05000280/LER-1980-028-03, W/Unit at 100% Power, Reduction in Svc Water Pressure to Charging Pump Experienced.Caused by Missing Valve Disk for 2-SW-113.Check Valve Replaced

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W/Unit at 100% Power, Reduction in Svc Water Pressure to Charging Pump Experienced.Caused by Missing Valve Disk for 2-SW-113.Check Valve Replaced
ML18139B298
Person / Time
Site: Surry  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 05/04/1981
From: Joshua Wilson
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML18139B295 List:
References
LER-80-028-03X, LER-80-28-3X, NUDOCS 8105080276
Download: ML18139B298 (2)


LER-1980-028, W/Unit at 100% Power, Reduction in Svc Water Pressure to Charging Pump Experienced.Caused by Missing Valve Disk for 2-SW-113.Check Valve Replaced
Event date:
Report date:
2801980028R03 - NRC Website

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I On September 26,1980, with the unit at *100% power, a reduction in service water

([Ia] I pressure to the charging pumps was experienced.

Investigation indicated a missing check valve disk for 2-HSW-113_, on the discharge of 2-SW-P-lOA.

If the pump had not been isolated, a reduction in cooling water flow would hav~ occurred.

This is contrary to T.S.3.3~A.8.b and is reportable per T.S.6.6.2.b.(2).

The temporary modification (missing disk) was not documented.

This is contrary to T.S.6.4.D and i))IJ I is reportable per T.S.6.6.2.b(3).

The health and safety of the_public were not affecfed.

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[II[] J The cause of the event was a :mis~ing valve disk for 2-SW-113.

The "A" pump was IIIIJ rr:m isolated thereby allowing the "B" pump to perform its intended function.

The check valve, 2-SW-113, was subsequently replaced.

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UPDATED !PORT-PREVIOUS REPORT DATED 10/210 ATTACHMENT 1 SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 2 DOCKET NO:

50-281 REPORT NO:

80-028/03X-1 EVENT DATE:

09-26:-80 TITLE OF REPORT:

INOPERABLE CHECK *v ALVE

  • 2-SW-113
1.

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On September 26,1980, with the unit operating a steady state power level of 100%, a reduction in service water pressure to the charging pumps was experienced.

This reduced pressure condition existed only when 2-SW-P-lOB was operating.

Subsequent troubleshooting indicated that_ the discharge check valve, 2-SW-113, on the non-operating redundant pump (2-SW-P-lOA) was open.

This is contrary to Technical Specification 3.3.A.8.b and is reportable per Technical Specification 6.6.2.b(2)..

While investigating the event, 1i:.t became apparent that 2-SW-P-lOB may have been operated in degraded mode without proper administrative measures in place.

Specifically, the internals for en.eek valve 2-SW-113 were removed and documentation of this temporary modification* was not performed, This is contrary to *.:

Technical Specification 6,4.D and is* reportable per Technical *Specification

- 6,6.2.b(3).

When this modificatd.on was performed, cannot be determined.

However, both pumps were proven operable, utilizing PT-18. 8, on September 6,1980.

2.

PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES A..'tID STATUS OF 'REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT:

The charging pump service water pumps supply cooling.water to the charging pump intermediate seal and lube oil coolers, With the t~A11 pump's discharge isolated, 2-SW-P-lOB was operable and was performing itst intended function.

Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3.

CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The cause of the event was a missing valve disk for 2-SW-113.

Investiga.tion revealed that the valve di*sk was removed during a previous maintenance

activity, Documentation of the previous maintenance was not performed.
4.

IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION; The immediate corrective act:i..on was to close the discharge valve for pump "A 11 This allowed 2-SW-P-lOB to function as designed.

A maintenance ~equest was isslled *to-r_epai~_.2-'SW-113.

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5.

SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE AClrION:

Check valve 2-SW-113 was replaced and tested, 6

  • ACTIONS TAK.EN TO PREVENT REC CURRENCE:

Operation and 111aintenance personnel have been reinstructed in the proper method of performance of work on Safety~Related systems.

7.

GENERIC 'IMPLICATIONS:

.'* None,