ML18139A315
| ML18139A315 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 05/16/1980 |
| From: | VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18139A314 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8006130299 | |
| Download: ML18139A315 (24) | |
Text
',.
ATTACHMENT 1 Tabulation Of Changes Identification of necessary changes to the Surry Unit 1 and 2 Technical Specifications as indicated by page numbers:
TS 1. 0-2 TS 3.0-1 3.0-2 3.0-3
- 3. 0-4 TS 3. 7-2 TS 3.9-1 3.9-2 TS 3.10-3 3.10-4 TS 3.ll-3 3.ll-5 TS 3.18-1 TS 3.21-1 3.21-2 3.21-3 3.21-4 TS 3. 21. 5 Revise the definition of operable in Specification 1.0-D Add new Specification 3.0.1, Specification 3.0.2 and corresponding Bases Clarify applicability in Specification 3.7-E Clarify Specification 3.9 to reference Technical Specification Section 3.16 Clarify applicability by adding Specification 3.10-D Clarify applicability by adding Specifi-cation 3.11-A.10 and Specification 3.11-A.ll Clarify applicability by adding Specification 3.18-C Clarify applicability by adding Specification 3.21-A.3 Clarify applicability by adding Specification 3.21-B.4 Clarify applicability by adding Specification 3.21-D.4 Clarify applicability by adding Specification 3.21-E.3 Clarify applicability by adding Specifications 3.21-F.3 and 3.21-G.3.
Correction of typographical error in Specification 3.21-G.2 8006130 2..Cf f
I ATTACHMENT 2 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE NO. 86
I~
i e
TS 1.0-2
- 4.
Hot Shutdown* Condition When the reactor is subcritical by an amount greater than or equal to 1.77% 6k/k and Tavg is ?._547°F.
S.
Reactor Critical
- 6.
- 7.
D.
When the neutron chain reaction is self-sustaining and keff = 1.0.
Power Operation When the reactor is critical and the neutron flux power range instrumentation indicates greater than 2% of rated power.
Refueling Operation Any operation involving movement of core components when the vessel head is unbolted or removed.
Operable A system, subsystem, train, component or device shall be operable or have operability when it is capable of performing its specified function(s).
Implicit in this definition shall be the assumption that all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, normal and emergency electrical power sources, cooling or seal water, lubrication or other auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, train, component or device to perform its function(s) are also capable of performing their related support function(s).
The system or component shall be considered to have this capability when:
(1) it satisfies the limiting
E.
F.
TS 1. 0-3 conditions for operation defined in Section 3, and (2) it has been tested periodically in accordance with Section 4 and meets its performance requirements.
Protective!nstrumentation Logic
- 1. Analog.Channel An arrangement of components and modules as required to generate a single protective action digital signal when required by a unit-condition.
An analog channel loses its identity*where single action signals are combined.
- 2.
Logic Channel A logic channel is a group of relay contact matrices which operate in response to the digital output signal from the analog channel to generate a protective action signal.
Degree of Redundancy The difference between the number of operable channels and the minimum number of channels monitoring a specific parameter which when tripped will cause an automatic system trip.
G.
Instrumentation Surveillance
- 1.
Channel Check A qualitative determination of acceptable operability by observation of channel behavior during operation.
This determination shall include comparison of the channel with
I' TS 3.0-1 3.0 Lil1ITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 3o0.l In the event a Limiting Condition for Operation and/or associated modified requirements cannot be satisfied because of circumstances in excess of those addressed in the specification, the unit shall be_ placed in at least hot shutdown within.6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in at least cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> unless corrective measures are completed that permit operation under the permissible action statements for the specified time interval as measured from initial discovery or until the reactor is placed in a condition in which the specification is not applicable.
Exceptions to these requirements shall be stated in the individual specifications.
3.0.2 When a system, subsystem, train, component or device is determined to be inoperable solely because its emergency power source is inoperable, or solely because its normal power source is inoperable, it may be considered operable for the purpose of satisfying the requirements of its applicable Limiting Condition for Operation, provided:
(1) its corresponding nor-mal or emergency* power source is operable; and (2) all of its redundant system(s), subsystem(s), train(s), component(s) and device(s) are operable, or likewise satisfy the requirements of this specification.
Unless both
_conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied, the unit shall be placed in at l~ast hot shutdown within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in at least cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
This specification is not,applicable in cold shutdown or refueling shutdown conditions.
Basis 3.0.1 This specification delineates the action to be taken for circum-stances not directly provided for in the LCD and whose occurrence would
I' TS 3.0-2 violate the intent of the specification.
For example, Specification 3.3 requires each Reactor Coolant System accumulator to be operable and provides explicit action requirements if one accumulator is inoperable.
Under the terms of Specification 3.0.1, if more than one accumulator is inoperable, the unit is required to be in at least hot shutdown within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
As a further example, Specification 3.4 requires two Containment Spray Sub-systems to be operable and provides explicit action requirements if one spray system is inoperable.
Under the terms of Specification 3.0.1, if both of the required Containment Spray Subsystems are inoperable, the unit is required to be in at least hot shutdown within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in at least cold shutdown in the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. It is assumed that the unit is brought to the.required condition within the required times by pr.omptly initiating and carrying out the appropriate action.
3.0.2 This specification. delineates what additional conditions must be satisfied to permit operation to continue, consistent with the actions for power sources, when a normal or emergency power source is not operable.
It specifically prohibits operation when one division is inoperable because its normal or emergency power source is inoperable and a system, subsystem, train, component or device in another division is inoperable for another reason.
The provisions of this specification permit ~he action statements associated with individual systems, subsystems, trains, components or devices to be consistent with the action statements of the associated electrical power source. It allows operation to be governed by the time limits of the action statement associated with the Limiting Condition for Operation for the nonnal or emergency power source, not the individual action
e TS 3. 0-3 statements for each system, subsystem, train, component or device that is determined tobe inoperable solely because of the inoperability of its normal or emergency power source.
For example, Specification 3.16 requires in part that two emergency diesel generators be operable.
The action statement provides for out-of-service time when one emergency diesel generator is not operable.
If the definition of operable were applied without consideration of Specification 3.0.2, all systems,.subsystems, trains, components and devices supplied by the inoperable emergency power source would-also be inoperable.
This*would dictate invoking*the applicable acti-0n state-ments for each of the applicable Limiting Conditions for Operation.
However, the provisions of Specification 3.. 0.2 permit the time limits for continued operation to be consistent with the action statement for the inoperable emergency diesel generator instead, provided the other specified conditions are satisfied.
In this case, this would mean that the corresponding normal power source must be operable, _and all redundant systems, subsystems, trains, components and devices must be operable, or otherwis*e satisfy Specification 3.0.2 (i.e., be capable of performing their design function and have at least one normal or one emergency power source operable).
If they are not satisfied, shutdown is required in accordance with this specification.
As a further example, Specification 3.16 requires in part that two physically independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class IE distribution system be operable.
The action statement provides out-of-service time when one required offsite circuit is not operable. If the definition of operable we~e-
e TS 3.0-4 applied without consideration of Specification 3.0.2, all systems, sub-systems, trains, components and devices supplied by the inoperable normal power source, one of the offsite circuits,*would be inoperable.
This would dictate invoking the applicable action statements for each of the applicable LCOs.
However, the provisions of Specification 3.0.2 permit the time limits for continued operation* to be cons*istent with the action statement for the inoperable normal power source instead, provided the other specified conditions are satisfied. In this case) this would mean that for one division the emergency power source must be operable (as must be the components supplied by the* emergency power source) and all redundant systems, subsystems, trains, components and devices in the other division must be operable; or likewise satisfy Specification 3.0.2 (i.e., be capable of performing their design functions and have an emergency power source operable).
In other words, both emergency power sources must be operable and all redundant systems, subsystems, trains, components and devices in both divisions must also be operable.
If these conditions are not satisfied, shutdown is required in accordance with this specification.
In cold shutdown or refueling shutdown conditions,. Specification 3.0.2 is not applicable, and thus the in~ividual action statements for each applicable Lim~ting Condition.. for Operation in these conditions must be adhered to.
- c.
D.
E.
Basis TS 3. 7-2 In the event of sub~system instrumentation channel failure permitted by specification 3.7-B, TS Tables 3.7-1 through 3.7-3 need not be observed during the short period of time the operable sub-system channels are tested where the failed channel must be blocked to prevent unnecessary reactor trip.
The Engineered Safety Features initiation instrumentation setting limits shall be stated in TS Table 3.7-4.
Automatic functions operated from radiation monitor alarms shall be as stated in TS Table 3.7-5.
The requirements of Specification 3.0.1 are not applicable.
Instrument Operating Conditions During plant operations, the complete instrumentation systems will normally be in service.
Reactor safety is provided by the Reactor Protection Sys~em, which automatically initiates appropriate action to prevent exceeding established limits.
Safety is not compromised, however, by continuing operation with certain instrumentation channels out of service since provisions were made for this in the plant design.
This specification outlines limiting conditions for operation necessary to preserve the effectiveness of the Reactor Control and Pr0tection System when any one or more of the channels is. out of service.
Almost all reactor protection channels are supplied with sufficient redundancy to provide the capability for channel calibration and test at power.
Exceptions
I, TS 3.9-1
- 3.9 STATION SERVICE SYSTEMS Applicabili t_y Applies to availability of electrical power for operation of station auxiliaries.
Objective To define those conditions of electrical power availability necessary to pro-vice for safe reactqr operation.
Specification A.
A unit's reactor shall not be made critical without:
- 1.
All three of the unit's 4,160 v buses energized
- 2.
All six of the unit's 480 v buses energized
- 3.
Both of the 125 v d-c buses energized as explained in Section 3.16
- 4.
One battery charger per battery operating as explained in Section 3.16 5..
Both of the 4,160 v emergency buses energized as explained in Section 3.16
- 6.
Both of the 480 v emergency buses energized as explained in Section 3.16
e e
TS 3.9-2
- 7.
Two emergency diesel generators operable as explained in Section 3.16.
B.
The requirements of Specification 3.9-A above may be modified for two reactor coolant loop operation to allow one of the unit's 4,-160 v no,rinal buses and the two 480 v normal buses feed from this 4,160 v bus, to be un-available or inoperable.
C.
The requirements of Specification 3.9-A may be modified as provided in Section 3.16 for items 3, 4, 5, 6, and lo Basis During startup of a unit, the station's 4,160 v and 480 v normal and emergency buses are energized from the station's 34.5 kv buses.
At reactor power levels greater than 5 percent of rated power the 34.5 kv buses are required to energize only the emergency buses because at this power level the station generator can supply sufficient power to the normal 4,160 v and 480 v lines to operate the unit.
Three reactor coolant loop operation with all 4,160 v and 480 v buses energized is the normal mode of.operation for a unit.
Equipment redundacy and bus arrangements, however, allow safe unit startup and operation with one 4,160 v normal bus and the two 480 v normal buses feed from this 4,160 v bus, un-available or inoperable.
References FSAR Section 8.4 Station Service Systems FSAR Section 8.5 Emergency Power Systems
e e
TS 3.10-3
- 7.
When the reactor vessel head is unbolted, a minimum boron concen-tration of 2,000 ppm shall be maintained in any filled portion of t'he Reactor Coolant System and shall be check by sampling at least once every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
- 8. Direct communication between the Main Control Room and. the refueling cavity manipulator crane shall be available whenever changes in core geometry are taking place.
- 9.
No movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor core shall be accomplished until the reactor has b°een subcritical for a period of at least 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br />.
lOo A spent fuel cask or heavy loads exceeding 110 percent of the weight of a fuel assembly (not including fuel handling tool) shall not be moved over spent fuel, and only one spent fuel assembly will be handled at one time over the reactor or the spent ruel pit.
- 11.
A spent fuel cask shall not be moved into the Fuel Building until such time as the NRC has reviewed and approved the spent fuel cask drop evaluation.
B.
If any one of the specified limiting conditions for refueling are not met, refueling of the reactor shall cease, work shall be initiated to correct the conditions so. that the specified limits are met, and no operations which increase the reactivity of the core shall be made.
C.
After initial fuel loading and after each core refueling operation and prior to reactor operation at greater than 75% of rated power, the movable
e TS 3.10-4 incore detector system shall be utilized to verify proper power distribution.
Do The requirements of Specif,ication 3.0.1 are not applicable.
Basis Detailed instructions, the above specified precautions and the design of the fuel handling equipment,.which incorporates built-in interlocks and safety features, provide assurance that an accident, which would result in a hazard to public health and safety, will not occur during refueling operations.
When no change is being made in core geometry, one neutron detector is sufficient to monitor the core and permits maintenance of the out-of-function instrumentation.
Continuous monitoring of radiation levels and neutron flux provides immediate indication of an unsafe condition.
Containment high radiation levels and high airborne activity levels automatically stop and isolate the Containment Purge System.
The fuel building ventilation exhaust is diverted through charcoal filters whenever refueling is in progress.
At least one flow path is required for cooling and mixing the coolant contained in the reactor vessel so as to maintain a uniform boron concentration and to remove residual heat.
The shutdown margin established by Specification A-7 maintains the core subcritical, even with all of the control rod assemblies withdrawn from the core.
During refueling, the reactor refueling water cavity is filled with approximately 220,000 gal of water borated to at least 2,0oo*ppm boron.
The boron concentration of this water is sufficient to maintain the reactor subcritical by approximately 10% 6k/k in the cold shutdown condition with all control rod assemblies inserted and also to maintain the core subcritical
't e
TS 3.10-5 by approximately 1% with no control rod assemblies inserted into the reactor.
Periodic ~hecks of refueling water boron concentration assure the prop.er shutdown margin.
Specification A-8 allows the Control Room Operator to inform the manipulator operator of any impending unsafe *condition detected from the main control board indicators during fuel movemento In addition to the above safeguards, interlocks are used during refueling to assure safe handling of the fuel assemblies.
An excess weight interlock is provided on the lifting hoist to prevent movement of-more than one fuel assembly at a time.
The spent fuel transfer mechanism can accommodate only one fuel assembly at a time.
Upon each completion of core loading and installation of the reactor vessel head, specific mechanical and electrical tests will be performed prior to initial criticality.
The fuel handling accident has been analyzed based on the activity that could be released from fuel :i:'od gaps of 204 rods of the highest power assembly* with a 100 hour0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> decay period following power operation at 2550 MWt for 23,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />.
The requirements detailed in Specification 3.10 provide assurance that refueling unit conditions conform to the operating conditions assumed in the accident analysis.
Detailed procedures and checks insure that fuel assemblies are loaded in the proper locations in the core.
As an additional check, the moveable incore detector system will be used to verify proper power distribution.
This*
system is capable of revealing any assembly enrichment error or loading error which could cause power shapes to be peaked in excess of design value.
TS 3.10-6
- Fuel rod gap activity from 204 rods of the highest power 15x15 assembly is greater than fuel rod gap activity from 264 rods of the highest power 17x17 demonstration assembly.
References FSAR Section 5.2 Containment Isolation FSAR Section 6.3 Consequence Limit~ng Safeguards FSAR Section 9ol2 Fuel Handling System FSAR Section 11.3 Radiation Protection FSAR Section 13o3 Table 13.3-1 FSAR Section 14.4ol Fuel Handling Accidents FSAR Supplement:
Volume I:
Question 3.2
e e
TS 3.11-3 A-1 Above are met.
- 10.
The requirements of Specification 3.0.1 are* not applicable.
B.
Gaseous Wastes
- 1.
The controlled release rates of gaseous wastes, excluding halogen and airborne particulates originating from station operation shall be limited as follows:
i (MPC) i 5
< 2.0 X 10 3
m sec where Qi is the controlled release-rate (curies per second) of any radioisotope i and (MPC) p in unit of microcuries per cubic centi-meter is defined in column 1, Table II of Appendix B to 10 CFR 20.
- 2.
The release rates of activity shall not exceed 16 percent of those specified. in paragraph.B.l. above when averaged over any calendar quarter or 10 percent of those specified in paragraph B.1. above when averaged over any 12 consecutive months.
3a. The release rate limit of all radioiodines and radioactive materials in particulate.form with half-lives greater than eight days released from the site to the environs as part of the gaseous wastes shall be such that 3 X 105 Q.::_ 1
- where Q = the measured release rate of the radioiodines and radioactive materials in particulate form with half-lives greater than eight days (Ci/sec).
- b. The average release rate per site of all radioiodines and radioactive materials in particulate form-with half-lives greater than eight days during any calendar quarter shall be such that 13 {3 X 105 Q} _s 1 I
e TS 3.ll-3A
- c. The average release rate per site of all radioiodine and radio-active materials in particulate form with half-lives greater than eight days during any period of 12 consecutive months shall be such that 25 {3 X 105 Q} < 1 (1)
The amount of iodine-131 released during any calendar quarter shall not exceed 2 Ci/reactor.
(2)
The amount of iodine-131 released during any period of 12 con-secutive months shall not exceed 4 Ci/reactor.
- d.
Should either of the conditions 1 and 2 listed below exists the licensee shall make an investigation to identify the causes of the release rates, define and initiate a program of action to reduce the release rates to design objective levels of 15 mrem/yr and report these actions to the NRC within 30 days from the end of the quarter during which the release occurred.
(1)
If the average release rate per site of all ra<lioiodines and radioactive materials in particulate form with half-lives greater than eight days during any calendar quarter is such that 50 {3 X 105 Q} > 1 (2)
If the amourit of iodine-131 released during any calendar quarter is greater than 0.5 Ci/reactor.
- 4.
Gaseous wastes gross and particulate activity and flow rate shall be continuously monitored and recorded during release of radio-active gaseous wastes to be the process vent.
S.
During release of radioactive gaseous waste to the process vent, the following conditions shall be met:
- a. At least one process vent blower shall be operating.
' t e
TS 3.11-5 fuel in the containment.
- 11.
The requirements of Specification 3.0.l are not applicable.
Basis The releases of radioactive materials will be kept as low as practicable as required by 10 CFR 50 and will not. exceed the concentration limits specified in 10 CFR 20.
At the same time, the licensee is permitted the flexibility of operation, compatible with considerations of health and safety, to assure that the public is provided a dependable source of power under unusual operating conditions which may temporarily result in.r~leases in excess of four percent of the concentration limits specified in 10 CFR 20.
However, all releases must be kept within the concentration limits specified in 10 CFR 20. It is ex-pected that using this operational flexibility under unusual operating conditions, the licensee shall exert every effort to keep levels of radioactive materials released from the plant as low as practicable and that annual releases will not exceed a small fraction of the annual average concentration limits specified in 10 CFR 20.
The limiting conditions for operation contained in specification A-3 above, which relates to the total number of cu~ies which may be released in liquid effluents in any year, is based on the expected performance of the Surry Power Station assuming both units are operating with 0.25 percent leaking fuel and each unit is experiencing a 20 gallon per day primary to secondary system leak rate.
The formula prescribed in*specification B-1 takes atmospheric dilution into account and assures that at the point of maximum ground concentration at the site boundary, the requirements of 10 CFR 20 will not be exceeded.
The limit is based on the highest annual average value of X/Q which will occur at the
- e.
TS 3.18-1 3.18 MOVABLE IN-CORE INSTRUMENTATION Applicability Applies to the operability of the movable detector instrumentation system.
Objective To specify functional requirements on the use of the in-core instrumentation systems, for the recalibration of the excore symmetrical off-set detection system.
Specification A.
A minimum of 16 total accessible thimbles and at least 2 per quadrant, each of which will accept a movable incore-detector, shall be operable during re-calibration of the excore symmetrical off-set detection system.
B.
Power shall be limited to 90% of rated power for three loop operation, 54% of rated power for two loop operation with the loop stop valves closed, and 50% of rated power for two loop-operation with the loop stop valves open if re-calibration requirements for the excore symmetrical off-set detection system, identified in Table 4.1-1, are not met.
- c.
The requirements of Specification 3.0.1 are not applicable.
l
- e TS 3.21-1 3.21.
FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION SYSTEM Applicabilit:Y Applies to the operating status of the Fire Detection and Suppression Systems.
Objective To define those conditions of the Fire Detection and Suppression Systems necessary to insure safe reactor o.perations.
These conditions relate to:
Fire Detection Systems, Plant Fire Suppression Water System, Plant Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems, Plant COz System, Plant Halon System, Plant Fire Hose Stations and Plant Fire Barrier Penetration Fire Sealso Specifications:
A.
Fire Detection Systems
- 1.
As a minimum, the fire detection instrumentation for each fire detection zone shown in Table 3.21-1 shall be operable at all times.
- 2.
With the number of operable fire detection instruments less than required by Table 3.21-1~
- a. Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, establish a fire watch patrol to inspect the zone with the inoperable instrument(s) at least once per hour, and
- b.
Restore the inoperable instrument(s) to operable status within 14 days or prepare and submit a special report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.6.4 within the next.10 days outlining the cause of the malfunction and the plans for restoring the instrument(s) to operable statuso
- 3.
The requirements of Specification 3.0.1 are not applicable.
TS 3.21-2 B.
Plant Fire Suppression Water System
- 1.
The Fire Suppression Water System shall be operable at all times with:
- a.
(2) high pressure pumps each with a capability ~f 2,500 gpm.
With their discharge aligned to the fire suppression header.
- b.
Separate water supplied each containing a minimum of 250,000 gallons reserved capacity from 300,000 gallon capacity tanks.
- c.
A flow path capable of.taking suction from both 300,000 gallon capacity tanks and transferring the water through distribution piping with OPERABLE sectionalizing control or isolation valves to the yard hydrant curb valves and the front valve ahead of the water flow alarm device on each sprinkler, hose standpipe or spray system riser.
- d. Automatic initiation logic for each fire pump.
- 2. a. With less than the above required equipment, restore the in-operable equipment to operable status within 7 days or pre-pare and submit a Special Report to the Connnission pursuant to Specification 6.6.4 within the next 10 days outlining the plans and procedures to be used to provide for the loss of redundancy in this system.
- b. With no Fire Suppression Water System operable, within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; (1)
Establish a backup Fire Suppression Water System.
(2)
Notify the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.6.4 out-lining the actions taken and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to operable status.
- 3. If 2.b(l) above cannot be fulfilled, place the reactor in Hot Shutdown with-in the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in Cold Shutdown within the following thirty (30) hours.
- 4.
The requirements of Specification 3.0.l are not applicable.
I.
/
'r e
TS 3.21-3
- c.
- Plant Spray and/or Sprinkler systems This section not applicable.* Safety and vital areas are not served by
.water spray systems.
D.
Plant CO2 System
- 1. The low pressure CO2 systems shall be. aper able, with a minimum level of 75% and a minimum pressure of 275 psi in the associated storage tank, at all times when the equipment in the following areas are required to be operable:
- a.
Cable tray rooms
- b.
Cable tunnel
- c.
Cable vault
- d.
Charcoal filter banks A and B
- e.
Emergency diesel generator rooms*, 1, 2, and 3.
- 2.
The high pressure CO2 systems shall be operable, with a minimum level of 90% by weight, at all times when equipment in the following areas are required to be operable:
- a. Fuel oil storage tank room for emergency service water pumps
- b.
Emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump rooms.
- 3. a.* With CO2 system inoperable, establish a continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipment for the un-protected area(s), within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
- b. Restore the system.to operable status within 14 days or prepare and submit a Special Report to the Connnission pursuant to Speci-fication 6.6.4 within the next 10 days outlining the cause of in-operability and the plans for restoring the system to operable status.
- 4.
The requirements of Specification 3.0.1 are not applicable.
e TS 3.21-4 E.
Plant Halon System
- 1. The Halon System shall be operable, with the storage tanks having at least 95% of full charge weight and 90% of full charge pressure, at all times when equipment in the following area is required to be operable:
- a. Station records storage vault.
- 2. a.
With the Halon System inoperable establish a continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipment for the unpro-tected area, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
- b.
Restore the system to operable status within 14 days or pre-pare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.6.4 within the next 10 days outlining the cause of inoperability and the plans for restoring the system to operable status.
- 3.
The requirements of Specification 3.0.l are not applicable.
F.
Plant Fire Hose Stations
- 1. The following fire hose station shall be operable at all times when equipment in the area is required to be operable:
LOCATION
- a. Auxiliary building hose Stations 37 throµgh 51 and 41A
- b. Fuel building' hose Stations 52 and 53.
Co Hose stations 12, 16, 20, 21A, 22, 23, 33 and 34 in Turbine Building to be used as backup SIZE 11/2" 11/2" 11/2"
e LOCATION co
( continued) to control room, emergency switch gear room and diesel generator room.
e TS 3.21-5 SIZE
- 2.
With a hose station inoperable, route an additional equivalent capa-city hose to the unprotected area from an operable hose station within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
- 3.
The requirements of Specification 3.0.1 are not applicable.
G.
Plant Fire Barrier Penetration Fire Seals
- 1. All penetration fire barriers protecting safety related areas shall be functional at all times.
- 2. With a penetration fire barrier non-functional, a continuous fire watch shall be established on at least one side of the affected penetration within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
- 3.
The requirements of Specification 3.0.l are not applicable.
Bases Fire Detection Instrumentation Operability of the fire detection instrumentation ensures that adequate warning capability is available for the prompt detection of fires.
This capability is required in order to detect and locate fires in their early stages.
Prompt detection of fires will reduce the potential for damage to safety related equipment and is an integral element in the overall facility fire protection program.