ML18136A251

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IE Insp Repts 50-280/79-55 & 50-281/79-73 on 790820-0907. Noncompliance Noted:Two Welders Grinding & Welding Elbow in Feedwater Line W/O Respiratory Protection
ML18136A251
Person / Time
Site: Surry  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 09/24/1979
From: Burke D, Kellogg P
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML18136A248 List:
References
50-280-79-55, 50-281-79-73, NUDOCS 7912050467
Download: ML18136A251 (5)


See also: IR 05000280/1979055

Text

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report Nos. 50-280/79-55 and 50-281/79-73

Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company

Richmond, Virginia 23261

Facility Name: Surry Units 1 and 2

Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50--281

License Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37

Inspection at

SUMMARY

Inspection on August 20 through September 7, 1979.

Areas Inspected

Si

Da~~

This routine inspection by the resident inspector involved 80 inspector-hours

onsite in the areas of plant operations and maintenance, including the Unit 2

steam generator replacement outage work, and followup on IE Bulletins and pre-

viously identified items.

Results

Of the four areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations

were identified in three areas; one apparent item of noncompliance was found in

one area (Infraction - failure to follow radiation control procedures (280/79-

55-01) paragraph 6).

,'

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1.

Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

DETAILS

Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)

  • W. L. Stewart, Station Manager
  • J. L. Wilson, Superintendent, Operations
  • T. A. Peebles, Superintendent, Technical Services
  • R. F. Saunders, Superintnendent, Maintenance

R. M. Smith, Supervisor, Health Physics

G. Kane, Operating Supervisor

  • F. L. Rentz, Resident QC Engineer

D. A. Christian, Engineering Supervisor

Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included control

room operators, shift supervisors, QC, engineering, HP,

plant maintenance, security, engineering, and administrative personnel.

  • Attended management interviews.

2.

Management Interviews

The scope and findings were summarized on a weekly basis with those persons

indicated in Paragraph 1 above.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

Not inspected.

4.

Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5.

Unit 2 Steam Generator Replacement Activities

The inspector reviewed certain U-2 SG replacement and associated activities

to verify that the activities were performed in accordance with the Steam

Generator Repair Program (SGRP) and applicable procedures.

The review included the following activities:

a.

Inspection tours of the Unit 2 containment for cleanliness and radia-

tion control; appropriate work and radiation controls were being

implemented.

b.

Review of certain contractor and plant personnel radiation exposure

records to verify that radiation work was appropriately controlled.

"

..

.

...

-2-

The licensee notified the inspector of an apparent overexposure when a

contracted employee's TLD was read, but discussion with the employee

and review of the individuals dosimetry readings and _work history

could not substantiate the TLD findings; NRC and licensee followup is

continuing.

c.

Replacement of the degraded Unit 2 reserve station service cable

identified during the high potential testing (ST-63) (See IE Report

50-280/79-46 and 50-281/79-65).

Within the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified.

6.

Unit 1 Operations and Maintenance

The NRC Order to Show Cause dated March 13, 1979, which resulted in Unit 1

shutdown, was lifted on August 22, 1979.

However, Unit 1 remains shutdown

pending resolution of I and E questions concerning IE Bulletins 79-02

(Anchor bolts & baseplates), and 79-14 (As-built piping systems verifica-

tion).

The inspector toured the control room and certain Unit 1 plant

areas to verify that the shutdown operations were in accordance with the

Technical Specifications and facility procedures.

Within the are*as in-

spected, one item of noncompliance was identified (infraction 280/79-55-01)

when the inspector observed two welders grinding and welding on a feedwater

line in Unit 1 containment without the respiratory protection required by

special RWP 621-A.

Subsequent licensee sampling and whole body counts of

the*individuals involved determined that no contamination or body uptake

resulted from the work.

Specific areas of inspection included:

a.

Followup on the boric acid filter material deterioration (open item

280/79-31-01); the Cuno filter charts indicate that the wound nylon

filter material may not be compatible with the heated boric acid

environment.

The licensee stated that the filters -would be changed to

a more suitable material, such as polypropylene, when their evalua-

tions are complete and the filters are in-stock.

This item is closed.

b.

Observation of the steam generator feedwater line repairs which re-

sulted from the inspection and .examination work performed per IE

Bulletin 79-13 (see noncompliance identified above).

c.

Walkdown of certain piping systems such as safety injection and con-

tainment recirculation spray (from lC µeat exchanger) to verify that

pipe support modifications had been performed in accordance with the

sketches and MKS drawings for the modifications resulting from as-

built verification or analyses.

One apparent discrepancy was iden-

tified; the shims on one containment spray pipe vertical support did

not appear to be installed in accordance with th~ modification sketch.

The licensee reviewed the discrepancy and corrected the shim instal-

lation.

d.

The inspector remained on-site during the aftermath of hurricane David

which passed through the area on the evening of September .5, 1979..

No si:te

. '

...

..

-3-

problems resulted when the remains of the storm passed through the

area.

In preparation for the storm, the licensee took precautions to

lower outside crane booms, test the emergency diesel-generators, and

verified that adequate supplies of diesel fuel were available on-site.

Additional personnel and communications links were also available.

e.

Review of plant logs and records for August, 1979, and verification

that the control rooms were staffed in accordance with Technical

Specification 6.1.

7.

IE Bulletin Followup

a.

b.

IE Bulletin 79-0lA, "Environmental Qualification of Class IE equipment

(ASCO Solenoid Valves)".

The inspector reviewed certification and .

purchase order documents for the ASCO solenoid operated pilot valves

(SOV) used inside Unit 1 containment and inspected the SOV's installed

in containment. Recently, the licensee replaced SOV's #8320Al02 on

the three SG blowdown isolation line valves inside containment after

the SOV's were determined to be environmentally unqualified.

(See LER 280/79-18) Although the new SOV's which were installed appeared to

have the appropriate high temperature coils-and metal parts, the

licensee could not verify that the Buna-N type materials in the SOV

were replaced with EP or Viton materials.

Since environmentally qualified ASCO SOV's (NP series) were available,

the licensee installed these SOV's on the SG blowdown isolation valves.

Qualified ASCO SOV's were also installed on valves such as the inside

containment sump valve (TV-D-200A), letdown, and the pressurizer*

power-operated relief valves. Additional SOV's inside containment are

being evaluated by the licensee. This Bulletin remains open pending

review of the licensee's evaluations.

LER 280/79-18 is closed.

IE Bulletin 79-04, "Incorrect Weight for Velan Check Valves".

The

inspector reviewed documentation which verified that corrective action

was taken on the discrepancies identified in IE Reports 50-280/79-33

and 50-281/79-51, paragraph S.S.

Analysis of the data determined that

the installations were adequate to support the corrected valve weights.

This bulletin is closed.

8.

Plant Physical Protection

The inspector verified the follwing by obse~ation:

a.

~ - b.

Gates and doors in protected and vital area barriers were closed and

locked when not attended.

Isolation zones described in the physical security plans were not

compromised or obstructed.

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,

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.....

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c.

Personnel were properly identified, searched, authorized, baqged and

escorted as necessary for plant access control .

. /


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