ML18152A205
| ML18152A205 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 10/10/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18152A206 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-97-08, 50-280-97-8, 50-281-97-08, 50-281-97-8, NUDOCS 9710230135 | |
| Download: ML18152A205 (29) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1997008
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Docket Nos:
License Nos:
Report No:
Licensee:
Facility:
Location:
Dates:
Inspectors:
Approved by:
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I I
50-280, 50-281
50-280/97-08. 50-281/97-08
Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)
Surry Power St?tion. Units 1 & 2
5850 Hog Island Road
Surry. VA
23883
August 25-29. 1997
W. Sartor. Exercise Team Leader
D. Jones. Senior Radiation Specialist
J. Kreh. Radiation Specialist
G. Salyers. Emergency Preparedness Specialist
K. Barr. Chief. Plant Support Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
9710230135 971010
ADOCK 05000280
G
ENCLOSURE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
SURRY POWER STATION. UNITS 1 & 2
NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-280/97-08 and 50-281/97-08
This routine. announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of
the biennial emergency preparedness exercise.
This plume exposure exercise
was held in conjunction with emergency response demonstrations by the
Commonwealth of Virginia and full participation by the risk counties. The.
exercise was conducted on August 26. 1997.
This report summarized the
observations of the five-person NRC team that assessed the adequacy of the
licensee's emergency preparedness program as the utility implemented its
Emergency Plan and Procedures in response to the simulated accident scenario
for the plume exposure exercise.
The NRC evaluators concluded that the
licensee successfully demonstrated its ability to implement the Surry
Emergency Plan in response to a simulated accident.
In the process. the
licensee identified an issue addressing news releases. the resolution of which
should lead to an improved program.
Summarized observations from the key
emergency response facilities follow:
The scenario developed for this exercise was effective for testing the
integrated emergency response capability.
The scenario development
process was a strength .
The Simulator staff and augmented call-out staff were sufficient to
respond and perform defined emergency responsibilities.
A standard system for emergency classifications was used to effectively
and correctly classify the off-normal events promptly.
The initial and follow-up notifications to the States and counties were
made in a timely manner with essential information for the upgraded
classifications.
Provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response
organizations to emergency personnel. and the provisions were
effectively used during the exercise to provide timely information and
coordinate emergency response.
The Joint Public Informatinn Center and its staff were activated and
organized in a manner that provided for the dissemination of timely and
usually meaningful accurate ir1formation to the public via the news
media.
An Exercise Weakness wns identified regarding news releases that
did not accurately portray release information and were not coordinated
with the Recovery Manager.
The Emergency Response Facilities were activated promptly and were
organized. equipped. and maintained in a manner that supported the
emergency response.
2
The licensee demonstrated the ability to implement protective measures
for onsite personnel and to make the required Protective Action
Recommentations for the protection of the public.
The controller/evaluator organization did a good job of evaluating
exercise performance.
Substantive comments were provided by the
evaluators to their management.
Report Details
Summary of Exercise Events
This biennial emergency preparedness exercise included full participation by
the Commonwealth of Virginia and associated risk counties. This plume
exposure exercise was evaluated by an NRC inspection team and was conducted
from 8:20 a.m. to 1:44 p.m. on August 26. 1997.
Player critiques were
conducted by the licensee's emergency response participants in the ,emergency
response facilities (ERFs) following termination of the exercise.
The NRC
exit meeting was conducted on August 28. 1997: following the licensee's
presentation to management of exercise results.
VI. Plant Support
P4.
Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness (EP)
P4.1 Exercise Scenario
a.
Inspection Scope (82302)
The inspectors reviewed the exercise scenario to determine whether
provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major
. portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee's plan.
b.
Observations and Findings
The licensee submitted its Scope and Objectives for the Surry Power
Station emergency exercise to the NRC with a letter dated May 21. 1997.
The detailed scenario package was submitted with a letter dated June 12.
1997.
A review of the package indicated that the scenario was
challenging and progressed from an Alert. to a Site Area Emergency
(SAE). and then to a General Emergency (GE).
The scenario fully
exercised the onsite and offsite emergency organizations of the licensee
and provided sufficient information to the State and local governmental
agencies for their full participation in the exercise. Additionally,
the licensee provided an addendum/errata sheet just prior to the
exercise. This was indicative of the licensee's attention to detail in
assuring a good product.
c.
Conclusion
The scenario developed for this exercise was effective for testing the
integrated emergency response capability.
The scenario development
process was a strength .
2
P4.2 Onsite Emergency Organization
a.
Inspection Scope (82301)
The inspectors observed the functioning of the onsite emergency
organization to determine whether the responsibilities for emergency
response were defined and whether adequate staffing was available to
respond to the simulated emergency.
b.
Observations and Findings
C .
The inspectors noted that the responsibilities for emergency response
were clearly defined.
The Shift Supervisor assumed the responsibilities
of the Site Emergency Manager (SEM). and other personnel assumed their
respective pre-established responsibilities.
Immediately after the
emergency declaration. the SEM
made a public announcement that directed
the emergency response organization to report to their assigned
stations. Adequate staff then responded to activate the emergency
response facilities.
Conclusion
The Simulator staff and augmented call-out staff were sufficient to
respond and perform defined emergency responsibilities.
P4.3 Emergency Classification System
a.
Inspection Scope (82301)
The inspectors observed selected emergency response personnel to
determine whether a standard emergency classification and action level
scheme was in use by the licensee.
b.
Observation and Findings
The licensee's Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures provide for a
standard accident classification scheme that was effectively used
throughout the exercise to properly categorize the off-normal events.
The Alert was declared at 8:45 a.m. due to damaged fuel in the spent
fuel pit.
At 10:14 a.m .. a Site Area Emergency (SAE) was declared due
to a major reactor coolant leak with safety injection.
The General
Emergency (GE) was declared at 11:24 a.m. due to increased reactor
coolant leak. increased containment pressure. and a release from
containment .
3
c.
Cone l us ion
A standard system for emergency classifications was used to effectively
and correctly classify the off-normal events promptly.
P4.4 Notification Methods and Procedures
a.
Inspection Scope (82301)
b.
C.
The inspectors observed the licensee's notification of State and local
governmental organizations and emergency personnel to determine whether
timely and substantive emergency information was provided in accordance
with procedures.
Observations and Findings
The initial emergency notification to the State of Virginia Emergency
Operations Center and the risk counties was made from the Control Room
Simulator.
Notifications to the State and counties for the SAE and GE
were made promptly from the Local Emergency Operations Facility (LEOF)
with concise and informative event descriptions. Transmission of the GE
notification with an appropriate protective action recommendation (PAR)
was completed 14 minutes after the declaration.
Conclusion
The initial and follow-up notifications to the States and counties were
made in a timely manner with essential information for the upgraded
classifications.
P4.5
Emergency Communications
a.
Inspection Scope (82301)
b.
The inspectors observed the flow of communications within the emergency
response organization and from and between the Emergency Response
Facilities (ERFs) to determine whether provisions existed for the prompt
transmission of emergency information.
Observation and Findings
The inspectors observed that the communications between the utility and
offsite agencies and amongst the ERFs were effective for the prompt
transmission of emergency information.
Responsible personnel were kept
informed of ongoing events and communicated effectively in performing
accident mitigation and initiating protective actions for both onsite
and offsite personnel.
4
c.
Conclusion
Provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response
organizations to emergency personnel. and the provisions were
effectively used during the exercise to provide timely information and
coordinate emergency response.
P4.6 Public Education and Information
a.
Inspection Scope (82301)
The inspectors observed how information concerning the simulated
emergency was made available to the public.
b.
Observations and Findings
During the exercise. the licensee established its Joint Public
Information Center (JPIC) in the company's Innsbrook Technical Center
located in ~len Allen. VA.
The company also had a Local Media Center
established during the early portion of the exercise in the Nuclear
Information Center approaching the entrance to the Surry Power Station.
A review of the news releases provided indicated an error and delayed
information regarding the release from containment.
For example. News
Release #2 indicated no release of radiation had been detected. This
could have been assumed to mean than no release had occurred. whereas a
small release had occurred due to the dropped fuel bundle event. Also.
no mention of the radiological release that began at approximately
11:25 a.m. was made in a news release until 1:15 p.m.
The licensee
identified these problems along with the failure of the JPIC to provide
the draft news releases to the LEOF for approval. which should have
resulted in corrections to the releases. This issue was identified as
an exercise weakness.
Inspector Follow-up Item 50-280. 50-281/97-08/01:
Exercise Weakness--News releases did not accurately portray release
information. and were not coordinated with the Recovery Manager.
c.
Canel usi ans
..
The JPIC and its staff were activated and organized in a manner that
provided for the dissemination of timely and usually meaningful accurate
information to the public via the news media.
An Exercise Weakness was
identified regarding news releases that did not accurately portray
release information and were not coordinated with the Recovery Manager .
. i
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P4.7
Emergency Facilities and Equipment
a.
Inspection Scope (82301)
The inspectors observed the activation. staffing. and operation of
selected ERFs to determine whether adequate emergency facilities and
equipment were available and maintained to support an emergency
response.
b.
Observations and Findings
Control Room Simulato: - An inspector observed that the on-shift
designated crew in the Simulator acted promptly to initiate the
emergency response.
The facility and equipment supported the crew as
they responded to the simulated emergency.
Technical Support Center (TSC) - The TSC was promptly activated with
assigned emergency response personnel.
The facility layout provided for
the necessary communication between the SEM and his staff. The
inspector noted good use of procedures by the staff. The procedural
. review of event classifications in the TSC was timely.
Good
prioritization of exercise activities was observed .
Operational Support Center (OSC) - The OSC was activated in accordance
with procedures and in a timely manner.
Congestion and noise were
minimized and habitability of the facility was verified on a periodic
basis.
The facility and equipment supported OSC mission accomplishment.
Team formation and briefings were reasonably timely.
Local Emergency Response Facility - The LEOF site was promptly staffed
and activated with predesignated personnel.
The Recovery Manager
communicated effectively with his staff with periodic. concise. and
informative briefings. Radiological field teams were satisfactorily
controlled from the LEOF.
The facility and equipment supported the
staff well as they performed required functions and interacted with
offsite officials .
..
c.
Conclusion
The Emergency Response Facilities were activated promptly and were
organized. equipped. and maintained in a manner that supported the
emergency response.
6
P4.8 Protective Responses
a.
Inspection Scope (82301)
The inspectors observed the protective actions implemented for onsite
personnel and the protective action recommendations (PARs) provided by
the licensee to the offsite agencies.
b.
Observations and Findings
The SEM implemented appropriate protective actions for onsite personnel
as the emergency classification escalated to a SAE.
The Recovery
Manager made appropriate PARs to the State within 15 minutes of the GE
declaration.
c.
Conclusion
The licensee demonstrated the ability to implement protective measures
for onsite personnel and to make the required Protective Action
Recommentations for the protection of the public.
P4.9 Exercise Critique
a.
Inspection Scope (82301)
The inspectors observed the facility critiques immediately following the
exercise and portions of the controller/evaluator organization critique
process to determine whether weaknesses noted in the licensee's
emergency response organization were formally presented to licensee
management.
b.
Observations and Findings
C.
The licensee conducted effective player critiques following exercise
termination.
From the player comments and the controller/evaluator
observations. the controller/evaluator staff determined the performance
of the .. emergency organization responding to the simulated accident to be
generally satisfactory. A good summary of this performance and
supporting observations were provided to licensee management on
August 26. 1997. by reviewing the exercise objectives and player
performance in meeting these objectives.
Conclusion
The controller/evaluator organization did a good job of evaluating
exercise performance. Substantive comments were provided by the
evaluators to their management.
7
V. Management Meetings
Xl
Exit Meeting Summary
The Team Leader presented the inspection summary to members of licensee
management at the conclusion of the inspection on August 26. 1997.
The
summary indicated satisfactory performance.
No proprietary information
is contained in this report .
8
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSON CONTACTED
Licensee
M.
Adams. Superintendent. Engineering
R.
Allen. Superintendent. Maintenance
M.
Bradley. Assistant Superintendent. Maintenance
W.
Benthall. Supervisor. Nuclear Safety and Licensing
R.
Blount. Assistant Station Manager
R.
Cramer. Superintendent. Site Services
D.
Hayes. Supervisor. Administrative Services
M.
Kansler. Vice President. Nuclear Operations
F.
McConnell. Materials Team Leader
J. Norvelle. Public Affairs
W.
Renz. Manager. Nuclear Emergency'Planning
B.
Shriver. Assistant Station Manager. Operations and Maintenance
B.
Stanley. Director. Nuclear Oversight
W.
Thorton. Superintendent. Radiation Protection
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 82301:
Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors
IP 82302:
Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios for Power Reactors
ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED
NONE
Attachment (10 pages):
Exercise Goals. Objectives. and
Narrative Summary with Time Chart
VIRGINIA POWER
SURRY POWER STATION
AUGUST 26, 1997 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
EXERCISE SCOPE
The purpose of this exercise is to activate and evaluate major portions of the Surry Emergency
Plan, associated implementing procedures, and selected portions of the Corporate Emergency
Response Plan in accordance with 1 OCFR50.47(b)(l4), and to support the implementation of state
and local governments emergency response plans.
This plume exposure pathway exercise will be held in conjunction with emergency response
demonstrations by the Commonwealth of Virginia and several local governments. The exercise
will demonstrate that the individuals and agencies assigned responsibilities in a radiological
emergency are capable of coordinating and assessing necessary protective measures to ensure the
health and safety of the public in the event of an accident at Surry Power Station.
The exercise will demonstrate responses to the emergency classes, commensurate wiu.1 the stated
exercise objectives, established by NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of
Radiological Emergencv Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants.
Free play is encouraged and facilitators will be allowed to interface with the participants to provide
-information. The facilitators will only alter the participants' responses if the exercise lags behind
schedule, if emergency response personnel take inappropriate actions to carry them to the next
event, or if action is taken that would correct the expected simulated response earlier than scheduled
by the scenario.
The focus item of this exercise is:
The dose assessment process, including the use of MIDAS.
The exercise will fulfill the following drill requirements:
Semi-annual Radiatjon Monitoring Drill
Annual Medical Emergency Drill
Annual Communications Drill
At no time will the exercise be permitted to interfere with the safe operation of the station. Station
management may, at their discretion, suspend the exercise for any period of time necessary to
ensure this goal.
Exercise participants will not have prior knowledge of the simulated incident.
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VIRGINIA POWER
SURRY POWER STATION
AUGUST 26, 1997 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
OBJECTIVES
The purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate the adequacy of the Surry Power Station Emergency
Plan, the Corporate Emergency Response Plan, and associated implementing procedures.
The objectives of this exercise are to demonstrate by actual performance a number of key
emergency preparedness functions as they relate to the Surry Power Station Emergency Plan. The
simulated accident will involve: emergency classification, notifications of company and off-site
organizations, simulated actions to correct the emergency condition, and initiation of accident
assessment and protective actions as necessary to cope with the event. The event will include a
simulated off-site radiological release to support a plume exposure pathway exercise.
As applicable to the events developed by the exercise scenario, the Surry Power Station and
Corporate Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) will be activated.
Each ERF staff will
demonstrate functions described in the implementing procedures. Emergency response functions
which are impractical to demonstrate will be simulated.
The attached objectives, as numbered in the Virginia Power Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Six
Year Plan, will be demonstrated as applicable to the schedule provisions of this plan. A matrix,
identifying the objectives and the Virginia Power Emergency Response Facilities/Groups where
they will be demonstrated, is provided. The Control Room Simulator will be used in lieu of the
actual Station Control Room.
The following is a list of corporate and station emergency response facilities and groups with their
associated acronyms:
(1)
Control Room Simulator (CRS)
(2)
Technical Support Center (TSC)
(3)
Operational Support Center (OSC)
(4)
Local Emergency Operations Facility (LEOF)
(5)
Corporate Emergency Response Center (CERC)
(6)
Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)
(7)
Local Media Center (LMC)
(8)
Health Physics (HP)
(9)
Security (SEC)
(10)
Chemistry (CHEM)
(11)
Central Emergency Operations Facility (CEOF)
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VIRGINIA POWER
SURRY POWER STATION
AUGUST 26, 1997 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
OBJECTIVES
The following objectives establish the scope, the extent of play and extent of evaluation for this
exercise. Also these objectives ensure that required events are included in the exercise scenario.
1.
Demonstrate the ability to analyze station conditions, assess Emergency Action Level
(EAL) parameters, and correctly classify the emergency.
2 .
Extent of Play
The CRS and TSC Emergency Response Organizations (ERO) will demonstrate this
objective by use ofEPIP-1.01 and appropriate operational procedures.
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant self-evaluation.
Demonstrate the ability to notify, mobilize, and sustain the Surry Power Station and
Corporate Emergency Response Organizations.
Extent of Play
The CRS staff, Station Security, and Corporate Security will notify and mobilize the ERO.
Station and corporate ERO notification will be conducted in accordance with the
Emergency Personnel Notification List (EPNL).
The TSC, LEOF, CERC, and JPIC will demonstrate sustammg continuous response
capability by formulating shift relief rosters. If required, the process for obtaining logistical
and technical support for emergency response personnel may be simulated.
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant self-evaluation.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to notify the State and local governments and the NRC within
established time constraints.
Extent of Play
As appropriate to the communications process, the CRS, TSC, and LEOF will demonstrate
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this objective by providing up-to-date information to the federal, state, and* local
governments within the required time limits.
a.
State and Local Government Communications
An Emergency Communicator (EC) will perform initial and follow-up
communications in accordance with EPIP-2.01.
The SEM will retain the responsibility for state and local government
communications until the LEOF is activated.
Following LEOF activation,
responsibility for communications will be transferred to the Recovery Manager
(RM).
b.
NRC Communications
An EC will perform initial and follow-up communications in accordance with EPIP-
2.02. The EC will transmit information to a phone cell simulating the NRC. The
responsibility for NRC communications remain with the TSC ERO.
Health Physics Network (HPN) communications will be performed in accordance
with EPIP-4.33. The HPN communicator will transmit information to a phone cell
simulating the NRC. The responsibility for HPN communications will be with the
LEOFERO.
The Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) will be activated in the CRS only.
Plant data will not be transmitted to the NRC.
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant self-evaluation.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to conduct assembly and accountability of personnel within the
Protected Area.
Extent of Play
The Station Security Staff will demonstrate this objective in accordance with EPIP-5.09 and
EPIP-5.03. Also, to support the overall accountability process, the Assembly Area Leaders
will perform area accountability.
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant self-evaluation.
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5.
Demonstrate the ability to assemble, dispatch, and control on-site emergency teams to
perform response activities.
Extent of Play
As appropriate, the CRS, TSC, OSC, and Health Physics staffs will demonstrate this
objective by briefing, dispatching, and controlling teams in response to scenario events
within the Station Protected Area.
The CRS staff will demonstrate this objective by
initiating applicable procedures. Following facility activation, the TSC and OSC staffs will
demonstrate this objective by implementing EPIP-3.02, EPIP-3.03, and EPIP-5.08.
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluared, including participant self-evaluation.
6.
Demonstrate the ability to assess conditions and implement appropriate protective measures
for emergency response personnel, including site access control, contamination control,
exposure control, use of protective devices and, as appropriate, the process for authorizing
the use of potassium iodide (KI).
Extent of Play
This objective will be demonstrated through an interface among the CRS, TSC, LEOF and
OSC emergency response organizations in which the TSC staff will monitor and authorize
protective measures for site access, contamination control, and exposure control.
The TSC organization, via the Radiation Protection Supervisor (RPS) located in the Health
Physics area, will dispatch and direct monitoring teams within the bounds of the site .
property per EPIP-4.01 and EPIP-4.02 and associated procedures to assess radiological
conditions.
Protective measures, appropriate for conditions, will be developed and/or
implemented for emergency response personnel.
Security will implement access control measures in accordance with EPIP-5.09 and EPIP-
5.04.
The OSC Staff and other site personnel will implement any necessary actions associated
with protective equipment requirements and in-plant access control.
If necessary, in response to scenario events, the CRS and/or TSC and OSC staffs may
demonstrate the process for requesting and authorizing exposure extensions, to include
emergency exposure authorization in accordance with EPIP-4.01 and EPIP-4.04. Also, if
necessary, the TSC staff will demonstrate the KI authorization process per EPIP-4.01 and
EPIP-5.07 .
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7.
8.
If necessary, in response to scenario events, the TSC will demonstrate the planning and
notification processes for protective measures and simulate evacuating non-essential
personnel (selected personnel will evacuate) in accordance with EPIP-4.07 and EPIP-5.05.
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant self-evaluation.
Demonstrate
the
ability
to
Recommendations (P ARs) based
projections and/or measurements.
Extent of Play
develop
appropriate
Off-site
Protective
Action
on assessment of plant conditions and off-site dose
As appropriate, this objective will be demonstrated by the SEM from the TSC or by the RM
in the LEOF by implementation of EPIP-1.06.
Additional information for PAR
determination may be obtained from EPIP-4.07. The TSC and LEOF organizations may
monitor plant conditions and perform off-site dose projections to support formulation of
P ARs. Responsibility for PAR development is transferred from the TSC to the LEOF
following activation of the LEOF .
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant self-evaluation.
Demonstrate the ability to perform off-site dose assessment.
Extent of Play
As appropriate, this objective may be demonstrated by the TSC and LEOF staffs. The
ability to perform initial dose assessment will be demonstrated through the implementation
of EPIP-4.01 and associated dose assessment procedures
Field monitoring teams will be dispatched per EPIP-4.01, EPIP-4.02, and associated
procedures to support the dose assessment effort.
As appropriate, these teams will be
directed by the RPS and/or the TSC and LEOF staffs.
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant self-evaluation .
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9.
As appropriate, demonstrate the ability of Health Physics and Chemistry to conduct
radiological monitoring activities, including exposure rate surveys, sample collection, and
sample analysis.
10.
Extent of Play
As required, radiological monitoring, sampling, and analysis for in-plant and/or on-site
activities will be initiated in accordance with EPIP-4.02. Post Accident Sampling activities
will be performed in accordance with EPIP-4.22 and EPIP-4.23.
Field monitoring teams will perform radiological monitoring activities in accordance with
EPIP-4.15 and EPIP-4.16.
.
Actual reactor coolant arid/or containment samples will not be collected using the High
Radiation Sampling System (HRSS). Simulated elevated radiological data necessary to test
response and monitoring capabilities will be provided by the facilitator during simulated
sample collection. Simulated elevated isotopic analysis data will be provided following
demonstration of proper sample preparation and upon expiration of spectrum collection and
analysis times.
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant self-evaluation.
Demonstrate the ability to effectively activate the emergency response facilities and
associated emergency response processes.
Extent of Play
Activation of facilities and emergency processes by the TSC, OSC, LEOF, CERC, JPIC,
and the LMC will be demonstrated in accordance with the appropriate procedures
As appropriate, activation of emergency processes will be demonstrated by the CRS, Health
Physics, Chemistry and Security.
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant self-evaluation.
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I
11.
Demonstrate that facility layout and equipment support emergency response activities in
each facility.
Extent of Play
This objective will be demonstrated in the CRS, TSC, OSC, LEOF, CERC, JPIC, LMC,
Security, Health Physics, and Chemistry.
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant self-evaluation.
12.
Demonstrate the ability to establish and maintain effective communications.
Extent of Play
The CRS, TSC, OSC, LEOF, CERC, JPIC, LMC, Security, Health Physics, Chemistry, and
Field Teams will demonstrate this objective.
Use of backup communications systems will only be demonstrated if pnmary
communications fail.
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant self-evaluation.
13.
Demonstrate the ability to maintain command and control of the emergency response effort.
Extent of Play
The SEM will demonstrate on-site emergency response command and control from the
CRS and TSC. The RM will demonstrate command and control of the emergency response
effort associated with the LEOF upon activation of that facility. The Corporate Response
Manager will demonstrate command and control of the emergency response effort
associated with the CERC upon activation of that facility.
The SEM will ensure personnel within the Protected Area are informed of emergency event
status by the use of emergency alarms, the plant paging system (Gai-tronics) and selected
personnel pagers. Remaining site personnel will be notified by other verbal communication
methods. Announcements should be preceded and terminated with the phrase: "This is a
drill. II
The CRS, TSC, and LEOF ERO will demonstrate the ability to transfer appropriate
command and control functions.
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a.
The CRS functions that will transfer to the TSC include:
(1)
Notifications to the state, local governments, and NRC.
(2)
Developing and transmitting P ARs to the state.
(3)
Determining the emergency classification.
(4)
Authorizing emergency exposures.
b.
The TSC functions that may transfer to the LEOF are:
(1)
Notifications to the state and local governments and to the NRC via the
HPN.
(2)
Developing and transmitting P ARs to the state.
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant self-evaluation.
14.
Demonstrate the ability to. coordinate preparation, review and release of timely and accurate
information to the public.
Extent of Play
The CERC, JPIC, LEOF, and LMC staffs will demonstrate this objective.
Press releases will be prepared and edited at the CERC and may be transmitted to the LEOF
for technical review.
Following approval by the RM and/or the Corpoi:ate Response
Manager, the process for issuing press releases will be demonstrated.
The JPIC Director will be cognizant of all press releases and make them available to the
media in the JPIC and LMC.
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant self-evaluation.
15.
Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control functions.
Extent of Play
This objective will not be demonstrated.
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will not be evaluated
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16.
17.
Demonstrate the ability to provide basic life support and to package and transport a
contaminated injured person to an off-site medical facility.
Extent of Play
This objective will be demonstrated by the First Aid Team implementing treatment
appropriate for the victim's level of injury and by Health Physics employing the necessary
radiological controls. EPIP-5.01 and HP-1061.010 will be implemented to remove the
victim from the accident scene and transport to the off-site medical facility.
As required, the CERC will implement CPIP-7.0.
As necessary, the Shift Supervisor directs Station Security to summons off-site support.
Station Security will prepare for station access by off-site support in accordance with EPIP-
5 .09.
Transport of the victim to an off-site medical facility will be demonstrated.
Off-site medical support agencies and facilities will participate.
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will be fully evaluated, including participant self-evaluation.
Demonstrate the ability to respond to, control and mitigate the consequences of a fire.
Extent of Play
This objective will not be demonstrated.
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will not be evaluated.
18.
Demonstrate the ability to establish a Recovery Organization and to develop a Recovery
Plan.
Extent of Play
This objective will not be demonstrated.
Extent of Evaluation
This objective will not be evaluated.
S&0-10
19.
Demonstrate the ability to conduct a self-critique and to identify areas for improvement.
Extent of ~lay
The CRS, TSC, OSC, LEOF, CERC, JPIC, LMC, Security, Chemistry, and Health Physics
will conduct a self-critique to identify weaknesses and improvement items .
S&0-11
1
2
3
4
5
X
X
X
X
X
osc
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
CERC
X
JPIC
X
LMC
'.
SECURITY
X
X
X
X
CHEMISTRY
X
VIRGINt_. OWER
SURRY POWER STATION
AUGUST 26, 1997 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
OBJECTIVES DEMONSTRATION MATRIX
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
- = Denotes objective not to be demonstrated
S&0-12
-
', ..
-**'
..
14
IS
16
17
18
19
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
.
X
X
.
X
X
VIRGINIA POWER
SURRY POWER STATION
AUGUST 26, 1997 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
SCENARIO NARRATIVE
A plume pathway exercise is scheduled to be conducted at the Surry Power Station. For purposes
of this exercise, Unit I is designated as the affected unit.
Unit I is operating at 100% full power equilibrium conditions at the end of life with no equipment
out of service. Operators are in the fuel building moving spent fuel in preparation for loading a
spent fuel cask next week.
Unit 2 is operating at 100% full power equilibrium conditions with no equipment out of service.
The exercise begins at 0830. At 0835 a speat fuel assembly drops from the fuel building movable
platform crane in the fuel building. The fuel assembly strikes a spent fuel storage rack resulting in
clad damage. The dropped fuel assembly and subsequent radiological release warrants the
declaration of an Alert (C-10).
During accountability, a chemistry technician returning from the sample sink room with a
primary sample suffers a stroke resulting in a medical emergency. The emergency is reported to
the control room at 0853. The victim's injuries are severe enough to require transport of the
victim to an off-site medical facility.
A small 5 gpm reactor coolant system leak begins at 0919. This leak results in a controlled
shutdown of unit 1. At 0945 'B' S/G steam flow channel CH-485 (channel 4) fails.
At 1002 a small break LOCA (400 gpm) occurs and at 1003 a manual reactor trip and safety
injection are initiated. A loose part results in 10% fuel clad damage and subsequent increase in the
reactor coolant system activity. Due to the inability to mairitain pressurizer level, a Site Area
Emergency should be declared (B-1 ). Due to the LOCA the containment pressure and activity
levels begin increasing. Also, when safety injection is initiated the # 1 EDG fails to start.
A major break LOCA occurs at 1123 causing a rapid increase in containment pressure and
subsequent CLS initiation. The increased pressure causes a joint in the piping at penetration #93 to
fail allowing a radiological release into the auxiliary building. Subsequently, a radiological release
to the environment occurs through the ventilation system. A General Emergency (GE) should be
declared based on the loss of three (3) fission product barriers (B-7).
When the major break LOCA occurs, fuel clad failure increases to 50%. When CLS initiates, 1-
CS-MOV-lOlA and 101B (1-CS-P-lA discharge valves) fail to open and 1-CS-P-lB trips on
overcurrent. At 1126, 1-RS-P-lA trips after it starts and the spray ring for 1-RS-P-lB clogs. Due
to lack of containment spray flow, the 1-RS-P-2A and 2B impellers degrade to the point they do not
deliver flow .
SOE-7
..
SCENARIO NARRATIVE (continued)
The escalation through the applicable emergency classifications provides activities designed to
exercise both on-site and off-site response organizations. Sufficient time is permitted to allow the
response organizations to perform the required assessment and appropriate response actions.
At 1330 the exercise will be terminated, except for any continuing or additional activities the state
must perform.
Facility critiques are scheduled to begin approximately fifteen minutes after termination of the
exercise.
SOE-8
'*
VIRGI1'\\..
R
TIME
0715
0745
0830
0835
0840
0853
0919
SURRY POWER STATION
AUGUST 26, 1997 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
TIME LINE
EVENT DESCRIPTION
ANTICIPATED RESPONSE
C/0 exercise day briefing.
Final prep for exercise. Lead Facilitator to ensure all changes and
questions are addressed.
Simulator briefing.
CRS Lead Facilitator to brief the operations shift on the initial
conditions and simulator set up.
Start exercise.
Simulator to "Run".
Dropped spent fuel assembly in spent fuel pool (mini-scenario
The operators stabilize the bridge crane and observe the dropped
- 1, Dropped Srent Fuel Assembly).
assembly. They notice bubbles emanating from the assembly.
Operators report the situation to the Shift Supervisor, evacuate the
Fuel Building and notify Health Physics. The Shift Supervisor
initiates O-AP-22.00 and enters EPIP-1.01.
Conditions are confirmed for classification per Tab C-10.
The Shift Supervisor declares an Alert per Tab C-10. Callout
ERO (EPNL), notify state & locals (EPIP-2.01) and NRC (EPIP-
2.02, control cell), activate facilities, and perform accountability.
First aid emergency occurs (mini-scenario #2, Medical
CRS informed of medical emergency. Gai-Tronics announcement
Emergency).
for First Aid Team to respond. First Aid Team responds to scene,
renders first aid and packages victim for transport to an off-site
medical facility. O-AP-47, Personnel Injury - Operations
Response and potentially EPIP-5.01 entered.
A small reactor coolant system leak of 5 gpm develops
Operators identify the leak, informs the TSC and quantify the
Containment radiation monitor readings began increasing.
leakage per (l-AP-16). Determine unit shutdown necessary.
SOE-9
(
TIME
0945
1002
1003
1123
f
.. '
(i'
VIRGil~*iA POWER
SURRY POWER STATION
AUGUST 26, 1997 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
TIME LINE
};VENT DESCRIPTION
ANTICIPATED RESPONSE
'B' S/G steam flow channel CH-485 (channel 4) fails (mini-
Operators identify the flow channel failure, stop the ramp and
scenario #3, 'B' S/G steam flow channel CH-484 Failure).
inform the TSC. TSC assigns task to OSC DC Team to conduct
assessment and perform repairs.
A small break LOCA (400 gpm) occurs and a loose part is detected
Operators identify rapidly decreasing RCS inventory and inform the
(mini-scenario #4, Loose Parts Alarm). in the reactor vessel. 10% TSC. SEM reviews EALs and declares a Site Area Emergency per
fuel clad failure occurs.
Tab B-1.
Manual reactor trip and safety injection. #1 J;:DG fails to (mini-
Operators initiate 1-E-O and identify the failure of the #1 EOG to
scenario #5, #1 EDG Start Failure).
start. The operators inform the TSC of the diesel start failure. TSC
assigns task to OSC DC Team to conduct investigation, assessment
and repairs.
Major break LOCA and severe fuel clad degradation occurs. CLS
Operators identify the LOCA and the multiple equipment failures
initiates, containment pressurizes and a radiological release to the
and inform the TSC. SEM reviews EALs and declares General
environment begins via the ventilation system. Containment spray
Emergency per Tab B-7, due to loss of fission product barriers.
pump discharge valve 1-C~-MOV-lOlA fails to open (mini-
Develop PAR (EPIP-1.06) and n<?tify state, locals (EPIP-2.01) and
scenario #6, 1-CS-MOV-lOlA Failure). Containment spray pump
NRC (EPIP-2.02, control cell). Track plume (EPIP-4.15, 4.16),
discharge valve l-CS-MOV"'.'101B fails to open (mini-scenario #7,
perform dose assessment (EPIP-4.03). The stability class is "C".
l-C~-MOV-101B Failure). Containment spray pump 1-CS-P-lB
The affected sectors are DEF. The wind direction is from 270
fails to start (mini-scenario #8, 1-CS-P-lB Overcurrent Trip).
degrees. The PAR should be #2. TSC to prioritize and assign tasks
Containment penetration #93 fails (mini-scenario #9,
to OSC DC Teams to conduct investigation, assessment and repairs.
Containment Penetration #93 Failure).
As required, HP performs surveys in-plant, on-site and off-site.
The operators attempt to manually open 1-CS-MOV-lOlA or 101
B.
SOE-10
TIME
1126
1127
1144
1212
1227
1330
1330-1345
1345
VIRGIN~..:
WER
SURRY POWER STATION
AUGUST 26, 1997 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
TIME LINE
EVENT DESCRIPTION
ANTICIPATED RESPONSE
Inside recirc spray pump,1-RS-P-lA trips after it starts (mini-
Operators identify the failure of the recirc spray pump and inform
scenario #10, 1-RS-P-lA Overcurrent Trip). Inside recirc spray
the TSC. Ops Field may investigate. TSC assigns task to OSC DC
pump 1-RS-P-lB low amperage after start (mini-scenario #11,
Teams to conduct investigation, assessment and repairs.
1-RS-P-18 Low Amperage).
Outside recirc spray pump l-RS-P-2A impeller degrades (mini-
Operators identify the failures of the recirc spray pumps and inform
scenario #12, 1-RS-P-2A Degraded Impeller). Outside recirc
the TSC. Ops Field may investigate. TSC assigns task to OSC DC
spray pump l-RS-P-2B impeller degrades (mini-scenario #13,
Teams to conduct investigation, assessment and repairs.
1-RS-P-28 Degraded Impeller).
Operators open l-CS-MOV-101B.
Operators initiate containment spray.
Inside recirc spray pump l-RS-P-1 A is returned to service.
Recirc spray is initiated.
Containment becomes subatmospheric.
Release from the containment terminates; however, the release to
the environment continues until the auxiliary building is purged.
Terminate exercise. As required, ensure that the ventilation is re-
ERO to put ERFs back to state ofreadiness, paperwork collected
aligned in the TSC.
for the exercise and given to the Lead Facilitators.
Facilitators conduct preliminary review.
Conduct facility critiques.
Perform critique process.
SOE-11
..
Summary:
{*'.
VIRGIN~}::,....
ER
SURRY POWER STATION
AUGUST 26, 1997 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
TIME LINE
I.
Dropped spent fuel assembly in the spent fuel pit causes a small radiological release and establishes conditions for an ALERT (Tab C-10).
2.
Small RCS leak begins.
3.
Medical emergency outside the sample sink room in the auxiliary building.
' .
~
4.
Small break LOCA occurs. Conditions satisfied for a Site Area Emergency (Tab B-1). A loose part in the reactor vessel results in fuel clad
failure and increase in RCS activity. Also the #1 EDG fails to start resulting in a DC evolution.
5.
Major break LOCA and leak through penetration results in a radiological release to the environment. Establishes conditions for a GENERAL
EMERGENCY (Tab B-7) and PAR #2.
6.
Containment spray and recirculation spray component and system failures drive accident mitigation and DC evolutions.
Success Paths:
1.
Implement Emergency Plan and applicable procedures. Activate ERO.
2.
Establish DC process. Prioritization and use of manpower.
3.
Provide first aid to victim, package, then transport to off-site medical facility.
4.
Establish monitoring teams and track plume.
SOE-12