ML18151A092
| ML18151A092 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 09/15/1987 |
| From: | Cantrell F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18151A090 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-87-26-EC, 50-281-87-26, NUDOCS 8710060067 | |
| Download: ML18151A092 (22) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1987026
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos.:
-Licensee:
50-280/87-26 and 50-281/87-26
Docket Nos:
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Facility Name: Surry 1 and 2
- Approved By:
SUMMARY
Scope:
An enforcement conference was held in the Region II Office on August
26, 1987.
Meesrs. J. N. Grace and L.A. Reyes opened the meeting by expressing
concern over the control of containment integrity and valve alignment as
discussed in NRC Inspection Report 280; 281/87-26 dated August 18, 1987.
Virginia Electric and Power Company then made a presentation covering an
overview, chronology of events, safety implications, corrective actions, and
the overall conclusions of the issues.
Attachment I to this report contains
information from the presentation.
Results:
One violation was identified in this report.
8710060067 870929
ADDCK 05000280
G
DETAILS
1.
Attendees
NRC:
2.
J. N. Grace, Regional Administrator, RII
L. A. Reyes, Director, Division of Reactor Projects, (DRP)
B. Uryc, Enforcement Coordinator
F. Jape, Test Performance Section Chief, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)
W. E. Holland, Senior Resident Inspector, Surry
L. E. Nicholson, Resident Inspector, Surry
R. P. Croteau, Project Engineer, DRP
G. A. Schnebli, Reactor Inspector, DRS
S. E. Sparks, Reactor Inspector, DRS
C. P. Patel, Project Manager, NRR
J. G. Luehman, Office of Enforcement
Licensee:
J. L. Wilson, Manager - Nuclear Operations Support
N. E. Hardwick, Manager - Nuclear Programs and Licensing
D. L. Benson, Station Manager - Surry Power Station
E. S. Grecheck, Assistant Station Manager - Surry Power Station
J. A. Price, Quality Assurance Manager - Surry Power Station
Enforcement Meeting
Messers. J. N. Grace and L. A. Reyes opened the meeting by expressing
concern over the administrative control of containment integrity and valve
manipulations.
The events were discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-280,
281/87-26 dated August 18, 1987.
Mr. J. L. Wilson, Manager - Nuclear
Operations Support, Virginia Electric and Power Company, gave a brief
introduction of the events.
Mr.
E.
S. Grecheck, Assistant Station
Manager, Surry, then presented an overview, chronology of events, safety
implications, corrective actions, and conclusions.
The first event involved the temporary repair of a defective weld in the
unit 2 letdown line between the inside containment isolation valve and the
cohtainment penetration. This event was discovered as a result of a step
increase in the reactor coolant system (RCS) unidentified leakage rate
noted on July 22, 1987.
The licensee isolated the leak from the the RCS
by utilizing excess letdown and subsequently temporarily repaired the
defect on July 28, 1987.
A system schematic and more detailed sequence of
events is contained in Attachment I.
3.
2
With respect to the safety implications, the hole in the defective weld
provided a direct path from inside the containment to the outside
containment isolation valve.
Subsequent calculations by the licensee
indicate that the total allowable leakage was not exceeded.
The licensee
stated that the operation of a drain valve between the weld defect and the
containment (2-CH-142
shown
on Attachment I) was
performed under
administrative control, and the operability of the outside containment
isolation valve was demonstrated.
The second event involved the discovery of four valves in the containment
leakage monitorirg system locked in an incorrect position.
An instrument
technician noted an apparent valve alignment problem while troubleshooting
a pressure transmitter and notified the control room.
Attachment I
contains a schematic and more deta i 1 ed sequence of events.
The va 1 ves
found open created a cross-connect between al 1 four containment pressure
transmitters providing signals to the consequence limiting system (i.e.
containment isolation, spray, etc.).
The licensee concluded that the safety consequences of the two events were
minimal.
Their analysis of the events did, however indicate programmatic
weaknesses in the documentation, administrative control, and station
safety committee areas.
Mr. Wilson concluded that a comprehensive
evaluation and enhancements in these areas will be achieved .
Conclusions
The licensee failed to recognize, evaluate, and control conditions which
resulted in a degradation of containment integrity.
These conditions
were:
Inadequate recognition, evaluation, and control
of containment
integrity with a weld crack in the unit 2 letdown line and the
outside containment isolation valve open.
Operation of a drain valve (2-CH-142) within the containment
isolation boundary of the system with the outside containment
isolation valve open.
Failure to evaluate the operability of the inside containment
isolation valves with indications that they may be leaking.
Routine opening of containment boundary valves such as 1-LM-40 with
no procedure control or operations involvement .
3
These findings *indicated that the programs for evaluation of containment
integrity and for admi n i strati ve contro 1 of the operation of containment
isolation valves were weak.
Failure to provide adequate procedural
control for activities affecting quality is identified as a violation
(280; 281/87-26-01).
Attachment:
Presentation Handouts
- ATTACHMENT 1
VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
AUGUST 26 , 1987
- Introduction
- Management Analysis
- Letdown Line Repair
-
Sequence of Events
-
Conclusions
- LM Valve Alignment
-
Sequence of Events
-
Conclusions
- Corrective Actions
- Overall Conclusions
__ ._- ________ ._._ -
MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS
DOCUMENTATION
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL
SNSOC
LETDOWN FLOWPA TH
CONTAINMENT
IN
OUT
I
I
I
I
I
I
. HVC 2200A
I
I
I
I
2-158
HVC 2200C
I TV 2204
2-CH-159
2460A
24608
I
REGEN
I
I
I
NON REGEN
HVC 22008
I
L!...J
2-CH-142
07/21/87
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
Letdown Line * Repair
Average Unidentified RCS Leakage
0.17 gpm
07/22/87 0600
Unidentified Leak Rate 0.57 gpm
Investigations in Progress
1330
Containment Entry
1530 . Leak at HCV-2200C Identified
07/23/87 1130
On Excess Letdown; Preparation for
Lagging Removal
1330
Pipe Crack Identified
- Assess Containment Integrity and Repair
,.
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
Letdown Line Repair
07/24/87 0930
Closed TV-2204; Verified Operability.
1200
Containment Entry to Drain Letdown Line
2-CH-142 Cycled
1633
Opened TV-2204 to Prevent
Pressurizing Line
07/26/87 1100
Containment Entry; Cycled 2-CH-142
07/28/87 1330
Entry to Install Temporary Repair,
Following Approval by SNSOC
(EWR 87-288)
2030
Charging and Letdown Back in Service
2128
VT-2 Inspection Satisfactory
.
07/29/87 0700
RCS Unidentified Leak Rate 0.27 gpm
>
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
Letdown Line Repair
08/05/87 0210
Containment Entry Checks Temporary
Repair
0400
Furmanite Can Leak Reported as
15-20 ml/hr
1130
RCS Leakage .10 Unidentified
2230
Procedure for Re-inject Approved by
SNSOC
08/06/87 0040
Containment Entry; Noted Box Had
Moved 1/16"
Reinjected; Leakage Reduced
08/07/87 1720
Additional Clamp Installed per EWR
87-288A, ,
Leakage Stopped
TEMPORARY REPAIRS
- Permanent Repair Evaluated
-
Failure Analysis Required
-
- Temporary Weld Repair
-
No Weld Procedure in Presence of Water
- -
Sources of Water
- Temporary Repair with Furmanite
-
Box* is Pressure Retaining Component
-
Sealant is Treated as Gasket
-
No Credit Taken for Strength of Sealant
- Analysis
-
Seismic
..
TEMPORARY REPAIRS
Added Weight on Piping System
Assumed Crack Would Fail -
Added Piping Restraint
- -
Temperature
Compound Rated to 604. Degrees F
-
Applicable Codes
Mechanical Joint with Gasket
Temporary Repairs not Discussed in ASME XI, IX, or
..
LETDOWN LINE REPAIR CONCLUSION
'
- Per T.S. Continued Operation Permitted with RCS Leak
Rate
- Initial Consideration of Containment Integrity
-
Qualitative
-
Verified TV-2204 Operable
-
Subsequent Calculation Verified Leakage
within La
- Drain Valve Opened Under Administrative- Control
- No Direct Correlation Between RCS Leakage
and Appendix J Requirements
LEAKAGE MONITORING SYSTEM
J 1-LM-40
J 1-LM-40
PT r~ IPT
1
I I
1-LM-28
I
I
1-LM-29
I
1-LM-30
I
1-LM-18
1-LM-31
T
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
LM Valve Alignment .
. 08/03/87 1450
Instrument Technicians Troubleshooting
- PT-CV-101A
.
Notify Control Room; Open 1-LM-40 to
Remove Suspected Moisture
Unexpected Transmitter Response;
Suspect Incorrect Lineup
Technicians Notify Control Room
2042 * Valve Position Logged as Closed
. *
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
LM Valve Alignment
08/05/87 1300
Shift Supervisor and STA Disc9ver
Valves Locked Open
Immediately Closed
Determined 1-hour Reportable
08/13/87
Engineering Confirms Postulated Fai_lure *
is Passive
CLS Function was not Affected
LM VALVE ALIGNMENT CONCLUSIONS
- Initial Determination of *Reportability Conservative
- Line Up Consistent with Design Basis
- Safety Consequences Insignificant
-
No Impact on Protective Functions or Containment
Integrity
- All Valve. Misalignments Fully Investigated
' . *
COMPLETED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- Reverification of All Locked Valves Outside
Containment
- Interim Manag.ement Directive to Prohibit Opening the
Containment Boundary Not Specifically Listed in T.S.
3.8 without Prior SNSOC Approval
- Expand SNSOC Minutes to Include Details of
Discussions as Appropriate
- Conduct HPES Evaluation
- Initiated QA Audit of Operations Administrative Controls
---
-
~~ ~-----------
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- QA Audit of Operations Administrative Activities and
Programs
-
Special Audit
-
SRO on Team
-
Beyond Compliance
-
Exit with SNSOC
FUTURE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- Enhance Operator Awareness
-
Revisions to Monthly Verification Program
-
Training Improvements
- Enhance* SN SOC Review of Station Trends
- Increase Station Supervision Sensitivity to Human
Performance
-
HPES Summary
- Permanent Repair of Letdown Line by Next Outage
HUMAN PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SYSTEM
SIGNIFICANT PERFORMANCE OF TASK
Frequency of Event (0/o)
50
40
30
20
10
0
Frequency to
Detect Error
Misinterpretation
=---
= Industry
North Anna
IBSurry
Incorrect
Carryout of
Correct Action
Following
Procedure
Incorrectly
- ~
OVERALL CONCLUSIONS
- Safety Consequences of Both Events Minimal
- Thorough Analysis of *soth Events
- Comprehensive Actions Including
-
Identification
-
Programmatic Enhancements
.....
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