ML18152A265
| ML18152A265 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 09/28/1995 |
| From: | Belisle G, Branch M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18152A266 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-95-16, 50-281-95-16, NUDOCS 9510100215 | |
| Download: ML18152A265 (17) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1995016
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199
50-280/95-16 and 50-281/95-16
Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Innsbrook Technical Center
5000 Dominion Boulevard
Glen Allen, VA
23060
Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281
License Nos.:
Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted:
August 6 through September 2, 1995
Lead Inspector:
Inspector
Other Inspectors:
D. M. Kern, Resident Inspector
W. K. ~o~rtn~, Res\\9ent Inspector
f;rc1 L5 &7:;/c,,;-
Approved by:
G. ..\\. Be 1 is 1 e, <s ti on Chief
Reactor Projects Section 2A
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope:
D
This routine resident inspection was conducted on site in the areas of plant
status, operational safety verification, maintenance and surveillance
inspections, on-site engineering review, plant support, and action on previous
inspection items.
Inspections of backshift and weekend activities were
conducted.
Results:
Plant Operations
In mid-August, Hurricane Felix approached the North Carolina and.Virginia
coastlines.
An initiative to review industry hurricane response programs
resulted in several improvements to the Virginia Power Hurricane Response
Plan.
Licensee preparations for the potential on-site hurricane arrival were,
9510100215 950928
ADOCK 05000280
G
2
good.
Station management's close control over maintenance activities
demonstrated a strong safety perspective (paragraph 3.1).
Unit I control room annunciator panels A-E were inoperable from August 22-25
due to failed power supplies. This event was similar to a July 1995 problem
with the Unit I annunciator system. Operators implemented appropriate
compensatory measures.
Root cause evaluation remained in progress at the
close of this report period (paragraph 3.2).
Licensee actions associated with restoring redundant pressurizer heater
capacity powered from separate emergency buses were appropriate and
demonstrated a proper safety perspective (paragraph 3.3).
A deficiency report review identified a negative trend in operator performance
associated with human error and inattention to detail (paragraph 3.4).
Maintenance
Maintenance performed to support the Unit 2 core uprate was generally
performed in a quality manner (paragraph 4.2).
Test equipment unavailability for two safety-related maintenance activities
prolonged the period during which the safety-related equipment was either
unavailable or degraded.
This was considered a weakness in the maintenance
program (paragraph 4.3).
Increased online maintenance was noted prior to the Unit I shutdown for
refueling (paragraph 4.4).
Engineering
Marine fouling repeatedly degraded Component Cooling (CC) Heat Exchanger (HX)
and emergency service water pump performance during the summer months.
Component performance trending was beneficial, but was not fully effective in
maintaining CC HX availability. A recent bromine injection modification was a
positive action to improve CC HX performance (paragraph 5.1).
Management's decision to test emergency service water pump IA promptly
following indicated flow degradation on emergency service water pump IC
demonstrated an appropriate concern for common mode failure (paragraph 5.2).
Plant Support
Scaffolding erection for the upcoming Unit I outage was well managed
(paragraph 6).
Security personnel actions did not fully address the degraded conditions of a
vital area/fire barrier/pressure boundary door (paragraph 6).
REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- W.
H.
- R.
- D.
J.
D.
- B.
R.
B.
- D.
C.
- J.
- S.
R.
- B.
- K .
- E.
T.
- B.
- J.
- N.
Benthall, Supervisor, Licensing
Blake, Jr., Superintendent of Nuclear Site Services
Blount, Superintendent of Maintenance
Christian, Station Manager
Costello, Station Coordinator, Emergency Preparedness
Erickson, Superintendent of Radiation Protection
Garber, Licensing
Garner, Outage and Planning
Hayes, Supervisor, Quality Assurance
Hayes, Supervisor of Administrative Services
Luffman, Superintendent, Security
McCarthy, Assistant Station Manager
Sarver, Superintendent of Operations
Saunders, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
Shriver, Assistant Station Manager
Sloane, Superintendent of Outage and Planning
Smith, Site Quality Assurance Manager
Sowers, Superintendent of Engineering
Stanley, Supervisor, Procedures
Swientoniewski, Supervisor, Station Nuclear Safety
Urquhart, Supervisor, Training
Other licensee employees contacted included plant managers and
supervisors, operators, engineers, technicians, mechanics, security
force members, and office personnel.*
NRC Personnel
M. Branch, Senior Resident Inspector
- D. Kern, Resident Inspector
- K. Poertner, Resident Inspector
- Attended Exit Interview
Acronyms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
2.
Plant Status
Unit 1 operated at power the entire reporting period.
The unit
commenced the reporting period in an end of cycle coastdown at 97%
power.
The unit was at 58% power with the A condenser waterbox removed
from service for cleaning at the end of the report period.
Unit 2 operated at power the entire reporting period.
On August 26, th~
unit reduced power to 83% for core uprate implementation and to remove
- -
=--=---==- -
-
~
2
the C waterbox from service for cleaning.
The unit returned to full
power on August 31.
3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707, 40500)
The inspectors conducted frequent tours of the control room to verify
proper staffing, operator attentiveness and adherence to approved
procedures.
The inspectors attended plant status meetings and reviewed
operator logs on a daily basis to verify operational safety and
compliance with TSs and to maintain overall facility operational
awareness.
Instrumentation and ECCS lineups were periodically reviewed
from control room indications to assess operability.
Frequent plant
tours were conducted to observe equipment status, fire protection
programs, radiological work practices, plant security programs and
housekeeping.
Deviation reports were reviewed to assure that potential
safety concerns were properly addressed and reported.
3.1
Hurricane Preparations
In mid-August, Hurricane Felix approached the North Carolina and
Virginia coastlines. The projected hurricane path included the
vicinity surrounding Surry Power Station. The licensee
implemented the Hurricane Response Plan at Surry Station and the
corporate offices. Region based specialists helped the resident
inspectors to provide continuous site inspection coverage while
the hurricane was a threat.
In addition, the NRC established a
mobile satellite communications link for use in the event that
normal off-site communication capabilities were disrupted.
The Virginia Power Hurricane Response Plan, revision 1, was
upgraded in early August to incorporate improvements identified
during a review of industry hurricane response programs.
The
licensee implemented hurricane preparations in accordance with the
plan, including OC-21, Severe Weather Checklist and AP-37.01,
Abnormal Environmental Conditions, revisiori 5.
The inspectors
performed periodic plant walkdowns including the electrical
distribution switchyard, the high and low level intake structures,
and the protected area. Hurricane preparations were good.
A continuous on-site Station Hurricane Coordinator was assigned
and watchbills were developed to staff th~ Station Hurri~ane
Response Center located in the TSC.
The TSC was partially staffed
when the storm track appeared most threatening.
The inspectors
reviewed NUREG 1474, Effect of Hurricane Andrew on the Turkey
Point Nuclear Generating Station from August 20-30, 1992, and
determined that licensee preparations for the hurricane were
consistent with the lessons learned from that event.
Station and corporate personnel closely tracked the storm's
position using real time national meteorological resources. Surry
county declared a hurricane watch, but did not escalate to a
hurricane warning which would the be *entry criteria for a NOUE.
~-=~:---=-=-==--=-~=--------------------------------- ---
- - --- -
3.2
3
The inspectors observed that station personnel were aware of
projected weather conditions, including projected high tide
surges.
High tide surges are important because they pose a flood
threat to the CW and ESW pump motors which pump water to fill the
The highest projected tide surge, in the
event that the hurricane reached Surry Station, was 9 feet above
MSL.
This was below the NOLIE entry condition of 12 feet above
MSL.
Operators demonstrated a clear understanding of the bases
for emergency entry conditions for tide height.
The inspectors questioned how operators measured and assessed tide
height for emergency event classification.
No control room
indications or local measuring instruments at the low level intake
structure exist. The SS informed the inspectors that outside tour
operators are trained to monitor for abnormal tide conditions and
inform the control room when unusually high or low tide conditions
are observed.
The SS then directs operators to monitor tide
height in relation to the top of the CW pump pits.
Emergency
event classification assessment is then made based upon water
height proximity to the CW or ESW pump motors.
pumps are the bases for NOLIE and ALERT event declarations.
The
inspectors concluded that the stated method of assessing tide
height for event classification was adequate .
Station management directed that no maintenance on safety-related
equipment, other than that to provide operability, be performed
while the hurricane was a threat. Maintenance personnel stopped
inprogress work and returned components to service accordingly.
On August 17, the hurricane changed course away from land and
moved further out to sea. Management then permitted safety-
related maintenance to continue on a limited basis (e.g., 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />
restoration requirement)._ Storm warnings for Virginia were
canceled and the licensee secured from the Hurricane Response Plan
at 2:00 pm on August 18.
The inspectors concluded that
management's close control over maintenance activities
demonstrated a strong safety perspective.
Unit 1 Control Room Annunciator Failure
On August 22, 1995, at 11:00 pm several alarms on the A-E control
room alarm panels annunciated for no apparent reason.
The A-E
panels comprise 50 percent of the Unit 1 control room alarms.
Operators saw light smoke and smelled a slight burned odor.
Initial inspection identified a blown fuse to one of nine
annunciator power supplies.
Further investigation confirmed that
the audible alarm, flashing light, and lock-in annunciator
features were not functioning properly. Control room instrument
indicators continued to indicate normally.
Operators initiated
abnormal procedure O-AP-10.13, Loss of Main Control Room
Annunciators, revision 0.
3.3
4
Operators promptly established compensatory actions which included
(1) stationing an additional RO in the control room to
continuously monitor control board indications, (2) implementing
supplemental plant tours at two-hour intervals to verify specific
safety-related equipment status for equipment with degraded
control room alarms, and (3) monitoring the Emergency Response
Facility computer display in the control room as an alternate
indication of important safety-related parameter alarm conditions.
The inspectors accompanied operators on supplemental plant tours
and observed augmented monitoring in the control room.
Operators
were knowledgeable of plant conditions and generally attentive
while performing assigned control board monitoring duties.
The
inspectors observed that some operators had difficulty maintaining
continuous close attention to control board indications for a
prolonged period and*discussed this observation with the SS.
Operations management took subsequent action to rotate the control
board monitoring duties more frequently among qualified ROs.
The
inspectors concluded that operations personnel properly
implemented compensatory actions in response to the inoperable
Unit 1 annunciators.
These same annunciators had been degraded from July 20-23, 1995.
Three of nine power supplies were determined to have failed during
that occurrence.
The root cause and corrective actions were not
fully developed at the time of the August loss of annunciators.
Troubleshooting and corrective maintenance activities for the
August 22-25 event are discussed in paragraph 4.1.
SNS engineers prepared SE 95-102 and JCO Sl-95-002 to assess
continued power operation with degraded control room annunciators.
The licensee determined that the UFSAR accident analysis credited
control room annunciators for mitigation of one accident, the
boron dilution accident. Unit 1 was at O ppm RCS boron
concentration due to end of fuel cycle coastdown when the A-E
annunciators failed. Therefore the boron dilution accident was
not considered credible. Additional compensatory actions were
identified in specific detail. The inspectors reviewed SE 95-102
and JCO Sl-95-002 and observed the SNSOC's safety review.
The
inspectors concluded that the licensee thoroughly evaluated the
loss of annunciator condition and implemented appropriate
compensatory actions.
The licensee replaced or rebuilt eight
power supplies.
The annunciator system was satisfactorily post
maintenance tested and returned to operation on August 25.
Following a 24-hour power supply burn in period, operators secured
the compensatory actions listed above.
Unit 1 Pressurizer Heaters
On August 24, operations found the electrical breaker to
pressurizer heater groups 11, 34 and 63 on the A pressurizer
heater bank tripped. Another group of 3 heaters on bank A was
already out of service and this left the bank with approximately
5
100 KW rated heater capacity available. Technical Specification 3.1.5.a requires that 125 KW of pressurizer heaters be available
and the TS Bases requires that the heaters be capable of being
supplied electrical power from an emergency bus.
Heater Bank A is
powered from the J emergency power bus.
The operators determined
that full heater capacity (250KW) existed on heater bank E powered
from the H emergency power bus and determined that a TS LCO did
not exist for pressurizer heater availability.
On August 25, troubleshooting commenced on heater groups 11, 34
and 63.
The licensee determined that the electrical fault causing
the breaker trip was located inside containment.
Based on this
information, the licensee implemented a temporary modification to
power a group of bank Cheaters from the supply breaker on the J
emergency power bus.
The temporary modification was completed on
August 28, and increased the available heater capacity powered
from the J emergency power bus to 150KW.
The inspectors monitored licensee actions and reviewed the
temporary modification package and associated 50.59 evaluation.
The inspectors determined that the temporary modification package
adequately addressed the safety concerns associated with
implementing the temporary modification.
In particular, the
inspectors verified that the modification package addressed diesel
generator loading requirements.
The inspectors reviewed the licensing requirement associated with
pressurizer heater capacity.
NUREG 0737, Clarification of TMI
Action Plan Requirements, Item II.E.3.1, Emergency Power Supply
For Pressurizer Heaters required that redundant heater capacity be
provided and that each redundant heater or heater group have
access to only one emergency power supply.
The TMI action item
also required that TSs be submitted to address pressurizer heater
capacity. This requirement was implemented to establish
sufficient pressurizer heater capacity to. maintain natural
circulation at hot shutdown conditions following a loss of offsite
power.
TS Amendment 93 contained requirements to have at least 125 KW
pressurizer heater capacity available.
Prior to this amendment,
pressurizer heater operability was not addressed in the TS.
This
amendment was issued after th~ NUREG 0737 requirements were
established and the TS amendment was determined to be acceptable
by the NRC.
Review of NRC correspondence prior to issuance of the
TS amendment determined that the NRC found the licensee's
pressurizer heater power supply design met the requirements of the
TMI Action Item (e.g., redundant heater groups powered from
separate emergency power supplies).
UFSAR Section 4.2.2.2,
Pressurizer, states that two backup heater groups rated at 250 and
200 KW and their associated controls are energized from redundant
emergency buses.
6
The inspectors discussed the apparent disconnect between the TMI
action item and the present TS with the licensee. The licensee
stated that the requirements of TS were met.
The temporary
modification would restore sufficient heater capacity to meet the
TMI action item.
The licensee also provided an engineering
analysis that determined 60 KW of pressurizer heater capacity
would be adequate to maintain natural circulation. The licensee
is presently reviewing the issue to determine if administrative
guidance should be provided to address loss of redundant heater
capacity.
The inspectors determined that the licensee met the
present licensing requirement for pressurizer heater capacity and
considered that the actions associated with restoring redundant
125 KW pressurizer heater capacity powered from separate emergency
buses demonstrated an appropriate safety perspective.
3.4
Deviation Report Review
During the report period the inspectors reviewed the following
DRs:
DR S-95-1596, Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Improperly Aligned
DR S-95-1667, SI Accumulator Inleakage During Recirc and
Sampling Evolutions
DR S-95-1675, AFW Pump Full Flow Recirc Valve Not Open Prior
To Pump Start For Testing
DR S-95-1780, Flow Inadvertently Aligned Through Deborator
While Flushing Ion Exchanger
DR S-95-1808, Containment Chiller Service Water Drain Valves
Not Open As Required By Tag Out
These DRs covered the period July 6 through August 9, 1995.
Each
DR addressed personnel errors by the operations staff. The
inspectors determined that on an individual basis these items did
not constitute a significant safety concern but that they
indicated a negative trend in operator performance and inattention
to detail by the operating crews.
The inspectors discussed these
items with station management and the operations superintendent.
The inspectors determined that the licensee was aware of the trend
and has taken actions to improve performance in this area.
The
actions included briefing all operations personnel on the
particular events and issuance of a station alert policy change.
The inspectors will continue to review this area and will review
operator performance during the upcoming Unit 1 refueling outage
to determine if corrective actions are effective in reversing the
negative trend in operator performance indicated by the above DRs .
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.,
7
4.
Maintenance and Surveillance Inspections (62703, 61726)
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed the following
maintenance and surveillance activities to assure compliance with the
appropriate procedures and TS requirements.
4.1
Troubleshooting and Restoration of Failed Unit 1 Control Room
The inspectors observed corrective maintenance ac.t i vi ti es
associated with WO 00324601, Troubleshoot/Repair Annunciator Power
Supplies (see paragraph 3.2). Initial troubleshooting efforts
conducted on August 23 by Virginia Power maintenance personnel,
determined that 4 of the 8 operable power supplies for annunciator
panels A-E were inoperable (1 additional power supply was
previously inoperable prior to the maintenance activity). The
licensee removed the 4 inoperable power supplies from service and
returned annunciator panel E {The First Out Panel) and
approximately 56 other alarms located on panels A-D to service
based on the number of operable power supplies. Subsequent to
returning the selected alarms to service all the operable
annunciators alarmed and then cleared without operator action. A
subsequent alarm test conducted by operations personnel determined
that the annunciators would not alarm and the annunciators on
panels A-E were declared totally inoperable at 7:58 pm on August
23.
On August 24, a vendor representative arrived on site to assist in
the troubleshooting efforts and repair of the power supplies.
The
troubleshooting activities conducted determined that all the power
supplies were degraded/inoperable and also found that the A-E
annunciator panel flashing card was bad.
As a result of this
determination the licensee replaced 3 of the failed power supplies
with new power supplies, the vender repaired the remaining power
supplies onsite (except for the previously inoperable power
supply), and the annunciator flashing card was replaced with a new
card. Annunciator panels A-E and 8 power supplies were returned
to service on August 25.
Power supply voltage readings were
monitored hourly for the 24-hour period following their return to
service to ensure proper operation.
The licensee plans to replace
the remaining inoperable power supply during the upcoming Unit 1
refueling outage.
The licensee is presently performing a Root
Cause Evaluation to determine why the power supplies failed.
The
inspectors will review the root cause determination when
completed.
The inspectors observed maintenance activities conducted in the
field and held discussions with the system engineer and vendor.
The activities observed were conducted appropriately and in
accordance with guidance provided by the work document.
8
4.2
Unit 2 Core Power Uprate
4.3
The Unit 2 core power uprate was performed August 24-31, 1995.
Numerous instrument control and protective setpoints were revised
to correspond to the uprated condition.
The inspectors closely
observed several maintenance activities during which the following
procedures were used:
-
2-IPT-CC-RC-T-412, Delta T and Tavg Loop T-412 Channel
Calibration, revision 14.
-
2-IPT-CC-RC-T-422, Delta T and Tavg Loop T-422 Channel
Calibration, revision 10.
-
2-IPT-CC-RC-T-432, Delta T and Tavg Loop T-432 Channel
Calibration, revision 11.
-
2-IPM-AMS-PNL-002, AMSAC Calibration, revision 4.
-
2-IPM-AMS-PNL-001, AMSAC Functional Test, revision 2.
-
2-IPT-CC-MS-P-446, Turbine Load Loop P-2446 Channel
Calibration, revision 1.
-
2-IPT-CC-MS-P-447, Turbine Load Loop P-2447 Channel
Calibration, revision 1.
Instrumentation technicians demonstrated strong procedural
knowledge and understood why each was being performed.
Communications between the control room and instrumentation rack
test locations were clear. Test equipment used for each procedure
was within specified calibration periodicity and in good working
condition. Technicians performed the maintenance successfully,
and closely followed procedures.
During 2-IPM-AMS-PNL-001, the SG B level
~ Channel II trip and
reset voltages were inconsistent. Technicians repeated the
applicable procedure steps and confirmed that the trip response
was unacceptable. Technicians halted the procedure, informed
management, and met with corporate engineers to further evaluate
the failure.
The licensee concluded that.an analog input module
had failed.
The inspectors observed module replacement and
recalibration. A corporate engineer closely supported the
technicians during these activities and noted that the calibration
procedure specified incorrect PLC monitor register points. After
a procedure revision, AMSAC calibration and functional testing
were successfully completed.
The inspectors concluded that this
maintenance activity was performed in a quality and timely manner.
Test Equipment Unavailable for Maintenance
The inspectors noted two instances during which properly
functioning test equipment was not available for technicians to
complete planned maintenance on safety-related equipment.
Technicians were not able to return charging pump 2-CH-P-lC to
service on August 17 because neither of the two pressure
calibration instruments functioned properly.
One instrument had a
damaged internal component and the second instrument was not
9
sufficiently charged.
Management had directed that 2-CH-P-IC be
restored early from planned maintenance due to an impending ..
hurricane.
The charging pump remained out of service until August
19.
On August 21, technicians were unable to begin corrective
maintenance, an equalizing charge, on station battery IA because a
calibrated DC ammeter was not available.
Each case prolonged the
period during which safety-related equipment was either
unavailable or in a degraded condition.
The Maintenance
Superintendent informed inspectors that tighter controls were
temporarily placed upon calibration equipment while previously
identified programmatic problems were corrected.
The Maintenance
Superintendent expected the actions to be complete in the near
future and improve calibration equipment availability by the
beginning of the Unit 1 refueling outage in September 1995.
The
inspectors considered unavailability of test equipment for
maintenance to be a weakness.
4.4
Online Maintenance
During the inspection period the inspectors reviewed*the safety
related online maintenance activities conducted on Unit 1 for the
period August 1 through September 1.
The most significant online
maintenance activity was conducted on the #1 EDG.
This activity
was scheduled to be completed within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and maintenance
crews were scheduled to support the maintenance activities on all
three shifts. However, problems were encountered and the diesel
was out of service for approximately 128 hours0.00148 days <br />0.0356 hours <br />2.116402e-4 weeks <br />4.8704e-5 months <br />.
During the period
reviewed, 11 online maintenance activities were scheduled that
required entry into TS LCOs on Unit 1.
The vast majority of the
maintenance items were scheduled to remove the equipment from.
service for less than a shift and in all cases the maintenance
window scheduled did not exceed 50% of the allowed LCO time.
The
inspectors noted that online maintenance activiti~s appeared to
increase prior to the Unit 1 shutdown for refueling.
The inspectors determined that online maintenance activities are
routinely conducted by the licensee and that the licensee has
established guidance on the conduct of online maintenance.
If the
outage time will exceed 50% of the allowed LCO, additional
management approval is required prior to scheduling the
maintenance activity.
The inspectors also determined that the licensee is in the process
of implementing a maintenance rule pilot program.
This program
establishes performance and monitoring criteria for plant systems,
structures, and components based on their risk significance and
importance to safety. The program establishes out-of-service
criteria based on a twelve month rolling average and a report is
presently issued monthly.
The licensee plans to fully implement
the program by July 10, 1996.
The inspectors will continue to
monitor licensee activities in this area. *
10
4.5
Emergency Service Water Pump Testing
On August 31, the inspectors observed operators perform procedure
O-OPT-SW-002, Emergency Service Water Pump 1-SW-P-lB, revision 5.
The procedure provides instructions for operability testing the lB
emergency service water pump.
During procedure performance, the
pump did not develop sufficient flow to meet the acceptance
criteria contained in the procedure.
To investigate the low flow
condition, a work order was initiated to inspect/clean the flow
element annubar.
The annubar was inspected and no obvious
obstructions or clogging were observed.
However, any obstruction
could have been removed when the pump was secured due to backflow
or when the annubar was removed from the system.
The test was
reperformed and indicated pump flow increased by 1000 gpm.
Based
on the increased flow indication, the pump met the acceptance
criteria contained in the procedure and the pump was declared
The inspectors determined ihat the test was performed
in accordance with the controlling procedure and that the actions
taken to resolve the indicated low flow conditi-0n were adequate to
resolve pump operability concerns.
Within the areas inspected*, no violations or deviations were identified.
5.
On-Site Engineering Review (37551)
5.1
Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Marine Fouling
Heavy rains and excessive ambient temperatures during the June and
July timeframes created conditions for significant CC HX marine
fouling.
The inspectors observed maintenance activities, revtewed
maintenance records, and discussed CC HX performance with system
engineers to determine wheth~r the licensee had established
appropriate controls to ensure adequate CC HX operability.
Surveillance procedures are performed weekly on each CC HX to
measure and assess macrofouling blockage.
In late June and early
July, significant hydroid and seaweed blockage was identified.
Each CC HX was determined to be inoperable between one and four
times during a two week period. Engineers noted that the A & CCC
HXs were the most frequently effected due to system configuration.
The inspectors verified that each time a CC HX was identified as
degraded (Alert Condition) or inoperable, the CC HX was promptly
cleaneq, tested, and returned to service.
The number of operable
CC HXs satisfied TS requirements.
The inspectors questioned whether surveillance and cleaning
intervals were adequate to identify and correct CC HX degradation.
The Shift Operations Supervisor informed the.inspectors that the
surveillance frequency would be increased as necessary to improve
reliability.
For two weeks, the A & CCC HXs were tested every
two days.
By mid-July a reliable data trend was observed and the
l
11
weekly test interval was reestablished.
In addition, a PM
schedule item was established to clean the A & CCC HX weekly
until performance improved significantly. The inspectors
determined that these actions were appropriate.
In early 1995, system engineers developed a trending data base to
assess CC HX performance. This analysis helped differentiate
between CC HX tube microfouling and CC HX tube~heet macrofouling.
This tracking provided useful insight to assist maintenance
technicians in determining whether tube scraping and/or tubesheet
cleaning was appropriate.
The inspectors noted, however, that the
engineering assessment of the trend data was not fully effective
in maintaining CC HX availability.
No increased surveillance or
cleaning intervals were recommended when the_C CC HX failed two
consecutive weekly surveillances in June.
The CCC HX also failed
a third consecutive surveillance prior to establishing the
increased monitoring and cleaning schedule.
Engineers informed the inspectors that bromine injection to the B
CC HX had proven effective in reducing marine fouling over a test
period.
In July the licensee began bromine injection to all four
CC HX performance has been good during this inspection
period.
The inspectors concluded that the bromine injection
modification was a positive action to improve CC HX performance.
5.2
Emergency Service Water Pump Marine Fouling
Based on marine fouling problems identified earlier in the summer,
a three week preventive maintenance interval was established to
clean the lA & lC ESW pump suction bells. The lB ESW pump suction
bell was previously coated with an antifouling material.
On
August 22, ESW pump lC failed its monthly performance test due to
low flow.
This was unanticipated due to the increased cleaning
interval in effect. Operators declared the pump inoperable and
entered a seven day LCO in accordance with TS 3.14.B.
ESW pump lC
was cleaned, retested, and restored to service on August 23.
Divers found a three-inch hydroid growth on the pump endbell which
is not typically sufficient to cause the flow degradation which
was observed.
Based upon the three week cleaning interval and
periodic performance trending, engineers proposed that the annubar
flow instrument may have been fouled, thereby indicating lower
than actual flow.
Management directed that ESW pump lA be tested
immediately to verify pump operability. The inspectors determined
this action was appropriate since marine fouling is a potential
common mode failure mechanism for ESW pumps.
On August 23, ESW pump lA failed its performance test due to low
flow.
The pump suction bell and flow instrument were cleaned, the
pump successfully retested, and returned to service on August 24.
The inspectors questioned whether common mode failure had made two
ESW pumps inoperable at the same time.
Engineering evaluation ET,
CME 95-0070, revision O concluded that although the pumps had
12
failed the ISI test criteria, available ESW flow was sufficient to
meet design accident analysis. The inspectors reviewed ErtME 95-
0070 and determined that the licensee's evaluation was technically
sound.
Licensing personnel initiated a review to assess 10 CFR
50.72 reporting applicability.
Engineers recommended that the pump endbell cleaning frequency be
further increased to every two weeks for the July - September
period.
Long term recommendations included applying an
antifouling coating on the IA & IC ESW pump suction bells,
revising test procedures, and conducting an engineering study to
evaluate potential flow instrument modifications.
The inspectors
concluded that the engineering recommendations were technically
sound.
The recommendations were under management review at the
close nf the inspection period.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Plant Support (71707, 71750)
The inspectors conducted facility tours, work activity observations,
personnel interviews, and documentation reviews to determine whether
licensee programs met regulatory requirements in the areas of
radiological protection, security, and fire protection. Radiological
areas were properly posted. A large number of scaffolds were erected in
preparation for the upcoming Unit 1 refueling outage.
Workers used
appropriate care when erecting scaffolding near equipment which could
cause a plant trip. Security force members ensured proper visitor
escort practices during site family visit tours in late August.
During backshift tours the inspectors noted that a vital area door,
which was also a fire barrier and controlled area pressure boundary, did
not reliably close.
The inspectors found the door closed and latched,
but the door failed to return to the closed position following entry
into the vital area. Security personnel had identified the degraded-
condition three days earlier and initiated corrective action which
addressed the door's security function.
The inspectors determined that
the corrective actions did not fully address the door's degraded
condition and that station operations personnel were not aware of the
degraded fire and pressure boundary door.
The inspectors informed the
SS of the degraded door.
The SS initiated prompt corrective action
which restored the door's operability. The inspectors questioned why
security had not informed the operations staff of the degraded door.
The Security Operations supervisor subsequently issued a memo to
security personnel which adequately clarified management's expectation
that security inform the operations SS whenever a vital door, fire
barrier, or pressure boundary door becomes degraded.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
~---------- ---
---
7.
13
Action on Previous Inspection Items (92901)
7.1
(Closed) VIO 50-280/94-08-01, Failure To Open The Unit .I 8 Loop
Hot Leg Stop Valve Within 2 Hours
On March 1, 1994, Unit 1 RCS loop 8 was filled in accordance with
procedure l-OP-RC-002, RCS Fill, revision 3, and the loop was
declared full at 8:40 am.
The loop 8 hot leg stop valve was
opened at 10:50 am.
TS 3.17.5.c required that the loop 8 hot leg
stop valve be opened within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> after filling the loop.
Failure to open the loop 8 hot leg within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> as required by
TS was identified as a violation.
This item was also addressed in LER 50-280/94-04 and corrective
actions included revising procedures l/2-0P-RC-002, Reactor
CooJant System Fill, counseling of the personnel involved in the
event, and inclusion of the LER in the required reading program.
The inspectors reviewed the correcti~e actions and verified that
procedures l/2-0P-RC-002 had been revised to provide adequate
guidance for the control of the evolution.
7.2
(Closed) VIO 50-281/94-17-0l, Failure To Close Unit 2 Makeup Water
Isolation Valve Within 15 Minutes After Makeup
7.3
On June 17, 1994, following a makeup evolution to the RCS, the
primary water isolation valve was not secured closed within 15
minutes following the makeup evolution as required by TS 3.2.f.
The valve was left open for a period of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and 8 minutes
following the makeup evolution.
This item was also addressed in LER 50-281/94-03 and the
licensee's immediate corrective actions were discussed in
inspection report 50-280, 281/94-17.
Long term corrective actions
included establishing procedural controls to ensure that the
isolation valve will be secured within 15 minutes and the LCD
clock tracked upon completion of makeup activities. Training
Functional Implementation Guideline 15 was also revised to provide
clearer guidance for control of RO/SRO license class inplant
periods.
The inspectors verified that the above actions had been
completed and reviewed the procedure revisions establishing the
procedural controls..
(Closed)
VIO 50-280,281/93-26-03, Failure To Design The ESW Pump
House Doors' Seal Plates Watertight
.
-
This item identified that measures were not established to assure
that the ESW pump house removable seal plates would be watertight
if installed. Corrective actions included performing_ an
engineering evaluation to determine if the seal plates were
required to be watertight, revision of the UFSAR to.document that
the seal plates were not required to be watertight, and revising
the procedure for abnormal weather conditions to reference a
14
maintenance procedure that was implemented to provide the
necessary instructions to ensure that the seal plate installation
restricts inleakage to acceptable limits. The inspectors verified
that the above actions had been completed.
The inspectors also
verified that the seal plate installation was accomplished per the
maintenance procedure during the preparations for hurricane Felix.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 6, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspectors described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results addressed
in the Summary section and those listed below.
Item Number
VIO 50-280/94-08-01
Status
Closed
Description/(Paragraph No.)
Failure To Open The Unit 1 B
Loop Hot Leg Stop Valve Within
2 Hours (paragraph 7.1).
VIO 50-281/94-17-01
Closed
Failure To Close Unit 2 Makeup
Water Isolation Valve Within
15 Minutes After Makeup
(paragraph 7.2).
VIO 50-280,281/93-26-03
Closed
Failure To Design The ESW Pump
House Doors' Seal Plates
Watertight (paragraph 7.3).
Proprietary information is not contained in this report. Dissenting
comments were not received from the licensee.
9.
Index of Acronyms
cc
CFR
cw
DR
GPM
ISi
JCO
LCO
ANTICIPATED TRANSIENT WITHOUT SCRAM MITIGATION SYSTEM
ACTUATION CIRCUIT
ABNORMAL OPERATIONS PROCEDURE
COMPONENT COOLING
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
CIRCULATING WATER
DEVIATION REPORT
EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER
GALLONS PER MINUTE
HEAT EXCHANGER
INSERVICE INSPECTION
JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION
LIMITING CONDITIONS OF OPERATION
15
LER
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
MEAN SEA LEVEL
MEGAWATTS
NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT
NRC
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OC
OPERATIONS CHECKLIST
PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER
PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE
PARTS PER MILLION
REACTOR OPERATOR
SAFETY EVALUATION
SAFETY INJECTION
SNS
STATION NUCLEAR SAFETY
SNSOC
STATION NUCLEAR SAFETY AND OPERATING COMMITTEE
SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR
SHIFT SUPERVISOR
THREE MILE ISLAND
TS
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION
UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
VIOLATION
WORK ORDER