05000280/LER-1978-034-01, /01X-1 on 781101:noted That 17 Spare Process Piping Penetrations on Unit 1 & 23 on Unit 2 Were Not Capped in Auxiliary Bldg.Caused by Failure to Properly Complete Capping at End of Constr
/01X-1 on 781101:noted That 17 Spare Process Piping Penetrations on Unit 1 & 23 on Unit 2 Were Not Capped in Auxiliary Bldg.Caused by Failure to Properly Complete Capping at End of Constr
05000281/LER-1999-004-02, :on 981109,EDG Was Inoperable Longer than Allowed by TS Due to Governor Compensation Valve.Root Cause Evaluation Being Performed to Determine How Compensation Valve Became Closed
05000281/LER-1999-004-02, :on 981109,EDG Was Inoperable Longer than Allowed by TS Due to Governor Compensation Valve.Root Cause Evaluation Being Performed to Determine How Compensation Valve Became Closed
LER-1978-034, /01X-1 on 781101:noted That 17 Spare Process Piping Penetrations on Unit 1 & 23 on Unit 2 Were Not Capped in Auxiliary Bldg.Caused by Failure to Properly Complete Capping at End of Constr
. 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES@
I During a routine inspection an lQ-27 78 it was noted tbat 17 spare process pipivg penetrations on Unit 1 and 23 on Unit 2 were not_ capped in the Anxj Jj ary Bui 1 ding,
During a routine inspection on 10-27-78 it was noted that 17 spare process piping containment penetrations on Unit 1 and 23 on Unit*2 had never been capped on the Auxiliary Building end.
A subsequent verifica-tion inspection revealed that 21 penetrations on Unit 1 and Z2.penetra-tions on Unit 2 are affected.
Containment ends are capped.
The condition has existed since the construction period and is less conservative than described in Section 5.2 of the FSAR (not updated).
Upon review, on 11-1-78, of the documentation identifying the condition, it was determined that the condition was reportable in accordance with Technical specifica-tion 6.6.2.a(9).
This report is applicable to Surry Unit 1 (Docket No.
50-280) and Unit 2 (Docket 50-281).
2.
Probable Consequences/Status of Redundant Systems:
There has been no compromise of containment integrity as evidenced by the fact that the containment has experienced two ILRT tests and five years of operation with no indication of degradation of the integrity of the inside caps, Therefore, the health and safety of
~.**
the public have not been affected.
3.
Cause
It appears that the outside end of the penetrations were left uncapped at the completion of construction.
4.
Immediate Corrective Action:
An immediate inventory was conducted to verify the condition initially reported.
The architect-engineer was requested to advise a method and procedures for correcting the condition.
5.
Subsequent Corrective Action:
The Surry FSAR, Section 5.2-10.states that pipe penetrations that are spares are to be capped at both ends.
In order to resolve this apparent discrepancy, external welded caps will be installed as per the architect-engineers design and thereby providing the double barrier utilized in the original design for containment isolation.
This modification will be implemented on Unit 1 by Mid April, 1979, and on Unit 2 by the end of the upcoming Steam Generator Outage, scheduled to commence in January, 1979.
6.
Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence:
The situation described is a result of the construction process.
The procedural controls now applicable to changes' in.fac~lity configuration would preclude a recurr.ence.
e (Attachment, page 2 of 2)
Surry Power Docket No:
Report No:
Station, Unit 1 50-280 78-034/0lX-l Containment Spare Process Piping Penetrations
7.
Generic Implications:
North Anna Power Station Unit 1 has the same spare p1p1ng penetration arrangement.
We have informed our architect-engineer of this event.
They are reviewing their records to determine if other facilities are affect.
/03X-1 on 780305:loss of Svc Water Flow Through Charging Pump Intermediate Seal Cooler Was Caused by Corrosion of Stem of Discharge Gate Valve;Corrosion Was Galvanic(Brass Touching Bronze);Problem Will Be Studied
Forwarding Licensee Event Report No. LER-78-005/01T-0 Re Westinghouses Error in LOCA-ECCS Evaluation Model, Which Will Result in Higher Calculated Peak Clad Temperature
/03X-1 on 780305:During Normal Full Pwr Oper,There Was No Svc Water Flow Thru Charging Pump Intermediate Seal Cooler 2-SW-E-1B,due to Failure of the Coolers Discharge Gate Valve
Submit Licensee Event Report Nos. LER 78-013/03L-0 Re Six Snubbers Not Meeting Test Criteria, & 78-014/03L-0 Re Mount Plate Was Warped, & 3 of 8 Bolts Were Insufficiently Embedded
Submit Licensee Event Report Nos. LER 78-017/03L-0 Re Not Documenting Four Electric Maintenance Procedures & Two Periodic Tests, & 78-020/03L-0 Re Suspended Air Bubbles in Reservoir Fluid
/03X-1 on 780726:Hydro Test Pump Failed to Build Up Pressure During Attempt to Fill Safety Injection Accumulators Due to Lifting of Its Relief Valve.Valve Replaced & Checked.Accumulator Refilled
/03L-0 on 780916:snubber Not Meeting Inspec Criteria Caused by Low Oil Level Due to Leakage at Mating Surface Between Body & End Plate.Holding Bolts Were Tightened & Snubber Was Refilled
/03L-0 on 781009:w/unit at Rated Pwr,Charging Pump Component Cooling Water Pump Btripped.Pump Tripped on Overcurrent.Caused by Corrosion Damage to Motor Bearings. Pump & Motor Rebuilt & Reinstalled
/03X-1 on 781001:during Normal Operation,Channel I Pressurizer Level (Protection) L-I-459 Drifted High.Caused by Drift of Electronic Zero Adjustment,In Conjunction W/ Leakage Thru Transmitter Bypass/Equalizing Valve
/03X-1 on 780926:circulating Water Outlet Valve MOV-CW-200D Failed to Close When Operated Electrically. Caused When Actuator Cam for Shut Torque Switch Became Wedged Against Torque Switch Hold Down Screw
/03L-0:on 781006,w/unit at Cold Shutdown,Snubbers 2-RH-HSS-20 & 2-WFPD-HSS-9 Inoperable.Caused by Low Fluid Level.Defective Snubbers Dry Because of Leaking Rod Seals & Mechanical Damage to Seals.Snubbers Replaced
/01X-1 on 781101:noted That 17 Spare Process Piping Penetrations on Unit 1 & 23 on Unit 2 Were Not Capped in Auxiliary Bldg.Caused by Failure to Properly Complete Capping at End of Constr
Update to LER 78-034/01X-2 on 781101:17 Spare Process Piping Containment Penetrations Were Not Capped.Condition Has Been Overlooked Since Const.Design Change Approved to Weld Caps on Open Ends
/01T-0 on 781109:study of Calibr Techniques Showed That SI Accumulators Indicated Level Would Be Lower than Actual Level.Discovered After Rigorous Review of Factors Affecting Instru
/03L-0 on 781015:compensatory Surveillance on RCP Cstator & Hearing Temp Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Failure of Operating Personnel to Restore Process Computer Trend Block Following Computer Reinitialization
/03L-0 on 781107:procedure Deviation Found Re Filling & Venting Reactor Coolant Sys on 770105.Procedure Deviation Was Misrouted to Records Vault W/O Review by Snsoc.Deviation Has Now Been Submitted to Snsoc for Review
/03L-0 on 781022:with Unit at Rated Pwr,Panel Indicator for Radiat Monitor RM-213 Monitoring a Steam Generator Blowdown Read 0.Caused by Loose Connector Joining Detector Cable to Electronic Chassis
/03X-1 on 781030:boric Acid Flow from Boric Acid Tank to Blender Was Interrupted.Caused by Blockage of Crystallized Boron at Elbow in Line 1-CH-356-152
/03X-1 on 781108:review of Operational Data Showed That Quarterly Calibr of Nuclear Power Range Instrumentation Had Not Been Performed Per Schedule,Due to Scheduling Error