ML18152A038
| ML18152A038 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 12/17/1992 |
| From: | Barr K, Wright F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18152A039 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-92-21, 50-281-92-21, NUDOCS 9212300171 | |
| Download: ML18152A038 (37) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1992021
Text
....
UNITED ST.O.TES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
DEC 1 7 1992.
Report. Nos.: * *50-280/92-21. and 50-281/92-21
Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Glen Allen, VA 23060
Docket Nos;:
50-280 and 50-281
Facility Name: Surry 1 and 2
License Nos.:
Inspection Conducted:
November 16 - 20, 1992
Inspector:~.......,,--~-=-*,~
J}_/1~* ~<~~-
~~..,..,* ,__{::f-=..,._*~*~~
F. rLWright, Tearii[eadifr
/2.. i1s-/1;_
- Date" Si~ned
Team Members:
G. Arthur
S. Boynton
W. Gloersen
S. T~*
ent
Approved by: ~
.
___,K-=-.+-->-=-p ....,._ '-:::--' ~,~Ch'""'i~e--=f-------
Emergency Preparedness Section
Radiological Protection and Emergency
Preparedness Branch
1rJ1 ff'-
DaeS~gned
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
SUMMARY
Scope:
'
This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of
the annual emergency preparedness exercise. Emergency organization activation
and response were selectively observed in the licensee'~ Emergency Response
Facilities including: Simulator Control Room, Technical Support Center,
Operational Support Center, and Local Emergency Operations Facility.
The
inspection also includ~d a review of the exercise scenarfo anij observation of
the licensee's post exercise critique. This exercise was a Partial
Participation.Exercise for State and local response agencies.
Results:
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified. The
licensee's performance during the exercise was good, with the licensee
.successfully meeting most of the exercise objectives. Overall, the exercise
demonstrated an effective capability to protect the public health and safety
in the event of a radiological emergency.
9212300171 921217
ADOCK 05000280
G
- PDR
I I*
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
REPORT DETAILS
- J. Albert, Senior Tra_ining Coordinator
- R. Anderson, Supervisor, Business System
- R. Ashburn, Coordinator, Security Systems
- R. Beckwith, Emergency Planner
- W. Benthall, Nuclear Safety and Licensing
- R. Bilyeu~ Sehior Staff Engineer
_
- H. Blake, Superintendent, Nuclear S~rvices
- R. Blount, Engineering Superintendent
- D. Brock, Assistant Supervisor, Chemistry
- D. Christian, Assistant Station Manager
- J. Collins, Drill Manager
- C. Core, Supervisor, Safety and Licensing Review
- J. Costello, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
- J. Downs, Outage and Planning Superintendent
- D. Erickson, Radiological Asses~ment Director
- A. Friedman, Nuclear Training Superintendent
- L. Girvin, Vice President, Nuclear Services
W. Grriss, Operatiohs Shift Supervisor
- R. Gwalthney, Maintenance Superintendent
M. Holdsworth, Supervisor, Security Operations
- L. Humphrey, Senior NDE Inspector
- F. Jenkins, Assistant Shift Supervisor, Operations
- M. Kansler, Station Manager
- R. Kulp, Emergency Planning Coordinator
J. Kunkle, Reactor Operator
R. Lee, Nuclear Engineering
- W. Madison, Emergency_ Planner.
- B. McBride, North Anna Emergency Coordinator
- J. McCarthy, Superintendent of Operations
- W. Neidermeyer, Simulator Lead Controller
- D. Nole, Senior Staff Engineer
- J. O' Hanlon, Vice-President, Nuclear Operations
- J. Price, Assistant Station Manager
- W. Quinn, Supervisor, Nuclear Training
- J. Rayman, Senior Engineer, North Anna Emergency Planning
- W. Renz, Staff Emergency Planner
R. Saunders, Recovery Manager
M. Small, Assistant Shift Supervisor
D. Souza, Senior Reactor Operator
- S. Wood, Senior Nuclear Training Instructor
- S. Woodyard, Staff Quality Specialist
Other licensee employees cont~cted during this inspection included
engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians,
and administrative personnel,
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- S. Ti~gent, Resident-Inspector
2
- J. York, Acting Senior Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exercise Scenario (82302)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that
provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major
portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee's Emergency
Plan and organization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(l4), 10 CFR 50,
Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F, and spe~ific criteri~ in NUREG-0654,
Section II.N.
The scenario was feviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and
was discussed with licensee representatives.* The scenario developed for
thts exercise was adequate to exercise fully the onsite and offsite
emergency organizations of the licensee and provide sufficient-emergency
information to the State and local government agencies for their
participation in the exercise. The exercise scenario was well
organized, detailed, and sufficiently challenging to exercise the
participants. *
No ~iolations or deviattons were identified;
3.
_ Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
4 ..
This area was observed to determine that primary responsibilities for
emergency response by the licensee_ have been specifically established
and that adequate staff ~as available to respond t~ an emergency as
required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(l), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A,
and specified criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.A.
The inspector observed that the onsite and offsite emergency
organizations were adequately described and the resporisibilitie~ for key
- organization positions were clearly defined in approved plans and
implementing procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Onsite Emergency* Organization (82301)
The licensee's on-shift emergency organization was obs~rved to determine
that the responsibilities for emergency response were unambiguously
defined, that adequate staffing was provided to insure initial facility
accident response in key functional areas at all ttmes, and that the
interfaces were specified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), 10 CFR 50,
Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,
Section II. B.
5.
3
The inspector observed that the initial on-shift emergency organization
~as well defined; the responsibility and authority for directing actions
.necessary to respond to the emergency were clear and that staff were
available to fill key functional positions within the organization.
The licensee adequately demonstrated the ability to alert, notify, and
mobilize licensee response personnel during a off-hours exercise
(06:00 p.m.- 04:00 a.m~).
Augmentation of the initial on-shift
emergency response organization was accomplished through mobilization of
additional offsite personnel and activation of the Emergency Response
Facilities (ERFs).
The inspector observed the activation, staffing, and
- operation of the emergency organization in the Simulator Control Room
(SCR),- Technical Support Center {TSC), the Operational Support Center
(OSC), and the Local Emergency Operations Facility (LEOF)~
The
inspector determined that the licensee was able to staff the facilities
in a timely manner.
Staffing and assignment of responsibilities at the
ERFs were consistent with the licensee's approved procedures.
Because
of the scenario scope and conditions, long term or continuous staffing
of the emergency response organization was not required.
No violatipns* or deviations weie identified .
Emergency* Response Support and Resources (82301)
This area was observed to* determine that arrangements for requesting and
effectively using assistance resources have been made, that arrangements
to accommodate State*and local staff at the li.censee's onsite LEOF have
been made, and that other organizations cap~ble of augmenting the
planned response have been identified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3),
Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in
.
State and 1 o*ca 1 staff could be accommodated at the LEOF.
Arrangements
for requesting offsite assistance resources were in place but not used
during this exercise.
The licensee did request fire and *rescue units from Surry County during
the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to determine that a standard emergency
classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear
facility licensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), 10 CFR 50,
_ Appendix E, Paragraph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,
Section II.D.
The licensee's classification scheme was defined in the Emergency Actio~
Level Table of the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing
Procedure (EPIP)-1.01, Emergency Manager Controlling Procedure, Revision
4
(Rev.) 30, dated September 11, 1992.
The proc~dures provided for off-
normal events to be classified into one of the four emergency
,
classification categories. During the exercise the licensee made the
following emergency classification declarations:
o
A Notification rif Unusual Event (NOUE) was decJared at.06:24 p.m.
due to a loss of containment integrity Emergency Action Level
(EAL) Tab D-4).
o
An Alert was declared at 06:34 p.m. due to a fire potentially
affecting a safety system (Number 1 Emergency Diesel Generator)
(EAL Tab 1-2).
o
A Site Area Emergency was declared at 07:59 p.m. due to loss of 2
fission p~oduct barriers (EAL M~2).
o
A General Emergency was declared at 08:07 p~m. due to loss of 2
fuel barriers and the potential loss of a third (EAL B-10).
The designated Station Emergency Manager (SEM) in the SCR promptly and.
correctly used the procedure to identify and classify ~he Notification
of Unusual Event and the Aler.t as did the SEM in the TSC to classify the
Site Area Emergency and General Emergency.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
-This area was observed to assure that procedures were established for
notification -0f State and local response organizations and;emergency
personnel by the licensee, and that the content of initial and followup
messages to response organizations ~as established .. This area was
further observed to assure that means to provide early notification to
the population within the plume. exposure pathw~y were established
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)ES), Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to
10 CFR SO, and specific guidance promulgated in Section 11.E of NUREG-
0654.
The inspector observed that notification methods and procedures were
used promptly to provide information concerning the simulated emergency
conditions to Federal, State, and local response agencies and to alert
the licensee's augmented emergency response organization.
Procedures
for making notifications to offsite authorities were defined in
EPIP 2.01, Notification of State and Local Governments, Rev .. 18, dated
July 9, 1991 and EPIP-2.02, Notification of NRC, Rev~ 9, dated March 27,
1992.
The SCR issued 3 Emergency Notification Messages and the Tse* and
LEOF issued 2 and 5 respectively.
In general, the message content was
accurate and sufficient for describing onsite events to offsit~
agencies.
Notifications of the Commonwealth of Virginia and local
offsite agencies were initiated within the 15 minutes notificat~on
requirement for the NOUE, Alert, Site Area, and General Emergency
declarations.
- - - ~-----------
5
The licensee demonstrated the ability to notify the NRC Emergency
Operations Center, within one hour followini the declaration of the
NOUE.
The licensee maintained continuous contact with the simulated NRC
phone cell following the initial notification.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Eme_rgency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to determine that prov1s1ons existed for prompt*
communications among principal response organizat.ions and emergency
personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E,
Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria jn NUREG-0654,Section II.F.
The inspector observed that adequate communicationsexisted among the
licensee's emergency organizations, and between the licensee's emergency
response organization and offsite-authorities.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Training and Drills (82301)
This area was observed to assure that training and .dfills for persons
whose assistance may be needed in the event of an radi at i-on emergency
were provided and maintained pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(8)(14);
Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50; and specific crit~ria in*
Section I1.N. of NUREG-0654.
a. *
Emergency Medi ca 1 Dri 11
Licensee exercise objective 16 was "D~monstrate the ability to
provide basic life support and to package and transport a
contaminated injured peison to an off-site medical facility.".
This area was observed to determine whether first aid to a
potentially contaminated injured individual was effectively
provided and to assure appropriate actions were. taken to transport
the worker to the offsite hospital.
An inspector observed the response of first aid and radiation
protection personnel to the simulated contaminated injured worker.
Contamination monitoring and control were provided.and adequate
efforts were directed to the life-threatening injury. However,
the inspectof observed the_ following problems with the licensee's
response: _
0
Command and control at the first aid site was not strong.
No one person appeared to be in charge of the overall effort
to provide initial first aid treatment and preparation of
- the ihjured person for transportation to an off~ite medical
. treatment facility.
6
. o
The injured person was contaminated and radiation protection
personnel at the site were trying to provide necessary
support without interfering with first aid efforts.
However, the radiation protection technicians established a
tight contamination control area around the injured person
-which had the effect of crowding and slowing down the
emergency treatment efforts.*
o
More personnel were at the injured workers site than were
needed, which contributed additional noise and confusion .
. o
Licensee*procedure EPIP 5.01, Transport of Contaminated
Injures Personnel, Rev. 10, dated July 25, 1991, was not
implemented and completed by the ERO.
Additionally, the overall response appeared slow.
It took _
approximately 50 minutes for a search and rescue team to locate
the injured employee following an accountability exercise. It
took an additional 44 minutes to provide initial first aid
treatment and to transport the injured person out of the *
licensee's protected area.
The inspector reported to licensee management that a subsequent
medical drill would be observed by NRC personnel in a future
exercise or drill as an Inspector Followup Item (IFI).
IFI 50-280/92~21-01: Review licensee performance demonstrating
proper response to contaminated injured personnel and capabilities
to ~mplement related procedures.
The simulated contaminated injured worker was transported to an
offsite hospital in an community emergency vehicle.
The _inspector
did not observe any exercise activities within the ambulance or
offsite.
No violations or deviations were identified ..
b.
Fi.re Dri 11
Exercise obje~tive 17 was "Demonstrate the ability to respond to,
control and mitigate the consequences of a fire~.
The inspector determined that the licensee met the exercise
objective.
The first responders were knowledgeable on fire
protection procedures ~i,d approached the situati6n with
-
appropriate caution. Fire teams wete prompt to ~rrive at the
scene, however, they were slow in fighting the fire.
The drill
permitted a lot of simulation.
For example, fire ho~es were not
charged and fire fighters did not don respirators or utilize
faceshield during exercise activities. Simulation of the
respirator and face shield usag~ limited the testing of
communications during the exercise.
- I
7
No violations or deviations were identified.
_ 10.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities
and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and
maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E,
Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.H.
The inspector observea the activation, staffing, and ~peration of key
ERFs,* including the SCR, TSC, OSC, and LEOF.
In .general, the inspector
found the facilities and equipment adequate to respond to emergency _
events. During the exercise the inspector observed good use of
procedures and checklist in implementing the Emergency Plan.
However,
the inspector noted that some of the licensee's procedures (station and
corporate) did not provide specific guidance for facility managers to
utilize in determining readiness for facility activation and assumption
of specific responsibilities.
The absence of such criteria did not
result in any specific problems during the exercise, however, such
criteria could assist the facility managers in determining true ability
to assume emergency functions.
The generation and maintenance of log
and n6te books were good.
a.
Simulator Control Room
The Shift Supervisor (SS) demonstrated excellent command and
control throughout the exercise and classifications and
notifications were accomplished efficiently and in a ti~ely
manner.
Emergency procedures wer~ readily available.
Both
reactor operators and supervisors demonstrated good use of
procedures throughout th~ exercise.
The operations staff worked
extremely well as a team.
The turnover briefing from the SS to
the SEM was effective.
No
violations or devtations were identified.
b.
The TSC was activated and staffed promptly upon notification by
the SEM of the simulated emergency condition leading to an Alert
- emergency classification. The TSC was activated in 48 minutes.
The Alert was declared at 06:34 p.m. and the facility was
activated at 07:22 p.m.
The facility layout provided for a good
interface between the SEM and his Emergency Directors.
Command and control of the emergency organization within the TSC
was good.
Periodic briefings regarding the incident status and
ongoing mitigating actions were routinely given by the SEM.
The
briefings were timely and sufficiently detailed.
The TSC facilities were well equipped and organized to support
simulated plant emergency conditions.
8
No violations or deviations were identified.
c.
Ope~ational Suppott Center
The OSC which was located in the licensee's maintenance building,
was staffed promptly upon notification by the SEM of the simulated
emergency condition leading to an Alert emergenc"y classification.
The OSC was staffed with minimum personnel and activated in
58 minutes.
The Alert was declared at 06:34 p.m. and the OSC was
fully manned at 07:32 p.m.
Emergency Plan Section 5.2.1.ll
states, in part, that "the duties and responsibilities of the OSC
Dir~ctor include accounting for as well as dispatching the Fire
Team, the Search and Rescue Team, and the pool of personnel who
compose damage control teams including mechanics, electricians,
instrument technicians and s_tandby operations personnel.
He shall
also coordinate the response of the -above teams and personnel when
directed to do so by t~e SEM or his designee."
The licensee's OSC did not include Radiation Protection personnel
therefore dispatch teams reported to a Radiation Control Area
(RCA) checkpoint for radiation protection support.
The procedure
was slow, in that, task objectives and orders must be given to the
maintenanc~ teams in the OSC and later described to the radiation
protection staff at the RCA checkpoint.
An OSC facility with
radiation protection support assigned to it could be more
effective and efficient with objectives and controls described to
the*maintenance operators and radiation protection personnel
together.
- No violations or deviations were identified.
d.
Local Emergency Operations Facility
The LEOF was promptly staffed and activated with qualified
personnel following the Alert Classification. The Interim
Recovery Manager and RM provided timely and accurate status
updates to the LEOF staff. Jhe LEOF was declared operational at
07:48 p.m., 74 minutes after declaration of the Alert.
The TSC
-facilities were well equipp~d and organited to support simulated*
p 1 ant emergency con_d it i ans.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Accident Assessment (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether adequate methods, systems,
and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual :or potential offsite
consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as
required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B,
and specific criteria *i~ NUREG-0654,Section II.I.
The a~cident assessment ptogram incl~ded both an engineering a~sessment
9
of plant status and an assess~ent of radiological hazards to both onsite
and offsite personnel resulting from the simulated accident. During the
exercise, the en~ineering accident assessment team functioned
effectively in analyzing the plant status so as to make recommendations
to the .SEM concerning mitigating actions to reduce damage to plant
equipment, to prevent release of radioactive materials and to terminate
the emergency condition.
No violations or ~eviations were identified.
12.
Protective Responses (82301)
This area was observed to determine that guidelines for protective
actions during the emergency, consistent with Fed.eral guidance, were
- developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers,
including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were implemented
promptly as required by 10 CFR 50:47(b)(l0), and specific criteria in
NUREG-0654, Section 11.J.
.
I
.
.
Protective actions were initiated for onsite personnel following the
Alert declaration by conducting a personnel accountability of those
personnel inside the protected ar*ea.
Licensee procedure EPIP-5.03,"
Personnel Accountability, Rev. 18, 1992, described the licensee's
procedure for determining onsite accountability following the
declaration of an Alert or higher emergency classification. The. Alert
was declared at 06:34 p.m., an announcement for the onsite staff to
report to assembly areas for accountability was made at
.
06:40 p.m. and accountability was complete in about 27 minutes, at
07:07 p.m.
Only 2 personnel were unaccounted for.
They were later
found by search a_nd rescue teams in the protected area at about
07i58 p.m~
Exercise objective 7 was: "Demonsirate the ability to develop
appropriate offsite Protective Action Recommendations based upon
assessment of plant conditions and offsite .dose projections-and/or
measurements."
Initial Protective Action Recommendations (PARs), for offsite
populations within the 10-mile Emergency Protection Zone, were made by
the SEM in the TSC and were reported to State and local agencies at
about 08:13 p.m.
The SEM utilized pfocedure EPIP 1.05, Response to
General Emergency, Rev. 12, dated June 25, 1992, t6 ~etermine th~
recommended protective actions.
Recommended PARs were:
Shelter all sectors out to 2 miles
Shelter sectors B, C, D and E (down wind) to 5 miles
The responsibility for making PARs switched from the TSC to the LEOF at
07:48 p.m.
Emergency Notification Message number 9, transmitted to the
State and local agencies at 09:30 p.m., reported revised PARs that
included some recommended evacuations.
The revised PARs were:.
10
Evacuate B; C, D and E to 5 miles
Shelter_remaining sectors within 2 miles
Shelter B, C, D and E 5 to 10 miles
The inspector noted that the PARs did not match any of the PARs shown in
EPIP-1.05, and inquired about the licensee's assessment of existing
Licensee representatives reported that the PARs listed in EPIP-1.05 were
based upon plant conditions and were meant to be -utilized by the- SEM in
making PARs before the LEOF was activated.
Licensee representatives
reported that more specific.PARs could be developed and utili.zed --
following LEOF activation.
The inspector inquired about the procedure
and documentation utilized to make the revised PARs. _ Licensee
representati~es reported that EPIP-4.07, Protective Measures, Rev 3,
dated August 23, 1990, was utilited to make the revised PARs.
When the
inspector requested a review of the procedure completed during the
exercise, the inspector was told that the documentation had apparently
been shipped to the corporate office following the exercise and would be
provided to the inspection team prior to the NRC exit. Just prior to
the NRC exit, licensee representatives reported that the documentation
showing implementation of EPIP-4.07 had not been found and would be
provided to the inspector the following week.
The inspector reported,
at the NRC Exit Meeting~ that a review of the licensee's PAR
documentation would be made when provided and the issue would remain an
. unresolved i tern until such documentation could be provided and reviewed.
On Novembei 23, 1992, licensee representatives reported to the Resident*
Inspector, that EPIP-4.07 procedure documentation had not been
completed, but was not required.
The licensee also reported that EPIP-
4.01, Radiological Asse$sment Director Controlling Procedure, Rev. 8,
dated March 27, 1992, required the initiation of MIDAS.
MIDAS was the
-licensee's offsite dose assessment program used to generate projected
offsite doses and PARs.
The program was capable of determining offsite
PARs by comparing off site dose projections with the Commonwealth of
Virginia Protective Action bUidelines.
The licensee reported that MIDAS
automatically generated the same PARs that would have been generated had
the LEOF Radiological Assessment staff utilized procedure
-
EPIP-4.07.
The licensee reported that EPIP-4.07 had been effectively
utilized thro_ugh MIDAS. , The inspector determined that the MIDAS program
considered existing conditions similar to those used when implementing
EPIP-4.07.
The inspector inquired about the licensee's plans to require evacuation
of all sectors downwind up to 5 miles and only sheltering remaining
sectors, particularly those less than 2 miles from the plant.* The
licensee reported that the evacuation was based upon existing
conditions.-
The inspector discussed the possibilities of a sudden shift
in wind direction and its effect with the licensee's PARs and the
advantage of evacuating all zones within 2 miles during declaration of a
General Emergency.
The licensee representatives acknowledged the
inspector's comments but made no commitment to modify existing
procedures or any specific corrective action at the end of the
11
inspection.
The inspector stated that a review of the licensee's
procedures and methods for generating offsite PARs would be reviewed in
a future inspecti~n as an IFI.
IFI 50-280/92-21-02:
Review licensee's procedures and methods for
making offsite PARs.
No violations or deviations were identified ..
13.
R~diological Exposure Control (82301)
This area was observed to determine that means for controlling
radiological exposures during an emergency were established and
implemented for emergenc~ workert,* and that these means included
exposure guidelines consistent with. EPA 'recommendations as .required by
10 CFR 50.47(b)(ll), and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.K.
An inspector noted th~t radiological exposures were controll~d
throughout the exercise by issuing supplemental dosimeters to emergency
workers and by periodic surveys in the ERFs.
Exposure guidelines were
in place for various categories of emergency actions, and adequate
protective clothing and respiratory protection were available and used
as appropriate.
In the previousgraded exercise, there were some delays in processing
personnel entering the RCA for critical missions~
As reported in the
insp~ction report, inability to dispatch operations personnel in a
. timely ~anner was an NRC concern when delayed operator actions may
affect the safety of the reactor.
An IFI was made to review the
licensee's performance in a future inspection and to review any
corrective action that the licensee may have taken to improve emergency
access into the RCA.
The inspector reviewed a licensee memorandum "RCA
Access Timeliness For Operators and Damage Control T~ams During
Eme'rgency Conditions", from the Operations Superintendent, dated
June 15, 1992.
The memorandum which was issued with the concurrence of
the Superintendent of Radiation Protection, Assistant Station Manager,
Operations and Maintenance, and the Station Manager provided guidelines
for expediting emergency personnel access into RCA.
The guidelines
appeared adequate and appropriate for inclusion in the licensee's
approved procedures.
The inspector did not observe any delays in
processing personnel responding to emergency tasks within the RCA during
the annual graded exercise. The inspector closed the IFI.
No violations or deviations were identified.
14.
Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to
determine whether shortcomings in the performance of the exercise were
brought to the attention of management and documented for corrective
action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(l4), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E,
.. Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
12
The licensee conducted facility critiques with exercise players
immediately following the exercise termination.
Licensee controllers
and observers conducted additional critiques prior to the formal
critique to management on November 20, 1992.
The critique process
including the critique to management was well organized, thorough and
included a review of the objectives that had been established for*
demonstration during the exercise.
Issues identified during the
exercise were discussed by licensee representatives during the critique~-
The licensee's critique addressed both substantive deficiencies and
improvement areas.
The conduct of the *critique was consistent with the
regulatory requirements and guidelines cited above and considered a
progtam strength.
Licensee action on identified finding~ will be
reviewed during subsequent NRC inspections.
No violationi or deviatioris were identified.
15.
Licensee Actions on Pr~vious Inspection Findings (92701)
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 50-280/91-25-01: Access Timeliness For
Operators and Damage Control Teams Entering RCA During Emergency
Conditions. This issue concerned the licensee's inability to process.
emergency response personnel into the RCA.in a timely manner.
The IFI
was made to review the licensee's performance in a future inspection and
to review any corrective action that the licensee may have taken to
improve emergency access into the RCA.
The inspector reviewed a
licensee memorandum issued June 15, 1992 which provided guidelines for
expediting emergency personriel access i~to the RCA.
The inspector did
not observe any delays in processing personnel responding to emergency
t*sk within the Radiological Control Area during the annual graded
exercise. This item was closed.
16.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and results were summarized on November 20, 1992
with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector described
the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results
listed below.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
Proprietary information .is not contained in this report.
Item Number
50-280/92-21-01
Description and Reference
IFI: Review licensee performance
demonstrating-proper response to
contaminated injured personnel and*
capabilities to* implement related
procedures (Paragraph 9.a) .
50-280/92-21-01
Attachments:
Exercise Objectives, Narrative
Summary, and Time Line
13
Review licensee's procedures and methods
for making offsite PARs (Paragraph 12).
- VIRGINIA POWER
SURRY POWER STATION
NOVEMBER 18, 1992 El\\1ERGENCY EXERCISE
SCOPE/OBJECTIVES*
- ,
- -
VIRGINIA POWER
SURRY POWER STATION
NOVEMBER 18, 1992 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
EXERCISE SCOPE
Virginia Power will demonstrate its ability to implement both the
corporate and Surry Power Station, Emergency Plans on November 18,
1992.
The purpose of this exercise is to. activate and evaluate
major portions of the Surry Emergency Plan, associated implementing
procedures,
and selected portions of the Corporate Emergency
Response Plan in accordance with 10CFRS0.47(b) (14), and to support
the: implementation of *state and local governments
emergency
respon_se plans as required by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency.
This plume pathway exercise will be held in conjunction with
emergency response demonstrations by the Commonwealth of Virginia
and several local governments.
The exercise will demonstrate that
those individuals and agencies assigned responsibilities in a
radiological emergency are capable of providing the necessary
protective measures to ensure.the health and safety of the public
in the event of an ac?ident at Surry Power Station.
The exercise will demonstrate responses to the emergency classes,_
commensurate witb the stated exercise objectives, established by
NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological
Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of -Nuclear
Power Plants.
Free play is encouraged and controllers will only
interfere with participants' responses if the exercise lags behind
schedule, if emergency respo'nse personnel * take inappropriate
actions to carry them to the next event, or if action is taken that
-would
correct the expected
simulated . response earlier than
scheduled by the *scenario.
The exercise will fulfill 'the following drill requirements:
Annual medical emergency
Annual environmental monitoring
Annual communications
Annual Post Accident sampling System (PASS)
Semi-annual radiological monitoring
At no time will the exercise be permitted to interfere with the
safe operation of the station.
station management ~ay, at their
discretion, suspend the exercis-e. for any period of time necessary
to ensure this goal .
Exercise participants will not have priQr knowledge of the
simulated incident, except the exercise date.
VIRGINIA POWER
SURRY POWER STATION
NOVEMBER 18, 1992 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
OBJECTIVES SUMMARY
The purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate the adequacy of the
Surry Power Station Emergency Plan,
the Corporate Emergency
Response Plan, and associated implementing procedures.
The objectives of this Emergency Exercise are to demonstrate by
actual performance a number of key emergency preparedness functions
as* they relate to the Surry Power Station Emergency Plan.
The
simulated
accident
will
involve:
emergency
classification,
notifications of company and off~site organizations, simulated
actions to correct the emergency condition, and initiation of
accident assessment and protective actions as necessary to cope
with the event.
The event will include a simulated off-site
radiological release to support a plume pathway exercise.
As applicable to the events developed by the exercise scenario, the
Surry Power Station and Corporate Emergency Response Facilities
(ERFs}
will be activated.
Each ERF staff will demonstrate
functions described in the implementing procedures.
Emergency
response functions which are impractical to demonstrate will be
simulated.
The attached objectives, as numbered in the Virginia Power*Nuclear
Emergency Preparedness Six Year Plan, will be demonstrated as
applicable to the schedule provisions of this plan.
A* matrix,
identifying the objectives and the Virginia Power
Emergency
Response Facilities/Groups where they will be demonstrated, is
provided.
The Control Room Simulator will be used in lieu of the
actual station control Room.
The following is a list of Corporate and Station Emergency Response
Facilities and Groups with their associated acronyms:
(l}
(2}
(3}
(4}
(5}
(6}
(7}
(8}
(9}
(10)
- ( 11}
Control Room Simulator (CRS}
Technical Support Center {TSC)
Operational Support Center (OSC)
Local Emergency Operations Facility (LEOF}
Corporate Emergency Response Center (CERC}
Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)
Local Media Center {LMC)
Health Physics (HP}
Security (SEC}
Chemistry (CHEM}
Central Emergency Operations Facility {CEOF)
Vl:RG:CN:CA POWER
SURRY POWER STAT:CON
NOVEMBER 18, 1992 EMERGENCY EXERC:CSE
OBJECT:CVES
The following objectives establish the scope of the November 18,
1992 Emergency Exercise.
The objectives ensure that required
events are included in the exercise scenario and establish
appropriate exercise evaluation criteria.
1.
Demonstrate the ability to analyze station conditions, assess
Emergency Action Level
(EAL)
parameters,
and correctly
classify the emergency.
The CRS and TSC Emergency Response Organization (ERO) will
demonstrate this objective by initiation and use of EPIP-1.01
and appropriate operational procedures.
status forms detailing radiological monitor and operational
data may be issued at periodic intervals to facilitate conduct
of the scenario.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to notify, mobilize; and sustain the
Surry
Power
Station
and
Corporate
Emergency
Response
Organizations.
The CRS staff, Station Security, and Corporate Security will
notify and mobilize the ERO. station ERO notification*will be
conducted in accordance with the appropriate Station EPIPs.
corporate Security will initiate their emergency notification
procedure to call out the corporate ERO.
This will be an off-hours exercise (1800-0400).
CERC ,, and JPIC will demonstrate sustaining
continuous response capability by formulating shift relief
rosters.
If required, the process for obtaining logistical
and technical support for emergency response personnel may be
simulated.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to notify the State and local
governments and the NRC within established time constraints.
The CRS, TSC, and LEOF ERO will demonstrate this objective by
providing up-to-date information to federal, state, and local
governments within required time limits *
a.
State and Local Government Notification
Information for these notifications will be identified
and recorded by an Emergency Communicator (EC) on EPIP-
2. 01, Attachment 1
(Report of Emergency to state* and
Local
Governments),
and
Attachment
2
(Report
of
Radiological Conditions to the State). Upon approval by
the Station Emergency Manager
( SEM)
or the Recovery
Manager (RM) , the EC will transmit the information to the
state and/or local governments.
The start time for completing ,the 15-minute initial
notification will commence when the SEM declares the
emergency classification. Follow-up communications will
be maintained using EPIP-2.01, Attachment 1, and will
occur at about 3 o minute intervals or as conditions
change.
As conditions warrant, the ability to transmit Protective
Action . Recommendations
(PARs)
to the State will be
demonstrated in accordance with EPIP-1. 05 and appropriate
notification procedures.
The EC will transmit the initial Report of Radiological
Conditions to the State
(EPIP-2.01,
Attachment
2)
following data assimilation, recording, and approval.
Follow-up notifications on radiological conditions will
occur at about 3 O . minute intervals . or as conditions
change .
The
SEM retains responsibility for state and local
government notifications until the LEOF is activated.
Following
activation,
responsibility
for
notification is transferred to the Recovery Manager (RM) .
Once state and local notification responsibility has been
transferred to the LEOF,
a demonstration of back up
communications will be conducted with the state or one of
the local governments.
b.
NRC Notification
'
Information for these notifications will be identified
and recorded by the EC on EPIP-2.02, Attachment 1 (NRC
Event
Notification
Worksheet),
Attachment
2,
(NRC
Emergency Communicator Log), and EPIP-4.33, Attachment 1
(HPN Protective Measures Status) and Attachment 2 (HPN
Communication Log).
Upon approval by the SEM, the ECs
will transmit the information to the NRC (phone cell if
the NRC does not participate).
The start time for
completing the 1-hour initial
notification
commences
when
the
SEM
declares
the
emergency classification. The initial notification will
be performed from the CRS or TSC.
Following initial
notification and unless otherwise directed by the NRC,
the EC will maintain continuous communications with NRC
Operations (phone cell if the NRC does not participate)
- to transmit plant condition changes.
Communication
dialogue highlights will be documented.
Responsibility for NRC Notifications in accordance with
EPIP-2.02 will remain with the TSC ERO.
Responsibility
for Health Physics Network (HPN) communications will be
transferred to the LEOF following activation of that
facility.
The Emergency Response Data System (EROS) will not be
used during this exercise.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to conduct assembly and accountability
of personnel within the Protected Area.
The Station security Staff will demonstrate this objective in
accordance with EPIP-5. 09 and EPIP-5. 03. Also, to support the*
overall accountability process, the Assembly Area Leaders will
perform area accountability.
5.
Demonstrate the ability to assemble, dispatch, and control on-
site emergency teams to perform response activities.
As appropriate, the CRS, TSC, and OSC staffs will demonstrate
this objective by dispatching and controlling teams in
response to scenario events within the Station Protected Area.
Also, the ability to brief emergency teams and establish
- appropriate protective measures and communications will be
demons.trated.
Prior to Emergency Response Facility activation, the CRS staff
will demonstrate this objective by initiating applicable
procedures.
Following facility activation, the TSC and.OSC
staffs will demonstrate this objective by
implementing
EPIP-3.02, EPIP-3.03, apd EPIP-5.08.
6.
Demonstrate the ability to assess conditions and implement
appropriate
protective
measures
for
emergency
response
personnel,* including site access
control,
contamination
control, exposure control, use of protective devices and, as
appropriate, the process for authorization of potassium iodide
(KI) administration.
This objective will be demonstrated through an interface among
the CRS, TSC, LEOF, and osc ERO in which the TSC staff will
monitor and authorize protective measures for site access,
contamination control, and exposure control.
The TSC organization, via the Radiation Protection Supervisor
(RPS) located in the Health Physics area, will dispatch and
direct monitoring teams within the bounds of the site property
per EPIP-4. 01 and EPIP-4. 02 and associated procedures to
assess
radiological
conditions.
Protective
measures,
appropriate
for
conditions,
will
be
developed
and/or
implemented for emergency response personnel.
Security will implement access control measures in accordance
with EPIP-5.09 and EPIP-5.04.
The osc staff and other site personnel. will implement any
necessary
actions
associated
with
protective
equipment
requirements and in-plant access control.
If necessary, in response to scenario events, the CRS and/or
TSC and osc staffs may demonstrate the process for requesting
and authorizing exposure extensions, to include emergency
exposure authorization in accordance with EPIP-4.01 and EPIP-
4.04.
Also, if necessary, the TSC staff will demonstrate the
KI authorization process per EPIP-4.01 and EPIP-5.07.
If necessary, in response to scenario events, the TSC will
demonstrate the planning and notification processes for
protective measures and evacuating non-essential personnel in
accordance with EPIP-4.07 and EPIP-5.05.
7.
Demonstrate the ability to develop appropriate Off-site
Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) based on assessment
of plant conditions and off-site dose projections and/or
measurements.
As appropriate, this objective will be demonstrated by the SEM
from the TSC or by the RM in the LEOF. * The TSC and LEOF
organizations will monitor plant conditions and perform off-
site dose projections to support formulation
of
PARs.
Responsibility for PAR development is transferred from* the TSC
to the LEOF following activation of the LEOF.
Radiological parameter data generated during the development
of this scenario may be artificially elevated and may not
represent the degree of fuel failure and radiological release
commensurate with the plant dynamic events.
This may be
necessary to demonst~ate this exercise objective.
8.
Demonstrate the ability to perform off-site dose assessment.
As appropriate, this objective will be demonstrated by the TSC
and LEOF staffs.
The ability to perform initial dose
assessment will be demonstrated through the implementation of
EPIP-4. 01 and associated dose assessment procedures.
As
required, the CERC will act in~ back-up capacity to perform
off-site dose assessment.
Field monitoring teams will be dispatched per EPIP-4. 01, EPIP-
4. 02, and associated procedures to support the dose assessment
effort.
As appropriate, these teams will be directed by the
RPS and/or the TSC and LEOF staffs.
9.
As appropriate, demonstrate the ability of Health Physics and
-Chemistry to conduct radiological monitoring activities,
including exposure rate surveys, sample collection, and sample
analysis.
As required, radiological monitoring, sampling, and analysis
for in-plant and/or on-site activities will be initiated in
accordance with EPIP-4.02.
Post Accident Sampling activities
may be performed in accordance with EPIP-4.22 and EPIP-4.23.
The
field
monitoring
teams
will
perform
radiological
monitoring activities in accordance with EPIP-4.15 and EPIP-
4.16.
'
Reactor coolant and/or containment samples will be obtained
utilizing
the
High
Radiation
Sampling
system
(HRSS).
Radiological data necessary to test response and monitoring
. capabilities will be _*provided by the controller during sample
collection. Isotopic analysis data will be provided following
demonstration of proper sample preparation and upon expiration
of spectrum collection and analysis times.
10.
Demonstrate the ability to effectively activate the emergency
response
facilities
and
associated
emergency
response
processes.
Activation of facilities and emergency processes by the TSC,
osc, LEOF, CERC, JPIC, and the LMC, will be demonstrated in
accordance with the appropriate procedures.
- As appropriate, activation of emergency processes will be
demonstrated by Health Physics, Chemistry and Security.
11.
Demonstrate that facility layout
and
equipment
support
emergency response activities in each facility.
This objective will be demonstrated in the CRS, TSC, osc,
LEOF, CERC, JPIC, and LMC.
'
In addition, Security, Health Physics and Chemistry facilities
will demonstrate this objective.
12.
Demonstrate the ability to establish and maintain effective
communications.
The CRS, TSC, osc, LEOF, CERC, JPIC, LMC staffs, and Field
Teams will demonstrate this objective.
In addition, Security, Health Physics and Chemistry facilities
will demonstrate this objective.
Use of backup communications systems will be demonstrated.
- 13.
Demonstrate the ability to maintain command and control of the
emergency response effort.
The SEM will demonstrate on-site emergency response command
and control from the CRS and TSC.
The RM will demonstrate
command
and
control of the
emergency
response effort
- associated with the LEOF upon activation of that facility.
The SEM will ensure personnel within the Protected Area are
informed of emergency event status by the use of emergency
alarms and the plant paging system (Gai-tronics).
Remaining
site personnel will be notified by other verbal communication*
methods. Announcements should be preceded and terminated with
the phrase:'
"This is a drill."
The CRS*, TSC, CERC, and-LEOF ERO will d'emonstrate the ability
to transfer appropriate command and control functions.
a.
The CRS functions that will transfer to the TSC include:
(1)
Notifications to the state, local governments, and
NRC.
_
(2)
Determining the emergency classification.
_(3)
Authorizing emergency exposures.
b.
The TSC functions that will tran*sf er to the LEOF are: *
(1)
Notifications to the state and local gov~rnments
and to the NRC via the HPN.
(2)
Developing and transmitting PARs to the state.
14.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinatepreparation, review and
release of timely and accurate information to the public.
15.
The CERC, JPIC, LEOF, and LMC staffs will demonstrate this
objective:
Press releases will -be prepared and edited at the CERC and
transmitted to the LEOF for technical review.
Following
approval by the RM and/or the Corporate Response Manager, the
process for issuing press releases will be demonstrateq.
The JPIC Director will be cognizant of all press releases and
make them available to the media in the JPIC and LMC.
Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control
functions. ,
Public Affairs will demonstrate this objective* by establishing
an
emergency
hotline
in* accordance
with
CPIP-2.1.
Questions will be called into the Public Inf orniation Room
requiring response.
16.
Demonstrc;tte the ability to provide basic life support and to
package and transport a contaminated injured person to an off-
site medical facility.
This objective will be demonstrated by the First Aid Team
implementing procedures appropriate for the victim's level of
injury and
by
Health Physics
employing the
necessary
radiological controls in accordance with EPIP-4.20 to remove
the victim from the accident scene.
.
.
As necessary, the Shift Supervisor directs Station Security to
implement applicable sections of EPIP-5.01 to summon off-site
support.
As required, the CERC will implement CPIP-7.1.
An off-site rescue unit will demonstrate the ability to -
respond to the station.
The contaminated injured person will be transported to an
off-site facility.
17.
Demonstrate the ability to respond to, control and mitigate
the consequences *of a fire.
This objective will be demonstrated by the Emergency Response
Organization in accordance with the Fire Protection Program.
An off-site support unit will demonstrate the ability* to
respond to the station.
If required,- Security will provide
prompt access for the emergency response support from off-
site.
18.
Demonstrate the ability to establish a Recovery Organization
and to develop a Recovery Plan.
This objective will not be demonstrated.
-19.
Demonstrate the ability to conduct a self-critique and -to
identify areas for improvement.
The CRS, TSC, o_sc, LEOF, CERC, JPIC, LMC, Security, Chemistry,
and Health Physics will conduct a self-critique .to identify
weaknesses and improvement items *
I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I
X
X
X
X
'
osc
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
CERC
X
JPIC
X
LHC
SECURITY
X
X
BP
X
CHEMISTRY
X
SURRY POWEd STATION
NOVEMBER 18, 1992 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
OBJECTIVES DEMONSTRATION MATRIX
s I 6 I 7 I 8 I 9 I 10 I 11 I 12 I
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
x*
X
X
X
X
- x
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
- =Denotes objective not to be demonstrated
13 I 14 I 15 I 16 I 17 I 18 I 19 I
X
X
X
X
'
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
-*
NOTE:
VIRGINIA POWER
SURRY POWER STATION
NOVEMBER 18, 1992 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
INITIAL CONDITIONS
SHIFT SUPERVISOR
SUPERINTENDENT OPERATIONS
STATION MANAGER
CORPORATE MANAGEMENT_
If at any time, in the judgement of the Operations Shift
Supervisor, this emergency exercise interferes with the
safe operation of the station, the exercise will be
suspended until station conditions are returned to
normal *
REVISlON 5 (11/18/92@ 07:16)
PAGE 1
- STATUS REPORT
VIRGINIA POWER
SURRY NUCLEAR POWER STATION
.11/18/92
- OPERATIONS**
.-:-,r-
.,
'.="S
- ~-iJ:~~.
~ m~J
KAB
06:16
- -
- :-~ .. - :r,*.t,
~-_':~ Wi.a~
11/18/92
Power Level ************** ~ ****.*.******* Percentage:
Electrical Output ........................... . MWe:
Heat Rate .* ~*~* *.***.**...**.************* BT.U/KW'Hr:.
Days Online or Shutdown *************. * *********** :
RCS Boron Concentration **.******************* ppm:
RCS Temperature ******** ~ *.****** _ ************** : F:
RCS Pressure *.*******.***.********** ~ ******* psig:
RCS Identified Leak Rate Sources UNIT 1 * UNIT 2:
UNIT.l
100.0
820
10141
73 0
682
574.0
223.5
UNIT 2
100.0
821
10276
129 0
306
574.0
- 2235
POTT
- * POTT
- GPM:
. * GPM:
RCS Unidentified Leak Rate *****..************ gpm:
RCS Total Leak Rate .*.*..*.************ gpm/trend:
Containment Sump Inleakage .****.***.** ~gpm/trend:
1.16
o.oo
0.1600
1.32 UP
0.12 UP
0.08
0.20
0.2400
0.52 UP
0.07 DN
Containment Temperature **..****** * ***.*********** F:
Lighted *control Room Annunciators *..************ :
Active Temporary Mods (tot/greater than 6 mos) ** :
Chem is try Index . ............................. * ... :
Condenser Air Ejector Flow Rate .*. _ *.* * A: .... scfm:
B: .*** scfm:
Total:~ *** scfm:
- PLANNING DEPARTMENT**
104.1
0
2/0
0.21
1.5
1.0
2.5
104.1
3
4/2
0.12
1.0
. 0. 8
-1. 8
BJT
15:38
11/15/92
Work Orders in * Backlog *.*.********************.****** * ** :
64 2
.
Average Age .*.****.****************.**** Days_:
65. 05
Completed Not Closed *.*.*..*** ~ ****************.*.******* :
- 284
Average Age ...***.*****.********** ~ ***** Days:
58.32*
POD Items (sc'hed/comp/work) ..*. _ ******** * *****.**.* ~. ~ *.. :
133/ . 27 / 99
- HEALTH PHYSICS DEPARTMENT**
BSJ
0.3: 45
{Report Reflects Totals For 11/17/92)
RCA Entries Since Last Report ************.*** * ******.*. * *** :
Contaminated Area Core ****************************** sq ft:
Contaminated Area Temporary .*****.******************* sq ft:
Contaminated Area Goal.-*.************ _ ********** _ ***** sq ft:
Station Exposure Since Last Report ******************** REM:
Station Exposure Year-To-Date ****.****.**********.** * ** REM:
PCEs Since Last Report **.********.**********.****.******** :
PCEs Year-To-Date .*...*...******.***********.**.*.******. :
Catch Container$ . ....... * .......... ~ ..................... :
- ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT**
11/18/92
642
4040
2600*
8000
- 0.619*
576.770
0
119
39
carryove~
Number of. Contractors On Site. I" **** **************************** :
240
..
REVISION 5 (11/18/92@ 07:16)
fhis * 1s A Drill
STATUS REPORT
VIRGINIA POWER
SURRY NUCLEAR POWER STATION
11/18/92
- STATION NUCLEAR SAFETY -
STAs **
LIMITING ACTION STATEMENTS
Entered/Expires
Mark #/Tech Spec#
Date
& Time
Description/ Action
PAGE 2
Carryover
============== =============== ================================
UNIT 1
None
UNIT 2
None
This * Is A Drill
REVISION 5 {11/18/92@ 07:16)
STATUS REPORT
. VIRGINIA POWER
rhis Is A *Drill
SURRY NUCLEAR POWER STATION
- 11/18/92.
- STATION NUCLEAR SAFETY -.STAs **
POTENTIALLY REPORTABLE EVENTS
Mark Number
Dr Date
Description
PAGE '3
Carryover
============== ==
======================*========
UNIT 1
None
UNIT 2
None.
SIGNIFICANT EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
Mark Number
Disc Dt
Description
=================== ======~
===============================
UNIT 1
Nc;me'
UNIT 2
None
This Is A Drill
REVISION 5 (11/18/92@ 07:16}
- This Is A . Drill SURRY
STATUS REPORT
VIRGINIA POWER
NUCLEAR POWER STATION
11/18/92
- STATION NUCLEAR SAFETY -
STAs **
PAGE 4
Carryover
EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT/ OFFSITE RESPONSE/ COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES
- Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS}:
Emergency Response Facilities
(ERFS} ,:
Emergency Comm Facilities and Equipment:
Prompt Notification Sys, incl. Sirens
Plant Monitors for Accident Monitoring:
Operable (Simulated}
Mark Number/Disc Dt
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
Desription
-=====-=======-=====-==-============================
UNIT 2
None
This Is A Drill
REVISION 5 (11/18/92@ 07:16)
PAGE 5
This Is A Drill
Mark Number
UNIT 1
01-CH -P
UNIT 2
None
-lA
STATUS REPORT
VIRGINIA POWER
SURRY NUCLEAR POWER STATION
11/18/92
- MAINTENANCE**
Description
========================================
>The pump remains out of service for rotating element
replacement.
This Is A Drill
VIRGINIA POWER
SURRY POWER STATION
NOVEMBER 18, 1992 E)(JmGENCY EXERCISE
INITIAL PLANT CONDITIONS
(0000 11/18/92)
1.
unit 1 system Line-Ups/ Flowpatbs /Equipment Status
A.
Normal charging and letdown,flows.
1-CH-P-lB is running
with one 45 and one 60 gpm orifice in service.
B.
All Main Steam PORVs, Steam Dumps, and S/G Safeties are
c.
All Pressurizer Code Safeties and PORVs are operable with
the associated block MOVs open and operabl,e.
D.
All
station Service,
Reserve
Station Service,
and
Emergency Buses are operable with normal full power
line-ups.
E.
- 1 and #3 Emergency Diesel Generators are operable and
in AUTO REMOTE.
F.
"A" BAST is in service on 1-CH-P-2A.
"B" BAST is on recirc using 1-CH-P-2B.
2.
Unit 2 system Line-Ups/ Flowpaths /Equipment status
A.
Normal charging and letdown flows.
2-CH-P-lA is running
with one 45 and one 60 gpm orifice in service.
B.
All Main Steam fORVs, Steam Dumps, and S/G Safeties are
c.
All Pressurizer Code Safeties and PORVs are operable with
the associated block MOVs open and operable.
D.
All station Service,
Reserve
Station Service,
and
Emergency Buses are operable with normal full power
line-ups.
E.
- 2 a~d #3 Emergency Diesel Generators are operable and
in AUTO REMOTE.
F.
"C" BAST is in service on 1-CH-P-2D.
Boric acid filter
is isolated for change out.
G.
Auxiliary Steam loads are being supplied by Unit 2 Second
Point Extraction Steam.
INITIAL PLANT CONDITIONS (CONTINUED)
(0000 11/18[92)
3.
_Radioactive Effluent Status
A.
Liquid Waste is in a normal system valve line up.
B.
The "A" High Level LW tank :ievel is 0%, "B II High Level LW
tank level is 29%, the "A" Low Level LW tank level is
19%, and the "B" Low Level LW tank level is 29%.
All
tanks are filling.
c.
No gaseous releases are in progress.
"A" Waste Gas Decay
Tank is at 65 psig and is the II in-service" tank.
The "B"
Waste Gas Decay Tank is isolated at 65 psi_g. *
4.
ventilation status
A.
.Vent Stack* flow is 106, ooo
cfm with 2 Central and
2 Gene~al exhaust fans in service, 1 Fuel Building,
1 Decon Building and~ Safeguards exhaust fans in service
- (1 per unit).
B.
Process Vent system flow is 300 cfm.
S.
Forecast
A.
Winds from the Southwest at 5 to 10 mph.
B.
It is partly cloudy.
VIRGINIA POWER
SURRY POWER STATION
JIOVEIIBER 18, 1992 BIIBRGBIICY BmCJ:SB
MESSAGE NO:
MF-1
1111
SCENARJ:O MESSAGE TO:
ALL PARTICIPANTS
I::]
CONTJ:NGENCY MESSAGE TO:
I::]
BLOCKJ:NG MESSAGE TO:
CONTROLLER J:NSTRUCTIONS:
Ensure that the lead participants
in each area receive this information.
TIME:
Beginning of exercise
'.rlll:S XS A DRJ:LL
For purpose of this exercise the actual control Room will
not participate.
Communicate with the Control Room
Simulator (CRS) using the appropriate automatic ring-down
circuits or the following phone numbers:
PBX Extensions:
62 or 365 -
2237 -
UNIT 1 ss
62 or 365 -
2238 - UNIT*2 ss
62 or 365 -
2239 - UNIT 1 CRO
62 or 365 -
2240 -
OTHER
62 or 365 -
3406 -
OPS FIELD (ANNEX)
OPX Extension:
81 -
273 -
3840
Commercial:
804 -
357 -
4290
Station alarms, radio, and the Gai-Tronics system are
operable from the Simulator Control Room.
caution: Only use channels 1-4 on Gia-Tronics.
Channel
s for actual control Room only.
DJ:S 'IS A DRJ:LL
VIRGIIUA POWER
SURRY POWER STATION
NOVEMBER 18, 1992 EMERGENCY EXERCISE
SCENARIO NARRATIVE
- A full scale plume pathway exercise is scheduled to be conducted at
the Surry Power Station on November 18, 1992. For the purpose of
- the exercise, Unit 1 is designated as. the affected unit.
Unit 1 is operating at 100% full power equilibrium conditi_ons near
middle of life.
Unit 2 is operating at 100% full power equilibrium conditions with
no equipment out of service.
.
.
The exercise initiates at 1815. At the beginning of the drill, a
containment entry team is exiting Unit 1. containment when air lock
problems occur.* The equipment hatch escape trunk is used and a
failure
occurs
creating
a . question
concerning. containment
integrity.
This containment breach warrants the declaration of a
Notification Of unusual Event (NOOE).
At 1826 a fire starts in the "#1" emergency diesel generator room.
This fire will require off-site support.
The fire warrants the
declaration of an. Alert.
When accountc;,.bility is conducted there
is an individual missing.
Search (and rescue) efforts should be
initiated.
When the individual is found, .the medical emergency
commences.
The contaminated injured victim will require transport
to an off-site medical facility.
Shortly thereafter the 480 volt "lH" bus will be de-energized due
to an electrical fault.
At 1952 a main steam line break *on "A"
steam generator will occur inside containment.. At this time a tube
. rupture will occur in *the "A" steam generator. . The containment
pressure will increase tp a pressure above atmospheric and a
release through* the
equipment hatch will
commence.
These
conditions require the declaration of a General Emergency.
Escalation through the applicable emergency classifications_ will
provide activities designed to exercise both on-site and off-site
response organizations. Sufficient time will be permitted to allow
the response organizations to perform the required assessment and
appropriate response actions.
The release will termin~te when repairs are made to the spray
systems and the containment is sprayed down to sub-atmospheric
conditions.
Facility critiques are scheduled to begin fifteen minutes after
termination of the exercise.
VIRGINIA POWER
SURRY POWER STATION
NOVEMBER* ,18, 1992 EMERGENCY E:XERCJ:SE
T:IKE LINE
NOTE:
T:IMES ARE APPROXIMATE
1645
Lead controllers and Lead Observers positioned.
1715
Operations* Department participants positioned in the Control
~oom Simulator (CRS).
Start brief for operations crew~
Containment entry is made to determine leak source.
I
'*
1815
Simulator run started.
Containment Team exiting the
containment after conducting the unidentified leakage
inspection has to use the equipment hatch escape trunk due
to *inoperability of the personnel airlock and escape hatch.
The equipment escape hatch.trunk breaks on exit. There is
a leak into containment identified.
Containment integrity
is breached (mini-scenario #1).
Containment pressure is below atmospheric pressure and
slowly increasing.
NOOE (Tab D-4) may*be declared due to breaching containment
~~~i~.
.
1826
Fire alarm is received for "#1" Emergency Diesel. Generator.
(mini-scenario #2)
1846
ALERT (Tab I-2) is declared due to fire potentially
affecting station safety systems (b~tween 1826. and 1846).
.
'
.
When accountability is performed, one person is identified
as missing.
The missing individual is contaminated and
injured in the Auxiliary Building.
An investigation to
identify the location of the missing individual should be
conducted (mini-scenario #3).
This initiates the First
Aid Emergency (mini-scenario* #4).
Divert the Rescue Squad from _MCV to Riverside Regional
. Medical Center.
RAD/RPS ARD communication link fails when facility
activation occurs _(mini-scenario #5) .
1847
Loose parts.alarm occurs and letdown radiation monitor
readings st~rts to increase (mini-scenario#~).
-
J...r,,,Jc.
ff11
~ A~7 'h Hofpe-. Av,, io1D._. J-1~ (j,f,O c.~+- A-iv ,~--,lt ~n')
- ,.t
- ,,
Per
Loss of "lH" 480v bus*(mini-scenario #7).
Breaker 14Hl
opens.
1952
Main steam line break, on steam generator "A", occurs inside
containment.
Tube rupture occurs in Steam Generator "A".
1953
Reactor and turbine trips.
1956
2003
2012
Per
Per
Per
Per
Per
steam driven AFW pump overspeeds (mini~scenario #8).
Safety Injection and Phase "1" isolation occur.
NOTE: If spraying of containment is attempted, 1-cs-P-lB
will fail on start (mini-scenario #9).
1-RS-P-lB will have
a sheared shaft (mini-scenario #10).
1-RS-P-2B will have
a grounded motor (mini-scenario #11).
As necessary,
effectiveness of spray pumps will be determined by the Lead
Controller.
The Lead controller will vary the size of the
steam break to control containment pressure.
Release occurs through equipment hatch.
GENERAL EMERGENCY declared due to (Tab B-10), the loss of
2 of 3 fission product barriers with potential loss of 3rd
barrier (between 1952 and 2012)
(Tab B-11), fuel failure with SG tube rupture (between*1952
and 2012).
Insta-phone failure (for James City County) in LEOF during
follow up notifications (mini-scenario #12).
Repairs are such that a portion of the containment spray
systems are back'in service to reduce containment pressure
to sub-atmospheric._
NOTE:
INFORM THE LEAD CONTROLLER PRIOR TO EQUIPMENT BEING
BROUGHT BACK INTO SERVICE SO PROPER COORDINATION
OF SIMULATOR INDICATIONS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED.
Terminate emergency on-site and restore Emergency Response
Facilities.
Begin Facility critiques.
Complete Facility critiques.