LER-1995-008, Forwards LER 95-008-01,suppl Rept,Describing Final Results of Evaluation Performed to Determine Safety Significance of Disabled Containment High Pressure Trip Function |
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10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor |
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| 2551995008R01 - NRC Website |
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October 20. 1995 U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington. DC 20555 DOCKET 50-255
- PALISADES PLANT LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 95-008 BYPASSED CONTAINMENT HIGH PRESSURE TRIPS ON REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM - SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Licensee Event Report (LER) 95-008-01. Supplemental Report. is attached. This supplemental report describes the final results of the evaluation that was performed to determine the safety significance of the disabled containment high pressure trip function. This event was originally reported to the NRC per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(A). as a condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of *the safety function of a system that is needed to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.
SUMMARY.OF COMMITMENTS This LER Supplemental Report revises several existing commitments from the
- initial LER ~ated August 28. 1995.
The revisions are editorial in nature and resulted from the final processing of the Palisades corrective action document.
- 1.
Provide enhancements to the Design Control Program by implementing the following changes:
a.
Revise Admi ni strati ve Procedures (AP) 9. 44. "Design Document Control." AP 9.45. "Vendor Manual Control." and AP 10.44.
"Engineering Records Center Distribution and Control of Design Documents" to indicate vendor manuals and vendor drawings have not been maintained as living documents.
Also. add a requirement to AP 10.44 to attach a notice of that condition to any second generation print issued by ERC which contains information obtained from a vendor document. manual or drawing.
9510300213 951020
~DR ADOCK 05000255 PDR A CM!:J CJVcr~ COMPANY
b.
Revise Project Management Construction and Testing procedure 1-3.
"Project Team Organization and Responsibilities" to better describe roles. responsibilities. and requirements for team meetings.
2 c.
Revise AP 9.03. "Facility Change." to add the requirement-to initiate condition reports when potentially generic or significant issues are discovered during Facility Change Project work and to eliminate the option of using an inexperienced Prime Design Reviewer.
d.
Revise AP 9.04. "Specification Changes." to add the requ1rement to initiate condition reports when potentially generic or significant issues are discovered during Specification Change Project work.
e.
Provide quarterly continuing training to Engineering Support personnel using a case study methodology to include as a minimum:
testing program improvements. management expectations for testing and consultant/vendor scrutiny. and Industry Experience Report evaluations.
- 2.
Provide enhancements to the Test Contro1 Program by implementing the.
following changes:
a.
Assign responsibility for review of all modification testing to Systems Engineering who will act as the testing authority.
Surveillance tests assigned to Systems Engineering shall meet the stanoards established by the testing authority.
b.
Revise applicable Administrative Procedures to emphasize functional testing requirements and accountability for test adequacy and completeness.
Ensure procedures include the
- expectation of 100% functional testing of anything changed or affected directly or indirectly by the work done for a project.
Include a description of overlapping when relying on multiple tests to meet requirements.
- 3.
Provide enhancements to the Industry Experience Program by implementing the following changes:
a.
Re-evaluate the documented responses to similar Industry Experience Reports (IN) pertaining to inadequate circuit modifications and testing, IN-88-83. IN-92-65. and IN-93-38.
(
b.
Develop a plan to implement reviews to comply with NRC intended actions for the new (currently in draft) Generic Letter No. 95-XX "Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits" published on May 22.
1995 in the Federal Register.
c.
Implement a second level critical review and approval of Industry Experience evaluations by Systems Engineering.
Re-emphasize the importance of management expectations for industry experience reviews.
Richard W. Smedley Licensing Manager CC Administrator. Region III. USNRC Palisades Project Manager. USNRC NRC Resident Inspector - Palisades Attachment 3
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| 05000255/LER-1995-001, :on 950302,malfunction of Left Channel DBA Sequencer Resulted in Inadvertent Actuation of Left Channel Safeguards Equipment.Replaced Microprocessor |
- on 950302,malfunction of Left Channel DBA Sequencer Resulted in Inadvertent Actuation of Left Channel Safeguards Equipment.Replaced Microprocessor
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000255/LER-1995-001-01, :on 950302,left Channel DBA Sequencer Malfunctioned & Started Most of Left Channel Safeguards Equipment.Caused by Failure of DBA Sequencer micro-processor Module.Svc of Mfg of Sequencer Hardware Will Be Utilized |
- on 950302,left Channel DBA Sequencer Malfunctioned & Started Most of Left Channel Safeguards Equipment.Caused by Failure of DBA Sequencer micro-processor Module.Svc of Mfg of Sequencer Hardware Will Be Utilized
| | | 05000255/LER-1995-002-01, :on 950307,degraded Sealing Capability of Inner Door of Personnel Air Lock Discovered.Caused by Personnel Error.Need to Establish Teamwork & Anticipate Plan for Contingencies Discussed |
- on 950307,degraded Sealing Capability of Inner Door of Personnel Air Lock Discovered.Caused by Personnel Error.Need to Establish Teamwork & Anticipate Plan for Contingencies Discussed
| | | 05000255/LER-1995-003-01, :on 950522,main FW Pump Transient Resulted in Rt.Evaluated MFP Governor Control Setpoint of 5250 RPM & Relationship to Overspeed Trip Setpoint |
- on 950522,main FW Pump Transient Resulted in Rt.Evaluated MFP Governor Control Setpoint of 5250 RPM & Relationship to Overspeed Trip Setpoint
| | | 05000255/LER-1995-004-01, :on 950714,determined That Redundant DG Circuits Not Separated Per App R Due to Insufficient App R Program Documentation.Hourly Fire Tour Established in EDG 1-1 Room & Review of LERs for App R Completed |
- on 950714,determined That Redundant DG Circuits Not Separated Per App R Due to Insufficient App R Program Documentation.Hourly Fire Tour Established in EDG 1-1 Room & Review of LERs for App R Completed
| | | 05000255/LER-1995-005-01, :on 950721,received Two Inadvertent SISs While Performing TS Test RO-12.Caused by Two Wires Taped Together After Being Removed from Terminal in Attempt to Isolate Sis. Procedure RO-12 Revised |
- on 950721,received Two Inadvertent SISs While Performing TS Test RO-12.Caused by Two Wires Taped Together After Being Removed from Terminal in Attempt to Isolate Sis. Procedure RO-12 Revised
| | | 05000255/LER-1995-006, :on 950629,determined That AFW Pump Low Suction Pressure Trip Setpoints Inadequate Due to Failure of Design of Afws Suction Piping to Consider Suction Vortexing.Rev of Low Suction Pressure Trip Setpoints Made |
- on 950629,determined That AFW Pump Low Suction Pressure Trip Setpoints Inadequate Due to Failure of Design of Afws Suction Piping to Consider Suction Vortexing.Rev of Low Suction Pressure Trip Setpoints Made
| | | 05000255/LER-1995-007, :on 950720,discovered That 12 Instrument Loops Had V-bolted Type Qualified Cable Splices Connected to Wires W/Exposed Kapton Insulation.Caused by Human Error.All V- Bolted Splices Replaced w/in-line Design |
- on 950720,discovered That 12 Instrument Loops Had V-bolted Type Qualified Cable Splices Connected to Wires W/Exposed Kapton Insulation.Caused by Human Error.All V- Bolted Splices Replaced w/in-line Design
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000255/LER-1995-008, :on 950728,discovered That None of Four Containment High Pressure Channels Would Initiate Reactor Trip Due to Programmatic Deficiencies.Administrative Procedure (AP) 9.44,AP 9.45 & AP 10.44 Will Be Revised |
- on 950728,discovered That None of Four Containment High Pressure Channels Would Initiate Reactor Trip Due to Programmatic Deficiencies.Administrative Procedure (AP) 9.44,AP 9.45 & AP 10.44 Will Be Revised
| | | 05000255/LER-1995-008-01, Forwards LER 95-008-01,suppl Rept,Describing Final Results of Evaluation Performed to Determine Safety Significance of Disabled Containment High Pressure Trip Function | Forwards LER 95-008-01,suppl Rept,Describing Final Results of Evaluation Performed to Determine Safety Significance of Disabled Containment High Pressure Trip Function | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor | | 05000255/LER-1995-009, :on 950728,discovered Lack of Procedural Guidance for Pump Repair Following Fire.Proposed Use of Power Supply Breaker Did Not Adequately Address Effect of Loss of Control Power.Performed Independent Assessment |
- on 950728,discovered Lack of Procedural Guidance for Pump Repair Following Fire.Proposed Use of Power Supply Breaker Did Not Adequately Address Effect of Loss of Control Power.Performed Independent Assessment
| | | 05000255/LER-1995-010, :on 950815,ESFA & Manual RT Occurred Following Isolation of PCS Leak.Caused by Less than Adequate Engagement of Tubing Section Into Compression Fitting. Replaced Failed Instrument Line |
- on 950815,ESFA & Manual RT Occurred Following Isolation of PCS Leak.Caused by Less than Adequate Engagement of Tubing Section Into Compression Fitting. Replaced Failed Instrument Line
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000255/LER-1995-011, :on 950817,CR 40 Withdrawal Occurred When Given Insertion Signal Due to skill-based Error in Crimping & Removing Foreign Matl from CRDM Motor Connection Box.Crd Package Replaced |
- on 950817,CR 40 Withdrawal Occurred When Given Insertion Signal Due to skill-based Error in Crimping & Removing Foreign Matl from CRDM Motor Connection Box.Crd Package Replaced
| | | 05000255/LER-1995-012, :on 950701,discovered Unqualified Electrical Connection in Containment SW Outlet Valve Controller.Caused by Failure of Assigned Engineers to Available Info.Replaced Wire Nuts W/Inline Butt Connections |
- on 950701,discovered Unqualified Electrical Connection in Containment SW Outlet Valve Controller.Caused by Failure of Assigned Engineers to Available Info.Replaced Wire Nuts W/Inline Butt Connections
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000255/LER-1995-013, :on 951103,circuit Fuse Coordination Deficiency Which Affects App R Safe Shutdown Equipment Noted.Design of Fuse Coordination in Potential Transformer Circuits Will Be Evaluated & Modified as Required |
- on 951103,circuit Fuse Coordination Deficiency Which Affects App R Safe Shutdown Equipment Noted.Design of Fuse Coordination in Potential Transformer Circuits Will Be Evaluated & Modified as Required
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | 05000255/LER-1995-014, :on 950119,PCP Oil Collection Deficiencies Created by FC-860 Piping Mod.Caused by Inadequate DBD for Sys & Lack of Review by Experienced Fire Protection Personnel.Updated Design Basis Documentation |
- on 950119,PCP Oil Collection Deficiencies Created by FC-860 Piping Mod.Caused by Inadequate DBD for Sys & Lack of Review by Experienced Fire Protection Personnel.Updated Design Basis Documentation
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000255/LER-1995-015, :on 951219,determined Up to Twenty MOVs Could Become Unavailable as Result of App R Fire Scenario.Caused by Original App R Review Not Considering Valve Limit Switch Circuits Could Be Routed in Configuration.Valves Repaired |
- on 951219,determined Up to Twenty MOVs Could Become Unavailable as Result of App R Fire Scenario.Caused by Original App R Review Not Considering Valve Limit Switch Circuits Could Be Routed in Configuration.Valves Repaired
| | | 05000255/LER-1995-016, :on 951226,did Not Analyze Primary Coolant Samples within 72 H.Caused by Belief Acceptability to Save PCS Samples for Choride Analysis Past 72 H.Counseled Chemistry Supervision |
- on 951226,did Not Analyze Primary Coolant Samples within 72 H.Caused by Belief Acceptability to Save PCS Samples for Choride Analysis Past 72 H.Counseled Chemistry Supervision
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) |
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