ML18136A355
| ML18136A355 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry, North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 12/21/1979 |
| From: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Proffitt W VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8001070242 | |
| Download: ML18136A355 (5) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 11*
101 MARIETTA,ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 1
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 DEC 2 1 1979 e
In Reply Refer To:
RII:JPO 50-338, 50-339 50 li.Q4 SQ l1Cl.5__
~ao: 50~2~
.:/'
Virginia Electric and Power Company Attn:
W. L. Proffitt Senior Vice President, Power P. O.*Box 26666 Richmond, Virginia 23261 Gentlemen:
This,Information Notice is provided as an early notification of a possible significant matter.
No specific action or response is requested at this time.
However, we anticipate that further NRC evaluations will result in issuance of an IE Circular, Bulletin, or NRR Generic Letter in. the near future which will recommend or request specific applicant or licensee a*ctions.
If you have any*
questions regarding,the matter, please contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
Enclosures:
- 1.
IE Information Notice No. 79-32
- 2.
List of Recently Issued Information Notices
/
Sincerely, so 010 7 0 ;+z..
Virginia Electric and Power Company cc w/encl:
W.R. Cartwright, Station Manager Post Office Box 402 Mineral, Virginia 23117 P. G. Perry Senior Resident Engineer Post Office Box 38 Mineral, Virginia 23117 W. L. Stewart, Manager Post Office Box 315 Surry, Virginia 23883 DEC 2 1 1979...
/
e 1 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 December 21, 1979 e
SSINS No.: 6870 Accession No:
7910250511 IE Information Notice No. 79-32 SEPARATION OF ELECTRICAL CABLES FOR HPCI AND ADS This notice contain~ information on boiling water reactors (BWR's) regarding the routing of high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system and automatic depres-surization system (ADS) cables in the same cable tray.
Such routing violates design criteria for separation of these safety systems.
This potential cable separation problem for BWR's is highlighted as a result of our review of recent
.. Licensee Event Reports (LER's):
Hatch Units 1 &2, Brunswick Unit 1, and James A. FitzPatrick (See references for LER 1identification).
Description of Circumstances:
The Hatch LER's state that the NSSS supplier (General Electric) contacted plant ma*nagement about possible irregularities in cable separation between HPCI and ADS.
Plant engineering personnel subsequently confirmed that separation criteria per design notes were* not met because HPCI system inboard steam supply isolation valve cables were routed with*ADS control cables.
The architect-engineer (AE) was notified of the HPIC/ADS cable separation problem and they are formulating a design change to provide for proper cable separation.
Other, immediate corrective action was not provided in the LER.
The Brunswick LER states that cables for the HPCI system steam supply inboard isolation valve are located in sections of cable* tray containing-ADS cables.
- Also,
, their analysis of those cables revealed that if the isolation valve were in the wrong pps~tion, then a failure at la tray section containing these cables might result *'in a combination of cable failures which could impair the operability of both the HPCI _and ADS systems.
The problem is common to both units at Brunswick.
The AE, United Engineers and Constructors, is said to be preparing plant modifi~
cations to provide sufficient isolation of HPCI and ADS cables.
The licensee stated_ that a review of emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) and their primary containment isolation valves is being performed to verify that no other cable separation problems exist.
Also, the cable separation criterion for HPCI and ADS systems is to be redefined in the cable separation specifications to prevent future recurrences of this event.
I The FitzPatrick plant staff was informed of the HPCI/ADS cable routing problem by the AE, Stone and Webster, following a fire hazard analysis conducted by the AE.
Six cables which could affect the control of the*steam supply inboard isolation
'valve for the HPCI system are located in the same cable trays as some ADS cables.
Initia_l corrective action by the licensee to preclude spurious closure of the HPCI system inboard steam supply isolation valve was' to de-energize the valve by
- racking out the breaker. ~n addition, for purposes of primary containment isolation, the outboard valve was maintained in its normal, closed position,
IE Information Notice No. 79-32 December 21, 1979 Page 2 of 2 and checke_d daily; However, reevaluation of the initial corrective action indicated the preferred method of assuring operability of both the ECCS and primary containment isolation functions would be to provide additional protection against a fire which might involve cables of both the HPCI and ADS, and to restore the inboard isolation.valve to a fully operable condition.
Accordingly, FitzPatrick initiated an hourly patrolling fire watch and restored the 'inboard' isolation valye to a fully operable condition.
The hourly patrolling fire watch parallels that required by Tec~ical Specifications when early warning protection.
against a potential fire must be taken due to inadequate or inoperable fixed detection systems.
The FitzPatrick plant staf~ was also informed by Stone and Webster that,other (third party) cables (not identified in the LER) could affect the operation of the inboard isolation valve for the HPCI steam supply due to their proximity to both HPCI and-ADS cables.
The licensee has decided to reroute the cables
_ of concern to correct both problems, and states that a preliminary design modification has been completed.
Conclusions Our review indicates that lack of separation of HBCI and ADS cables is a possible generic problem for all BWR4's and that earlier designs may also be affected.
Permanent resolution of this problem, corrective action in the meanwhile, and separation from other systems such as RCIC or isolation cond,enser are under consideration-*by the NRC. 'It is anticipated that further NRC evaluations will result in issuance of an IE Circular, Bulletin, or NRR Generic Letter in the near future which will recommend or request specific applicant or licensee actions.
This Information Notice is provided to tnform licensees of a possible significant matter. If you have questions regarding this matter, please contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.-
No written response to this Information Notice is required.
References:
- 1.
Hatch 1, LER #79-:-056/0IT-O, dated September 11, 1979
- 2.
Hatch 2, LER #79-098/0IT-O, dated September,11, 1979
- 3.
Brun~wick 1, LER #79-068/0IT-O, dated October 9, 1979
- 4.
FitzPatrick, LER #79-056/0IT-O, dated October 9, 1979
- 5.
FitzPatrick, LER /179-056/0IT-1, dated November 19, 1979
IE !~formation Notice No. 7.9-32 December 21, 1979 Information Notice No. 79-32 79-31.
79-30 79-29 79-28 79-27 79-12A 79-26 79-25 79-24 79-23 79-22 RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION NOTICES Subject Separation of Electrical Cables for HPCI and ADs Use of Incorr*ect *Amplified Response Spectra'* (ARS)
Date Issued 12/21/79 12/13/79 Reporting of Def~cts and 12/6/79 Noncompliance, 10 CFR Part 21.
Loss of Nonsafety-Related Reactor Coolant System Instrumentation During Operation
/
Overloading of Structural Elements Due to Pipe Support Loads Steam Generator Tube Ruptures at Two PWR Facilities Attempted Damage to New Fuel Assemblies Breach of Containment Integrity Reactor.Trips at Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Overpressurization of Containment of a PWR Plant After a Main Steam Line Break Emergency Diesel Generator.
Lube Oil Coolers Qualification of Control
- Systems, 11/16/79 11/16/79 11/16/79 11/9/79 11/5/79 10/1/79 10/1/79 9/26/79 9/14/79 Enclosure Issued To All ~olders, of power reactors OLs and CPs All holders of power reactor OLs and CPs All power reactor facilities holding OLs and CPs and vendors inspected by LCVIP All power reactor facilities holding OLs or CPs All power reactor facilities with an OL or CP All power reactor facilities holding OLs and CPs All Fuel Facilities, research reactors, and power reactors with an OL or CP All power reactor facilities holding OLs and CPs All power facilities with*
an OL or a CP All power reactor facilities with a CP All power reactor
, facilities holding OLs and CPs
- All power' reactor facilities with operating licenses and constrµction permits.