ML18151A646
| ML18151A646 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 11/22/1995 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18151A648 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-95-20, EA-95-223, NUDOCS 9512110474 | |
| Download: ML18151A646 (37) | |
See also: IR 05000914/2010004
Text
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Surry Power Station
Docket No. 50-280
License No. DPR-32
EA 95-223
Unit 1
During an NRC inspection conducted on September 14 through October 4, 1995,
violations of NRC requirements were identified.
In accordance with the
"General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions,"
NUREG-1600, the violations are listed below:
A.
-
.---
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, as implemented by the Surry
Operational Quality Assurance Program Topical Report (VEP-l-5A),
Section 17.2.5, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires, in
part, that activities affecting quality be prescribed by and
accomplished in accordance with documented procedures of a type
appropriate to the circumstances.
For operational activities affecting quality these requirements are
implemented, in part, by Virginia Power Administrative Procedure
(VPAP)-1401, Conduct of Operations, Revision (Rev.) l; Operations
Department Administrative Procedure (OPAP)-0005, Shift Relief and
Turnover, Rev. 4; and OPAP-0002, Operations Department Procedures,
Rev. 3.
VPAP 1401, Section 6.1.12.b.l, requires that the Shift Supervisor and
the Unit Senior Reactor Operator maintain, as a matter of highest
priority, the broadest perspective of operational conditions affecting
the facility.
VPAP 1401, Section 6.1.12.c.2, requires that all shift team members be
aware of station status at all times and that supervisory personnel
monitor the performance of shift personnel who could affect station
safety.
OPAP-0005, Section 6.1.4, requires that the departing shift make checks
and remarks on the required *shift relief checklist in a way that informs
the relieving shift of information including significant or important
inoperable equipment including instrumentation.
Section 6.1.5 also
requires that the departing and relieving personnel discuss important
items affecting plant operations.
OPAP-0002, Section 5.3.5, states that the Shift Supervisor and Unit
Senior Reactor Operator are responsible for enforcing compliance with
procedures as written.
Enclosure 1
9512110474 951122
ADOCK 05000280
G
POO
. '-
. *
I~
2
Contrary to the above, on September 13, 1995, activities affecting
quality were not accomplished in accordance with documented procedures
as evidenced by the following examples:
1.
The Shift Supervisor and the Unit Senior Reactor Operator failed
to maintain a broad perspective of operational conditions
affecting the facility, in that, reactor coolant system inventory
was reduced by approximately 4,500 gallons over an approximate
five hour period without knowledge of the activity and its effect
on unit safety.
2.
Not all shift team members were aware of station status, in that,
a unit control room operator unknowingly lowered reactor vessel
water level when he conducted letdown operations to maintain
3.
- standpipe level indication. Additionally, shift supervision did
not properly monitor the operator performing this evolution which
could.have affected station safety.
The departing day shift failed to make remarks on the required
shift relief checklist to inform the oncoming shift of important
inoperable equipment.
Specifically, the isolation of the reactor
coolant head vent which rendered the only means of reactor vessel
level indication inoperable was not recorded on the shift relief
checklist. Additionally, members of the departing and relieving
shifts failed to discuss this important issue affecting plant
operations.
4.
The Shift Supervisor and Unit Senior Reactor Operator failed to
enforce compliance with procedure l-OP-RC-011, Pressurizer Relief
Tank Operations, Rev. 1, for venting the Pressµrizer Relief Tank
as described in Violation C below.
(01013)
B.
Technical Specification 6.4 requires, in part, that detailed written
procedures be provided for corrective maintenance activities which would
have an effect on nuclear safety and that they be followed.
VPAP-2002, Work Request and Work Order Task, Rev. 5, partially
implements these requirements for maintenance activities.
VPAP-2002, Section 5.7.1, requires that the Shift Supervisor review and
approve work orders on permanent plant structures, equipment, and
components.
VPAP-2002, Section 5.7.2, requires that the Shift Supervisor align plant
systems, as jequired, to support work order task activities.
VPAP-2002, Section 5.7.4, requires that equipment be prepared for
maintenance prior to approval of a work order .
Contrary to the above, on September 13, 1995, the Shift Supervisor who
approved Work Order 00316472, Retract/Install Flux Thimbles, failed to
-*
3
ensure that the appropriate plant system was aligned to support the work
order task requirements and failed to ensure that the appropriate
equipment was prepared for maintenance prior to approval of the work
order. Specifically, the Shift Supervisor failed to ensure that the
reactor coolant system was depressurized.
(01023)
C.
Technical Specification 6.4 requires, in part, that detailed written
procedures be provided for activities which would have an effect on
nuclear safety and that they be followed.
Procedure l-OP-RC-011, Pressurizer Relief Tank Operations, Rev. 1,
Section 5.5, establishes the method for venting the pressurizer relief
tank to the Vent Vent System.
Steps 5.5.4, 5.5.5, and 5.5.6.a require
that a Gaseous Group Release Permit be obtained for venting the
pressurizer relief tank to the Vent Vent System; a poly hose be
connected from valve 1-RC-ICV-5025 to the nearest containment purge
exhaust; and, valve 1-RC-HCV-1549, PRT Vent, be closed, respectively.
Contrary to the above, on September 13, 1995, approved detailed written
procedures were not followed to perform venting of the Unit 1
pressurizer relief tank as evidenced by the following:
1.
2.
3.
No Gaseous Group Release Permit was obtained for venting the
pressurizer relief tank to the Vent Vent System.
A poly hose was not connected from valve 1-RC-ICV-5025 to the
nearest containment purge exhaust.
1-RC-HCV-1549, PRT Vent, was not closed.
(01033)
These violations represent a Severity Level III problem (Supplement I). This
violation is applicable to Unit 1 only.
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Virginia Electric and Power
Company is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:. Document Control Desk, Washington,
D.C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and a copy to
the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice
of Violation (Notice), within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting
this Notice.
This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of
Violation" and should include for each violation:
(1) the reason for the
violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation, (2) the
corrective steps that have been taken a~d the results achieved, (3) the
corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the
date when full compliance will be achieved.
Your response may reference or
include previous docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately
addresses the required response.
If an adequate reply is not received within
the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be
issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or
why such other action as may be proper should not be taken.
Where good cause
is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.
4
Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response
shall be submitted under oath or affirmation.
Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to
the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary,
or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without
redaction.
However, if you find it necessary to include such information, you
should clearly indicate the specific information that you desire not to be
placed in the PDR, and provide the legal basis to support your request for
withholding the information from the public.
Dated ~~tlanta, Georgia
thi~.:.;J-l<IY of November 1995
LIST OF ATTENDEES
NRC Personnel
J. R. Johnson, Acting Deputy Regional Administrator
E.W. Merschoff, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP}
A. F. Gibson, Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS}
C. F. Evans, Regional Counsel
B. Uryc, Director, Enforcement and Investigations Coordination Staff (EICS}
W. J; McNulty, Director, Office of Investigations Field Office
J. N. Hannon, Acting Deputy Director, DRP
B. C. Buckley, Senior Licensing Project Manager, Project Directorate II-2,.
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
G. A. Belisle, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 5 (RPB 5}, DRP
M. W. Branch, Surry Senior Resident Inspector, RPB 5, DRP
L. W. Garner, Project Engineer, RPB 5, DRP
L. J. Watson, Enforcement Specialist, EICS
D. C. Payne, Operator Licensing Examiner, DRS
M. E. Ernstes, Operator Licensing Examiner, DRS
J. E. Beall, Enforcement Specialist, Office of Enforcement (By Telephone}
Virginia Electric and Power Company
R. F. Saunders, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
M. L. Bowling, Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Operations Support
D. A. Christian, Station Manager, Surry Power Station
J. H. McCarthy, Assistant Station Manager, Operations and Maintenance
B. L. Shriver, Assistant Station Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing
R.H. Moore, Shift Supervisor
R. D. Scherer, Reactor Operator
Enclosure 2
- .
PREDECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE AGENDA
SURRY
NOVEMBER 6, 1995, AT 1 :00 P.M.
NRC REGION II OFFICE, ATLANTA, GEORGIA
I.
OPENING REMARKS AND INTRODUCTIONS
J. Johnson, Acting Deputy Regional Administrator
II.
8. Uryc, Director
Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff
Ill.
SUMMARY OF THE ISSUES
IV.
V.
J. Johnson, Acting Deputy Regional Administrator
STATEMENT OF CONCERNS/ APPARENT VIOLATIONS
E. Merschoff, Director
Division of Reactor Projects
LICENSEE PRESENTATION
R. Saunders, Vice President - Nuclear Operations
VI.
BREAK / NRC CAUCUS
VII.
NRC FOLLOWUP QUESTIONS
VIII.
CLOSING REMARKS
J. Johnson, Acting Deputy Regional Administrator
Enclosure 3
_***
A.
ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instruction, Procedures and
Drawings; VPAP-1401, Conduct of Operations; and OPAP-0002,
Operations Department Procedures require that operational activities
affecting quality be accomplished in accordance with prescribed
procedures. On September 13 operational activities were not
accomplished in accordance with procedures as evidenced by the
following examples:
1 .
The SS and the Unit SRO failed to maintain a broad perspective
of operational conditions affecting the facility. As a result, RCS
coolant inventory was inadvertently reduced by approximately
4500 gallons over an approximate three and one half hour period.
2.
3.
4.
A Unit Control Room Operator was not aware that reactor vessel
water level was being lowered when he initiated letdown
operations to maintain RVWL standpipe indication. Additionally,
shift supervision did not properly monitor the operator performing
this evol_ution which could affect station safety.
The departing day shift failed to make remarks on the required
shift relief checklist to inform the oncoming shift of important
inoperable equipment. The reactor coolant head vent was
isolated rendering the only means of reactor vessel water level
indication inoperable. Members of the departing and relieving
shifts did not discuss this important item affecting plant
operations.
The SS and Unit SRO failed to enforce compliance with procedure
1-0P-RC-011 for venting the PRT.
,
NOTE:
The apparent violations discussed in this predecisional
enforcement conference are subject to further review and are
subject to change prior to any resulting enforcement decision .
8.
ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED
Technical Specification 6.4 requires that written procedures be
provided and followed for corrective maintenance activities.
Procedures for maintenance activities were not followed for WO 00316472, Retract/Install Flux Thimbles, which was approved by the
SS on September 13, 1995. Specifically, the plant system was not
aligned and the equipment was not prepared for maintenance to
support the work activity, in that, the RCS was not depressurized.
NOTE:
The apparent violations discussed in this predecisional
enforcement conference are subject to further review and are
subject to change prior to any resulting enforcement decision.
C.
Technical Specification 6.4 require that written procedures be provided
and followed for operation of all systems involving nuclear safety .
On September 13, 1995, approved detailed written procedures were
not used to perform venting of the Unit 1 PRT as evidenced by the
following:
1.
No Gaseous Group Release Permit was obtained for venting the
PRT to the Vent Vent System as required by procedure
1-0P-RC-011, step 5.5.4.
2.
A poly hose was not connected from valve 1-RC-ICV-5025 to the
nearest containment purge exhaust as required by procedure
1-0P-RC-011, step 5.5.5.
3.
1-RC-HCV-1549, PRT Vent was not closed as required by
procedure 1-0P-RC-011, step 5.5.6.a.
NOTE:
The apparent violations discussed in this predecisional
enforcement conference are subject to further review and are
subject to change prior to any resulting enforcement decision.
.}.-
. * ...
i
.
VIRGINIA POWER
\\
SURRY POWER STATION
PREDECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE
NOVEMBER 6, 1995
Enclosure 4
..' .. * .
VIRGINIA POWER
INTRODUCTION
R. F. Saunders
Vice President - Nuclear Operations
-
2 -
r
',
- --
I
- "
I
l *
'
AGENDA
- Introduction
- Management Perspective
- Summary of Events
and Lessons Learned
- Corrective Actions
- Safety Significar,ce
and Program Effectiveness
- Conclusions
-
3 -
- . '
R. F. Saunders
D. A. Christian
W. H. Moore
R. D. Scherer
J.H.McCarthy
B. L. Shriver
B. L. Shriver
VIRGINIA POWER
MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE
D. A. Chrisnan
Stati,on Manager
- 4 -
__ ,,.,, .. -.........*..
MANAGEMENT
PERSPECTIVE
- .
-..
Events of September 13 - 14, 1995 Revealed Weaknesses in the
Control of Some Plant Evolutions
-
An Undetected Loss of Reactor Vessel Inventory Resulting
from Inadequate Configuration ~ontrol Due to a Weakness in
Operations Crew Knowledge
-
Release of Work on the Seal Table Due to a Failure of Team
Members to Verify Changes in Reactor Coolant System
Conditions
-
Venting of the Pressurizer Relief Tank without Meeting
Procedural Requirements by Operations Management
The Overall Outage Schedule and Safety Assessment Assured
that these Weaknesses did Not Challenge Safety
- s -
.*.
.
.* *
..*
,:
MANAGEMENT
PERSPECTIVE
Outage Schedule Development
-
Philosophy of Incremental Change Based on Surry Experience
-
Developed by Interdepartmental Outage Integration Team
-
Outage Schedule and Duration Approved by Station Management
,
Outage Safety Assessments Assure "Defense in Depth"
-
Safety Assessment is an Integral Part of Initial Outage Schedule
Development and is Approved by the Station Nuclear Safety and
Operating Committee
-
Changes in Outage Sequence are Evaluated and the Safety
Assessment is Revised
-
Station Management Review Actual Plant Status Using the Critical
Safety Parameters
- 6 -
MANAGEMENT
PERSPECTIVE
Pre-Outage Preparations Included:
- .. '*
.
'
-
Simulator Training on New Plant Cooldown/Depressurization .
Process
-
Refueling Crew Training
-
ALARA Awareness Training for 552 Personnel
-
Readiness Reviews
-
Outage Work Schedules
-
7 -
.*
',
- .
)
MANAGEMENT
PERSPECTIVE
Immediate Management Actions were Taken to Address each
Issue and Assure Improved Crew Performance
-
Work Activities Potentially Affecting Reactor Coolant System
Inventory were Halted and the Status of Other Safety
Equipment was Verified
-
Station
Management Provided
Coaching to Reinforce
Operations Standards for Command and Control
-
Training was Provided to Address Operator and Shift
Technical Advisor Knowledge Weaknesses
Procedural Controls were Strength.ened
-
Management Oversight was Strengthened
Category I Root Cause Evaluation was Initiated
- 8 -
MANAGEMENT
PERSPECTIVE
Category I Root Cause Evaluation (RCE) was Initiated on
September 14, 1995
-
Interdepartmental Team Including Members from Corporate Nuclear Safety,
Station Nuclear Safety, Training, and North Anna Power Station Operations
-
Independent Management Oversight
Root Cause of Undetected Loss _of Reactor Vessel Inventory
was Determined
-
Inadequate Configuration Control Due to a Weakness in Operations Crew
Knowledge
RCE Identified Other Issues
-
Release of Work on the Seal Table
- Caused by Failure of Team Members to Verify and Communicate Changes
in Reactor Coolant System Conditions
-
Venting of the Pressurizer Relief Tank without Meeting Procedural
Requirements
- Caused by Inappropriate Personnel Performance
- 9 -
MANAGEMENT
PERSPECTIVE
Initial Actions were Effective
-
No Problems were Experienced with Subsequent Draindowns
-
Operations Command and Control was Maintained
-
Knowledge and Understanding were Enhanced
-
Management and
Licensed
Operator Sensitivity were
. Enhanced
Longer Term Actions Include:
-
Continued Coaching and Monitoring of Operations Personnel
to Ensure Standards are Being Met
-
Training and Procedural Enhancements to Ensure Shift
- Teams are Better Prepared to Implement the Outage
Schedule
- 10 -
/
'\\ *
- ,
VIRGINIA POWER
SUA(MARY OF EVENTS
AND LESSONS LEARNED
R. D. Scherer
Reactor Operator
-:-- 11 -
w .. H .. Moore
Senior Reactor Operator
- .. ',
.
'
. *. ~*.'.? .;.i .. .' .* \\
, *
,
- ,*
REACTOR VESSEL HEAD VENT
AND STANDPIPE DIA'GRAM
Cloop
Cloop
-
TH
[:]
p
r
D * *
u
r
I
z
1-RC-184
D
j5% 29.0'
r
-ll'll, 27.5'
-
12 -
+--Tygon
1-RC-135
POR\\f
24.0' Tap of_.,.
18.7' R-fllrve
- * **
l
., __ ,"I*
_:_ ..
i
REACTOR VESSEL
INVENTORY
e: . ,
Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT) Pressure was Maintained while
the Reactor Coolant System was Drained from 11% Pressurizer
Level to 18 Feet
Preparation of Reactor Vessel Head Vent Tagout
-
Separate Technical Briefings
- Reactor Operators
- Senior Reactor Operator
I * *
- Auxiliary Operator
Reactor Vessel Head Vent was Isolated for Spoolpiece Removal
The Reactor Vessel Level Standpipe became Inoperable, but
was Not Recognized as Such Due to Knowledge Deficiency
- 13 -
I
- ..
REACTOR VESSEL
INVENTORY.
Control of Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Inventory
-
Minor Level Changes were Induced to Verify Reactor Vessel Level
Standpipe Response
-
Maintained Reactor Vessel Standpipe Indicated Level at 18 Feet
- Maximized Letdown Flow
- Adjusted Charging Flow
Reactor Vessel Standpipe Indicated Level Decreased from 18
Feet to 13.3 Feet when the Reactor Vessel Head Studs were
Detensioned
Actuons were Immediately Initiated to Restore RCS Level to 18
Feet
Reactor Vessel Head Vent was Returned to Service
- 14 -
- -
'
. *~ **
.:
INCOREFLUX
THIMBLE SEAL
......
Senior Reactor Operator Preparation/Perception
-
Believed Reactor Coolant System (RCS) was at Atmospheric
Pressure
- !Board Walkdown Prior to Shift Turnover
- Interface with Chemistry Department Regarding Pressurizer
Sampling
Determination that the RCS was Pressurized During the
Disassembly of an lncore Flux Thimble High Pressure Seal
-
Suspended Work on Flux Thimbles
-
Stopped the Release of Pressurizer Safety Valve Work
-
15 -
SHIFT PERSPECTIVE
Typical Operations Performance Ensures:
-
Supervisory Oversight is Provided
-
Evolutions are Well Unders*.:ood
-
Plant Conditions are Known
-
Procedures are Used
- *
These
Events
were
Not
Characteristic
of
Operations
Performance
Shift Assessment and Lessons Learned
-
Questioning Attitude
-
Supervisory Oversight
-
Shift Turnover
-
Communications
-
Broad Perspective
- 16 -
VIRGINIA POWER
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
J. H. McCarthy
Assistant Station Manager
Operations and Maintenance
- 17 -
- *
-
.
.
.*
,.
IMMEDIATE
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Level was Restored
Measures were Implemented to Ensure Configuration Control
Reactor Vessel Head Vents were Tagged Open
-
Configuration of Important Safety Systems was Confirmed
Work Activities Potentially Affecting RCS Inventory were Halted
Management Initiated a Category I Root Cause Evaluation
- 18 -
.. ,*i ..
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
CONTINUED DURING THE OUTAGE
Management Oversight was Strengthened
.
'
~:. .
"
'
Management Expectations for Operations Personnel and Shift
Technical Advisors .(STA) were Clarified and Reinforced
-
Nuclear Safety Policy
-
Command and Control
-
Critical Monitoring of Plant Parameters
-
Shift Turnover
-
Configuration Control
Station Manager Approval Required for Fuel On-Load
-
Core On-Load Assessment
- 19 -
-- --*--------
.,
, .. d * ... **
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
CONTINUED*DURING THE OUTAGE
'
.
-
'"~,:II
' :..
.,
"
Training was Conducted for Operations Personnel and Shift
Technical Advisors *
-
Operations Standards
-
Management Expectations
-
Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Inventory Control
-
Reactor Vessel Head Vent and Level Standpipe Interrelationship
-
RCS Inventory Balance
Unit 1 Procedures were Revised to Provide Better Guidance to:
Ensure Reactor Vessel Level Standpipe Operability
-
Perform an RCS Inventory Balance
Outage Schedule was Revis,d to:
-
Reduce Multiple Reactor Coolant System Inventory Activities
-
!Unasolate the RCS Loops Only when tlhe RCS Level was > 5% in the
Pressurizer
- 20 -
- ""'
.
.
~**
. *
'
.
~
l
~ -
LONGER TERM
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Verify that Operations Standards Clearly -Define Management
Expectations
Communicate Operations Standards and Monitor Operations
Personnel Performance to Ensure Standards are Being Met
Develop and Provide Refueling Outage Preparatory Training to
Ensure that Shift Teams are Better Prepared to Implement the
Outage Schedule
Actions Resulting from the Category I Root Cause Evaluation:
-
Developed a Specific Operations Procedure that Controls the
Manipulation of the Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valves
Revised Unit 2 Procedures to Provide Better Guidance to:
- Ensure Reactor Vessel Level Standpipe Operability
- * Perform a Reactor Coolant System Inventory Balance
- 21 -
- *
- , ..
.
.
.
LONGER TERM
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Actions Resulting from the Category I RCE (Continued):
-
Revise Continuing Training for Operations Personnel and Shift
Technical Advisors (STA)
- Enhance Discussion of the Reactor Vessel Head Vent and Level
Standpipe Interrelationship
- Emphasize STA Responsibilities During Outages
- Include Simulator Training on Reactor Coolant System Draindowns
-
Provide Continuing Training to Operations Personnel and Shift
Technical Advisors
- Need to Maintain Questioning Attitude
- Need * to Self Check when Making Reactor Coolant System Inventory
Changes
- Need to Maintain a Broad Perspective of Unit Activities
- 22 -
. *
,
VIRGINIA POWER
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE AND
PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS
B. L. * Shriver
Assistant Station Manager
Nuclear Sa/ ety and Licensing
- 23 -
.
'
' J . ,,
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
AND PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS
Individually and Collectively the Issues were Not Safety
Significant
-
Residual
Heat
Removal
System
Operation
was
Not
Challenged
- System Performance was Not Affected
- Inaccurate Reactor Vessel Level Standpipe Indication was
Self-Correcting
-
Equipment and Procedures Provided Alternate Methods of
Core Cooling
-
No Identifiable Radiological Exposures
-
Radiological Releases were Within Administrative Limits
- 24 -
. l '
,..
'
. ; I ,
'
'-'
.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
AND PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS
Weaknesses in Activities During the* Preparations for Reactor
Head Removal were Not Due to a Breakdown in Control of
Licensee Activities and were Not Due to a Lack of Attention to
Licensed Responsibilities
-
Management Programs and Procedures Ensured that an
Adequate Margin of Safety was Maintained
-
Event Causes were Different and Not Indicative of a
Programmatic Breakdown of Control or Inattention
-
Other Critical Outage Activities were Properly Controlled
-
Station Response Demonstrates an Overall Commitment to
Safety
-
25 -
.... ,l* .*
- ,.
.
.
' *.
.)
I
'
.
.
.. *> '
.
- ',',
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
AND PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS
A Comprehensive Corrective Action Plan was Implemented
Immediate Actions were Taken to Assure Reactor Coolant
System Inventory was Maintained and Outage Activities were
Controlled
-
Corrective Actions Continued During the Outage to Improve
Crew
Knowledge
and
Strengthen
Implementation
of
Operations Standards
-
Longer Term Corrective Actions have been Initiated to
Provide Additional Assurance that Operating Crews Fully
Meet High Standards
- 26 -
...
' *
.*..
'
'
/
.
'
i ... ,
.
"
- ,.') ~-
...
CONCLUSIONS
Not Indicative of Programmatic Deficiencies
Not Representative of a Breakdown in Control of Licensee
Activities
Not Representative of a Lack of Attention Toward Licensed
Responsibilities
No Nuclear Safety or Radiological Significance
Prompt Corrective Actions and Management Follow-Up
Effectiveness of
Programs Assured through Critical and
Comprehensive Self-Assessment
- 27 -
MlN REQ'D EQUIP FOR
PRIMARY /BACKUP
COOLING METHODS
AVAILABLE
(AS PER J-OSP-ZZ-004)
NO
INTACT
N/A [3
Fully Operable
Acceptable
Condition Green
REFUELING
~REMENTS MET
l!:.J YES
NO
Component(s) Degraded or 1 Power Supply Unavailable
Acceptable but degraded
Condition Yellow
Component Inoperable
Function or System Inoperable
Condition Orange - Contingency actions may be required
Function or System Requirement Unacceptable
Unacceptable condition
Condition Red
Enclosure 5
r
MIN REQ'D EQUIP FOR
PRJMAR Y/BACKUP
COOLING METHODS
REFUELING
REQUIREMENTS MET
G
YES
NO
Component(s) Degraded or 1 Power Supply Unavailable
Acceptable but degraded
Condition Yellow
Component Inoperable
Function or System Inoperable
Condition Orange - Contingency actions may be required
Function or System Requirement Unacceptable
Unacceptable condition
Condition Red
Enclosure 6
- -1