ML18153A547
| ML18153A547 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 11/22/1995 |
| From: | Ebneter S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Ohanlon J VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18151A648 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-95-223, NUDOCS 9512110461 | |
| Download: ML18153A547 (4) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1995020
Text
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November 22, 1995
EA 95-223
Virginia Electric and Power Company
ATTN:
Mr. James P. O'Hanlon
Senior Vice President-Nuclear
Innsbrook Technical Center
5000 Dominion Boulevard
Glen Allen, VA
23060
SUBJECT:
(NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-280/95-20 and 50-281/95-20)
Dear Mr. O'Hanlon:
This refers to the inspection conducted on September 14 through October 4,
1995 at t~e Surry facility.
The inspection included a review of the
circumstances associated with the September 13 and 14, 1995, unplanned
reduction of Unit 1 reactor vessel water level.
The results of this
inspection were sent to you by letter dated October 19, 1995.
A closed
predecisional enforcement conference was conducted in the Region II office on
November 6, 1995, to discuss the apparent violations, the root causes, and
your corrective actions to preclude recurrence.
A list of conference
attendees, NRC slides, and a copy of your presentation summary are enclosed.
Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information
your staff provided during the conference, the NRC has determined that
violations of NRC requirements occurred.
These violations are cited in the
enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding them
are described in detail in the subject inspection report.
The three
violations, described in the enclosed Notice, involved: (1) failures of the
operating staff to maintain management 6versight and control of operating
activities; (2) failure of the operating staff to properly confirm and control
plant configuration affecting approved maintenance activities; and,
(3) failure to follow procedures for the control of pressurizer relief tank
(PRT) venting activities.
As a result of the deficiencies noted in
Violation A, approximately 4,500 gallons of water were inadvertently drained
from the reactor vessel.
The roqt causes of the three violations included deficiencies in operator
training, poor control and oversight of plant evolutions being conducted in
the control room, weak communication practices and lack of control of field
activities by the licensed operations staff. Specifically, weak operator
training in the operational characteristics of the reactor vessel water level
standpipe indication led to a deficiency in the operators' understanding of
its operation. This contributed to failures of the licensed control room
staff to recognize that the method of reactor vessel water level indication
provided a false level indication when the reactor vessel head vent was
isolated to accommodate installation of the reactor cavity seal ring.
The
licensed operator controlling reactor water level did not maintain a
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9512110461 951122
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questioning attitude when he continued with a rate of letdown in excess of
makeup over a period of almost five hours due to the false water level
indication.
Senior reactor operators failed to question and oversee this
evolution.
Communication deficiencies were a characteristic of all three
violations.
The violations included the failure to maintain adequate turnover
logs of the status of required equipment, poor operating crew turnovers of
plant status, and lack of communication among the senior reactor operators and
operating shifts.
It is also significant that the procedure for venting the
PRT was not followed.
The NRC is particularly concerned that although the
licensed control room operators were aware of the PRT venting evolution, they
did not ensure the evolution was conducted using the approved procedure and
failed to provide proper oversight.
The violations cited occurred shortly after the reactor was shutdown for
refueling.
In addition, at the time, reactor vessel water level was below the
level of the reactor vessel flange and the reactor coolant loops were
.
isolated; thus, there was a reduced inventory of water available for core
cooling.
During this period of time, sufficient reactor coolant system water
inventory is essential in ensuring adequate decay heat removal.
Violation A
resulted in a significant unanticipated reduction in a reactor safety margin,
i.e., reactor water level. All three violations indicate a lack of proper
control of operational activities during a critical time period.
While the
individual violations were not of significant safety consequence, the NRC is
concerned that continuing performance at this level could lead to incidents of
greater safety significance.
Collectively, these violations are cause for
significant regulatory concern and represent a serious lack of attention to
licensed responsibilities. Therefore, these violations are classified in the
aggregate in accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure
for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600, as a
Severity Level III problem.
In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount
of $50,000 is considered fo~ a Severity Level III problem.
Because your
facility has not been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the
last two years, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Corrective
Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment provision in Section
VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Your corrective actions were comprehensive
and included improvements in a broad spectrum of areas as discussed in your
handout provided to the NRC at the predecisional enforcement conference
(Enclosure 4). These corrective actions included training initiatives,
procedure revisions, reinforcement of management expectations for Operations
personnel, revisions to your outage plans and strengthening of management
oversight of operational activities. The NRC determined that credit was
warranted for the factor of Corrective Action.
Therefore, to encourage prompt, comprehensive correction of violations and in
recognition of the absence of previous escalated enforcement action, I have
been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement,
not to propose a civil penalty in this case.
However, significant violations
in the future could result in a civil penalty.
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You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions
specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response.
In your
response, you should document the specific actions taken and any additional
actions you plan to prevent recurrence.
After reviewing your response to this
Notice, including your proposed corrective actions and the results of future
inspections, the NRC will determine whether further NRC enforcement action is
necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory requirements.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of
this letter, its enclosures, and your response will be placed in the NRC
Public Document Room (PDR).
To the extent possible, your response should not
include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that
it can be placed in the PDR without redaction.
The responses directed by this letter and the enclosed Notice are not subject
to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required
by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.96-511.
Docket No. 50-280
License No. DPR-32
Enclosures:
1.
2.
List of Attendees
3.
NRC Slides
Sincerely,
Original signed by
Jon R. Johnson for
Stewart D. Ebneter
Regional Administrator
4.
Virginia Power Presentation Summary.
5.
Surry Unit 1 CSD and RSD
Critical Parameters, 9/13/95
6.
Surry Unit 1 CSD and RSD
Critical Parameters, 9/14/95
cc w/encls: (See next page)
..
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cc w/encls:
M. L. Bowling, Manager
Nuclear Licensing & Operations
Support
Virginia Electric & Power Company
Innsbrook Technical Center
5000 Dominion Boulevard
Glen Allen, VA
23060
David A. Christian, Manager
Surry Power Station
Virginia Electric & Power Company
5570 Hog Island Road
Surry, VA
23883
Ray D. Peace, Chairman
Surry County Board of Supervisors
P. 0. Box 130
Dendron, VA
23839
Dr. W. T. Lough
Virginia State Corporation
Commission
Division of Energy Regulation
P. 0. Box 1197
Richmond, VA
23209
Michael W. Maupin
Hunton and Williams
Riverfront Plaza, East Tower
951 E. Byrd Street
Richmond, VA
23219
Robert B. Strobe, M.D., M.~.H.
State Health Commissioner
Office of the Commissioner
P. 0. Box 2448
Richmond, VA
23218
Attorney General
Supreme Court Building
900 East Main Street
Richmond, VA
23219
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