ML18093A609

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Safety Insp Repts 50-272/87-37 & 50-311/87-37 on 871214-18. No Violations or Deviations Noted But Measurement Accuracy Doubtful.Major Areas Inspected:Water Chemistry Control Program Including Mgt Controls,Sys & Implementation
ML18093A609
Person / Time
Site: Salem  
Issue date: 01/21/1988
From: Bicehouse H, Pasciak W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML18093A608 List:
References
50-272-87-37, 50-311-87-37, IEB-79-17, IEB-87-001, IEB-87-1, NUDOCS 8802030157
Download: ML18093A609 (11)


See also: IR 05000272/1987037

Text

Report Nos.

Docket Nos.

0. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

50-272/87-37.

50-311/87-37

50-272

50-311

License Nos.

DPR-70

DPR-75

Priority ----

Ca tegory _ _;;c;,___

Licensee:

Public Service Electric & Gas Company

P. 0. Box 236

Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Facility Name:

Salem Generating Station

Inspection At:

Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey

Inspection Conducted:

December 14-18, 1987

Inspector:

Approved by:

date

I dat

Ins~ection Summary:

Ins ection on December 14-18, 1987 (Combined Re art Nos.

50- 72/87-37 and 50-311/ 7- 7

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspection of the licensee's

water chemistry control program including management controls, plant water

chemistry systems and implementation.

Results:

No violations or deviations were identified. The licensee was

implementing a generally effective water chemistry control program.

However,

weaknesses were noted in the licensee

1s controls of inline chemistry

instruments needing licensee attention and correction *

8802030157 880125 .

PDR

ADDCK 05000272

G

PDR

Details

1.

Persons Contacted

During the course of this routine inspection, the following personnel

were contacted or interviewed.

1.1 Licensee Personnel

  • J. Zupko, Jr., General Manager, Salem Operations
  • R. Dolan, Chemistry Engineer, Salem
  • R. Dulee, Principal Engineer, Quality Assurance
  • G. Raggio, Station Licensing Engineer, Salem
  • J. Trejo, Radiation Protection and Chemistry Manager

Other licensee personnel were also contacted or interviewed during

the inspection.

1.2

NRC Personnel

2.

Scope

K. Gi~son, Resident Inspector

R. Summers, Project Engineer

  • Attended the exit interview on December 18, 1987.

This routine safety insp~ction reviewed the licensee's water chemistry

control program.

The purpose of the inspection was to review the

licensee's program to control corrosion and out-of-core radiation field

buildup, ensure long-term integrity of the reactor coolant and secondary

pressure boundaries and minimize fuel leakage caused by corrosion-

induced failures. The licensee's program in these areas was reviewed

relative to requirements, commitments and industry practices provided in

the licensee's Technical Specifications, Updated Final Safety Analysis

Report (UFSAR), NRC Regulatory Guides, Bulletins and Information Notices

and industry-consensus standards provided by the Electric Power Research

Institute (EPRI) and the American Society for Testing and Materials

(ASTM).

3.

Previously Identified Item

(Closed) 25-00~13 TI-Trial Use of Water Chemistry Inspection Modules

This inspection completed a series of inspections of the licensee's water

chemistry control program which involved the trial use of two inspection

modules *

4.

3

Plant Description

The inspector reviewed the design and operating history of two units.

Salem Unit 1 (Salem-1) is a four-loop Westinghouse Pressurized Water

Reactor (PWR) rated at 1079 MWe which began commercial operation in June,

1977.

Salem Unit 2 (Salem-2) is also a four-loop Westinghouse PWR rated

at 1106 MWe which began commercial operation in October 1981.

Both units

employ Westinghouse Model 51 Steam Generators and have operated on All-

Volatile Treatment (AVT) since initial operation.

Most older Westinghouse units exhibit some degree of denting in their

steam generators. The damaging consequences are most pronounced in the

outer periphery wedge and flow slot area. Units that have used all solids

(i.e. phosphate) secondary water treatment tend to experience thinning

attack. It occurs on both the hot leg and cold leg sides, at and above

the steam generator tube sheet, within the sludge pile. Units with open

tube sheet crevices are prone to Intergranular Attack/Stress-Corrosion

Cracking (IGA/SCC) within the crevice region. Models 51 and 51 A/M Steam

Generators are susceptible to primary side cracking at inner row U-bends

and at the roll transition. Models 24, 27, 33 and 51 steam generators

experience fretting wear at the anti-vibration bars (AVBs).

Salem-1 has

experienced thinning, fretting and minor denting. Salem-2 has

experienced fretting and minor denting.

During 1977, Unit-1 operated for the majority of its first fuel cycle

with leaking condenser tubes and high dissolved oxygen concentrations in

the feedwater system. Nondestructive examinations (NOE) during the first

refueling outage revealed some tube-to-tube support plate intersection

denting. Although the denting was minor, the licensee installed a

full-flow condensate polishing system, retubed the condenser (replacing

copper/nickel (90/10) tubes with AL-6X tubes) and instituted 1/3 flow

condensate cleanup system for cleanup prior to power operations.

NOE for

Unit 1 following the second fuel cycle showed no detectable increase in

the number of dented intersections. During the refueling outage, the

licensee installed a system to return steam generator blowdown to the

condenser hot well. Salem-2 began its first operating cycle in 1981 with

a full-flow condensate polishing system and copper-nickel condenser

tubes. Subsequently, the licensee retubed that condenser with AL-6X

tubing.

The following additional items were noted during review of the units

current configurations:

0

0

Low-pressure feedwater heater tubes and high-pressure feedwater

heater tubes for both units are 304 stainless steel.

The moisture separator reheaters (six per unit) are being changed

from 90/10 copper/nickel alloy to stainless steel. Salem-1 has one

remaining copper/nickel alloy moisture separator reheater and

Salem-2 has two.

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

4

Low-pressure heater drains for both units are pumped back to the

hotwell but high pressure heater and moisture separator drains are

pumped forward.

Strainers are provided in both units* Feedwater systems for

particulate removal. Auxiliary feedwater is not filtered.

Deaeration of auxiliary feedwater is not provided.

However

feedwater dissolved oxygen is routinely maintained less than five

parts per billion (ppb).

The steam generator blowdown rates are 40,000 pounds per hour

(maximum up to li % main steam flow).

Blowdown is returned to the

hotwell for both units.

Circulating condenser rate averages (annually) about 3,000 parts per

million (ppm) chloride being taken from the Delaware River estuary.

Condenser air in-leakage rate, for the units aren

1t currently known

but the licensee is planning to provide monitoring capability.

Fuel perfonnance has been good since 1980 with very few leaking pins

noted. Radiochemistry indications are nearly

11tramp

11 uranium levels

routinely.

Cation conductivities for the two units have been consistently among

the PWR industry

1s best readings.

Low pressure and high pressure turbine examinations have revealed no

corrosion-induced problems with discs and blades.

Primary-to-secondary leakage rates have been low and well within

Technical Specifications. Leaks in Salem-1 (Steam Generator No. 13)

of 20 gallons per day (gpd) and Salem-2 (Steam Generator No. 24) of

50-60 gpd were noted in recent cycles. Licensee methods of detection

are capable of detecting leakage rates from about 1 gpd.

Steam generator sludge is removed routinely during refueling

outages. Clear indications of copper (in addition to iron)

have

been not.ed in sludge analyses. Sludge piles by fuel cycle are shown

below:

5

Fuel Cycle No.

Unit

Steam Generator

Pounds of Sludge

1

1

11

94

1

1

12

106

1

1

13

70

1

1

14

106

1

2

21

34

1

2.

22

24

1

2

23

14

1

2

24

19

2

1

11

94

2

1

12

94

2

1

13

82

2

1

14

105

2

2

21

0

2

2

22

24

2

2

23

49

2

2

24

12

3

1

11

59

3

1

12

35

3

1

13

35

3

1

14

70

3

2

21

5

3

2

22

14.5

3

2

23

28.5

3

2

24

12

4

1

11

24

4

1

12

47

4

1

14

35

4

1

14

47

5

1

11

46

5

1

12

30

5

1

13

43

5

1

14

41

6

1

11

29

6

1

12

21

6

1

13

62

6

1

13

62

7

1

11

24

7

1

12

29

7

1

13

46

7

1

14

41

6

Both units have conventional Westinghouse four-loop PWR designs for

the primary systems employing chemical and volume control systems

(CVCS) for chemical control, addition and cleanup.

Conventional

reactor grade primary resins are used in the eves.

The licensee

employs the "constant pH

11 (lithium hydroxide/boric acid coordinated)

operating scheme for both units. The primary system materials

include Zircalloy-4 in the fuel rods, stellite on wear surfaces,

inconel steam generator tubing and stainless steel elsewhere.

Recent channel head dose rates of 15-20 R/hr (Salem~l) and 5 R/Hr

(Salem-2) were noted.

The licensee plans to try the "elevated

lithium" operating

schem~ in one unit (see related discussion on

Task Force recommendations below).

Cobalt source reduction is also

undergoing discussion by the licensee.

In summary, both units showed designs, materials and basic operating

schemes generally consistent with industry recommendations.

The

licensee has made modifications to improve secondary water chemistry

and has shown improved steam generator performance with apparently

arrested denting in the tubes.

5.1 Organization

Figure 13.1-10 of the licensee's UFSAR describes the general

organization of licensee's chemistry function for the station.

Within the Radiation Protection/Chemistry Department, the Chemistry

Engineer is responsible for the development and implementation of

the chemistry, radiochemistry and liquid effluent monitoring

program.

The Chemistry Engineer is also responsible for plant water

treatment and control systems. The Senior Chemistry Supervisor

reports to the Chemistry Engineer and is responsible for the

sampling/analyis of plant fluid systems, data reporting, calibration

of chemical instrumentation, evaluation of laboratory and chemical

systems operation and techniques, operation of water

treatment/control systems and maintenance of fluid systems within

established limits. Three Technical Supervisors report to the Senior

Chemistry Supervisor with responsibility for laboratory systems, and

instruments. The licensee employs technicians as analysts, treatment

system operators and instrument technicians and trains them in an

Institute of Nuclear Plant Operations (INPO) accredited program.

The

inspector noted that the licensee was reorganizing the chemistry

function.

The reorganization will be reviewed in a subsequent

inspection.

No deviations from UFSAR commitments were noted in this

review.

The licensee is developing a corporate chemistry function.

At the

time of the inspection, there was little evidence of corporate

involvement in Salem Chemistry operations:

0

Senior management hadn't provided a policy statement regarding

plant water chemistry control.

0

0

0

7

Oversight functions appeared unorganized and unfocused in both

the corporate engineering and new Radiation

Protection/Chemistry Services organizations.

Systematic review/audit of chemistry activities (other than

Quality Assurance) for technical direction weren't evident.

Long-term trending and suggestions for program improvement

weren't evident.

Corporate sponsored inter-and intra-laboratory analytical

intercomparisons for chemical parameters weren't in place.

Industry practices commonly show corporate involvement, sponsorship

and participation in all the aforementioned areas.

Lack of the

above is considered a weakness in the licensee's program.

5.6 Policies/Procedures

Twelve chemistry procedures (governing specifications, routine

surveillance activities, in-line and grab sampling/analyses and

system operations) were reviewed and discussed with the licensee's

representatives to determine if:

0

0

0

0

0

critical chemical variables and limit/action levels for control

of those variables had been identified;

Resin replenishment intervals or criteria were specified;

Sampling schedules, flush lines for grab sampling normally

statement stagnant lines and locations for obtaining samples

had been provided;

Control, comparison and actions to be taken were provided for

inline monitors (conductivity, specific conductivity, pH,

hydrazine and dissolved oxygen monitors); and

investigative and corrective actions to be taken when control

or diagnostic parameters exceeded action levels were

established.

Within the scope of the review, the following weakness was

identified:

0

The licensee makes routine intercomparisons of in-line and

laboratory instrument readings for process monitors providing

continuous indications of plant parameters, (e.g. conductivity,

dissolved oxygen, etc.). However, review of licensee's

procedures showed that acceptance criteria for determining that

an inline monitor was performing properly weren't provided.

At

the exit interview on December 18, 1987, the licensee indicated

8

that a contractor would develop acceptance criteria during the

next operational run by statistical review of the

intercomparisons made between the in-line monitors and the

laboratory measurements.

Other aspects of the licensee's

procedures were in reasonable agreement with EPRI and ASTM

guidance, Westinghouse-recommended practices or manufacturer's

suggested practices.

5.3 Resources

Chemistry staffing was reviewed relative to analytical/sampling,

instrument calibration/maintenance and water systems operational

responsibilities. Staffing of chemistry technicians, assistants and

workers appeared to be adequate since no backlogs of assigned work

were noted in the areas reviewed.

Laboratory and inline analytical

capabilities were reviewed relative to EPRI guidance and typical NRC

Region I utility capabilities. State-of-the-art analytical

instrumentation allowing ppb measurements to be routinely made were

noted.

Within the scope of this review, the inspector concluded that

adequate resources had been provided by the licensee to support the

licensee's basic water chemistry control program.

5.4 Audit/Review Processes

The two most recent quality assurance audits of the licensee's

chemistry program were reviewed to determine if Technical

Specification and Quality Assurance Plan requirements had been met

in the scope, coverage, management review and resolution of findings

from those audits. The inspector noted that the licensee had

contracted for additional audits by a contract chemistry

organization every six months.

During the recent refueling outage, the licensee's Maintenance

Department proposed the use of a refueling gasket material

containing a chloride/fluoride organic compound.

The inspector

noted that introduction of the gasket material into the core could

result in localized chloride/fluoride attack of the Zircalloy-4

cladding due to breakdown of the material in the heat and radiation

environment. The inspector reviewed Site Operations Review Committee

(SORC) meeting minutes to determine if the concern had been raised,

addressed and resolved.

SORC Meeting No.87-086 (October 16, 1987)

extensively discussed the potential problem and subsequent revisions

provided material controls to reduce the likelihood of gasket

material intrusion.

During periods of operation, daily and monthly reports were provided

to Station Management giving chemical and radiochemical data/trends

by the Chemistry group.

The reports were reviewed to determine if

key chemical and radiochemical parameters were identified, the

9

report received wide management distribution and significant results

were acted upon.

No concerns were identified. The reports were

a~curate and reasonable presentations of key parameters and received

wide station distribution.

6.

Sampling/Measurement

The inspector reviewed the licensee's sampling and measurement program to

determine if:

0

0

reactor coolant, steam generator and feedwater chemistry were

adequately sampled relative to Technical Specifications, UFSAR

commitments and industry consensus standards; and

surveillance of in-line instrumentation sample stream temperature

control and conditioning, quality control of inline instrumentation

accuracy, acceptance and correction criteria for conductivity and

cation conductivity measurements, sample line valve operation and

radiological control met industry-consensus standards provided by

EPRI AND ASTM.

The units' sampling and inline instrumentation was observed during plant

tours, discussed with Chemistry personnel and key procedures and records

were reviewed to complete the determination.

Within the scope of this review, the following weakness was noted:

0

The licensee's control of sample temperatures for inline

instrumentation failed to meet ASTM standards.

ASTM recommends that

sample temperatures be controlled to 25 degrees centigrade (+/-1

degree) to avoid errors associated with calculated temperature

correction. The licensee's sample conditioning used circulating

cooling water to reduce temperature from plant conditions to

measurement temperatures. However, circulating cooling water varies

seasonally in temperature from 48 degrees to 115 degrees Fahrenheit

(8-46 degrees Centigrade).

No other control of sample temperature

was provided. Conductivity and dissolved oxygen readings are

particularly sensitive to widely variable temperatures. Since the

licensee did not control temperatures, systematic errors in the

measurement of key chemical parameters by inline instruments were

introduced lessening the accuracy and reliability of those measurements.

At the exit interview on December 18, 1987, the licensee indicated that

sample temperature control would be improved.

7.

Implementation

The licensee's implementation of the water chemistry control program was

reviewed relative to Technical Specifications, recommendations and

guidance in NRC Regulatory Guides, licensee conrnitments in response to

NRC Bulletins and EPRI and ASTM concensus standards.

7.1

10

Surveillances

For Salem-1, (under Technical Specification No. 3/4.4.7) and for

Salem-2, (under Technical Specification No. 3/4.4.8), the licensee is

required to determine dissolved oxygen, chloride and fluoride

concentrations in the Reactor Coolant System at least once per 72

hours. Chemistry logs and other records were reviewed to determine

. if the surveillances and limits had been met for both units during

periods of operation in 1986 and 1987. Within the scope of this

review, no violations were noted.

The licensee's general chemistry sampling and analysis program for*

control and diagnostic parameters on the two units' primary and

secondary coolant loops was reviewed relative to the licensee's

procedures. Chemistry logs and other records were reviewed and

discussed with chemistry personnel to determine that sampling

frequencies and analyses as specified in the procedures had been met

and, if any unusual concentrations had been noted that they were

investigated by the licensee. Within the scope of this review, no

violations were identified.

7~2. NRC Bulletin No. 79-17

In response to NRC Bulletin No. 79-17, the licensee committed to

examinations and surveillances to ensure the integrity of piping

systems containing stagnant borated water was maintained. The

inspector briefly reviewed surveillance and sampling activities and

discussed pipe examinations with the licensee to determine whether

the commitments were being fulfilled.

No deviations were noted.

7.3

NRC Bulletin No. 87-01

In response to NRC Bulletin No. 87-01, the licensee responded to

questions concerning programs for monitoring the wall thickness in

condensate, feedwater, steam and related piping subject to

erosion/corrosion phenomena.

In addition, the licensee responded to

a questionnaire regarding typical chemical parameters in those

systems.

The inspector reviewed the accuracy and representativeness

of the chemistry values reported by the licensee on a sampling basis

and determined that the chemical data presented was representative

of plant conditions.

7.4 Task Force Recommendations

The licensee chartered and staffed several in-house special task

forces to provide recommendations to improve performance in several

areas. The inspector reviewed three task force reports for

recommendations related to improved corrosion and radiation field

buildup control and noted the following:

0

0

0

0

0

11

The licensee implemented a recommendation to increase CVCS

letdown flowrates to better utilize the cleanup system for the

primary coolant.

The licensee is considering nonchemical fuel rod cleaning and

chemical decontamination of selected primary coolant loop heat

exchangers to control radiation field buildup.

The licensee plans to implement an elevated lithium hydroxide

operating scheme in place of the current coordinated lithium

hydroxide/boric acid to maximize cobalt solubility and reduce

radiation fields.

Control of debris associated with valve maintenance were

reviewed and suggested improvements were recommended.

Recommendations for reduced primary loop cobalt alloys were

made.

The inspector noted that the recommendations were consistent with

industry-suggested improvements for radiation field control and

lauded the licensee for this in-house initiative.

8.

Exit Interview

The inspector met with the licensee's representatives (denoted in Detail

1) at the conclusion of the inspection on December 18, 1987.

During the

meeting, the inspector summarized the purpose and scope of the

inspection, identified findings and expressed concern over the in-line

instrument sample temperature control and reading intercomparison

weaknesses.

The licensee indicated a willingness to address and resolve

those weaknesses.

At no time during this inspection was written material provided to the

licensee by the inspector.

No infonnation exempt from disclosure under

10 CFR 2.790 is discussed in this report *