ML18150A113
| ML18150A113 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 05/20/1987 |
| From: | Decker T, Tabaka A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18150A111 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-87-12, 50-281-87-12, NUDOCS 8706030060 | |
| Download: ML18150A113 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1987012
Text
Report Nos. :
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
MAY 2 6 1987
50-280/87-12 and 50-281/87-12
Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Richmond, VA
23261
Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281
Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted:
May 4-8, 1987
Inspector:(~ J~
License Nos.: DPR-32 and DPR-37
{-t'r A. E. Tabaka *
s/2~'(.8 7
Date'S1gned
Accompanying Personnel:
E. D. Testa
A
/7
(r
/
Approved by: ~ -K . {/t,~,hc
T. R. Decker, Section Chief
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection was to evaluate selected areas of
the emergency preparedness program.
Results:
One violation was identified
Failure to provide training to various
members of the emergency organization in accordance with the Emergency Plan *
8706030060 870526
ADOCK 05000280
G
REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- E. S. Grecheck, Assistant Station Manager (NS&L)
- H.L. Miller, Assistant Station Manager (O&M)
- R. H. Blount, Superintendent Technical Services
- D. J. Burke, Superintendent Maintenance
- S. P. Sarver, Superintendent Health Physics
- A.H. Friedman, Superintendent Nuclear Training
- J. B. Costello, Coordinator Emergency Planning
- B. A. Garber, Health Physicist
- J. A. Price, Manager Quality Assurance
- E. M. Topping, Senior Instructor
- R. L. Johnson, Operations Coordinator
- T. J. Szymanski, Associcate Health Physicist, Corporate
- W. D. Craft, Licensing Coordinator
- S. R. Burgold, Operations Coordinator (Projects)
C. Smith, Senior Clerk
V. Jones, Supervisor of Offices
K. Sloan, Shift Supervisor
M. Gabriel, Senior Reactor Operator
G. Polson, Coordinator Emergency Preparedness, Corporate
F. Cox, Supervisor Emergency Planning, Corporate
M. Haduck, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor
P. Blount, Assistant Health Physics Supervisor
J. Butrick, Health Physics Technician Trainee
Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians,
operators, security force members, and office personnel.
Other Organizations
G. Urguhart, Department of Environmental Services, Conmonwealth of
A. Warren, Department of Environmental Services, Conmonwealth of Virginia
J. Tokarz, Assistant County Administrator, Surry County
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- W. E. Holland, Senior Resident Inspector
- S. G. Tingen, Inspector, Region II
- L. E. Nicholsen, Resident Inspector
- C. P. Patel, NRR - Licensing Project Manager
- Attended exit interview
2.
2
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 8, 1987, with
those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
The inspector discussed the
areas evaluated and summarized the findings to include the one unresolved*
item* and the violation of regulatory requirements.
The violation
involved the failure to provide training to emergency response personnel
in accordance with the Emergency Plan and is discussed in Paragraph 9.
The licensee aid not take -exception -to any of the--items identified and -
committed to consider those areas identified as Inspector Follow-up Items.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided
to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
4.
Unresolved Items
5 *
One unresolved item pertaining to the evacuation of non-essential site
personnel upon declaration of a Site Area or General Emergency was
identified and is discussed in Paragraph 6.
Emergency Detection and Classification (82201)
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4); 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Sections IV.B
and IV.C; and Section 4.0 of the licensee's Emergency Plan, this program
area was inspected to determine whether the licensee used and understood a
standard emergency classificat_ion and action level scheme.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's classification procedure, Emergency
Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) 1.01, "Emergency Manager Controlling
Procedure," and pertinent portions of the Emergency Plan.
The event
classifications in both* the Plan and procedures were consistent with the
four standard classes required by regulation.
The classification scheme
did not contain any significant errors which would lead to incorrect or
untimely classification.
One discrepancy between the Plan and procedures
for the Site Area Emergency EAL, "Secondary line break with primary to
secondary leakage greater than 50 gpm and fuel damage indicated" was
noted. There appeared to be a typographical error for the Main Steam Line
High Range Radiation Monitor.
The licensee agreed to correct this error
in the next Plan revision.
Selected emergency action levels (EALs) specified in EPIP 1.01 and the
Plan were reviewed.
Those EALs examined appeared consistent with the
initiating events specified in Appendix 1 of NUREG-0654.
Many of the
licensee's EALs were based on specific plant parameters obtainable in the
Control Room, in addition to radiological monitoring results *
- Unresolved Items are matters about which more information is required to
determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations.
3
The following notification procedures were reviewed:
EPIP 2.01, Notification of State and Local Governments
EPIP 2.02, Notification of NRC
The Plan, in addition to the controlling procedures for each emergency
class, included criteria for initiation of offsite notifications.
These
procedures required that offsite notifications be made to the Commonwealth
and loca-1 governments within 15 minutes of -emergency declaration and to
the NRC no later than one hour after declaration.
The procedures a 1 so
contained criteria for transmitting protective action reconmendations as
applicable.
The inspector discussed with licensee representatives the coordination of
EALs with Commonwealth and local officials. Licensee documentation showed
that the annual
EAL review with Commonwealth and local government.
officials was held August 4, 1986.
Licensee representatives indicated
that no dissenting comments were received.
Interviews*were held with two shift supervisors to verify that they
understood the relationship between core status and such core damage
indicators as containment high-range radiation monitor, fuel temperature
indicator, containment hydrogen monitor, and post-accident primary coolant
analysis.
These interviewees appeared knowledgeable of the various
indicators.
The responsibility and authority for classification of emergency events
and initiation of emergency actions were clearly described in the
Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures.
Interviews with selected key
members of the licensee's emergency organization revealed that these
personnel understood their responsibilities and authorities in relation to
accident classification,
notifications,
and
protective action
recommendations.
Selected Emergency and Abnormal Procedures were reviewed by the inspector
and discussed with licensee personnel.
These procedures directed the
users to implement the emergency classification procedure.
In many cases,
the emergency action level scheme and controlling procedures also
cross-referenced back to the applicable Abnormal and Emergency Procedures.
Walk-through evaluations involving accident classification problems were
conducted with several individuals designated as interim and alternate
Station Emergency Manager.
Personnel interviewed properly classified the
hypothetical accident situations presented to them and appeared to be
familiar with appropriate classification procedures.
The inspector reviewed licensee documentation of actual licensee events
for the period April 1986 to April 1987 to verify that events which
occurred during .this time were properly classified and that the
notifications were made within the applicable time frames.
In general,
the documentation was in order and actions appropriate to the emergency
were performed in a timely manner.
In addition, the inspector reviewed
the licensee's self-critique of the implementation of the Emergency Plan
4
during the December 9, 1986, incident. It appeared that the licensee had
adequately addressed and corrected the problems noted during the event,
particularly in the area of offsite corrvnunications.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Protective Action Uecision-Making (82202)
-Pursuant- to 10 CFR 5ff.47(b}(9) and (10)-; -and 10 CFR Part-50, Appendix E,
Section IV.D.3; this area was inspected to determine whether the licensee
had 24-hour-per-day capability to assess and analyze emergency conditions
and make recommendations to protect the public and onsite workers.
The inspector discussed responsibility and authority for protective action
decision-making with licensee representatives and reviewed pertinent
portions of the licensee's Emergency Plan and procedures.
The Plan and
procedures clearly assigned responsibility and authority for accident
assessment and protective action decision-making.
Interviews with members
of the licensee's emergency organization showed that these personnel
understood their authorities and responsibilities with respect to accident
assessment and protective action decision-making.
lhe inspector reviewed the Plan and pertinent EPIPs to determine that the
licensee had made adequate provisions for protecting onsite and offsite
individuals in the event of an emergency.
The licensee had the criteria
and methodology in place for making offsite protect1ve action
recommendations based on core status and radiological release data
consistent with those required by regulation.
However, the licensee had
not provided for a similar level of protection for onsite, non-essential
personnel in the event of an emergency. Specifically, the licensee's Plan
and procedures did not explicitly require the evacuation of non-essential
personnel upon declarat10n of a Site Area or Genera I Emergency in
accordance with NUREG-0654,Section II.J.4.
The licensee's onsite
evacuation -criteria contained in Sections 6.5.b and 6.4.1.1.a of the
Emergency Plan, EPIP 1.04,
11Response to Site Area Emergency," EPIP 1.05,
11Response to General Emergency,
11 and EPIP 4.07,
11 Protective Measures,
11 was
based solely on radiological parameters.
This was contrary to regulatory
guidance where such decision-making shall be based on event
classification/plant conditions.
Sole use of radiological data to
determine the protection to be afforded site personnel neither explicitly
nor implicitly met the protective action guidance presented in NUREl:i-0654.
This variance from published Federal guidance was not in accordance with
10 CFR 50.47(b){10) and was identified to the licensee as an unresolved
item pending further agency review.
Unresolved Item {50-280, 281/87-12-01):
Evacuation of non-essential site
personnel upon declaration of a Site Area or General Emergency.
Walk-through evaluations involving protective action decision-making were
conducted with three individuals designated to fill the position of
Station Emergency Manager.
Personnel demonstrated familiarity with the
5
use of procedures for making offsite protective actions, and they
understood the need for timeliness in making such recommendations to
offsite officials.
Given hypothetical situations, these individuals were
able to formulate the appropriate protective action recommendation for the
public.
Licensee procedures made provisions for contacting responsible offsite
authorities on a 24-hour basis.
Backup communications links with offsite
-authorities were ava-ilable.
The inspector independently confirmed that
Commonwealth and county authorities could be contacted from the Control
Room using the Insta-phone ringdown system.
/
The inspector reviewed the licensee's and Commonwealth of Virginia's
emergency response plans to determine that Commonwealth decision-makers
had predetermined criteria for use in protective action decision-making
which were consistent -with those used by the licensee.
This review
indicated the protective action. guides were consistent, and that the two
entities had agreed upon their use in a letter from the Commonwealth to
the licensee dated March 4, 1985.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
- Notification and Communication (82203}
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b}(5} and (6}; and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,
Section IV.D; and Sections 4.0 and 7.0 of the licensee's Emergency Plan,
this area was inspected to Qetermine whether the licensee was maintaining
- a capabi 1 i ty for notifying and communicating {in the event of an
emergency) among its own personnel, offsite supporting agencies and
authorities, and the population within the EPZ.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's notification procedures.
The
procedures were consistent with the emergency classification and EAL
scheme used by the licensee.
The inspector determined that the procedures
made provisions for message verification.
The inspector determined by review of applicable procedures and by
discussion with licensee representatives that adequate procedural means
existed for alerting, notifying, and activating emergency response
personnel.
The procedures specified when to notify and activate the
onsite emergency organization, corporate support organization, and offsite
agencies.
The licensee's management control program for the prompt notification
system was reviewed.
According to licensee documentation and discussions
with licensee representatives, the system consisted of 48 fixed sirens.
Thirteen additional sirens are to be added in the near future to enhance
the notification coverage. A review of licensee records verified that the
system as installed was consistent with the description contained in the
Maintenance of the system had been provided for by the
licensee.
-The inspector reviewed siren test records for the period
January 1986 to January 1987.
The records showed that the required tests
6
were completed and that no abnormal maintenance or equipment failure
existed.
Communications equipment in the Control Room, Operations Support Center
{OSC), Technical Support Center {TSC), and Local Emergency Operations
Facility {LEOF) was inspected.
Provisions existed for prompt
communications among emergency response organi zati ans, to emergency
.response . personne,l, and to the public.
The installed communications
systems at the emergency response faci l i-ties were -consistent with system
descriptions in the emergency plan and Implementing Procedures, with the
exception of the Health Physics Network {HPN) as noted in Paragraph 7
below.
The inspector conducted operability checks on selected communications
equipment in the Control Room.
No problems were observed.
The inspector
reviewed licensee records for the period January 1986 to January 1987
which indicated that communications checks. were conducted at the specified
frequencies.
Licensee records al so revealed that corrective action was
taken on problems identified during communications checks.
Redundancy of offsite* and onsite communication links was discussed with
licensee representatives.
The inspector verified that the licensee had
established a backup communications system which made use of the
following: 1) Various internal and external Ringdowns; 2) county and
Commonwealth Insta-phone Loop; 3) .General Office Off-Premises Extension;
4) Private Branch Exchange; 5) Commercial Phones; 6} Two-way UHF radio to
the local Sheriffs office; 7) State Controlled Administrative Telephone
System.
The
inspector requested and observed an unannounced
communications and notification check using the county and Commonwealth
Insta-phone Loop system.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Changes to the Emergency Preparedness Program (82204)
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47{b)(16); 10 CFR 50.54(q); and 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix E, Sections IV. and V; this area was reviewed to determine
whether changes were made to the program since the last routine inspection
{ February 1986) and to note how these changes affected the overa 11 state
The inspector discussed the licensee's program for making changes to the
Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures.
The inspector reviewed
Sections 8.2.1 and 8.2.2 of the Emergency Plan and Procedure SUADM-LR-01,
"Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Co111111ittee,
11 which govern the review
and approval of changes to the Plan and procedures.
The inspector
verified that changes to the Pl an and procedures were reviewed and
approved by management as required~
-
The inspector reviewed licensee documentation to determine that the
licensee had performed a review and update of the Emergency Pl an and
Emergency Telephone Directory as required by Sections 8.2.1 and 8.2.3 of
the Emergency Plan.
The dqcumentation indicated that the reviews and
7
updates were performed for 1986 as appropriate.
However, during a review
of several procedures which support the Emergency Plan, a procedure was
identified which had not been updated in a timely manner.
Specifically,
in June 1986, an error in a conversion factor was identified in AP-5.20,
Radiation Monitoring System Ventilation Vent Monitors Alert/Alarm," and a
formal deviation was written. Although this deviation was reviewed by the
Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee no action had been taken to
date to correct the error.
Follow-up on the revision to this procedure
will oe reviewed at a future date. - -
Inspector Follow-up Item (50-280, 281/87-12-02): Untimely implementation
of corrective action to a known error in AP-5.20.
During the period of March 1986 to May 1987 several revisions were made to
the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures.
Upon Regional review no
changes were identified to have decreased the Plan's effectiveness.
It.
was determined by transmi tta 1 1 etter review a 11 these
changes were
submitted to the NRC within 30 days of the effective date as. required~
with one exception.
In a letter dated J~ne 5, 1986, from the licensee to*
the NRC Region II, it was identified that several revised Implementing
Procedures had not been submitted as. required.
Upon identification of the
problem, the licensee performed an internal audit of the procedures to
ensure that all revisions were properly transmitted, those that were not
wer~ sent, and a 30 day conmitment was entered into its internal
Commitment Tracking System to ensure future transmittals were timely. The
inspector noted the implemented corrective actions, and found no submittal
problems after July 1986.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for distribution of changes
to the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures.
Examination of
selected controlled copies indicated that the appropriate onsite persons
were sent copies of the changes made since the last routine inspection.
Although no controlled copies of the Plan and procedures were found to be
out-of-date, the inspector did observe that the licensee had failed to
remove old, uncontrolled emergency procedures from the LEOF Corporate
position packets.
The licensee did not rectify this problem during the
course of the week; however, the procedures still remain uncontrolled.
The maintenance of these packets will be reviewed at a future date.
Inspector Follow-up Item: (50-280, 281/87-12-03): Failure to remove old,
uncontrolled procedures from the LEOF Corporate position packets.
Discussion with licensee representatives concerning modifications to
facilities, equipment, and instrumentation indicated that several changes
8
had been made.
These changes included installation of the new Health
Physics Network Phones and the completion of the Safety Parameter Display
System Computer.
The Plan has not yet been updated to reflect these
recent changes; however, the licensee indicated this would be performed
during the next Plan revision.
The organization and management of the emergency preparedness program were
reviewed.
Since the last routine inspection, several plant management
changes have been made as- we 11 * as- the pl a cement of a new person in the . _
position of Site Emergency Preparedness Coordinator.
Because these
personnel changes do not reflect any change in assfgnment of
responsibility, they, in themselves, do not appear to have any affect on
the Plan
1s implementation.
Further discussion with licensee
representatives also disclosed that there had been no significant changes
in the organization and staffing of Corporate and offsite support agencies
since the last inspection.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Knowledge and Performance of Duties (Training) (82206)
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(15); and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section
IV.5; this area was inspected tci determine whether emergency response
personnel understood their emergency response roles and could perform
their assigned functions.
The inspector reviewed the description (in the Emergency Plan) of .the
training program,* training procedures, and selected lesson plans, and
interviewed members of the instructional staff.
Based on these reviews
and interviews, the inspector determined that the licensee had established
a formal emergency training program.
The inspector reviewed training records .for key members of the emergency
organization for the period January 1986 to April 1987. A random s.ampl ing
of the training record for approximately twenty (20) individuals indicated
that eight (8) had not received specialized emergency training as required
-by Section 8.3 and Table 8.1 of the Emergency Plan.
The individuals
lacking the required training were from various alternate positons in the
emergency organization.
Typically, emergency training provided to upper
management and technician level personnel appeared adequate while most of
the individuals deficient in training were mid-level management in the
normal plant organization.
In addition, Section 8.3.1 of the Plan stated
that the department superintendent and supervisors have been assigned the
responsibility for ensuring that their personnel receive adequate
training.
This responsibility also included the identification of
specific individuals who may serve as primary, interim or alternate
emergency response personnel.
Although departmental emergency
notification call-out listings were available, a formal identification of
emergency position personnel was not found for each department.
The
.
failure to ensure that all personnel expected to respond to an emergency
9
receive the training required by the Plan was identified to the licensee
as a violation.
Violation: (50-280, 281/87~12-04) Failure to provide training to response
personnel in accordance with the Emergency Plan.
According to the licensee's documentation, other aspects of the training
program were being provided.
Records indicated that emergency drills were
contfucted in accordance with Section 8.5 of t-he Emergency Plan.
These
drills included communications, medical transport, environmental,
radiological, and post-accident sampling drills.
In most cases, the
drills were conducted in conjunction with the annual exercise.
The inspector also reviewed documentation concerning the training of
offsite support agencies.
These records showed that the groups indicated
in Sections 8.4 and 8.8 of the Plan were invited to participate in annual
training. Actual participation by the local groups appeared satisfactory.
Discussions with licensee representatives and documented meeting agendas
indicated the required training subjects were offered.
The inspector conducted walk-through evaluations with selected key members
of the emergency organization.
During these walk-throughs, individuals
were given various hypothetical sets of emergency conditions and data and
asked to walk-through the response as they would during an actual
emergency.
The individuals demonstrated familiarity with their emergency
response roles, and no problems were observed in the areas of emergency
detection and classification, notifications, dose calculation and
protective action decision-making.
One violation was identified.
10.
Dose Calculation and Assessment {82207)
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47{b){9), this area was inspected to determine
whether there was an adequate method for assessing the consequences of an
actual or potential radiological release.
The inspector reviewed the following dose assessment procedures: EPIP-4.08
titled Initial Offsite Release Assessment and EPIP-4.28 titled Class "A"
Dose Calculation Model.
The procedures had provisions for calculating doses for ground, monitored
and unmonitored pathways such ,as the plant building vents, containment
leakage, and steam releases.
The procedures allowed for refinement of
dose projections through incorporation of feedback from field monitoring.
The inspector discussed the manual (EPIP), computer (RAD/MET), and
Commonwealth dose projection models to detennine their compatibility. The
differences between the EPIP and RAD/MET have been discussed, and the
differences are understood; however, the documentation to support the
EPIP, RAD/MET and the Commonwealth comparison has not been completed *.
10
Inspector Foll ow-up Item (50-280 ,281/87-12-05) Documentation of the
manual, computerized and Commonwealth dose assessment models such that
differences a re known and understood by a 11 pa rt i es prior to their
required use.
The licensee's procedures made provision for timely incorporation of dose
assessment results into the offsite protective action recommendation
process.
However, during interviews with key licensee emergency response
personnel, they all appeared to recognize the uncertainties associated
with dose projections and the importance of making protective action
recommendations based on plant conditions.
An inspection and operability check were made of *selected equipment and
support items used for dose assessment in the Control Room, TSC, and LEOF.
During the operability check of the Class "A" Dose Calculation Model, the
inspector observed the computer system to be inoperable.
It appeared that
during a system update of the data base configuration, key files needed to
make the system operable were deleted or modified.
This problem had not
been identified by the licensee.
Inspector Follow-up (50-280, 281/87-12-06) program operability of the
computerized dose calculation model.
The inspector requested and observed dose assessment wa 1 k-throughs by
selected licensee personnel designated as responsible for dose projection
during an emergency.
The individuals demonstrated their ability to make
such calculations using both manual and computerized methods after the
missing computer files had been reinstalled.
The inspector discussed the backshift availability of personnel qualified
to make dose calculations.
Licensee representatives stated that such
personnel were avatlable on all shifts.
The inspector verified from a
- review of current staffing levels and back-shift walk-throughs .that this
capability existed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
License Audits (82210)
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and (16) and 10 CFR 50.54(t), this area
was inspected to determine whether the 1 i censee had performed an
independent review or audit of the emergency preparedness program.
Records of audits of the program were reviewed.
The records showed that
an independent audit of the program was conducted by the Quality Assurance
Department and was documented in. Audit Report No. 86-04, \\dated May 16,
1986.
This audit fulfilled the 12-month frequency requirement for such
audits. A review of the past five annual audit reports indicated that the
licensee had complied with the five-year retention requirement for such
reports, and that the audit findings and recommendations were presented to
plant and*corporate management.
11
The audit records showed that the Commonwealth and local government
interfaces were evaluated.
In past audits, QA has identified findings
involving offsite support groups; however, the inspector was not provided
formal documentation that indicated offsite groups had been made aware
that these findings were available for their review.
Inspector Follow-up Item (50-280, 281/87-12-07) Ensure that QA findings
from the- annual Emergency Preparedness Program Audit concerning _the_
offsite interfaces are readily available to ColTITlonwealth and local
authorities.
Licensee emergency plans and procedures required critiques following
exercises and drills.
Licensee documentation dated October 1, 1986,
showed that critiques were held following periodic drills as well as the
annual exercise.
The records showed that deficiencies were discussed in
the critiques, and recommendations for corrective action were made.
The licensee's program for follow-up action on audit, drill, and exercise
findings were reviewed.
Licensee procedures required fol low-up. on
deficient areas identified during audits, drills, and exercise.
The
inspector reviewed licensee records for the 1985 exercise which indicated
that corrective actions were taken on identified problems, as appropriate.
The licensee had established a tracking system as a management tool in
following up on actions taken in deficient areas, and deficiencies for the
1986 exercise were being tracked.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12.
Coordination with Offsite Agencies (82210)
The inspector held discussions with licensee representatives regarding the
coordination of emergency planning with offsite agencies.
Written
agreements existed with those offsite support agencies specified in the
Emergency Plan, and the agreements had been renewed within the past two
years, as required.
The inspector determined through telephonic
interviews with representatives of selected local and Conmonwealth support
agencies that there were no significant problems related to the interfaces
between the 1 i censee and the offs i te support agencies 1 i sted in
Paragraph 1.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8); and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section
IV. E; this area was reviewed to determine whether adequate emergency
facilities and equipment to support the emergency_ response are provided
and maintained.
12
The inspector toured the various on and near-site emergency facilities
including the Control Room, Technical Support Center, Operations Support
Center, and Local Emergency Operations Facility.
During the tour it was
observed that certain installed radiation monitoring equipment did not
appear operable in the TSC and LEOF.
Although this equipment is
calibrated annually, licensee representatives indicated that the monitors
were not part of a regular performance testing program.
Inspector Follow-u-p Item (50-280, -281/8-'7-12-08) No-periodic-operability - -
_
checks on installed radiation monitoring equipment in the TSC and LEOF.
The tour also revealed that the pressure seals on the penthouse level
exterior doors of the LEOF did not appear to provide a leak tight barrier.
According to licensee representative and the Emergency Plan this facility
is designed to maintain a positive pressure during emergency operation,
and meet the requirements of NUREG-0696.
It was not apparent during the
inspection that preventive maintenance nor testing was performed to ensure
the system could maintain the designed positive pressure.
Inspector Follow-up Item
(50-280, 281/87-12-09): Review documentation to
ensure that LEOF habitability is in accordance with NUREG-0696 as
committed to in the Section 7.1.d of the Emergency Plan.
The inspector reviewed the monthly inventory and operability checks on
selected emergency equipment and kits.
For the period of January 1986 to
December 1986, established kits were inventoried as appropriate. Problems
noted during equipment operability checks were documented and corrected as
. required~
No violations or deviations were identified.
14.
Inspector Follow-up (92701)
a.
(Closed) *Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) 50-280, 281/87-33-01:
Follow-up on licensee corrective action on 1985 emergency exercise
findings. A sampling of self-identified exercise items was evaluated
and found to be adequately corrected and/or addressed.
b.
(Closed) IFI (50-280/86-08-0l): Emergency position training lesson
plans were not available for review.
The emergency response training
plans were available for each of the training sessions provided.
The
documentation was available which cross-referenced each lesson plan
with the required training class as specified in Table 8.1 of the
Plan.
c.
(Closed) IFI (50-280/86-08-02): Inconsistency in shift supervisor
interviews with respect to protective action decision-making.
Walk-through evaluations were conducted with three individuals
designated as either interim or alternate Station Emergency Manager *
These individuals appeared cognizant of their responsibility to make
13
protective action recommendations and responded with the appropriate
protective action when given hypothetical plant conditions.
d.
(Closed) IE Information Notice 86-98: Offsite Medical Services.
In a
letter dated March 12, 1985, the NRC identified the lack of a
designated back-up hospital for the treatment of site individuals as
an Emergency Plan deficiency.
Upon evaluation of the licensee's
response, _dated April 25, 1985, it was determined that the
arrangement made for medical -services -was appropriate.
The adequacy
of these current arrangements and the need for back-up hospitals for
the treatment of the general public, however, will be evaluated by
FEMA at a later date.
e.
(Closed) IFI (50-280, 281/87-EP-01): Verification of the audibility
of alarms in high noise areas.
The inspectors observed an actuation
test of the various emergency al arms.
Al though during the limited
observation no problems were noted, all documentation concer~ing the
licensee's evaluation of alarm audibility, the placement of
additional PA units, and the deletion of previously implemented
administrative controls in the old EPIP-9 were not available. for
review.
This information will be reviewed in a future inspection.
(Inspector Follow-up Item 50-280, 281/87-12-10)