ML18085A114

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IE Insp Repts 50-272/80-16 & 50-311/80-12 on 800701-31. Noncompliance Noted:Entry Into Operating Mode 3 While Exceeding Tech Spec Limiting Condition for Operation
ML18085A114
Person / Time
Site: Salem  PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 08/18/1980
From: Hill W, Keimig R, Norrholm L
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML18085A110 List:
References
50-272-80-16, 50-311-80-12, NUDOCS 8010230294
Download: ML18085A114 (9)


See also: IR 05000272/1980016

Text

,

-

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION I

50-272/80-16

Report Nos.

50-311/80~12


50-272

Docket Nos.

50-311


DP R -70

License Nos.

DPR-75.


Licensee: ___ P_u_b_l_i _c _S_e_rv_i_c_e_E_l_e_c_tr_i_c_* _an_d_._G_as_* *_c_om_.* p_a_n.._y_* _. *_* _. _* _* *--

80 .Park.Place

Newark, New Jersey

07101 * *

Facility Name:

Salem*Nuclear Generating*station*~ Units 1*and*2

Inspection At:

Hancocks Bridge~ New Jersey*

Inspectors:

rr om, Senior Resident Reactor Inspector

~

4~ Yn-JJ:u h.

. .. * ....... .

date

Inspection summarf

.

.

Inspecti ans* on Ju y * 1~31 ~ * 1980 * (Canibined Report* Numbers* 50~272/80~16 *and 50~311/80-12)

Unit 1 Areas Insaected: Routine inspections by the resident inspectors of plant

operations inclu ing tours of the facility; log and record reviews; review of

licensee events; operational safety verification; implementation and tennination

of strike contingency plans; and training staff qualifications. The inspections

involved 72

inspector-hours by the resident NRC inspectors.

Unit 2 Areas Inseected: Routine inspections by the resident inspectors of plant

startup testing including tours of the facility; operating license conditions; and

pre-critical testing. The inspections involved 56 inspector-hours by the resident

NRC inspectors.

Results:

No items of noncompliance were identified relative to Unit 1.

One item

of noncompliance was identified relative to Unit 2 (Infraction-Entry into operating

Mode 3 while exceeding Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation -

Detail 3).

.

8010280 294

DETAILS

1. Persons*contatted

J. Gallagher, Asststant Matntenance Engineer

S. LaBruna, Matntenance Engineer

H. Midura, Manager - Salem Generating Station

P. Moeller, Nuclear Licensing Engirieer

W. Reuther, Site QAD

F. Schnarr, Station Operating Engineer

R. Silveri'o, Assistant to the Manager

J. Stillman, Station QA Engineer

R. Swetnam, Senior Performance Supervisor-HP

J. Zupko, Chief Engineer

The inspector also interviewed and talked with other licensee personnel

during the course of the inspections including management~ clerical, main-

tenance, operati'ons, perfonnance and quality assurance personnel.

2. Status* of Previous I'nspectton *Items

1 No previous inspection i terns were reviewed during this tnspection pert od. *

SITE

3. -Shift*Logs*and*operattng*Retords

a. The inspector reviewed the following plant procedures to determine the

ltcensee established requirements in tfli's area in preparation for a review

of selected logs and records,

AP-5, Operating Practices, Revision 10, May 10, 1980;

AP-6, Operational Incidents, Revision 6, Feoruary 22, 1979;

AP-13, Control of Lifted Leads and Jumpers, Revision 4, February

11, 19.80;

Operations Dir~ctive Manual; and,*

AP-15, Tagging Rules, Revis.ion 0, April 13, 1976.

The tnspector had no questions in thi*s area.

b. Shift logs and operating records were revtewed to verffy that:

Control room l_og sheet entries are filled out and i"nitialled;

Auxiliary l.og sheets are filled out and initialled;

Log entries involving abnormal conditfons provfde sufficient detai'"l

to communicate equipment status, locRout status~ correctfon and

restoration;

Log Book reviews are befog conducted by the staff;

3

Operating orders do not conflict wttfr Tecfinica 1 Specification

requirements;

Incident reports detail no vtolatton of Technical Speciftcation

LCO or reporti_ng requirement; and,

--

Logs and records were maintained in *a.ccordance .. witfi Technical

Specifications and the procedures i'n*3.a aoove.

c. The *review included the following plant shtft logs and operating records

as indicated and discussed with ltcensee personnel:

Log No. 1 - Control Room Daily Log, June 30 ... July 1, July 4~10,

14-31

Log No. 3 - Control Console Reading Sheet (Mode 1-41, June 30 ...

July 1, July 4-10, 14-31

Log No, 6 - Primary Plant Log, June 30 .... July 1, July 4 ... 10, 14-31

Log No. 7 - Secondary Plant Log, June 30 ... July 1, July 4-10, 14-31

Log No. 8 - Unavailable Equtpment Status Log, June 30 - July 1,

July 4 ... 10, 14-31

.

'

-.... Inddent Reports .,.. Numoers 80 ... 139., 154 ... 155, 157-159, 161, 164..;165,

169_, 172-17 4' 176.-177' 179' 181, 186

--

Tagging Requests - All active (SSS file1

... -

Ntght Orders, June 30 ... July 30'~ 1980

......

Lifted Lead and Jumper L_og ... All *active

d,

The fo 11 owing ooservattons* apply to l_ogs* and records revtewed duri_ng

th.ts reporti_ng per.tod;

.

......

Durt:ng a re:View of operating logs for July 13 and 14, 1980., the

inspector noted that valves- 21 .and 23MS45 we*re found tagged shut

on July 13-and that valves 21 and 22 CS 6 were found tagged shut

on July 14. The MS 45 valves isolate the steam supply to # 23

Auxtltary Feedwater Pump and the. CS 6 valves isolate the Containment

Spray System inside containment, rendering ooth systems inoperaole~

Tl:te p 1 ant ftad entered Mode: 4 and then Mode 3 on July 9. and ttad oeen

at nonnal operating pressure and temperature for several days when

tftese conditfons were noted.

Immedtate* steps to restore operability

of the systems were taken.

Fat-lure to ensure operaotlity prior to

the_p1ant neatup_int? Mode 3 constitutes apearent noncompltance with

Te chm ca 1 Specif1cat1on 3. 0 .* 4 -C'il.1/80 . ..-12~01}.

The fnspector had no further questtons relative to logs and records

reviewed.

4

4. Plant Tour

a. During the course of the inspections, the inspector made observations

  • and conducted multiple tours of plant areas, including the following;

b.

(1) Control Room (daily}

(2) Relay Rooms

(3) Auxiliary Building

(4) Vital Switchgear Rooms

(5} Turbine Building

(6) Yard Areas

l7) Radwaste Building

(8}

Penetration Areas

(9) Control Point

Oar Site Perimeter

The following detenninations were made:

Monitoring instrumentation: The inspector verified that selected*

instruments were functional and demonstrated parameters within

Technical Specification limits.

Valve positions. The inspector vertfted that selected valves were

in the position or condition required by Tech:rii'cal Specifications

for the applicable plant mode. This veri'fication included control

board indication and field of>servation of valve position (Charging/

Safety Injection, Auxiliary Feedwater, and Contatnment Spray Systemsl.

Radiation Controls. The inspector verified By observation that

control point procedures and posting requirements were being

followed.

The inspector identified no failures to properly post

radiation and high radiation areas.

Plant housekeeping conditions, Observations relative to plant

housekeeping identified no unsatisfactory conditions.

Fluid leaks.

No fluid leaks were observed which had not been

identified by station personnel and for whicfi corrective action

had not been initiated, as necessary,

Piping vibration.

No excessive piptng viDrations were observed

and no adverse conditions were noted,

Selected pipe hangers and seismic restraints were observed and no

adverse conditions were noted .

Equipment tagging. The inspector selected plant components for

which valid tagging requests were in effect and verified that the

tags were in place and the _equipment in the condition specified.

Control room annunciators. Selected lit annunciators were discussed

with control room operators to verify that the reasons for them were

understood and corrective action, if required, was being taken.

By frequent observation through the inspection, the inspector verified

that control room manning requirements of 10 CFR 50.54 (k) and the

Technical Specifications were being met.

In addition, the inspector

observed shift turnovers to verify that continuity of system status

was maintained. The inspector periodically questioned shift personnel

relative to their awareness of plant conditions and knowledge of

emergency procedures.

Fire protection. The inspector verified that selected fire extinguishers

were accessible and inspected on schedule, that fire alann stations

were unobstructed, that cardox systems were operable, and that adequate

control over ignition sources and fire hazards was maintained.

Releases.

On a sampling basis, the inspector verified that appropriate

documentation, sampling, authorization, and monitoring instrumentation,

were provided for effluent releases.

Technical Specifications. Through log review and direct observations

during tours, the inspector verified compliance with selected Technical

Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation. The following para-

meters were sampled frequently: accumulator levels and pressures,

RWST level, BIT temperature, AFST leveJ, rod insertion limits, contain-

ment pressure and temperature, valve power lockouts, axial flux

difference.

In addition, the inspector conducted periodic visual

channel checks of protective instrumentation and inspection of elec-

trical switchboards to confirm availability of safeguards equipment.

Security. During the course of these inspections, observations

relative to protected and vital area security were made, including

access controls, boundary integrity, search, escort, and badging.

No notable conditions were identified.

Surveillance. The inspector observed pottions of the following sur-

veillance test in progress; Rod Position Indication Calibration.

Maintenance.

The inspector observed portions of maintenance activity

on the following components to verify compliance with procedure and

administrative controls; Boric Acid Transfer pump repair.

6

c. The following acceptance criteria were used for the above i:tems:

Technical Specifications

Ope.ratings Directives Manual

Inspector Judgement

d. The inspector had no questions relative to. observations made duri.ng plant

tours.

5. Strike

At midnight July 24, 1980, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers

(IBEW} Union went on strike. Included in the niembershi'p of the union were

licensed reactor operators. Plant operations during tile stri'ke were conducted

by supervisory personnel. SRO-licensed operators from licensee management

and supervisory staffs satisfied minimum shi*ft crew composition as required

by Technical Specifications.

The strike 1 asted for approximately fourteen hours* unti 1 a tentative agreement

was reached which was to be ratified by unfon vote at a later date, The

. striking members were invited back to work.

The inspector monitored plant conditions prior to the strike, turnover of

plant operations to supervisory personnel, and plant operations during the

strike.

No concerns relative to shift relief and reactor operations oy supervisory

personnel were identified, The inspector monitored.followup of the strike

plan, plant security, manning of the Security Force, and communications.

Loss of commercial and Emergency Notification System (ENSl telephones shortly

after the start of the strike, was immediately recogritzed 5y NRC Headquarters,

NRC resident inspector, and 1 i censee management an*d operators. The inspector

monitored the licensee's efforts to establish emergency and Backup communication

capaoilities. Reltaole radio communications were* estaoltshed within approx-

imately twenty minutes* with state and 1oca1 autfioriti es, Coverage by NRC

inspectors continued untll normal operattons resumed following *shtft turnover

to union workers.

The inspectors had no further questions regarding plant operations during .

the strike or the licensee's implementation of *the Strike Contingency plan.

..

7

6. Trainitig*staff

A March 28, 1980. letter to the licensee from the Di*rector, Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation, required that appltcattons* _for.Senior Reactor Operator

(SRO} license examination oe submitted By August l, 19.80 for ltcensee tratni_ng

staff instructors involved tn tratntng on systems, integrated response,

tr~nsients, and simulator courses.

The licensee tdenttfted three members of tfie training staff who were involved

with training in these areas. The inspector* veri'rted that a current SRO

license was held for the three members identified By the licensee.

The inspector had no further qu~stions regardtng ltcense qualifications of

training staff personnel.

UNIT 1

7. Operational *Events

Unit 1 continued operation at power for the entire inspectton period.

On

July 27, 1980, critical boron coneentration reached effectively zero and a

power coast-down i'nitiated. Power reduction to approximately *so% is antici-

pated, terminating at the start of a refueling outage on September 20.

No concerns relative to this mode of operation were tdenttfi'ed.

UNIT 2

8.

Pre.;.Critical *resting

a. Salem Untt 2 Operating License Number DPR-75, issued on Aprtl 18, 19:80

authorized core load and testing at low power.

Tfi.e li'cense and.accompanying

Technical Specifications contain several conditions to oe met prior to

neat- up and prior to criticality, Tfi.e fol lowi*ng conditions* were verified

as descrioed o*elow By the i"nspectors,

At tfie conclusion of th.is inspection?

tne unit was tn Mope 3.

No conditions for criticality were outstandi'ng.

Some open items remained to be resolved. All *fiad direct impact on system

  • operaoility as descriBed in Techritcal Spectftcation 4~0!4.

Tfte fol lowing license conditions, ltsted oy li'cense paragraph were

vertfied:

Technical Specification 7 .3(11 ""' Completton of SUP *21 (Radiation

MonitoringL

The startup procedure fiad beeri completed for criticality

and reviewed by the Preoperati ona 1 Revi.ew Commtttee.

Open ttems*

were related to testing of cnannels i'n the redundant computer.

Operaoility of the system prior to crtttcal operatton was verified,

Technical Specification 7,3[2) - Construction and testing open items.

The listing of remaining open items was reviewed.

No items remained

which were identified as impacting on safety or compliance with

Technical Specifications.

8

Technical Specification 7.3(3) and 7.4(3) - Completion of test

program and repairs as required by the provisions of IE Bulletin

  • 79-02, Revision 2.

The anchor* bolt test program and all identified

repairs were completed prior to critical operation of the unit.

Technical Specification 9.5. - Testing of remaining steam generator

safety valve. The valve was successfully lift tested during hot

system operation prior to criticality.

Technical Specification 9.6. - Boron concentration.

On a continual

basis, the inspector verified that a minimum boron concentration

of 2000 ppm was maintained until just prior to criticality. At

. the time of entry into Mode 4, sufficient unit 2 operator's licenses.

were held to support critical operation.

Technical Specification 9.7. - Procedures to provide guidance to

supervisor of the unaffected unit in the event of an emergency on

the companion unit. The inspector verified that a procedure was

in place on both units to direct shift supervisor action in the

event of an accident on the other unit.

b.

The inspectors observed portions of testing conducted during this

period. Observations included the following; correct procedure in

use, crew requirements, test prerequisites, plant conditions, cali-

brated test equipment, adherence to procedure, coordination, data

collection, and data review.

The following tests were observed:

SUP 7013 Reactor Coolant Flow Coastdown

SUP 70.4 Pressurizer Spray and Heater Capability

--

SUP 70.7 Rod Drive Mechanism Timing

SUP 70.9 Rod Control System Operation

The inspectors had no questions in this area.

c.

Heatup of the unit began on July 7, 1980 and Mode 4 established. The

unit entered Mode 3(Hot Standby) on July 9.

Cooldown to Mode 4 was

initiated when it was discovered that several instrument channels were

not operable and tracking plant conditions (3 steam flow channels, one

steam pressure channel, and two pressurizer pressure channels). These

channels were later found to be isolated due to shut isolation valves.

The discovery was made prior to required operability of the respective

instruments in accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.2.1.

Due

to the potential loss of required instrumentation, licensee corrective-

action to prevent recurrence is being requested. This item is unresolved

pending review of the licensee's proposed actions (311/80-12-02).

-"\\-. .,

........ !"'

9

Following restoration of the instrument cnannels, heat up to Mode 3

. was resumed.

On July 22, the plant was cooled down to Mode 5 tn order

to effect repairs. to leaRing spray valves whicff were impeding tlie

pressurizer neater capacity test (SUP 70.4J. Heat.up resumed on July

  • 28 and Mode 3 re-entered on July 29.

At tile con cl us ion of this inspection

period, tlie unit was in Mode 3 and ready for i'ntttal cri'ticality.

The inspector had no further questions relative to testing activittes.

9. Unresolved !terns

Areas for which more information is required to determine acceptaf)iltty

are considered unresolved.

An unresolved item ts contained in Paragraph

8 of this report.

10. Exit Interview

At periodic intervals during the course of this inspectton, meetings were

held with senior faciltty *man.agement to di*scuss inspectton *scope and findings.