeds to the spent fuel pool
cooling pumps.
Currently, Design Change 97-004. is scheduled for
completion by the end of February 1999. This will provide the committed
emergency power feed to the spent fuel pool cooling pumps prior to the
end of 1999.
c.
Cone l usi ans
The licensee's actions related to spent fuel storage pool issues were in
accordance with commitments made to the NRC.
The inspectors verified
that a change to the pool high temperature alarm and operational
procedural enhancements have been made.
The one remaining commitment.
providing emergency power to the spent fuel pool cooling pumps. was
scheduled for completion by the end of February 1999.
01.6 Inadequate Tagout of the Unit 2 C Bearing Cooling Heat Exchanger
a.
Inspection Scope (71707)
b.
The inspectors reviewed the circumstances surrounding the tagout of the
Unit 2 C bearing cooling heat exchanger.
Observations and Findings
On April 22. 1998. plant operations tagged out the Unit 2 C bearing
cooling heat exchanger to support preplanned corrective maintenance.
This work involved the replacement of two heat exchanger tubes and
sacrificial anode plugs.
The bearing cooling water system is a non-
safety related closed loop cooling water system located in the turbine
6
building used to cool secondary plant loads.
When maintenance personnel
initiated the removal of the first tube. water began streaming from the
tube sheet into the service water plenum of the heat exchanger and onto
the turbine building floor. Maintenance personnel initiated the
securing of the heat exchanger by closing the heat exchanger exterior
access cover doors and informed the control room of the situation.
Operators were dispatched to assist maintenance personnel.
Approximately three minutes after being informed of the leak. operations
received an alarm indicating that the bearing cooling head tank had a
low level condition.
Initial measures to restore bearing cooling water
level in the head tank were unsuccessful. and fire water had to be
valved in to return water level to its normal operating band.
Unit
operation was unaffected by this transient on the bearing cooling water
system.
Following restoration of the bearing cooling system to a normal status.
it became apparent that the tagout for the intended maintenance work had
been inadequate. Specifically, the bearing cooling water side of the
heat exchanger had not been isolated. and when the mechanic removed the
heat exchanger tube, a direct leakage path existed through the tube
sheet.
The maintenance request for a tagout clearly stated that heat
exchanger tubes would be replaced as part of the intended maintenance.
The operators preparing and reviewing the tagout did not identify that
the bearing cooling side of the heat exchanger required isolation and
approved and placed the tagout without proper isolation. Because this
event occurred on a non-safety related secondary system, this matter
does not constitute a violation of NRC requirements.
However, the same
process is used when tagging safety related equipment. Since this event
occurred on a relatively low pressure and temperature system, neither
personnel nor equipment sustained any damage.
This event demonstrates a
clear lack of sensitivity to the tagout process and a continued problem
with configuration control as noted in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-
280, 281/98099.
Based on this event and previous problems the*
inspectors are concerned with the declining performance by some
operations department personnel in regards to the tagout process and
configuration control.
Further followup related to this issue revealed that the cross-tie
valve, which is used to provide make up to the bearing cooling head tank
from the opposite unit. was in a throttled position in lieu of being
fully open.
Because of this condition, it was necessary for operations
to utilize the fire water system to restore water level to the bearing
cooling head tank.
No reason has been determined for the valve being in
the throttled position.
c.
Conclusions
The licensee performed an inadequate tagout on the bearing cooling water
system which demonstrated a lack of sensitivity to the tagout process.
Based on this event and previous problems the inspectors are concerned
with the declining performance by some operations department personnel
in regards to the tagout process and configuration control.
7
02
Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
02.1 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW)
a.
Inspection Scope (71707)
The inspectors walked down portions of the Unit 1 AFW system inside
containment.
b.
Observations and Findings
The inspectors verified that the Unit 1 manual AFW isolation valves
inside containment were properly aligned.
The valves were locked open
as required by the system alignment procedure and properly identified.
No discrepancies were identified.
c . Cone 1 us i ons
The Unit 1 manual Auxiliary Feedwater System isolation valves inside
cont a i n*ment were proper 1 y aligned for normal operation and were properly
identified.
08
Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92901)
08.1
(Closed) VIO 50-280. 281/96011-01: Spent fuel pit cooling valve out of
position. This violation involved the failure to reposition a valve in
the spent fuel pool cooling system following a revision to the valve
alignment procedure. Corrective actions included review of other valve
alignment procedure changes to ensure proper alignment of systems and
implementation of a revision to procedure VPAP 0502, "Procedure Process
Control," to require that the Supervisor-Shift Operations be notified of
any valve lineup changes.
The inspectors reviewed the corrective
actions and verified that VPAP 0502 had been revised to require
notification of operations.
08.2 (Closed) VIO 50-280. 281/96012-01: Inadequate Alternate Alternating
Current (AAC) diesel generator return to service procedure.
This
violation involved the failure to return the AAC diesel generator output
breaker control switch to the auto position following maintenance
activities due to a deficient procedure.
Corrective actions included
revising procedure O-MOP-AAC-002. "Return to Service of the AAC Diesel
Generator.* to require that the control switch be returned to the auto
after trip position and revising operator logs to verify switch
positions on a daily basis. The inspectors verified that the above
corrective actions had been implemented .
8
II. Maintenance
Ml
Conduct of Maintenance
Ml.1 Maintenance Activity Performed on Incorrect Component
a.
Inspection Scope (62707)
The inspectors reviewed an error made by the maintenance department
during the performance of a preventive maintenance activity.
b.
Observations and Findings
On April 28, the Unit 1 B charging pump was removed from service to
perform pre-planned maintenance activities.
One of the scheduled tasks
was the performance of Preventive Maintenance (PM) activities on the
motor operator for the pump's normal suction valve, 1-CH-MOV-1269A.
This work was to be done in accordance with procedure O-MPM-0300-01,
"Limitorque Operator Type SB, SBD, SMB, and HBC Lubrication and
Inspection," Revision 4-P2, and with work order 00385581-01.
The actual
work to be performed included the 18 month lubrication and inspection of
the operator.
During this activity, the valve was to be manually
cycled.
Valve 1-CH-MOV-1269A was tagged out of service, and work order 00385581-01 was released by operations to the maintenance department for
work to commence.
At approximately 9:45 a.m., control room operators
noted that the control room indication for valve 1-CH-MOV-1286B (the
normal discharge valve for the B charging pump) indicated an
intermediate position. After holding discussions with maintenance
personnel and investigating the matter at the B charging pump cubicle,
the licensee determined that the PM activity intended to be performed on
valve 1-CH-MOV-1269A had in fact been performed on 1-CH-MOV-1286B.
No
maintenance activities were planned on valve 1-CH-MOV-1286B nor was it
tagged out.
No personnel or equipment sustained any injury or damage.
Since the B charging pump had been removed from service for maintenance
activities, the error in working on the discharge valve in lieu of the
suction valve did not affect the operability status of the B charging
pump.
Followup of the activity by the licensee indicated that the mechanic
assigned to perform the PM activity had been adequately briefed prior to
beginning the task.
The mechanic, however, did not adequately perform
the pre-maintenance verification to ensure the correct component was
identified prior to the commencement of work as required by procedure
O-MPM-0300-01.
This failure to follow procedure resulted in the
performance of the PM activity on the wrong component.
The inspectors reviewed the circumstances involving the identification
and corrective actions associated with this matter.
The issue was
promptly identified by an operator performing a walkdown of the control
panel.
Following identification, operations and maintenance quickly
interfaced to determine the cause of the intermediate indication on
valve 1-CH-MOV-1286B.
This identification demonstrated good attention
9
to detail on the part of operations associated with this maintenance
activity. The inspectors determined that the corrective actions for
this matter were prompt and comprehensive.
These corrective actions
included:
1) Initiating a deviation report to document and track the
issue, 2) Promptly identifying the cause of the issue as failure to
self-check and issuing the appropriate personnel action to ensure
managements expectations are understood, 3) A plan was developed to
stress managements expectations to the maintenance department with
regards to self-checking and verbatim compliance, and 4) A plan was
initiated to have all mechanical maintenance department personnel
utilize the licensee's self-checking simulator to reinforce self-
checking techniques.
The failure to follow procedure O-MPM-0300-01 and work order 00385581-01
while performing preventive maintenance on valve 1-CH-MOV-1269A is a
violation of technical specification 6.4.A.7 and 6.4.D. This non-
repetitive. licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated
as a Non-cited Violation (NCV) consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the
NRC Enforcement Policy. This matter is identified as NCV 280/98004-03.
c.
Conclusions
A non-cited violation was identified concerning maintenance personnel
failing to verify that they were working on the proper component before
starting preventive maintenance activities.
As a result, work to be
performed on the B charging pump normal suction valve was performed on
the pump's normal discharge valve.
Identification and corrective
actions for this matter were prompt and thorough.
Ml.2 Unit 1 Pressurizer Manway Inspection
.a.
Inspection Scope (62707)
The inspectors examined the Unit 1 upper pressurizer manway opening and
the licensee's effort to repair a previously identified leak in this
opening.
b.
Observations and Findings
Following the restart of Unit 1 from the spring 1997 refueling outage,
the licensee identified that the upper pressurizer manway was leaking.
As a part of the spring 1998 Unit 1 maintenance outage, the licensee
intended to replace the manway access cover and its associated gasket in
order to stop the pressurizer leak.
The inspectors reviewed the
licensee's plans to replace the installed manway cover with a primary
manway access cover removed from a previously installed steam generator.
These steam generators are stored on site in a specially constructed
mausoleum.
The inspectors reviewed Westinghouse technical manual 38-
W893-00033, which stated that the pressurizer access cover is identical
to and interchangeable with the steam generator primary manway access
cover.
The inspectors also verified, by visually inspecting and
10
comparing the parts to a technical manual drawing, that the gasket and
spacer being installed with the replacement manway access cover were the
appropriate parts.
The inspectors also visually inspected the pressurizer manway opening to
ensure its condition was adequate to support continued operation.
The
clad seating surfaces of the manway opening were fully intact. Some
minor cutting of the non-clad surfaces was seen. but because of the
location of the flaws. the sealing and seating of the manway would be
unaffected. After the unit was returned to normal operating pressure,
the licensee determined that the leak had been corrected~
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's plans for the replacement of the
Unit 1 pressurizer manway access cover and found them to be adequate.
Although a steam leak had been present. the inspectors verified that the
pressurizer clad manway seating surface was fully intact.
Ml.3 Emergency Diesel Generator (EOG) Maintenance
a.
Inspection Scope (62707)
The inspectors observed portions of the work activities associated with
replacement of an EOG alarm relay.
b.
Observations and Findings
On April 24. 1998, the inspectors observed portions of the work
activities associated with Work Order (WO) 00388023. "Repair/Replace NVR
Relay." The work order was initiated to replace a failed relay in the
number 3 EOG remote alarm panel.
The relay failure resulted in a
continuous alarm condition in the control room and required increased
operator tours of the number 3 EOG room.
The work activity was
accomplished using procedure O-ECM-1806-01, "Protective Relay and
Associated Control Circuit Replacement.* Revision 5. and Engineering
Transmittal S98-074. "Mounting Details for NVR Relay in EOG Remote Alarm
Panel Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2." The work activities observed
were accomplished in accordance with the work package instructions and
the electricians performing the work activity were knowledgeable of the
how to perform the activities. The inspectors also reviewed the
associated tagging record and found it adequate.
c.
Conclusions
EOG number 3 alarm relay replacement activities were accomplished in
accordance with the work package instructions. The electricians
performing the work were knowledgeable of how to perform the activities.
The tagout for the work was adequate.
11
Ml.4 Containment Radiation Monitor Testing
a . Inspection Scope ( 61726)
The inspectors observed portions of the performance of procedure O-PT-
26.6V. "Victoreen Radiation Monitoring Equipment Background. Heat Trace
Flow Fault Checks and Filter Replacement." Revision 7.
b.
Observations and Findings
The inspectors observed surveillance activities associated with Unit 1
containment radiation monitor RM-159.
The inspectors observed
activities locally at the detector and in the control room.
The
surveillance was conducted in accordance with procedure O-PT-26.6V and
the instrumentation and control technicians performing the surveillance
activity were knowledgeable of the procedure requirements.
c.
Conclusions
Surveillance activities for a containment radiation monitor were
performed in accordance with procedure requirements and the
instrumentation and control technicians performing the procedure were
knowledgeable of the procedure requirements.
Ml.5
Improper Torque Applied to Safety Injection Check Valves
a.
Inspection Scope ( 62707)
The inspectors reviewed the application of improper torque values to
safety injection check valves 1-SI-130 and l-SI-145.
b.
Observations and Findings
During the Unit 1 maintenance outage conducted in late March. the
licensee performed maintenance on the lC safety injection accumulator
discharge check valve. l-SI-145. to correct a longstanding back-leakage
condition. This maintenance. which involved internal repairs to the
valve. was to be performed in accordance with work order 00365452-01 and
procedure O-MCM-0417-25. "Darling Swing Check Valve Inspection and
Overhaul Model S 350W SC," Revision 6.
Following the completion of the
maintenance activity, the maintenance department determined that a
possibility existed that the valve bonnet hold down fasteners (studs and
nuts) had been tightened to an excessive torque.
Based on this, the
fasteners were removed with the breakaway torque being measured during
removal. which in turn confirmed the over-torque condition.
The
fasteners were removed. replaced with new studs and nuts, and tightened
to the correct torque.
During the same maintenance outage, an inspection of valve 1-SI-130, the
18 safety injection accumulator outlet to the B cold leg check valve.
revealed a body to bonnet leak.
The licensee performed an inspection of
a fastener in the vicinity of the leakage to determine if any bolt
12
wastage had occurred. This inspection revealed that the leakage had
caused some bolt wastage and a decision was made to replace all of the
valve bonnet hold down fasteners. Maintenance personnel replaced all of
the hold down fasteners in accordance with work order 00386551-01 and
procedure O-MCM-1001-01. "Stud Replacement." revision 0.
Based on the
over torque condition discovered on 1-SI-145. the licensee questioned
the possibility of the hold down fasteners on 1-SI-130 being tightened
to an excessive torque.
The fasteners on 1-SI-130 were removed and
their breakaway torque also revealed an over torque condition.
The
fasteners were removed, replaced with new studs and nuts. and tightened
to the correct torque.
The licensee's investigation iDto this matter revealed that the cause of
the over torque condition was the use of an incorrect pressure/torque
conversion chart for the torque head that was used to tighten the
fasteners.
This resulted in the fasteners being tightened to a torque
of approximately 4500 foot-pounds in lieu of the procedurally specified
value of approximately 2600 foot-pounds.
This condition was applicable
to both the 1-SI-130 and 1-SI-145 valves.
To correct this matter. the licensee:
1) Installed new fasteners
tightened to the correct torque, 2) Initiated two deviation reports to
document the occurrence. 3) Pressure/torque conversion charts have been
attached to each torque head. and 4) Craft personnel were briefed on
this matter and informed of the requirement to use only the charts
attached to the torque head.
During the inspectors review of the
matter. no documentation could be located which described the magnitude
of the over torque condition or the acceptability of the threads in the
valve body.
Component engineering personnel informed the inspectors
that a sample of the threads in the 1-SI-145 valve body had been.
inspected and found acceptable.
During the removal and installation
process. the fasteners on 1-SI-130 and l-SI-145 were noted to turn in
and out freely. Additionally, an informal calculation was done to
demonstrate the acceptable affects of the over torque on the valve body.
Based on the inspectors questions. the licensee stated that a more
formal evaluation and documentation of these over torque conditions
would be performed.
The application of the incorrect torque to 1-SI-130 and 1-SI-145 is a
violation of technical specification 6.4.A.7 and 6.4.D.
This non-
repetitive. licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated
as a Non-cited Violation (NCV) consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the
NRC Enforcement Policy. This matter is identified as NCV 280/98004-04.
c.
Conclusions
A non-cited violation was identified for application of a higher than
specified torque for the body to bonnet fasteners on two safety
injection check valves.
An incorrect pressur~/torque conversion chart
for the torquing device was used to apply an approximate torque valve of
4500 foot-pounds in lieu of the specified 2600 foot-pounds of torque.
13
II I. Engineering
El
Conduct of Engineering
El.1 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Thermowell Temporary Modification (TM)
a.
Inspection Scope (37551)
The inspectors reviewed Temporary Modification Sl-98-07, "1-RC~P-18
Lower Bearing Thermowell Plug."
b. Observations and Findings
During the Unit 1 maintenance outage water was found in the B RCP radial
bearing Resistance Temperature Detector (RTD) thermowell. Analysis
determined that the leakage was primary coolant.
The thermowell is 47
inches long and is part of the RCS pressure boundary.
Based on the fact
that replacement of the thermowell would require pump removal and
disassembly, the licensee decided to remove the RTD and plug the
thermowell.
The licensee plans to repair the leaking thermowell at the
next scheduled refueling outage.
The inspectors reviewed TM Sl-98-07, associated Safety Evaluation 98-
0040, and Engineering Transmittal 98-0058, "1-RC-P-lB Pump Bearing RTD
Thermowell Repair." that provided the instructions to plug and seal the
thermowell.
The inspectors determined that the TM. Safety Evaluation
and Engineering Transmittal adequately justified implementation of the
TM to remove the RTD and plug the B RCP radial bearing RTD thermowell.
c.
Conclusions
Safety Evaluation 98-0040 and Engineering Transmittal 98-0058 adequately
justified a temporary modification to plug a leaking reactor coolant
pump thermowell.
EB
Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92903)
EB.1
(Open) Violation 50-281/96001-01: Failure to revise steam flow
calorimetric computer program.
The inspectors determined that all the
corrective actions identified have not been completed.
The licensee has
two Commitment Tracking System (CTS) items left to complete prior to
closure of the concerns identified in the violation.
The CTS items
involved resolution of procedural and engineering discrepancies.
The
present scheduled completion date documented in the CTS tracking system
is May 31, 1999.
The inspectors discussed the remaining open CTS items
with licensee personnel.
The open items were considered low priority
items by the licensee.
The inspectors expressed concern that the
corrective actions had not been completed.
The inspectors determined
that the items are being reviewed and engineering is providing some
attention to the remaining items. This item will remain open pending
additional review of the licensee's actions .and their progress to
complete the remaining items.
14
IV. Plant Support
Rl
Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls (71750)
On numerous occasions during the inspection period. the inspectors
reviewed Radiation Protection (RP) practices including radiation control
area entry and exit. survey results. and radiological area material
conditions.
No discrepancies were noted. and the inspectors determined
that RP practices were proper.
Sl
Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities (71750)
On numerous occasions during the inspection period. the inspectors
performed walkdowns of the protected area perimeter to assess security
and general barrier conditions.
No deficiencies were noted. and the
inspectors concluded that security posts were properly manned and that
the perimeter barrier's material condition was properly maintained.
V. Management Meetings
Xl
Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors presented the inspection results t6 members of licensee
management at the conclusion of the inspection on May 13. 1998.
The
licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during
the inspection should be considered proprietary.
No proprietary
information was identified.
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
M. Adams. Superintendent. Engineering
R. Allen. Superintendent. Maintenance
R. Blount. Manager. Nuclear Safety & Licensing
D. Christian. Site Vice President
M. Crist. Superintendent. Operations
E. Collins, Director. Nuclear Oversight
B. Shriver. Manager. Operations & Maintenance
T. Sowers. Superintendent. Training
B. Stanley, Supervisor, Licensing
W. Thorton. Superintendent. Radiological Protection
15
IP 37551:
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
Onsite Engineering
IP 40500:
Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and
Preventing Problems
IP 61726:
IP 62707:
IP 71707:
IP 71750:
IP 92901:
IP 92903:
Surveillance Observation
Maintenance Observation
Plant Operations
Plant Support Activities
Followup - Plant Operations
Followup - Engineering
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
50-280/98004-01
50-280/98004-02
50-280/98004-03 *
50-280/98004-04
Closed
50-280/98004-03
50-280/98004-04
50-280, 281/96011-01
IFI
Review of the licensee's RHR
system failure analysis
(Section 01.2).
Inadequate revision to
procedure l-GOP-1.2 (Section
01. 3).
Failure to follow procedures
by performing preventive
maintenance work on the wrong
B charging pump valve
(Section Ml. l).
Improper Torque Applied to
Safety Injection Check Valves
(Section Ml.5)
Failure to follow procedures
by performing preventive
maintenance work on the wrong
B charging pump valve
(Section Ml. l).
Improper Torque Applied to
Safety Injection Check Valves
(Section Ml.5)
Spent fuel pit cooling valve
out of position
( Sect i on 08 . 1) .
50-280, 281/96012-01
Discussed
50-281/96001-01
16
Inadequate ACC diesel
generator return to service
- procedure (Section 08.2).
Failure to revise steam flow
calorimetric computer program
(Section E8 .1).