ML18152A150
| ML18152A150 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 02/22/1989 |
| From: | Fredrickson P, Holland W, Larry Nicholson, York J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18152A151 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-88-51, 50-281-88-51, NUDOCS 8903130270 | |
| Download: ML18152A150 (21) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1988051
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGU.LATORY COMMISSJOi\\'
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.\\'\\'.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos.:
50-Z80/88-51 and 50-281/88-51
Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Glen Allen, VA
23060
Docket Nos.:
50-280 ,and 50-281
License Nos.: DPR-32 and DPR-37
Facility Name:
Surry land 2
Inspection Conducted:
December 18, 1988 - January 28, 1989
Inspectors:
- 1). S. /_**fd-6/t;
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Date S i7gned
'-J)) ) __ /::~ ,._. "c .*
Ir*(
__________ _
Ll, ::. York, Seni~r' Resirn*~ liiSpector
/
_ ?/12/57
Date Signed
(
L.
Inspector
onnel: \\,JJ L~F?e, NRR
Approved by:
,
u__ 7.l_ tJ;kV'v\\..
(')_
P.
Fredrickso:n, Chief, sicfun 2A
P'(~v/s4
Date s'i gned
Scope:
Results:
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
This routine resident inspection was conducted on site in the areas
of licensee action on previous enforcement matters, plant operations,
plant maintenance, p~ant surveillance, licensee event report review,
followup on inspector identified items, and evaluation of the
licensee quality assurance program.
A special evaluation of the
licensee's program used to walk down selected systems prior to unit
restart was also in.eluded in this report.
This evaluation will
continue and be further documented in the next resident inspection
report.
Certain tours were conducted on backshifts or weekends.
Backshift or
weekend tours were conducted on January 2, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15,
16, 17, 21, 22, 23, and 28.
During this inspection period, one additional example of an apparent
violation listed in NRC Inspection Report 280, 281/88-32, one new
violation, and three inspector followup items were identified. These
items. are listed below .
One additional example of apparent violation 280, 281/88-32-01 was
identified in paragraph 8.a during closeout of unresolved item 280,
281/88-28-02 regarding the emergency diesel generator (EOG) room
Th2 ,.:xar:1ple involved a f2ilure to translate appropriate
design requirements into specifications and procedures.
2
One violation was identified in paragraph 3.b with regard to several
examples of operations problems with failure to fol]ow procedures
and/or inadequate procedures (280, 281/88-51-01).
One inspector followup item was identified in paragraph 4.b with
regard to the review of the instrument air system for operability
(280, 281/88-51-02).
One inspector followup item was identified in paragraph 8.d with
regard to a reviev1 of the evaluation of Whip restraints on the
pressurizer surge line (281/88-51-03).
One inspector followup item was identified in paragraph 9.a with
regard to followup on licensee evaluation of replica parts issue
(280, 281/88-51-04) .
REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
2.
Licensee Employees
- J. Bailey, Superintendent of Operations
- R. Bilyeu, Licensing Engineer
- R. Blount, Superintendent of Technical Services
- E. Grecheck, Assistant Station Manager
- M. Kansler, Station Manager
- G. Miller, Licensing Coordinator, Surry
- H. Miller, Assistant Station Manager
- J. Ogren, Superintendent of Maintenance
- T. Sowers, Superintendent of Engineering
- D. S. Hart, Supervisor, Quality
Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators, shift
technical advisors, shift supervisors and other plant personnel.
- Attended exit meeting .
During this inspection period, a third NRC resident inspector reported for
duty at the Surry Power Station.
The third inspector, Mr. John W. York,
was assigned to the station to supplement the resident inspection effort
due to the NRC management's increased concern of recent events and
identification of programmatic issues associated with the design and
management overview of operation of the facility.
The NRC Region II Section Chief, F. Cantrell, visited the Surry Power
Station on January 12 and 13, 1989.
Mr. Cantrell toured the plant
including the low level intake structure and the Unit 1 containment.
Mr. Cantrell also participated in a meeting between the NRC.residents and
licensee management.
The meeting was held to discuss the current status
of issues and the schedule for corrective actions associated with the
issues.
Plant Status
Unit 1 began the reporting period in a refueling shu.tdovm.
The reactor
vessel head was properly torqued and the unit entered cold shutdown
conditions.
After completion of work which required maintaining vessel
water level below the flange, the reactor coolant system was filled and
reactor coolant pumps were jogged to vent the system.
The reactor coolant
sys tern temperature was increased and a bubb 1 e was formed in the
pressurizer on January 11.
Reactor coolant temperature was increased
above 150 degrees F and a satisfactory hydrostatic test of piping repairs
1.,ias accomplished on the
11 B" steam generator feedwater piping.
The unit
2
remained in cold shutdown at the end of the inspection period while
repairs continued on safety-related pumps.
Unit 2 began the reporting period in a refueling shutdown.
Fuel offload
was completed on December 19, 1988, and empty vessel work was accomplished
including an inspection for foreign material in the system.
After
completion of empty vessel work, the core reload was completed on
January 6, 1989.
The head was properly torqued and the unit entered the
cold shutdown condition on January 16, where it remained while repairs
continued on various plant components.
3.
Operational Safety Verification
(71707)
The inspectors conducted daily inspections in the following areas:
control room staffing, access, and operator behavior; operator adherence
to approved procedures, technical specifications, and limiting conditions
for operations; examination of panels containing instrumentation and bther
reactor protection system elements to determine that required channels are
operable; and review of control room operator logs, operating orders,
plant deviation reports, tagout logs, jumper logs, and tags on components
to verify compliance with arproved procedures.
The inspectors conducted weekly inspections in the following areas:
verification of operability *of selected engineered safety feature (ESF)
systems by valve alignment, breaker positions, condition of equipment or
components, and operability of instrumentation and support items essential
to system actuation or* performance. Plant tours were
conducted which
included observation of general
plant/equipment conditions, fire
protection and preventative measures, control of activities in progress,
radiation protection controls, physical security controls, plant
housekeeping conditions/cleanliness, and missile hazards.
The inspectors
routinely monitor the temperature of the auxiliary feedwater pump
discharge piping to ensure steam binding is prevented.
The inspectors conducted biweekly inspections in the following areas:
verification review and walkdown of safety-related tagouts in effect;
review of sampling program (e.g., primary and secondary coolant samples,
boric acid tank samples, plant_liquid and gaseous samples); observation of
control room shift turnover; review of implementation of the plant problem
identificatio1 system; verification of selected portions of containment
isolation lineups; and verification that notices to workers are posted as
required by 10 CFR 19.
Inspections included areas in the Units 1 and 2 cable vaults, vital
battery rooms, steam safeguards areas, emergency switchgear rooms, diesel
generator rooms, control room, auxiliary building, Units 1 and 2
containments, cable penetration areas, independent spent fuel storage
facility, 1 ow 1 evel intake structure, and the safeguards va 1 ve pit and
pump pit areas. Reactor coolant system leak rates were reviewed to ensure
that detected or suspected 1 eakage from the system was recorded,
investigated, and evaluated, and that appropriate actions were taken, if
3
required.
The inspectors routinely independently calculated reactor
coolant system (RCS) leak rates using the NRC Independent Measurements
Leak Rate Program (RCSLK9).
On a regular basis, radiation work permits
(RWPs) were reviewed and specific work activities were monitored to assure
they were being conducted per the RWPs.
Selected radiation protection
instruments were periodically checked, and equipment operability and
calibration frequency were verified.
In the course of monthly activities, the inspectors included a review of
the 1 i ce_nsee
I s phys i ca 1 security program.
The performance of various
shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily
activities to include: protected and vital areas access controls;
searching of personnel, packages and vehicles; badge issuance and
retrieval; escorting of visitors; and patrols and compensatory poits.
a.
b.
Walkdown o( Instrumentation and 125VDC Cabinets
On December 23, the inspector witnessed field walkdowns in progress
in the Unit 2 7100 Series Instrumentation cabinets.
This field
verification, detailed in an engineering memo dated December 6, 1988,
was in reaction to an NRC concern identified during the service water
Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFI).
The scope of this effort
involved inspecting all external connections in both units cabinets
using the latest drawings.
The licensee engineering staff at their
Innsbrook office has been tasked with evaluation and disposition of
the discrepancies that are identified.
The inspector observed the
wa 1 kdowns in progress and discussed the overa 11 process with the
staff.
No discrepancies were noted.
Operational Problems Encountered During This Inspection Period
During the latter part of this inspection period, several operational
related problems occurred that appeared to be a result of inattention
to detail. Although all of the problems were not directly attributed
to operator mistakes, the operations department had involvement in
all areas.
The following is a listing of these problems.
( 1)
CC-TV-209A Mechanical Stop Blocking Device Failed.
On January 11, operators attempted to block open the air
operated containment isolation valve (CC-TV-209A) which allows
for fl ow of component coo 1 i ng water to the
II A
II residua 1 heat
removal (RHR) heat exchanger for Unit 2.
This evolution was
being done in preparation for maintenance on the air portion of
the valve.
When the air was restored to the valve after
installing the blocking device, the valve unexpectedly closed,
shearing the blocking bolt.
The operators immediately reopened
the valve to restore component cooling water flow to the RHR
heat exchanger and wrote a deviation report
(S2-89-035)
documenting the unexpected action.
(2)
4
Inadvertent Flooding of Unit 2 Cavity Area Due to Improper
System Alignment.
On January 11, operators were completing a system realignment on
Unit 2 in accordance 1vith procedures.
While completing
operational procedure 14.3, the refueling water storage tank
(RWST) backflowed into the reactor coolant system and out of the
reactor vessel flange.
The reactor vessel head had just been
reset earlier that day.
The problem occurred due to improper
system alignment and related to a procedure which had temporary
changes and was difficult to follow.
Operators secured the
improper flowpath and drained the excess water to the
containment sump.
The operators wrote a deviation report
( S2-89-037) documenting the pro bl ems.
The operators involved
met with the Operations Superintendent to discuss the problems
associated with this event.
It was concluded that while the
procedure could have been clearer, the operator failed to follow
the procedure guidance for recovery from this abnormal system
alignment.
(3)
1-SW-432 Tagged Open, Found Closed.
On January 13, during a walkdown by the Institute of Nuclear
Power Operations (INPO), service water drain valve l-SW-432 was
found to be shut although it was tagged open in accordance with
station procedures.
Operations personnel returned the valve to
the -open position and wrote a deviation report ( Sl-89-88) to
document the problem.
Operations personnel also conducted a
selected tagout audit and no additional problems were
identified.
(4)
Suction to Unit 1 Operating Charging Pump Isolated
On January 14, Unit 1 operators received an alarm on seal
injection to the reactor coolant pump (RCP) decreasing to
approximately
11 0
11 flow.
Also, the operators noticed a low
amperage reading on the operating charging pump.
Additional
evaluation of the control panel determined that the suction
flowpath to the charging pump from both the RWST -and the volume
control tank (VCT) were isolated.
This isolation resulted in a
partial loss of seal injection to the running RCP, and operation
of a chargin[ pump with an inadequate suction supply of water
for one or two minutes.
The operators reestablished a flowpath
from the RWST to the operational charging pump and indication of
flows and amps returned to normal.
Operations personnel then
documented the problem with a deviation report (Sl-89-94) and
also determined that the charging pump which was running had an
inboard seal leak .
Initial investigation of the problem determined that the
assigned unit operator had turned the unit over to the third
( 5)
(6)
5
operator approximately five minutes prior to the event.
During
the turnover, the unit operator failed to speci fi ca lly identify
that the charging pump suction was aligned to the RWST during
the board walkdown.
This information may have contributed to a
slight recovery delay; however, the reason that the RWST suction
flowpath was lost (LCV-11150 shut) has not been determined.
The
personnel involved performed a detailed review of the event,
including construction of the sequence of events from the
Emergency Response Facility Computer System (ERFCS).
In
addition, personnel in the vicinity of the LCV-11150 breaker at
the time of the event were interviewed.
No cause for the
closure of the suction valve has been determined at this time.
CC-TV-109A Mechanical Stop Blocking Device Failed.
On January 15, operators were attempting to block open the air
operated containment iso-lation valve (CC-TV-109A) that allows
for flow of component cooling water to the
11A
11
RHR heat
exchanger for Unit 1. This evolution was being done to test the
blocking device and the operators had the
11 B
11 RHR heat exchanger
in service, which did not require the flowpath through the 109A
valve.
Also, an operable RCS Loop was available to remove decay
heat, if required.
When the air was restored to the valve after
installing the blocking device, the valve went unexpectedly to
the closed position shearing the blocking bolt. This action was
similar to the problem that occurred on the Unit 2 valve on
January 11.
The operators wrote a deviation report (Sl-89-102)
to document the action.
The licensee concluded that the
b 1 oc king .device is not designed to keep the va 1 ve open with
instrument air pressure inadvertently acting to close the valve.
Initial
investigation determined that the shift orders
instructed the operators to install the blocking device in
accordance with procedure FCA 1. 00 ( 120) to determine if the
device wou 1 d work.
The 1 i censee has determined that the
procedure would work satisfactorily for its intended purpose
(i.e. loss of instrument air).
However, in the presence of
instrument air, the pneumatic relay causes the valve to go
closed with a force sufficient to break the blocking device.
The licensee concluded that FCA 1.00 should not be used for
maintenance evo 1 uti ons and wi 11 prepare a new procedure to
address establishment of proper controls for maintenance.
Drain Valves in Turbine Building Found Shut With Pipe Caps
Installed; But Were Tagged Open.
On January 17, during an INPO walkdown three additional service
water drain valves were found to be shut when they were tagged
open in accordance with station procedure.
Also, one secondary
plant drain valve was found open when it was tagged shut.
Operations personnel wrote four deviation reports (Sl-89-121,
6
122, 123, 124) documenting the problems.
This condition is
similar to the January 13 problem.
Licensee management, by memo
dated January 18, reemphasized to all personnel the policy that
only operators, properly authorized, are permitted to operate
plant components.
(7)
Reactor Coolant Pump Start Without Proper Verification That Loop
Flow Instrumentation Was Available.
On January 19, the Unit 1
11 B
11 reactor coolant pump was started
in accordance with procedure.
After approximately 10 seconds,
the pump was secured due to no flow indication in the loop.
Subsequent investigation determined that the loop flow
transmitters were tagged out.
Operations personnel wrote a
deviation report (Sl-89-139) documenting the problem.
Licensee
management stated that the requirements to verify that al 1
supporting components are available prior to operation of a
cpmponent is the responsibility of the Shift Supervisor.
The
licensee is still reviewing the causes of this event.
(8)
Operation of Charging Pump Without Proper Recirculation Flow
Alignment.
( 9)
On January 19, the Unit 1
11 P..
11 charging pump was started in
accordance with procedure.
After running for several minutes,
operators noticed that the pump amperage was oscillating and the
discharge piping at the pump was vibrating.
The
11 B
11 charging
pump was started and the
11A
11 charging pump discharge valve was
shut.
After approximately 20 seconds, the
11A
11 charging pump
amperage started to decrease.
The operator immediately secured
the
11A
11 charging pump.
Review of the control panels determined
that the red and green valve position indication lenses for the
11A
11 charging pump recirculation isolation valve 1-1ere reversed.
This condition resulted in the operators thinking that the
recirculation flow isolation valve was open prior to pump start
when the valve was actually closed.
The reversed lens condition
was corrected and a review of all other indication lens
positions was conducted.
Operations personnel wrote a deviation
report (Sl-89-144) documenting the problem.
The licensee is
reviewing this problem to determine if any additional corrective
actions are required.
Operation of Containment Vacuum Pump with Blank Installed in
Suction Flowpath.
On
January 21, operations personnel attempted to start
containment
1A
1 vacuum pump (1-CV-P-lA) and determined that no
flow was occurring during operation.
The pump was secured and
subsequent investigation determined that a blank was installed
in the suction line at penetration # 72 in containment.
Operations personnel wrote a deviation report (Sl-89-159)
7
documenting the problem.
A review of the temporary
modifications logs indicates that the subject blank was properly
documented as being ins ta 11 ed and removed as required by
procedure.
The licensee is reviewing this problem to determine
why the blank was still installed.
After the first two problems occurred, the reside*nt inspectors
discussed the situation with licensee management including the
operations supervisor and station manager.
Initial action taken
by the 1 icensee was a briefing of all operations shifts by the
operati~ns supervisor.
The briefing specifically emphasized
that the operators must pay attention to detail and ensure that
each evolution being performed is done correctly.
After the next three problems occurred, the resident inspectors
again discussed the situation with station management.
On
January 14, the senior resident inspector discussed the problems
1-Jith the station manager and the Vice President - Nuclear.
The
inspector expressed concern with regard to the situation and
stated that. licensee actions in these areas will be closely
monitored.*
The inspector was informed that additional actions
were being implemented, which requires each operations evolution
to be reviewed by two operators (person performing evolution and
his supervisor) prior to performance.
Management also stated
that they were reemphasizing to station personnel that doing the
job right the first time and not using schedule as the primary
requirement over qua 1 ity is the way that management wants the
job done.
During the following week, the last four problems occurred.
The
residents
held several
discussions with station management
during this time frame, and again expressed concern that it was
not evident that management
1 s actions to correct the problems
were effective.
The station manager assured the resident
inspectors that the adverse trend would be corrected.
He stated
that station management met with all department heads
on
January 20, to review these and other occurrences, and to
discuss common threads and corrective actions.
Each occurrence
was reviewed with emphasis on determining lessons learned and
accountability, as well as methods to communicate the standards
to all personnel.
As a result of the meeting, as well as
earlier discussions between the Superintendent .of Operations and
operations supervision, station management took the following
actions:
A requirement that the shift supervisor pre-brief all off-normal
operational evolutions with the personnel involved in order to
provide additional assurance that proper preparation and review
are being conducted .
C.
8
Implementation of a policy in which
any
operations
personnel involved in an event are immediately, relieved of
watch duties, and required to prepare and present a report
detailing
the
event problem,
causes,
and
corrective
actions.
A requirement that operations perform a 100% audit of
current tagging records to assure that pl ant status is
accurate.
The primary responsibility for the Unit 1 component status
control has been returned to the on-shift Shift Supervisor.
This action allows for more shift involvement in the
control and review of the return of components and systems
from maintenance.
A meeting with operations personnel, the station manager,
and
the
operations
superintendent
to
discuss
job
performance, attention to detail, and doing the job right
the first time.
This meeting reiterated the management
requirement that doing the job right is paramount over
schedule.
The residents consider that the senior station management is properly
sensitized to correcting the problems.
Virginia Power Corporate
Management also considers that attention to detail, doing the job
right the first time, and not trying to maintain schedule at the cost
of quality are requisite requirements.
However, the failure to get
this message down to the working level is one of the reasons that the
problems listed above are still occurring.
Surry Technical Specification 6.4 requires that detailed written
procedures with appropriate check-off lists and instructions shall be
provided and followed *for normal startup, operation, shutdown,
testing, and conduct of preventative or corrective maintenance
operations of all systems and components involving nuclear safety of
the station.
The operations related problems as listed in paragraphs
3.b.l, 3.b.2, 3.b.3, 3.b.5, 3.b.6, 3.b.8, and 3.b.9 above are
identified as a violation* of Technical Specification 6.4.
Violation
280, 28J/88-5J-Ol, Failure to follov, procedure and/or inadequate
procedure.
Licensee 10 CFR 50.72 Reports
On January 6, a four hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 was
made to the NRC with regards to an inadvertent start of the No. 3
EOG.
During of testing of the EOG, the diesel automatically started
after shutdown.
The restart occurred when the diesel control switch
was returned to- auto.
Investigation by the licensee revealed that
one of the electrical relays supplied the auto start signal due to
failure of a diode in the start circuitry.
No valid start signal was
9
determined to be at the start relay.
The relay and diode were
replaced and appropriate post maintenance testing was performed.
On January 26, 1989, the licensee reported to the NRC in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.72 that damaged power cables had been discovered for
both Unit 2 inside recirculation spray (IRS) pumps.
During previous
work to replace a damaged flex conduit on the Unit 1-B IRS pump, the
licensee noted that the fiberglass braid jacket was frayed and in
some areas missing.
In addition, the silicon rubber insulation was
cracked, exposing the copper wiring.
This prompted additional
inspection of the other Unit 1 pump and the two pumps in Unit 2.
From the results of this inspection, the licensee determined that the
B pump in Unit 1 and the A and B pumps in Unit 2 were potentially
inoperable due to degraded power cables.
A region-based inspector
examined the cable as discussed in NRC Inspection Report 280,
281/89-03.
The licensee evaluation of the failure mechanism was
being conducted when the inspection period ended.
4.
Operational Readiness Program Review
(71710)
During the last half of 1988, several problems have been identified at the
Surry Power Station which resulted in questioning the design basis of the
Service Water System and also in questioning the known configuration of
other safety-related systems.
As a result of these problems, the
licensee, in a meeting in NRC headquarters on December 22, 1988, stated
that they would conduct a safety system review to assure a comprehensive
search and resolution of problems prior to the initial unit startup. This
review effort was sorted by systems that are referenced in the station
Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) and assigned to the newly formed
systems engineering group at the station.
The licensee presented a broad
overview of the review and concluded that a Station Nuclear Safety and
Operating Committee (SNSOC) review and acceptance of the findings would be
required prior to restart.
In conjunction, the licensee stated that the
site Quality Assurance (QA) group would perform an independent assessment
of the review activities.
The licensee was unable to address in detail
the specifics of the review activities and, therefore, agreed to meet at a
later date.
The licensee, in a January 5, 1989, meeting in the NRC Region II offices,
presented a more detailed overvi~w of the operational readiness program.
The licensee's Vice President - Nuclear presented a chart which outlined
the new engineering organization and discussed to some extent how this
organization would be providing support to the stations in the future.
The Surry Station Manager then provided a fairly detailed overview of how
system reviews would be conducted.
The controlling Engineering Work
Request (EWR), which is discussed below, was the major topic of
discussion.
Additional licensee personnel addressed the mechanics of the
system/component selection, the method and technique to be used for system
\\\\1alkdowns, the power supply verification process, and how additional
i
10
testing and documentation review would be accomplished.
The meeting
generally provided a satisfactory understanding of the operational
readiness program to the NRC staff.
The controlling document for this effort was stated to be the Engineering
11System Review for Startup/Surry/Units 1 & 2.
11
The stated purpose of this EWR was to bolster confidence that systems will
operate as expected.
The scope of this EWR outlines the overall method in
which this task is to be performed as follows:
a.
Determination of Systems to Be Included
b.
Plant Configuration Confirmation
c.
Power Supply and Train Independence Confirmation
d.
Assessment of Outstanding Issues for Each System
e.
Functional Testing
f.
Documentation and Acceptance of Results
The resident inspectors extensively monitored the licensee actions as
. implementation of each of the above items began.
The following details
the specifics of this inspection effort.
a.
Determination of Systems to Be Included.
The licensee utilized the EOPs to identify components or systems
requiring review.
This broad group of procedures included Emergency
Procedures (EP), Fire Contingency Action (FCA) Procedures, Emergency
Contingency Action (ECA) Procedures, and Functional Restoration
Procedures ( FRP).
A task team was formed that reviewed the above
procedures and identified all components or systems that require
review.
The team, which included a senior reactor operator (SRO),
determined if each component was necessary for the safe completion of
the procedure, and annotated this evaluation on the master list. The
EWR required this determination to be made based on the Updated Final
Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) assumptions, safety related versus
non-safety related equipment, and the technical specification
requirements.
The inspectors reviewed the final results of the task team and were
in agreement with the general method used to bound the scope of this
effort.
This review included a sample of components that are
referenced in a procedure, yet determined to be exempt from the
walkdowns.
The inspectors noted that the systems review for each
unit did not include the entire cross-tie piping and the required
equipment in the opposite unit.
The licensee acknov1ledged this
comment and was developing an evaluation as the inspection period
ended.
The inspection will continue in this area.
l
11
b.
Plant Configuration Confirmation
This portion of the EWR deals with the system walkdowns performed by
the system engineers.
The intent of these walkdowns is stated as
follows:
Insure that components are physically located in the system as
per the station drawings.
Insure that proper identification is provided for the
components.
Insure that components are in proper orientation (e.g. check
valves in proper direction).
Insur~ that discrepancies are identified and addressed.
The method utilized for these walkdowns was for the system engineers
to take the marked up drawings provided by the task team previously
discussed and, starting from a known location, confirm the location
of co~ponents with respect to the identified drawings.
The results.
of these walkdowns were documented on a
11Walkdown Report
11
, \\vith any
discrepancies listed on an attached
11 Items of Note
11 page.
Following
the walkdown, the system engineers discussed their findings with a
designated SRO and determined whether the discrepancy constituted a
11 startup concern
11 and required any other appropriate action to be
taken.
This action to resolve each issue was documented adjacent to
each item on the
11 Items of Note
11 page.
The inspectors
1
review of the system walkdowns included the
following:
Independent walkdowns and comparison with the licensee results
for portions of the following systems:
Safety Injection Accumulator lA
Emergency Diesel Generator Starting Air
Auxiliary Feedwater - Main Feedwater (Feedwater) Outside
Containment
Main Steam (licensee had not completed walkdown)
Compressed Air
Walkdowns with the system engineers to observe t~chnique and
identification of items for portions of the following systems:
Chemical and Volume Control
12
Witness the determination of actions to resolve each item
by
the systems engineer and the SRO on portions of the following
systems:
Radiation Monitors
Component Cooling
Auxiliary and Safeguards Building Ventilation
Main Control Room Envelope Ventilation
Review the system engineer
1s items identified during their
walkdown of the following systems:
Emergency Diesel Generator Starting Air
Inside & Outside Recirculating Spray
The following are examples of the licensee
1s findings that were
identified during walkdowns of some of the systems:
Numerous tagging problems, e.g., brass instead of stainless*
steel tag, no tag, tag attached to the wrong part of component,
etc.
Broken or loose electrical conduits
Housekeeping
Electrical junction boxes, e.g., no cover, missing screws, or*
bolts, boric acid leak onto box, etc.
Missing insulation
Outdated calibration stickers
Valve handwheels loose, missing or obstructed
Material conditions, e.g., rusty fasteners, rusty base plate,
rusty piping, cracked concrete, etc.
Too much grease on motor operated valves (MOV)
Bent travel indicator on valve, bent scale plate
Supports/restraints, e.g., missing, missing spring can
The inspectors concluded that the system engineering walkdowns
appeared adequate.
In some instances, deficiencies were identified
13
by the walkdown on portions of the system that were not highlighted
to be included.
The inspectors also concluded that the threshold for
categorizing deficiencies for startup was adequate.
A concern was
raised, however, during the inspectors in depth look at the station
instrument air system.
The instrument air compressors are identified
in the UFSAR as being the primary (normal) supplier to the instrument
air system.
In addition, the instrument air compressors are powered
from an emergency bus to mitigate the consequences of a loss of
offsite power event.
In reality, and as described in the plant
training manual,
the service air compressors are used as the primary
supply to the instrument air system.
It was evident from the
instrument air system walkdown that the instrument air compressors
have not been routinely maintained in an operable and usable
condition.
The 1 i censee acknowledges the above comments and has
committed to return the instrument air compressors to full
operability prior to a unit restart.
This item is identified as an
Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 280, 281/88-51-02, Review of the
Instrument Air System Status Prior to a Unit Restart.
c.
Power Supply and Train Independence Confirmation.
This subject was inspected by reg1on-based inspectors and documented
in NRC Inspection Report 280, 281/89-01.
d.
Assessment of Outstanding Issues for Each System.
This item is covered in Attachment
IV to EWR 88-584 and includes a
review of outstanding temporary modifications and/or jumpers, station
deviations, commitment items, outstanding safety-related work orders,
outstanding EWRs and open Type 1 engineering evaluations .. The system
engirieers have been tasked with reviewing the above items pertaining
to their particular system and evaluating if closure of the item is
possible prior to unit startup.
For those items that \\vill not be
closed prior to startup, a justification for not completing the item
must be completed and approved by the Superintendent of Technical
Services.
-
The overal 1 status of the engineering work as of January 26, 1989,
was as fo 11 ows:
System Walkdowns
Discrepancies Identified
Discrepancies Cleared
Startup Issues
89% Complete
2853
703
55
It should be noted that a large majority of the discrepancies identified
consisted of minor concerns that do not hinder operation of the systems.
The appropriate system engineers were just starting their document review
when the inspection period ended.
The inspectors performed a broad
overv i ev1 of each document fl owpath and wi 11 continue this inspection
effort by following a representative sample of each of the above subjects
14
through the system engineer and on to final disposition.
In addition, the
inspectors will continue to perform some additional walkdowns of systems
as well as observe selected deficiencies that have been identified.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Maintenance Inspections (62703)
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed maintenance
activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedures.
On January 19, the inspectors witnessed routine disassembly and cleaning
of the
1 B
1 train chiller and associated service water strainer and piping
that supplies chilled water to the main control room and emergency
switchgear rooms.
This \\'/Ork was being performed in accordance with
maintenance procedtJrP.~ MMP-C-VS-269,
11 Control Room Chiller Condenser Tube
Cleaning
11
, and VS-YS-M/2W,
11 Cleaning of Control/Relay Room Chiller Pump
Inlet Y-Type Strainers
11
The inspector examined the condition of the
condenser prior to cleaning and noted a fairly extensive buildup of river
sludge in the tubes.
The maintenance staff indicated that this was
representative of a condenser unit that had remained idle for some period,
and noted that there was no strong evidence of biological growth present.
The inspector verified procedure adherence for the work being performed.
No discrepancies were noted.*
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Surveillance Inspections
(61726)
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed various surveillance
activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedures as
follows:
a.
Test prerequisites were met.
Tests were performed_ in accordance with approved procedures.
Test procedures appeared to perform their intended function.
Adequate cocrdination existed among personnel involved in the test.
Test data were properly collected and recorded.
Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Test
The inspectors revievJed the special test of the component cooling
water heat exchangers (CCWHX) in accordance with Special Test ST-243,
11 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Water Box Level Test
11
, dated
January 19, 1989.
This test collects performance data of the two
upper CCWHX without the aid of the vacuum priming system and with the
intake canal level at 20 feet plus or minus 1 foot.
This issue was
b.
15
initially identified and discussed in NRC Inspection Report 280,
281/88-14, when the inspector observed an apparent dependency of the
CCWHX on the non-safety related and non-seismically qualified vacuum
priming system.
The licensee committed to testing this system to
demonstrate that adequate service water flow can be maintained as
documented in
NRC Inspection Report 280, 281/88-28 (IFI 280,
281/88-28-03).
The inspectors reviewed the proposed test, witnessed
installation of test equipment, and discussed the test with the
operations staff.
The actual test was delayed due to plant
conditions, therefore, this inspection effort will continue into the
next inspection period. This IFI remains open.
Charging Pump Operability Test
On
January 20,
1989,
the inspectors witnessed operability
verification of the 1-CH-P-lA charging purip in accordance \\'Jith
periodic test procedure 1-PT-18.7,
11 Charging Pump Operability And
Performance Test.
This test was being conducted to assess any
damage that may have occurred when the pump was started with the
recirculation line inadvertently isolated (discussed in paragraph
3.b.8). The pump met the acceptance criteria for fully operable with
the exception of the vibrations on the outboard pump bearing, which
were slightly in the alert range.
The inspector witnessed the
communic_ation and data collection in addition to verification of
compliance with the test procedure.
No discrepancies were noted.
7.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Review
(92700)
The inspectors reviewed the LER's listed below to ascertain whether NRC
reporting requirements were being met and to determine appropriateness of
the corrective actions. The inspector's review also included followup_ on
implementation of corrective action and review of licensee documentation
that all required corrective actions were complete.
LERs that identify violations of regulations and that meet the criteria o~
10 CFR, Part 2, Appendix C,Section V shall be identified as Licensee
Identified Violations (LIV) in the following closeout paragraphs.
LIVs
are considered first-time occurrence violations which meet the NRC
Enforcement Policy for exemption fro~ issuance of a Notice of Violation.
These items are identified tc allow for proper evaluations of corrective
actions in the event that similar events occur in the future.
(Closed)
Excessive Leakage Past Reactor Cavity Seal Ring.
The LER involved the leakage of approximately 25,800 gallons of water past
the reactor cavity seal and into the containment sump.
This event was
investigated by an NRC Augmented Inspection Team with the results
documented in NRC Inspection Report 280, 281/88-33.
The redesign of the
seal and additional corrective actions were inspected by region-based
inspectors as documented in NRC Inspection Reports
280, 281/88-38 and
88-47.
Appropriate testing inspections were documented in NRC Inspection
Reports 280, 281/88-41 and 88-45.
This LER is considered closed.
- 8.
16
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701 and 92702)
a.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (URI) 280, 281/88-28-02, Review of Safety
Classification of Emergency Diesel Generator (EOG) Room Louvers.
This item involved the non-safety grade room louvers that must open
to allow combustion and cooling air to the EDGs.
In addition, the
proper operation of the louvers was not verified by a periodic test
and the maintenance on the louvers was not commensurate with their
importance to safety.
The licensee has subsequently maintained the
louvers in a failed open condition until the system can be upgraded.
This item is identified as an additional example of apparent
violation 280, 281/88-32-01 for failure to translate appropriate
design requirements into procedures and drawings.
b.
(Closed)
URI 280, 281/88-36-03, Review of Additional Licensee
Evalu?.tion Addressing Timely Determination of System Operability and
Generic Evaluation of Problems.
This item was identified in NRC
Inspection Report 280, 281/88-36.
In that report, the inspectors
determined that the licensee's actions with regard to timely
eva 1 uati on of operabi 1 i ty from a design and emergency procedures
perspective should be reviewed.
Licensee management agreed with the
inspector's concern and revised the administrative procedure
(SUADM-0-12, "Operational Department Notifications") to insure that
better guidance is provided to the Shift Supervisor in order to
properly evaluate operability of safety-related components.
The inspectors also identified a concern with regard to generic
evaluation of the leaking pipe joint as related to other similar
joints in the system.
During this inspection period, the inspector
was provided a copy of the engineering evaluation of the pipe joint
condition.
In that report, the engineer stated that all similar
joints would be reviewed and repaired as necessary.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to the generic
concerns and also determined that generic reviews would be
appropriately addressed in the future by the new realignment of the
engineering organization.
The inspector considers that licensee
response in this area is adequate to close this unresolved item.
c.
(Closed) (IFI) 280/88-36-02, Walkdown of Containment Spray System.
d.
This item identified several minor discrepancies discovered during an
inspector ~alkdowrr of selected portions of the Unit 1 containment
spray system.
The inspector reviewed the same discrepancies noted by
the system engineer during his walkdown of this system, and reviewed
the documented corrective actions to be performed.
The actions taken
by the licensee regarding these discrepancies appear to be adequate,
therefore this item is considered closed .
(Open)
NRC
Bulletin 88-11, Pressurizer Surge Line Thermal
Stratification.
This bulletin concerns the unexpected movement of
the pressurizer surge line due to thermal stratification which could
17
result in high local stresses, fatigue or functional impairment of
the line.
The inspectors observed the licensee action taken to
satisfy paragraph 1 a. of the bulletin.
This paragraph requested
that the licensee conduct a visual inspection of the pressurizer
surge line to determine if there is any gross discernible distress or
structural damage in the line, including piping, piping supports,
pipe whip restraints, and anchor bolts.
On Unit 1, no gross deformation of supports or piping was noted.
One
flat area on the inside diameter approximately six by six inches was
noted.
This area was not near a support and probably occurred during
pipe bending.
In the area Qf the five C-shaped whip restraints, the pipe had small
smoothly worn areas approximately two inches long by one inch wide by
a maximum of 1/64 inch deep.
The most notable indications were on
the bottom of the pipe, but indications were also noted on the top of
the pipe in the area of several whip restraints.
The indications
were caused when a two-inch wide buildup area on the whip restraint
was contacted by the surge line during thermal expansion.
Stone and
Webster has evaluated the indications for the licensee and they are
acceptable.
On Unit 2, none of these types of indications were noted.
However,
some loose nuts were noted on the inside of whip restraint No. 3.
One restraint had a bent rod and two other spring can rods were
offset approximately three inches from plumb.
This offset would
increase once the surge line grows due to thermal expansion.
Three
of the five spring cans were bottomed out on the load indicator. All
of this is being evaluated by Stone and Webster engineering.
This is
identified as IFI 281/88-51-03, Evaluation of Whip Restraints on
Pressurizer Surge Line.
The inspector entered Unit 1 containment with the cognizant Stone and
Webster engineers on January 16, 1989, and Unit 2 on January 18,
1989. * The inspectors performed a visual inspection to verify the
above reported results and also inspected the surge line supports and
whip restraints to determine if the licensee had detected all
apparent damage.
The inspectors did not note any other damage.
9.
Evaluation of Licensee Quality Assura~ce Program Implementation
(35502)
a.
Replica Parts in Safety-Related Valves and Pumps
During this inspection period, the licensee identified a potential
problem associated with the station procurement process for the
purchase of sleeves, bushings, bearings, and/or shafts during the
period from approximately 1975 to 1983.
The potential problem was
discussed between the residents and the station manager on
January 11, 1988.
In that discussion, the station manager stated
that the problem was limited to approximately 270 to 280 purchase
18
orders (POs) from two suppliers (STURM and BEAVCO).
The issue had to
do with inappropriate documentation of the procured parts for use in
safety-related applications.
When the procurement problem was
discovered in 1983, the licensee took actions to purge the suspect
parts from the warehouse inventory.
However, at the time of
reassembly of the Unit 2 inside recirculation spray pumps during this
current outage, inappropriate parts procured from STURM were
discovered, prompting a reviev1 of the procurement process.
This
review identified the fact that actions to purge the suspect parts in
1983 were not adequate.
On January 13, 1989, the licensee held a meeting on site at which
time the residents and the NRC section chief for Surry were briefed.
The licensee also provided a plan to resolve the issue.
In that
meeting the 1 icensee identified all susceptible safety-related
components which must be evaluated for possible replica parts.
These
components include the pressurizer power operated relief valves
(PORVs), charging pumps, inside and outside recirculation spray
pumps, containment spray pumps, residual heat removal
pumps,
auxiliary feedwater pumps, low head safety injection pumps, emergency
service water pumps, component coo 1 i ng water pumps, boric acid
transfer pumps, charging pump cooling water pumps, charging pump
service water pumps, emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer
pumps, spent fuel pit cooling pumps, and control room chiller service
water pumps.
The licensee formed a task team to identify the
component priority list, to identify replica parts in the components
if applicable, to resolve acceptability of replica parts in
components, and to document all corrective actions associated with
this issue.
The residents were provided with a listing of the team
members and also provided assurances that no other known replica
parts problems presently existed.
On January 25, the residents were provided with a memorandum from the
Engineering Superintendent to the Surry Station Manager addressing
the status of the replica parts issue.
In that memo, the licensee
stated that based.on a review of the maintenance and procurement
history for safety-related pumps and PORVs listed above, the task
team has determined that no replica parts are installed in the
safety-related pumps and PORVs except for one low head safety
injection pump (1-SI-P-lJl.), one spent fuei cooling pump, and one
component cooling water pump.
The licensee intends to replace the
replica parts in the low head safety injection pump prior to Unit 1
restart.
The residents will monitor the maintenance activity on this
pump and conduct additional reviews of documentation in this area
prior to restart.
This item is identified as IFI 280, 281/88-51-04,
Followup on Licensee Evaluation of Replica Parts Issue.
10.
Other Items
In January 1989, the Virginia Power Nuclear Engineering Organization was
reorganized to better support the requirements of the two nuclear power
19
stations.
This reorganization resulted in realignment of the Surry Power
StatioD engineering staff.
A new Superintendent of Engineering position
was created at each station to better coordinate engineering efforts.
Under this position, five new engineering supervisory positions were
created (Supervisor, System Engineering; Supervisor, Advisory Operations;
Supervisor, Configuration Management; Supervisor, Design; Supervisor, NOE)
to better coordinate the engineering support during the design
reconstitution effort at the station.
11.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 2, 1989,
with those individuals identified by an asterisk in paragraph 1.
The
following new items were identified by the inspectors during this exit:
One additional example of apparent violation 280, 281/88-32-01 was
identified in paragraph 8.a during closeout of unresolved item 280,
281/88-28-02 regarding the EOG room louvers.
The example involved a
failure to translate appropriate design requirements into specifications
and procedures.
One violation was identified in paragraph 3.b with regard to several
examples of operations problems with failure to follow procedures and/or
inadequate procedures (280, 281/88-51-01).
One inspector followup item was identified in paragraph 4.b with regard to
the review of the instrument air system for operability (280,
281/88-51-02).
One inspector followup item was identified in paragraph 8.d with regard to
a review of the evaluation of whip restraints on the pressurizer surge
line (281/88-51-03).
One inspector followup item was identified in paragraph 9.a with regard to
followup
on
licensee evaluation of replica parts issue (280,
281/88-51-04).
The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings; however, the following
comment was provided with regard to the additional example of apparent
violation 280, 281/88-32-01, which was discussed in paragraph 8;a.
The
1 i censee stated that appropriate engineering cal cul ati ons demonstrated
that the emergency diesel generator room 1 ouvers would have opened if
required due to the differential pressure created during EOG operation.
Therefore they considered that the classification of the louvers as not
safety-related was appropriate.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided
to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.