ML18081A839
| ML18081A839 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 12/21/1979 |
| From: | Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Schneider F Public Service Enterprise Group |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8001070162 | |
| Download: ML18081A839 (4) | |
Text
e UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I 631 PARK AVENUE KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406 Docket No. 50-272 DEC 2 11979 Public Service Electric and Gas Company ATIN:
Mr. F. W. Schneider Vice President - Production 80 Park Place Newark, New Jersey 07101 Gentlemen:
This Information Notice is provided as an early notification of a possibly significant matter. No specific action or response is requested at this time.
However, we anticipate that further NRC evaluations will result in issuance of an IE Circular, Bulletin, or NRR Generic Letter in the near future which will recommend or request specific applicant or licensee action.
If you have any questions regarding the matter, please contact this office.
Enclosures:
Sincerely,
- ~6Lm.ae~
Uoyce H. Grier
~irector
- 1.
IE Information Notice No. 79-32
- 2.
List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices CONTACT:
S. D. Ebneter (215-337-5296) cc w/encls:
F. P. Librizzi, General Manager - Electric Production E. N. Schwalje, Manager - Quality Assurance R. L. Mittl, General Manager -
Li~ensing and Environment H. J. Midura, Manager - Salem Generating Station
\\. \\.
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ENCLOSURE 1 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF "INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.. 20555
.SSINS No.: 6870.
Accession Na:
7910250511 IE Information Notice No. 79-32 Date:
December 21, 1979
. Page 1 of.2 SEPARATION OF ELECTRICAL CABLES FOR HPCI AND ADS This notice contains information an boiling water reactors (BWR 1s) regarding the routi.ng of high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system and automatic depres.surization system (ADS) cables in the same cable tray.
Such routing violates design criteria for separation *of these safety systems.
This potential cable separation problem for BWR 1s is highlighted as a result of our review of recent Licensee Event Reports (LER 1s):
Hatch Units 1 & 2, Brunswick Uni..t 1, and James A. FitzPatrick (See references for LER identification).
Description of Circumstances:
The Hatch LER 1s state that the NSSS supplier (General Electric) contacted plant management about possible irregularities in cable separation between HPCI and ADS. Plant engineering personnel subsequently confirmed that separation criteria per design notes wer.e not met because HPCI system inboard steam supply isolation valve cables were routed wit)l ADS control cables.
The
- architect-engineer (AE) was notified of the HPIC/AOS cable separation problem and they are formulating a design change to provide for proper cable separation. Other, immediate corrective action was not provided in the LER.
The Brunswick LER states that cables for the HPCI system steam supply inboard isolation valve are located in sections of cable tray containing ADS cables.
Also, their analysis of those cables revealed that if the isolation valve were in the wrong position, then a failure at a tray section containing these cables might result in a combination of cable f~ilures which could impair the operability of both the HPCI and ADS systems.
The problem is common to both units at Brunswick. The AE, United Engineers and Constructors, is said to be pr~paring plant modifications to provide sufficient isolation of HPCI and ADS cables.
The licensee stated that a review of emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) and their primary containment isolation valves is being performed to verify that no other cable separation problems exist. Also, the cable separ-ation criterion for HPCI and ADS systems is to be redefined in the cable separation specifications to prevent future recurrences of this event.
The FitzPatrick plant staff was informed of the HPCI/ADS cable routing problem by the AE, Stone and Webster, following a fire hazard analysis conducted by the AE. Six cables which could affect the control of the steam supply inboard isolation valve for the HPCI system are located in the same cable trays as
IE Information Notice No. 79-32 Date:
December 21, 1979 Page 2 of 2 some ADS cables. Initial corrective *action by the licensee to preclude spurious closure of the HPCI system inboard steam supply isolation valve was to de-en-
- . ergize the valve by racking out the breaker.
In addition, for purposes of pr.imary containment isolation, the outboard valve was maintained in its normal,
.closed position and checked daily.
However,. re-evaluation of the initial corrective action indicated the preferred method of assuring* operability of both the ECCS and primary containment isolation functions would be to provide
- additional protection against a fire which might involve cables of both the HPCI and ADS, and to restore the inboard isolation valve to a fully operable condi.tion.
Accordingly, FitzPatrick initiated an hourly patrolling fire watch and restored the inboard isolation valve to a fully operable condition.
The hourly patrolling fire watch parallels that required by Technical Specifications when early warning protection against a potential fire must be taken due to inadequate or inoperable fixed detection systems.
The FitzPatrick plant staff was also informed by Stone and Webster that other (third party) cables (not identified in the LER) could affect the operation of the inboard isolation valve for the HPCI steam supply due to their proximity to both HPCI and ADS cables~ The licensee has decided to re-route the cables of concern to correct both problems, and states that a preliminary design modification has been completed.
Conclusions Our review indicates that lack of separation of HPCI and ADS cables is a possible generic problem for all BWR4's and that earlier designs may also be affected. Permanent resolution of this problem, corrective action in the meanwhile, and separation from other syst~ms such as RCIC or isolation condenser are under consideration by the NRC.
It is anticipated that further NRC eval-uations will result in issuance of an IE Circular, Bulletin, or NRR generic letter in the near future which will recommend or request specific applicant or licensee actions.
This Information Notice is provided to inform licensees of a possible significant matter.
If you have questions regarding this matter, please contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
No written response to this Information Notice is required.
References:
- 1.
Hatch 1, LER #79-056/0IT-O, dated September 11, 1979
- 2.
Hatch 2, LER #79-098/0IT-O, dated September 11, 1979
- 3.
Brunswick 1, LER #79-068/0IT-O, dated October 9, 1979
- 4.
FitzPatrick, LER #79-056/0IT-O, dated October 9, 1979
- 5.
FitzPatrick., LER #79-056/0IT-l, dated November 19, 1979
ENCLOSURE 2 IE Information Notice No. 79-32 Date:
December 21, 1979 Page l of 1 RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION NOTICES
. Information
- Subject Date Issued to Notic.e No.
- Issued 79-23 Emergency Djesel Generator 9/26/79 All Power Reactor Faci-79-24 79-25 79-26 79-l2A 79;..27 79-28 Lube Oil Coolers lities with an Operating li:cense (OL} or Construc-tion Permit (CP)
Overpressurization of Con-tainment of a PWR Plant
- After a Main Steam Line Break Reactor Trips at Turkey Point Unit 3 and 4 Breach of Containment
.Integrity Attempted Damage to New Fuel Assemblies
. Steam. Generat_or Tube Ruptures at Two PWR Facilities
- 10/1/79
- All Power Reactor Faci-lities with an OL or CP 10/1/79 All Power Reactor Faci-lities with an OL or CP 11/5/79 All Power Reactor Facil-
- itieswith an Ol or CP 11/9/79. All Fuel Facilities, Research Reactors and Power Reactors with an OL or CP 11/16/79 All Power Reactor Faci-lities with an OL or CP
-Overloading of Structural
- ll/lG/79 All Power Reactor Faci-
.. Elements Due to Pipe Support lities with an OL or CP
- Loads 79-29 Loss of Nonsafety Related 11/19/79 All Power Reactor 'Faci~
79-30 79-31 Reactor Coolant System In-lities with an Ol or CP