ML18101B243
| ML18101B243 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 02/29/1996 |
| From: | Olshan L NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| References | |
| TAC-M87879, TAC-M87880, NUDOCS 9603040051 | |
| Download: ML18101B243 (17) | |
Text
r-UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 February 29, 1996 LICENSEE:
Public Service Electric & Gas Company FACILITY:
Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2
SUBJECT:
SALEM POST-FIRE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY (TAC NOS. M87879 AND M87880)
On February 7, 1996, members of Public Service Electric & Gas Company (PSE&G, the licensee) met with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in Rockville, Maryland, to.discuss post-fire shutdown capability of Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2. is a list of the attendees.
Enclosure Z is a copy of the slides used in the licensee's presentation.
By letter dated January 25, 1996, the NRC raised concerns regarding the licensee's use of repair activities in its alternate shutdown methodology and the licensee's analysis of fire-induced spurious actuations.
The meeting was held.to discuss these concerns.
The principal issues were (1) a licensee assumption that incorrectly limited the number of fire-induced spurious operations that required analysis; (2) the lack of electrical independence between the control room and the remote shutdown panel; and (3) fire-induced:
spurious operation and mechanical damage to valves needed for alternative shutdown.
The licensee stated that its new management team at Salem has committed to implement many improvements to the plant.
Two of these improvements will reduce the number of components that are susceptible to the NRC concerns expressed in the January 25 letter. Transfer switches will be installed for more than 30 components, reducing the licensee's reliance on repair activities in its alternate shutdown methodology.
The second improvement involves installation of thermal overlqads for motor protection of many motor-operated valves (MOVs).
This satisfies the NRC's concern that the potential exists that a control room fire could result in hot shorts between control wiring and power sources of MOVs which may result in spurious operation of the valve and mechanical valve damage sufficient to prevent reactor operators from manually operating the valve.
(For further discussion, see Section 5.2.2 of the Technical Evaluation Report (TER), which is Enclosure 1 to the January 25, 1996, letter). The licensee committed to implement these improvements prior to restart of each unit.
As discussed in Section 5.2.1 of the TER, the licensee's analysis for fire-induced spurious operations assumes that if cables of redundant components required for hot shutdown are located in the same fire area, only one of the redundant cables would be affected by the fire in a manner which would result in spurious operation of a required shutdown component within the same fire area.
At the meeting, the licensee stated that this position resulted from their interpretation of Section 5.3.10, "Design Basis Plant Transients," of Generic Letter (GL) 86-10 which is directly related to the design of the alternative or dedicated shutdown system.
The staff did not agree with this 9603040051 960229' "
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' assumption and stated that the guidance of GL 86-10, question 5.3.1, "Circuit Failure Modes," should be followed.
Basically, this guidance specifies that any and all components within a fire area which could spuriously operate should be considered by the analysis.
The licensee committed to.review its use of the one spurious signal and equipment maloperation assumption and analyze all potential fire-induced spurious actuations and failures within each fire area.
On the basis of this expanded analysis, the licensee will identify those cases where spurious equipment maloperations could occur and evaluate the cable routings and circuit configurations to determine if one path of safe shutdown equipment remains available and free of fire damage.
The licensee will provide the results of this revi~w, and a schedule for implementing any modifications in its response to the January 25, 1996, letter.
1 Dricket Nos. 50-272/311 L Li st of Atte'ndees *~:; *
- 2. Slides/Licensee's Presentat.ion-.<-*,.~ :....
Enclosures:
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~c w/~ncls~ See next page DISTRIBUTlON:
HARD COPY Docket File w/encls~ 1 and 2 PUBLIC w/encls~ l and 2 PDI-2 Reading w/~ncls. 1 and 2 OGC ACRS OFFICE NAME
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'.W. Russell/f. Mir'aglia... *
- R. Zimmerman
- :S. Varga
'*J. Zwolinski *.
J. Stolz L. Olshan w/encls., 1 and 2 M. O'Brien*
E. Jordan*
P. Madden W. Ruland W. Dean, EDO L. Nicholson, RGN-I w/encls. 1 and 2 assumption and -stated that the guidance of GL 86~10, question 5.3.1, "Circuit Failure Modes," should be followed.
Basically, this guidance specifies that any and all components within a fire area which could spuriously operate should be considered by the analysis. The licensee committed to review its use of the one spurious signal and equipment maloperation assumption and analyze all potential fire-induced spurious actuations and failures within each fire area.
On the basis of this expanded analysis, the licensee will identify those cases where spurious equipment maloperations could occur and evaluate the cable routings and circuit configurations to determine if one path of safe shutdown equipment remains available and free of fire damage.
The licensee will provide the results of this review, and a schedule for implementing any modifications in its response to the January 25, 1996, letter.
Docket Nos. 50-272/311
Enclosures:
- 1. List of Attendees Leonard L. Olshan, Project Manager Project Directorate 1-2 Division of Reactor Projects - 1/11.
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
- 2. Slides/Licensee's Presentatfon cc w/encls:
See next page
Public Service Electr~& Gas Company cc:
Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esquire Winston & Strawn 1400 L Street NW Washington, DC 20005-3502 Richard Fryling, Jr., Esquire Law Department - Tower SE 80 Park Place Newark, NJ 07101 Mr. Clay Warren General Manager - Salem Operations Salem Generating Station P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 Mr. Louis Storz Sr. Vice President - Nuclear Operations Nuclear Department P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Mr. Charles S. Marschall, Senior Resident Inspector Salem Generating Station U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Drawer 0509 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 Dr. Jill Lipoti, Asst. Director Radiation Protection Programs NJ Department of Environmental Protection and Energy CN 415 Trenton, NJ 08625-0415 Maryland Office of People's Counsel 6 St. Paul Street, 21st Floor Suite 2102 Baltimore, Maryland 21202 Ms. R. A. Kankus Joint Owner Affairs PECO Energy Company 965 Chesterbrook Blvd., 63C-5 Wayne, PA 19087 Mr. Elbert Simpson Sr. Vice President - Nuclear Engineering Nuclear Department P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Nuclea~enerating Station, Units 1 an Richard Hartung Electric Service Evaluation Board of Regulatory Commissioners 2 Gateway Center, Tenth Floor Newark, NJ 07102 Regional Administrator, Region I U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Lower Alloways Creek Township c/o Mary 0. Henderson, Clerk Municipal Building, P.O. Box 157 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 Mr. Frank X. Thomson, Jr., Manager Licensing and Regulation Nuclear Department P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 Mr. David Wersan Assistant Consumer Advocate Office of Consumer Advocate 1425 Strawberry Square Harrisburg, PA 17120 Ms. P. J. Curham MGR. Joint Generation Department Atlantic Electric Company P.O. Box 1500 6801 Black Horse Pike Pleasantville, NJ 08232 Carl D. Schaefer External Operations - Nuclear Delmarva Power & Light Company P.O. Box 231 Wilmington, DE 19899 Public Service Commission of Maryland Engineering Division Chief Engineer 6 St. Paul Centre Baltimore, MD 21202-6806 Mr. Leon R. Eliason Chief Nuclear Officer & President-Nuclear Business Unit Public Service Electric and Gas Company Post Office Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038
PSE&G R. Bashall R. Beckwith W. McDevitt G. Overbeck R. Rose C. Tully SALEM FIRE PROTECTION MEETING FEBRUARY 7, 1996 LIST OF ATTENDEES NRC P. Madden L. Olshan W. Ruland Other N. Chapman, Bechtel N. Fioravante, TMCS P. Gunter, NIRS K. Sullivan, Brookhaven National Laboratory D. Vann, State of New Jersey
SALEM GENERATING STATION APPENDIX R - SAFE SHUTDOWN
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)ALEm Generating Station NRC PRESENTATION February 7, 1996
AGENDA
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- INTRODUCTION Gary Overbeck
- ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY Rich Bashall
- INFORMATION NOTICE 92-18 Bill McDevitt
- SPURIOUS OPERATION BillMcDevitt
- CLOSING REMARKS Gary Overbeck
ALTERNA*ESHUTDOWfJ CAPABILITY KEY LICENSING POINTS
)ALEm Generating Station 1981 NRC interim acceptance of wire modifications
- 1982 Achieve hot standby without repairs Preferred method of shutdown using Jumpers 1983 NRR SER ST ATES Methodology accepted No repairs required for hot and cold shutdown
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ALTERNA*ESHUTDO\\NN CAPABILITY PERFORMANCE GOALS Reactivity Control
- Reactor trip Reactor Coolant Makeup
- Charging Decay Heat Removal
-Auxiliary Feedwater Process Monitoring
- Independent Instrumentation Support Functions
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- Diesel, Service Water, Component Cooling
AL TERNA-.= SHUTDOW~
CAPABILITY ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN IMPROVEMENTS
- New Management Team
- Operator Work Around
- Design Change Install transfer switches
)AL Em Generating Station
- Duplicates wiring modifications
e INFO NOTICE 92-18 CONCERN FOR MOV'S Fire in the Control Room (or other alternate shutdown areas)
"Smart" hot short bypasses valve torque and limit switches combined with absence of thermal overload protection Potential valve damage occurs before operator takes control of valve outside the Control Room
e INFO NOTICE 92-18 ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN AREAS Control Room Area CONTROL SSPS CONSOLE I : Relay Room 28VDC I
115VAC cabling to Solid State Protection System (not applicable to all
.,valves)
TP.
RC Ceiling Area of 460 /230V Switchgear Room 115VAC MCC VALVE
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INFO NOTICE 92-18
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Generating Station ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN REDUNDANCY Operations Control Room Evacuation Procedure provides flexibility I redundancy If a fire resulted in an IN92-18 hot short which damaged a valve, a safe shutdown path is available Design Enhancement Re-installing thermal overloads for motor protection
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SPURIOUS OPERATION.
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Generating Station IDENTIFICATION OF SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS
- Components whose operation is required for system performance (HSB, CSD)
- Components whose spurious operation would prevent system success (SOE)
Charging System Example
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SPURIOUS OPERATION ANALYSIS FOR SOE COMPONENTS 1st Stage:
All SOE components were
. assumed to spuriously operate regardless of actual cabling 2nd Stage:
If a success path was not available, revie~ actual cabling and assume all SOE components spuriously operate, if physically possible 3rd Stage:
If a success path is not available at this stage, Generic Letter 86-10, Section 5.3.10 was applied
APPLICAT<<>N OF GL 86410
. SECTION 5.3.10 SECTION 5.3.10 Was Applied To Define The Number Of Spurious Actuations That Needed To Be Considered For Each Fire Area Any one spurious actuation Multiple failures (loss of all automatic functions with one worst case spurious
. operation)
- Each set of high-low pressure interfaces
- 8PURIOU~ OPERATION*
RE-REVIEW OF SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS Reviewed every Fire Area where Generic Letter 86-10, Question 5.3.10 was used Identified each case of valves Evaluated cabling of each valve to determine if one path of safe shutdown equipment is available Results - one train of safe shutdown equipment remains free of fire damage