ML18085A531
| ML18085A531 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 04/09/1968 |
| From: | Morris P US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Rich Smith Public Service Enterprise Group |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18085A530 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8101200636 | |
| Download: ML18085A531 (20) | |
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-... The instnimentation and control info:rmB.tion presented in ___ the*
PSAR is incomplete.
- For example~ similarities and differences
..... _____.from t:he.-,Diablo_ Canyon protection systel!l are inadequately iden-*
.. -.:. ~---:;.~tified. : The design bases relating to the facility shutdown -
- capability, ii the control room should be.come uninhabitable,*
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.. : adequate evaluation ::-of*- the. structural linEilySis methods' loading
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- tural design of the planL Specific comments on deficiencies
- in foundation and structural design information are presented
- ****in Attacbment* i..:...:*--~-~;.-:: * -*
- ----*~:
The foregoing is a summary of the major areas we found to be
- inadequately treated *in.jour PSAR *. A list of specific comments and information required is attacb.ed." Although not intended to
- -*
- be complete:t this list illustrates the kind of information needed to continue our review.
Your reply_ should be submitted
-* as an amendment. to your application._*:-:.. *
.. '",r; We are available to clarify the meaning of any of our comments
- *as may be required. *
Enclosure:
- * *.. :::. Attaclnnent 1......
- FOr= AEC-318 (Rev. 9-53)
Sincerely yours,
- Peter A~ Morris, Director Division of Reactor Licensing U.S.GO\\IERNMENT PRINTING CfF!CE: 196&-0-214~29
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1.0 GENERAL ATTACHMENT 1 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUIRED PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND* GAS COMPANY SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION DOCKET NOS. 50-272 & 50-311 1.1 With respect to the nuclear pressure vessels in the Class I systems, the extent of compliance with the "Tentative Regulatory Supplementary Criteria for ASME Code-Constructed Nuclear 'Pressure Vessels" was summarized in Amendment 5 and discussed in our meeting of March 27-28, 1968.
The designation of the excess letdown heat exchanger was not:included in the summary.
In addition, in Amend-ment 5, it was stated that the design of heat exchanger is not applicable to the supplementary criteria.
Clarify this designation.
L 2 Quality Assurance Program 1.2.1. Submit Certified Code Design Specifications for Component parts of the Class I systems as required by the ASME Code,Section III, paragraph N-141 (passeq 6-23-67).
1.2.2 Provide a functional organization chart for Public Service Electric and Gas.
Company detailed to show responsibility channels for Quality Assurance (design) and Quality Control (inspection) efforts, including safety related electrical, instrumentation, and control systems.
Include consultants and service organiza-tions which have been enlisted.
1.2.3 Provide a functional organization chart for United Engineers and Constructors detailed to show responsibility channels for Quality Assurance (design) and Quality Control (inspection) efforts.
Distinguish between responsibilities of home office and site organizations.
1.2.4 Show the responsibilities for shipping and erection procedures.
In addition, describe the environmental protection techniques that will be employed for shipping and storing primary system components at the site, particularly with respect to the reactor vessel and internals.
i.2.5 Provide a functional organizational chart for Westinghouse Electric Corpora-tion, detailed to show_r~?ponsibility channel$ for Quality Assurance (design) and Quality Control (inspection).efforts.
1.2.6 Describe your plans to collect complete Quality Control records from suppliers of ASME coded pressure vessels.
--*-~----- ----- - -- - -- __.:._ -------------- - 1. 27 It is., stated on page 4. 3-1 that "..
- favorable stress levels will be obtained during fabrication."
Clarify the type of stresses to which this statement refers.
2.0 SITE 2.1 To permit an evaluation of the adequacy of the design water levels for the facility, provide the following:
- a.
The maximum design water level based on the maximum probable hurricane as designated by studies currently in progress by the U. S. Weather Bureau Hydrological Branch.
Include the calculational methods used in this analysis.
In addition, the results, assumptions_, and calculational method.for your analysis of the design wave height, wave runup, and wave overtopping associated with the maximum probable hurricane should be provided.
The analyses should include the peak flow on the Delaware River associated with this hurricane.
- b.
Based upon data published in Water Supply Paper 1586-E~ it does not appear that the design low water level cited in corre_cted page 2. 7-7 (Amendment 5) is the maxim'um probable low water.
Accordingly, re-evaluate the calculated low water level based on maximum probable conditions, 9r justify with supporting data the level cited in the PSAR.
- c.
Discuss the *effects on plant operation and maximum design water levels, wave he~ght, wave runup, and wave overtopping.
2.2 Your discussion of the environmental radiation monitoring program given in question I.D, Volume 4, was p'rimarily related to aquatic biota.
Additional informa-
_tion *is. required on the environmental radiation monitoring program as related to the measurement of radiation levels and concentrations in grass, milk, agricultural products, wildlife, etc.
2.3 With regard to the plant water intake and discharge arrangement, provide the follo-wing :
- a.
A sketch of the new arrangement as discussed during our meeting of March 27-28; 1968.
- b.
Supporting information to show how recirculation of radioactive liquid effluent and potential bhildup of contamination will be minimized.
2.4 Because of the heavy commercial river traffic in the Delaware River, we are con-cerned with possible damage tq the service water intake*structure from an accident involving shipping.
Accordingly, provide an evaluation to show that damage to the service water intake structure from shipping would not impair the
- function of the service wat~r:, system.
- U. S. Geological Survey
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.----* 2.5 Provide details on the method used for calculating whole body exposures result-ing from accidents presented in the PSAR.
3.0 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM AND OTHER CLASS I SYSTEMS 3.1 Provide the bases and results of an analysis which provides the* estimated activity in the secondary system by relating primary coolant activity, assumed leakage rate from the primary t6 secondary system, and the removal and cleanup mechanisms for the secondary coolant.,
3.2 Discuss. the current status of the analysis relating to the effect of.thermaL shock on reactor compenents induced by operation of the emergency core cooling system.
Update the in~ormation provided in Section 12.3 and question V-D
- (Volume*_.4, Group V)
- 3.3 With regard to Class I (seismic) mechanical systems, consider the following:
- a.
The design criteria for Class I (seismic) mechanical systems are described in Appendix C (Volume 3) and also in response to the AEC/PG&E October-2..6,- - :.
1967 letter.
These submittals are not consistent with each other *. Provide the necessary clarification.*
- b.
Provide revised Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix C (Volume 3) to incorporate the information submitted in Note 1 (pages C-18, 19 of Appendix C).
4.o* ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES AND ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 4.1 We understand that the Zion and Diablo Canyon.core heatup studies for the spectrum of breaks.are applicable to the Salem LOCA analysis.
Summarize the result:s~of-.
these studies as applicable to Salem by piotting the peak clad temperature and percent of rods. perforated., as a function of break size.
4.2 For representative small, intermediate, and large breaks, provide plots.of temperature versus time after the accident for a range of percent volume fraction of the fuel cladding.
4.3 To permit us to evaluate the pressure transient in the containment following a loss-of-coolant accident, provide the following:
- a.
A table of masses, including primary coolant, zircaloy clad, internals metal, vessel metal (below nozzles), and accumulator water.
- b.
A table of the principal structural heat sinks, listing for each material the area, thickness, heat capa~ity, density, and thermal conductivity.
- c.
For a.three-square-foot break at time equal to zero, provide a time related chronology.of events that occur, with and without core cooling.
Where t=.=.=.=.=.=.=.=_:_:_
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-*- 2.5 Provide details on the method used for calculating whole-body exposures result-ing from accidents presented in the PSAR.
3.0 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM AND OTHER CLASS I SYSTfiloIB 3.1 3.2 Provide the bases and results of an analysis which provides the* estimated activity in the secondary system by relating primary coolant activity, assumed leakage rate from the primary to* secondary system, and the removal and cleanup mechanisms for the seccmdary coolant.,
Discuss the current status of the analysis relating shock on reactor compenents induced by operation of system.
Update the information provided in Section (Volume*.4, Group V)
- to the effect of.thermaL the emergency core cooling 12.3 and question v-n*
3.3 With regard to Class I (seismic) mechanical systems, consider the following:
- a.
The design criteria for Class I (seismic) mechanical systems are described in Appendix C *(Volume 3) and also in response to the AEC/PG&E October-Ui,- - :..
1967 letter.
These submittals are not consistent with each other. -Provide the necessary clarification.-
- b.
Provide revised Tabies 1 and 2 in Appendix C (Volume 3) to incorporate the information submitted in Note 1 (pages C-18; 19 of Appendix C).
4.0 ENG°INEERED SAFETY FEATURES AND ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 4.1 We understand that the Zion and Diablo Canyon_ core heatup studies for. the spectrum of breaks,are appiicable to the Salem LOCA analysis.
Summarize the results-of:.
these studies as applicable to Salem by piotting the peak clad temperature and percent of rods.perforated, as a function of break size.
4.2 For representative small, intermediate, and large breaks, provide plots.of temperature versus time after the accident for a range of percent volume fraction of the fuel cladding.
4.3 To permit us to evaluate the pressure transient in the containment following a loss-of-coolant accident, provide the following:
- a.
A table of masses, including primary* coolant, zircaloy clad, internals metal, vessel metal (below nozzles), and accumulator water.
- b.
A table of the principal structural heat sinks, listing for each material the area, thickness, heat capacity, density, and thermal conductivity.
- c.
For a-three-square-foot bteak at time equal to zero, provide a time related chronology of events that occur, with and without core.cooling.
Where
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- --------*-- applicable, these events include the start of accumulator flow, peak con-tainment pressure, end of blowdown, initial safety injection, end of accmnulator flow, start of c0ntainment sprays, start and end of metal-water reaction.
- 4.4 To permit an evaluation 0f the radiological consequences resulting from postu-l~ted. breaks or leaks of the ECCS recirculation line in the auxiliary building, following a loss-of-coolant accident, provi.de the following:
- a.
The maximum integrated leakage that cannot be is0lated.
dition,.calculate the off-site doses that would result, cation for the assumptions used.
For*this con-and include j~stifi-
- b.
For a ruptur'e of the recirculation line at the pump discharge, discu.ss how such a break woulo be detected and isolated.
Calculate the resulting off-site dose.
Discuss hew the dose would vary with ECCS performance, with fission product release*assumptions, and with time of recirculation line failure.
4.5 Based on the arrangement of the main steam header shown in Figure II.J-1, Volume 4,,discuss the safety.re}..ated consequences of a failure of this header.
4.6 From the arrangement of the containment spray system shown in Figure 6.3-1 (Amendment 5), it appears possible that flow from the sodium hydroxide additive tank could be shunted to the refuelirig water storage tank.
This may result as head and flow rate from the water storage tank change.
Accordingly, provide supporting information to demonstrate the capability of the contairnnflnt spray system to provide delivery of the proper concentration of sodium hydroxide to the spray nozzles.
4.7 The design of the containment relief valves was discussed at our meeting of March 27-28., 1968.
Clarify your position relative to use of these valves, and discuss the. design criteria for sizing the valves.
5.0 INSTRUMENTATION, CONTROL, AND ELECTRICAL POWER.
5.1 The differences between the Salem Station, Westinghouse designed protection systems which would initiate reactor trip and engineered safety feature action and those incorporated in the Diablo Canyon Station (Docket No. 50-275) should be discussed and evaluated.
Where there are differences, the discussion should include the preliminary design of the system from sensors to actuation logic.
5.2 With respect to the reactor protection and engineered safety feature actuation circuits to be designed by o~her than Westinghouse, the design features which conflict with the proposed IEEE Standard for Nuclear Power Plant Protection Systems should be identified.
Justification for any conflicts should be provided.
5.3 The differences between the Salem Station, Westinghouse designed control sy?tems, and those to be incorporated in 'the Diablo Canyon Station (Docket No. 50-275) should be identified and discussed.
This discussion should include an evaluation of the safet~ significance of each system change.
5.4 The criterion for the physical identification of the reactor protection and _
engineered safety feature equipment, including: panels, components, and cables should be described and evaluated.
5.5 Relative to the separation of-"control and safety functions, describe and_ evaluate the changes which will be made in the design of the instrumentation and control systems as a result of the ACRS recommendations contained in the Diablo ~anyon and Prairie Island letters.
5.6 Where_ reactor protection and engineered safety feature signals feed annunciators and/or a data logging computer, the design criterion to be used to assure circuit isolation should be described and evaluated.
5.7 Evaluate the effect on safety of single.failures in the station instrument air
_system.
The evaluation should be *supported by tne preliminary design_ of that part of the system pertinent. to_ safety.
- 5. 8... Clarify the criterion, as stated in the PSAR, for the diesel fuel oil on-site supply relevant to meeting the accident and shutdown requirements.
Provide the time for fuel resupply by truck, barge, or boat.
5.9 The PSAR on page 8.3-4 states the station batteries are 125 VDC and 250 VDC~
Elsewhere in the PSAR, there are indications that the two batteries may both be 125 VDC (e.g., Fig. 8.3-3).
Discuss the d.c. supply in sufficient detail to clarify this point.
Describe and evaluate the need for additional d.c. voltage supplies in the station switchyard.
5.10 Describe and evaluate the ability of the station design to meet Criterion 11 of the AEC General Design Criteria.
Include the following:
- a.
Th~*need for an airborne radiation detector to monitor the control room ventilation system outside air intake and automatically close off_~he air intake on high radiation. *
- b.
The*need for. redundant communication systems.
- c.
Shutdown capability of the station in the event that the control room should become uninhabitable.
5.11 Describe and evaluate the Radiation Monitoring System.
Describe the Prelimi-nary-Design in at least the depth as that provided for previous plants (e.g.~
- zion~ Docket No. 50-295).-
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=--~- 5.12 A recent electrical fire in a nuclear power station has underlined the importance of the.design of electrical penetrations and cable runs.
Describe and evaluate the criteria for the design(s) t0 be. used for the cable runs and electrical...
penetrations. in the Salem Station.* TM,.s discussion should include but not be limited to the types of cables to be used, the design and spacing ef cable trays and electrical penetrations, and the provi:ions for fire detection and fire fighting.
6.0 OPERATING PROCEDURES AND EMERGENCY PLANS With regard to the proposed operating procedures and emergency plans developed at the construction permit stage, provide the following:
- a.
A summary description of nuclear training possessed by the engineering and operational staff~-of the utility and a brief description of the future operating staff requirements.
- b.
Provide an outline of the emergency plan for the dual plant complex which summarizes the objective, scope, delineation of authority and responsibility for the multi-reactor site.
The eutline should indicate the degree to which each-reactor facility plan interacts with the overall site plan. It should also provide the basis f0r actions required by each reactor facility in the event of an accident leading to _a release of radioactivity off-site.
Informa-tion should be provided describing the coordination of emergency activities with local, state, and federal authorities.
In addition, general informa-tion should be provided with regard to the action levels at. which the emergency plan would _be implemented.
Instrumentation to be installed in each plant for evaluation of the emergency action levels sho\\,lld be described. *
- c.
Im organization chart showing the relationships of the various engineering groups within Public Service assigned responsibility for the design evalua-tion of the project.
Im adequat_e description of the various review responsibilities and authorities should be provided which clearly describes the relationships between the vendors-and Public Service required in the design and construction of the plant.
7.0 FOUNDATION AND STRUCTURAL DESIGN 7.1 With respect to the soil foundation on which the plant structures are to be located, provide the following:
- a.
Sensitivities of the cohesive soils and the range of sensitivities at which the cohesive soils become quick, assuming the most unfavorable conditions.
- b.
Relative densities of the uniform sands and silty sands in the foundation, according to the procedure for determining in-situ relative densities as described by Gibbs and Holtz, Proceedings of the 4th International Conference Soil Mechanics and Foundation Engineering, Vol. l,_ pp. 35-39.
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-T-7.2 Considering the foundation design of all structures, including the service water intake structure and Class I water storage tanks, provide the following:
- a.
A profile diagram of the principal plant structures, including the sub-structure and cofferdam foundations, and showing the subsurface formations (including the upper 50 feet. of the Vincentown Formation).
- b.
A listing of the type of foundation (mat, spread footing, or piles).
Include the elevation to the bottom of the foundation, the thickness of mats, and the Fype, diameter, length, and wall*thickn~~s of the piles.
- c.
A description of the construction and soil preparation procedures to be employed for the various types of foundations.
- d.
With respect to (c) above, describe the quality control procedures to be employed in preparing the soil under the foundations; e.g., backfilling the excavation with engineered fill.*
7.3 The service water pipes (Class I) will be buried in compacted backfill at the service water intake structure end and in soft hydraulic fill material at the containment end.
Accordingly, describe the criteria and bases that will be used to ensure that these pipes and the subsurface will be designed to withstand the seismic forces that may be expected from the maximum credible earthquake; As discussed at our meeting of March 27-28, 1968, provide profile diagrams showing the subsurface foundations of the pipe lines from the service water intake structure to the containment.
7.4 Since the Class I water tanks will be located on cellular cofferdams containing the soft material immediately above the Vincentown formation and possibly some of the hydraulic fill material, give the sensitivities of all cohesive strata and the relative densities of all cohesionless strata contained in the cofferdam cells which are to support the water tanks.
Discuss whether th~s material will safely support the water tanks under all.stresses, including seismic stresses fro"m the maximum credible earthquake, and how much settlement in how long a period
'Will result from the static loading initially, and from dynamic loading.
Give the computed factors of safety for each case.
7,5 With respect to the containment foundation, discuss the criteria that will be used for recognizing the acceptable Vincentown formation during the excavation in preparation for backfilling with concrete.
- 7. 6 Prom the PFDSAR and verbal discussions, we understand t_hat the turbine-generator, administration and service buildings will be founded on piles.
Further, mat foundations will be used for the containment, auxiliary and fuel handling buildings, the service water intake structure, and the Class I water storage tanks.
In this regard, provide the following.
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The magnitude of the maximum static differential settlements estimated as being possible between structures on. pil_es and those on mat. foundations.
- b.
The *magnitude of maximum vertical; horizontal and rotational differential motions that m.igh~ be expected bet~een the various structures as a result of the maximum credible earthquake.
7.7 Discuss the potential for liquefaction under the action of the maximum credible earthquake, and describe the studies and data that support the conclusions con-cerning the possibility of liquefaction.
7.8 As noted in the PFDSAR, the surface soil deposits are*of man-made origin.
Discuss whether this surface_ hydraulic fill will be left in place *beneath the pile supported structures. If it is to remain in place, will it experience any*
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7.9 In connection with the selection of the design earthquake loadings for this plant which is founded on deep sediment layers, describe the manner in which possible amplification through sediment motion was considered in arriving at the surface seismic loading criteria.
7.10 In connection with the load combinations reported on page 5.1-19 of the PFDSAR, and the load plots presented in Figures 5.1-5 to 5.1-14, ~ term l.OB, where B refers to buoyancy effects, is employed.
From the information presented; it is difficult to ascertain the effect of this :erm on the loadings shown.
Accord-ingly, describe the effect of buoyancy in the load plots, and especially at any points where it assumes major significance.
7.11 In regard to the design of the containment liner and consideration of possible buc.1<.ling of the liner as discussed in Section 5.1.2.4, provide clarification and/or additional information as noted for the following:
- a.
- On page 5.1-25; the statement is made that "
maximum 0-equals -9.4 ksi and maximum rr equals -9.4 ksi, or the sum equals -18.8 ksi~" This follows a statement cSncerning the maximum stress condition involving pressure and temperature associated with the accident conditi.on, and -the maximum earth-quake loading.
Do the two maximum stress values noted occur at the same time?
- b.
The problem of out-of-roundness of the liner receives some mention in Section 5.of the PFDSAR.
Additional inforniation is requested as to the permissible out-of-roundness and the possible effect on the buckling strength.
- c.
In.connection with (b), what will be the effect at the anchors?
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- d.
On-page 5.1-30; the following statements are made.
"The axial force in the liner at the location where buckling occurs is equal to the critical load.
In the adjacent area, the forces are*much greater due to the fact that the effective anchor spacing is much closer."* It is not clear as to what zone of the containment liner is under discussion in this section nor what is meant by the term effective anchor spacing.
Clarification* is required.
7.12 The design of the large openings (penetrations) is discussed in Section 5.1.3.6 and-. further information is presented in Section 5.1. 4.
Hewever, the* manner of handling the' secondary loadings in the vicinity 0£ the openings is not* clear from the material presented.
Accordingly, clarify this aspect of the design.
7.13 Tbe containment base slab analysis is discussed in Section 5.1.3.7 and dis-continuity stresses are*discussed in Section 5.1.3.5.
From the material pre-sented, it is not clear how the design of the discontinuity arising at the cylinder-base slab junction will be handled.
Further clarification is requested.
7.14 On page 5.1-54, it is indicated that five percent of critical damping will be employed for the dynamic design of the containment structure and all internal concrete.structures for the ma.ximum earthquake.
Although this percentage of critical damping is reasonable and acceptable for the maximum earthquake load-ing condition, it is to be noted that this degree of damping corresponds to stress levels approaching yield and significant cracking.
Accordingly, dis-cuss the compatibility of this degree of deformation with the liner deformation.
Further, it is noted on page 5.1-23 that the liner will be designed to assure no strains greater than.that corresponding to the guaranteed yield point at the factored loads.
Clarify whether this latter statement means that the strain in the -liner will not exceed about 0.1 percent strain.*
7.15 The dynamic design procedures are discussed in Section 5.1.3.8.
At the bottom of page 5.1-56, there is discussion of the load distribution pattern associated with the assumed seismic loading.
The discussion as presented is not clear as to the total effective seismic load, and elaboration on the load pattern.
employed in the design is requested.
7.16 The criteria for the design of structures and equipment is discussed in some detail in Appendix C of Vol. 3 of the PFDSAR.
In note 1 beginning on page C-18, it is noted that for the combination of normal load plus maximum potential earthquake loads plus pipe rupture loads associated with a major loss-of-coolant accident, a 20 percent uniform strain is to be permitted as the allowed membrane strains.
In connection with the loading combinations and stress limits pre-sented in*Table 1, clarification is requested as to whether the strain limits associated with the stress limits for loading Cases 2 or 3*(namely, l.8S) can be associated with a strain level greater than the 20 percent uniform. strain level associated with loading Case*4.
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> *:7'.17 In the discussion on seismic design, it *is noted that the horizontal and vertical earthquake loadings will be considered to act simultaneously.
However, there is no-.:indication as to whether or not the vertical and horizontal earthquake stresses will be combined linearly and directly with other applicable stresses arising from.dead loads, operating loads, accident. loadings, etc; Clarification on this point is required.
7.18 No mention of the possible rocking of the containment structure on its founda-tion was noted in the PFDSAR.
Provide information indicating how this possible mode of motion wi.11 be handled in the seismic analysis, and the percentage of critical damping that will be ~mployed in analyzing the rocking motion.
7.19 Since the.containment structure is founded at some depth in the ground, the motion of the structure will,lead to interaction between the ground and structure.
Describe how is this handled in the design.
7,20 A review of the PFDSAR reveals no discussion of the seismic design criteria for Class II components.
Provide information on this aspect of the design.
- 7. 21 From the information presente'd in the PFDSAR, it is apparent that many aspects of the controls, instrumentation, electrical systems, batteries, etc.~ are Class I items.
Describe the seismic design criteria_ applicable to the design of these ~tems, including battery racks or support structures.
7.22 Since the containment building crane is'a Class I item, describe the seismic design criteria that insure fts ability to withstand earthquake forces and motion's.
7.23 With respect to the tornado design criteria and bases, provide the following:
- a.
The time period associated with the 3 psig atmospheric pressure drop for the containment and the 1.5 psig atmospheric pressure drop for the fuel handling and auxiliary buildings.
- b.
Supporting information to justify the selection of an atmospheric pressure drop 0f 1. 5 psig for the fuel handling and auxiliary buildings.
- c.
A discussion of how tornado wind loading will be translated into direct, torsional, and shear loadings on the structures.
- d.
A discussion on the influence of the size of the *funnel of the design tornado, its translation speed, and the effect of a non-uniform pressure distribution.
Prov~de the maximum tornado wind speed that the structures (designed for 300 mph) will be capable of withstanding.
- e.
The *bases and r*esults of an analysis to show the effects of tornado induced missiles on vital structures, systems, or component barriers.
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8.0 STRUCTURAL DESIGN IN GENER.At.
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- 8.1 Provide a list of.combined structures; i.e., structures consisting of Class LI and Class*III elements, or Class I and Class-III elements.
8.2 Provide a list of Class.I equipment supported by, or located in, Class II or Class III structures.
8.3 Provide design criteria and design methods for combined structures mentioned in 8.1 above.
- 8. 4 State. how equipment indicated in 8.2. above will be protected.
Provi.de design criteria for Class II and Class.III structures.
- 9. 0 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL DESIGN.
9.1 Clarification of the design procedures and stress limits is.required.
Describe:
- a.
The detailed design procedure and stress and strain.limits to be used in the structural 4esign £8i-tension, bending and for radial, lateral, longi-tudinal,.and uplift shear;
- b.
The.extent to which liner participation is relied upon to provide resis-tance to lateral (earthquake) shear. If liner participation is not
-included, describe _how the-corresponding strains-are transmitted to the
- ..iiner-and their*effect.on*the liner.
9.2 Show the general reinforcing patterns, including layout and typical spacing for tension, flexural and shear reinforcement.
9.3 After tests and under accident conditions; concrete will be cracked.
Explain how,. under this condi-tion, the shears are. transferred through the section.
9.4 The reinforcing steel may be stressed to the yield point.
This stress is larger than the guaranteed minimum yield.point of the liner which is 32,000 psi.
Does this mean that, u~der certain conditions, the liner may be stressed beyond the yield point? Clarify.this-point.
9.5 Because of cracking of concrete due to shrinkage, to testing, and to thermal*
stresses, the problem of adequate bar anchorage is of special concern.
Justify the anchorage of bars in the dome, at discontinuities and at openings.
9.6 Describe the anchorage of tangential inclined bars and the "splicing" of inclined radial bars in the wall.
If the "splicing" is done by lapping the diagonal bar with a vertical bar, demonstrate that, despite biaxial tensile stress-es in concre*te *and vertical and horizontal crack pattern, the load in the diagonal bars can safely be transmitted to the vartical bars.
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/ 9. 7 With respect to seismic-design.of-the.containment, please.describe:
- a.
The general analytical.model for 'the *containment including mass distribu-tion, stiffness coefficients; modes* of vibration, and analytical procedures*
for arriving at:a loadi~g distribution.
- b.
The magnitude cf lateral.earthpressure under seismic loading and indicate how such-loading will be. factored*into the containment design..
- c.
The manner in which*damping will be considered in the structural design.
In this description, justify the,damping values employed for the.various components of the structure considering possible cracking.
- d.
The extent and,manner *in wh.ich the.horizontal, vertical and rocking motions.will b~ considered in the' design, and how the corresponding damping will be included.
10.0 DESIGN OF THE LINER 10.l If the effect of temperature.rise.in the liner will be represented by a uni-form pressure increase, please justify this method.
The thermal load from the liner*is a functio"O of the thickness of the liner plates, and of the.
yield point of the liner steel.
The* thickness of the two adjacent' liner plates may vary by as much as *10%.
Only the minimum yield point is.established in the PSAR, but not the maximum yield point, which may* differ from the minimum by as much as 25 to 30%.
Explain how these two variable_paraI11eters*are taken care of in the design.
10.2 With respect to liner design, describe:
- a.
Types and combinations-of loading considered with regard to liner buck~
ling, and the safety factors applied with respect to buckling.
Include the influence of large strains due to cracking of concrete.
- b.
The geometrical pattern, type, and.spacing of liner attachments, and the analysis procedures, boundary conditions; and results with respect.to buckling under the loads cited above.
- c.
Tolerance on. liner plate thickness and liner yield strength variation and their bases.
d, Examine the possibility of elastic.and unelastic buckling especially at the base of the wall.
In this study include the influence of all.perti-nent parameters, such as: variation of place thickness and of yield point of liner steel; erection inaccuracies (local*bulges, at seams, wrong anchor location); shrinkage.and cracking of concrete; ground water infil-tration; earthquake; temperature loading, etc.
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- a.
Th~ type,.character,.and magnitude.to* cyclic loads for which the.contain-ment liner will be designed, including the.seismic load.
- b.
The analytical procedures and.techniques.to*be.used in liner anchorage design including sample calculations.*
- c. *The f~ilure mode*and failure:pnipagaticm characteristics of anchorages.
Discuss the extent to which these characteristics*-influence:leak-tight-ness integrity.
- 10. 4 For the design of the _anche.rs, elastic and inelastic buckling of the liner should be considered.
The study should prove that no chain-reaction can occur* and that the p_ossibility of* massive buckling of. the liner;* and ~mass fa.1lure of anchors is excluded.
10.5 What plastic.strains can the liner material acconunodate without. cracking?
10.6-The* details of the arrangement for loadtransfer through the liner under the-bottom of the.interior structure should provide for transfer of shears paral-lel,to the liner.
Indicate how the shears, especially those due-to thermal expansion and earthquake, will be taken care of.* It _should be. noted that..:_
test channels on the bottom.liner are not accessible after the bottom concrete above.the liner is installed. It *is.therefore very important to-avoid any.
unnecessary stresses and,-strains in the.bottom liner.*. Discuss possible.. shear-*
ing eff of the.test channels.by differential strains in concrete above and below.the b0ttom liner; 10.7 Provide:
- a.
The-.liner detail tc be used at the base-cylinder liner* juncture, the strain,conditions imposed at the juncture, and an.analysis of the capa-bility of. the chosen liner*. de tail* to absorb these strains under design basis*accident and earthquake conditions.
b, The design approach that *will be used where. loadings must be transferred through the liner.
Provide.typical design details.
10.8 Describe the.calculational procedures to be used fer the analysis of liner stresses.around openings.
Justify the :proposed thickening of the liner at penetrations.
11.0 DESIGN OF.THE PENETRATIONS AND OPENINGS*
11.1 Provide corrected sketches of typical penetrations.
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- a.
The design criteriathatwill be applied te ensure that, under postulateq design basis __ accident _loadings' that could result in pipe rupture. or rela-tive displacement of the.internal_sy.stems relative to the _containment, a subsequent pipe rupture due te t0rsicnal, axial,. bending, or shear piping loads will net.cause a-breach of-the containment.
Also, include the; detailed,design.. criteria with. respect to pipe ruptu-r:e between the ;penetra- *
- tion and* containment isolation valves.
These piping sections.represent an extension of-the centainment boundary.under a condition when isolation is required.
What code will be used?
- b.
Previde typical*designs to illustrate how the criteria are applied.
- c.
Th~* extent to which *the pene tra ti ems and. their surrounding liner regions.
will be subjected to vibr4tory loading from machinery attached to the piping systems.". Indicate hew these loads will be treated in the design.
- d.
Criteria for cencrete thermal*protection at-penetrations; include the temperature rise permitted*to.exist*in the concrete under operating con-.
ditions and* the (time dependent) effect that lo~s ef _thermal protection would have on.the containment's.structural and leak-tightness character-:-
istics. *
- e.
The capability of the penetration design t~ ~bsorb liner strain without severe distress at the opening.
- f. If the full plastic strength of a pipe with regard t:o torsion, bending and shear.is to be.used, an explanation should be-given as tc;> the manner in which axial stresses; loop stresses, shear stresses_, banding stresses (in.
two directions) and _shear stresses*due to tersion*are combined in the plastic domain.
What failure criterion will be used?
11.3 With respect to the design of large openings, describe:
- a.
Th~ loads that will*be.considered-in the design of the openings; and th~
stress analysis procedure* that will be used in design.
- b.
Indicate*the method that will be followed for the design, i.e.; t~e working stress design method or the.ultimate strength design -method, or both.. If*
the ultimate strength desigri method is used) the factored load combinations used fer the design of the.. openings. should be.given together with the. cor-responding capacity reduction factors.
- c.
Indicate how the existence of biaxial tension in concrete (cracking) will be taken care of in the.design.
How-will the normal andshear stresses due to axial load, two-directional bending, two-directional shear, and torsion, be combined?
Clarify these points.
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- d.
Es~ablish criteria for the design of the.ring girder considering the.tor-sional-effect of the loads; References.. to recent pressure tests of similar openings would not be.- conclusive~ since the: thermal. *and earthquake loads were not applied during 'tests, _;;md since* these tests-have*not established*
th~ safety factor provided in the-structure (tests have not been continued till failure occurred).
- e.
The method to check*the design of the.thickened stiff beam around large-openings *and its _effect _en,the shell.should be indicated in detail.
The*
comparison with stresses in a circular flat plate would not be convincing, since it eliminates one, ef *the mo.st important effects, i. e;, the effect of torsion.
A method should be presented.which would include these torsional stresses. _
/
f; Provide detailed~sketches of additional reinforcing. at. openings and sample design computations.
12.0 INSULATION
- a.
If insulati£>n-is.require.d, present a detailed study of.it; This study.
should include design* requirements and.performance specifications.
, b, Indicate. the means*, previded. for fastening the insulating material to the back of the liner and for precluding steam channeling in back of the insula-tion (frem the top.or.through joints). Will the.insulating panels be removable? _
13.0* CORROSION PROTECTION 13.1 Discuss the extent to _which. cathodic protection has been considered and is being pr0vided; Have soil resistivity surveys been conducted?
What are the results?
13.2. Discuss.the extent to which protective coatings-will be applied to the liner.
13.3 The containment.structure base will be lecated below ground water*level. It.
appears that a waterproofing membrane exists between the soil and the contain-ment. but no use of back-up porous concrete is mentioned.
Considering the possibility ef cracking of the.concrete and perforation of the membrane, ground water under pressure.may reach the liner. The*effect*on.the stability of the liner and possible ceri;osien should be evaluated.
14.0 CONSTRUCTION 14.1 Indicate the codes of practice that will be followed during construction.
14.2 Indicate the specific extent to_which ASl'f..E*fabrication standards will be adhered to in liner manufacturing.
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14.3 Describe the general construction procedures and sequence that will be used in construction of the containment.
Include excavation, ground water control, base.slab construction, liner-erection and testing, concrete.construction in cylinder and*dome-regions, concrete placing and.curing, bonding betwee~ lifts, and the placing of-concrete *and joint arrangement in the base slab, in the wall and in the dome~
15.0 QUALITY CONTROL 15.1 Describe the extent of cemcrete
- compressien *and slump testing to be used.
-Include the.statistical basis.for the proposed-program and the standards for batch rejection and pour removal. -
- 15. 2 Indicate the planned *_prsgram of user. testing of.reinforcing steel for strength and ductility.
Include the statistical basis for the program and the basis for reinforcing steel shipment.rejection.
15.3 Indicate the reinforcing bar welding procedures and quality control to be used in performing reinforcing bar strength welds.
Include bar preparation, user check.testing of reinforcing steel composition, maximum-permissible alloy specifications~ temperature control provisions, r*adiographic and
- strength testing requirements; and the basis*for welded splice rejection and cut-out. Will any. tack. welding of *reinforcing steel be permitted?
15.4 Indicate the minimum percentage of reinforcing splices to be checked by the welding inspector, using non-destructive *inspection methods (x-raying, dye penetrant test, etc.).
The statement 11 *** performed on a random basis **.
11 alone would not be sufficient *.
- 15. 5 Indicate* the extent of user. check *testing of liner NDT properties, liner thick-ness, ductility, weldability, etc.
15.6 Indicate the applicable ASME or API code sections*that will *be adhered to in liner *erection.
15.7 Indicate the procedures and criteria for control of seam weld porosity.
15.8 Indicate the requirements that will be placed on seam welds to assure adequate ductility.
15.9 Discuss the planned seam weld radiography program.
Also, provide an evaluation of the liner radiography with respect to providing assurance that flaws that may develop into positive leakage paths under-design basis accident conditions do not, "in fact, exist *.
15.10 Describe the quality control procedures for test channels, liner angle and stud welding *.
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liner plate and test channels; include welder qualifications, welding proce~ -
dures, post-weld heat treatment, visual inspection, magnetic particle inspec-tion, liquid penetrant inspection, and construction records.
Indicate the degree to which material preparation and construction activities will be subject.to inspector surveillan~e.
TESTING AND IN-SERVICE SURVEILLANCE Describe the.instrumentation program for structural testing.
Present a detailed discussion supporting the selected test pressure, A table should be provided comparing~the computed stresses for two different pressure test conditions with the computed stresses due to the design basis accident alone, _and to the earthquake plus accident.
~he information should be suffi-cient to evaluate the reliability of the stress computations.
Explain in detail the methods used in the preparation of this table, and give the numerical value of all cons.tan ts. employed.
Describe the surveillance,capabilj.ties provided by the containment design with reference to periodic inspection of the steel liner, and periodic struc*-
tural *testing of the containment. If the leak rate testing is intended to be performed at reduced pressure, provide an evaluation of the minimum level of such tests that would also serve to verify continued structural integrity.
Consider in the evaluation structural response and surveillance instrumentation requirements.
17.0 ProvTde the basis arid *results of an analysis to support your conclusion that failures of rotating parts of_ the turbine-generator will not violate the integrity of the containment, control room, or other vital structures or systems.
Include in the analysis the results for an assumption of zero energy absorption of the turbine casing.
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