ML18051B249
| ML18051B249 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 01/31/1985 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18051B248 | List: |
| References | |
| IEB-79-01, IEB-79-01B, IEB-79-1, IEB-79-1B, NUDOCS 8502050358 | |
| Download: ML18051B249 (48) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION PALISADES PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-255 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY I.O INTRODUCTION Equipment which is u~ed to perform a necessary safety function must be demonstrated to be capable of maintaining functional operability under all service conditions postulated to occur during its installed life for the time it is required to operate. This requirement, which is embodied in General Design Criteria I and 4 of Appendix A and Sections III, XI, and XVII of Appendix B to IO CFR Part 50, is applicable to equipment located inside as well as outside containment.
More detailed requirements and guidance relating to the methods and procedures for demonstrating this capability for electrical equipment have been set forth in IO CFR 50.49, 11Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants, 11 NUREG-0588, 11 Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment 11 (which supplements IEEE Standard 323 and various NRC Regulatory Guides and industry standards),
. and Guidelines for Evaluating Environmental Qualification of Class IE Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors 11 (DOR Guidelines).
2.0 BACKGROUND
On February 8, I979, the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE) issued to all licensees of operatinq plants [except those included in the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP)' IE Bulletin (IEB) 79-0I, 11Environmental Qualification of Class IE Equipment.
11 This Bulletin, together with IE Circular 78-08 (issued on May 3I, I978), required the licensees to perform reviews to assess the adequacy of their environmental qualification programs.
On January I4, I980, NRC issued IEB 79-0IB which included the DOR Guidelines and NUREG-0588 as attachments 4 and 5, respectively. Subsequently, on May 23, I980, Commission Memorandum and Order CLI-80-21 was issued and stated that the DOR Guidelines and portions of NUREG-0588 form the require-ments that licensees must meet regarding environmental qualification of safP.ty-related electrical equipment in order to satisfy those aspects of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 4.
Supplements to IEB 79-0lB were issued for further clarification and definition of the staff's needs.
These supplements were issued on February 29, September 30, and October 24, 1980.
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. In addition, the staff issued orders dnted August 29, 1980 {amended in September 1980) and October 24, 1980 to all licensees.
The August order required that the licensees provide a report, by November 1, 1980, documenting the qualification of snfety-related electrical equipment.
The October order required the establishment of a central file location for the maintenance of all equipment qualification records.
The central file was mandated to be established by December 1, 1980.
The staff subsequently issued a Safety Evaluation (SE) on environmental qualification of safety-related electrical equipment to the licensee on June 1, 1981.
This SE directed the licensee to "either provide documentation of the missing qualification information which demonstrates that safety-related equipment meets the DOR Guidelines or NUREG-0588 requirements or commit to a corrective action [requalification, replacement {etc.)J.
11 The licensee was required to respond to NRC within 90 days of receipt of the SE.
In response to the staff SE issued in 1981, the licensee submitted additional information regarding the qualification of safety-related electrical equipment.
This information was evaluated for the staff by the Franklin Research Center {FRC) in order to:
(1) identify all cases where the licensee's response did not resolve the significant qualification issues, (2) evaluate the licensee's qualification documentation in accordance with established criteria to determine which equipment had adequate documentation and which did not, and (3) evaluate the licensee's qualification documenta-tion for safety-related electrical equipment located in harsh environments required for.TM! Lessons Learned Implementation. A Technical Evaluation Report (TER) was issued by FRC on December 30, 1982.
An SE was subsequently issued to the Consumers Power Company on April 25, 1983, with the FRC TER as an attachment.
A final rule on environmental qualification of electric equipment important to safety for nuclear power plants became effective on February 22, 1983.
This rule, Section 50.49 of 10 CFR Part 50, specifies the requirements of electrical equipment important to safety located in a harsh environment.* In accordance with this rule, equipment for Palisades may be qualified to the criteria specified in either the DOR Guidelines or NUREG-0588, except for replacement equipment.
Replacement equipment installed subsequent to February 22, 1983 must be qualified in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.49, using the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.89, unless there are sound reasons to the contrary.
A meeting was held with each licensee of plants for which a TER had been prepared for the staff by FRC in order to discuss all remaining open issues regarding environmental qualification, including acceptability of the environmental conditions for equipment qualification purposes, if this issue had not yet been resolved.
On January 10, 1984, a meeting was held to discuss Consumers Power's proposed method to resolve the environmental qualification deficiencies identified in the April 25, 1983 SE and December 30, 1982 FRC TER.
Discussions also included Consumers Power's general methodology for compliance with 10 CFR 50.49, and justification for continued operation for those equipment items for which environmental
- qualification is not yet completed.
The minutes of the meeting and proposed method of resolution for each of the environmental qualification deficiencies are documented in February 14 and June 15, 1984 submittals from the licensee.
3.0 EVALUATION The evaluation of the acceptability of the licensee's electrical equipment environmental qualification program is based on the results of an audit review performed by the staff of:
{1) the licensee's proposed resolutions of the environmental qualification deficiencies identified in the April 25, 1983 SE and December 30 1982 FRC TER; {2) compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49; and {3) justification for continued operation {JCO) for those equipment items for which the environmental qualification is not yet completed.
Proposed Resolutions of Identified Deficiencies The proposed resolutions for the equipment environmental qualification deficiencies, identified in the April 25, 1983 SE, and the FRC TER enclosed with it, are described in the licensee's February 14 and June 15, 1984 submittals. During the January 10, 1984 meeting with the licensee, the staff discussed the proposed resolution of each deficiency for each equipment item identified in the FRC TER and found the licensee's approach for resolving the identified environmental qualification deficiencies acceptable.
The majority of deficiencies identified were documentation, similarity, aging, qualified life and replacement schedule.
All open items identified in the SE dated April 25, 1983 were also discussed and the resolution of these items has been found acceptable by the staff.
The approach described by the licensee for addressing and resolving the identified deficiencies includes replacing equipment, performing additional analyses, utilizing additional qualification documentation beyond that reviewed by FRC, obtaining additional qualification documentation and determining that some equipment is outside the scope of 10 CFR 50.49, and therefore not required to be environmentally qualified, e.g., located in a mild environment.
The staff discussed the proposed resolutions in detail on an item by item basis with the licensee during the January 10, 1984 meeting.
Replacing or exempting equipment, for an acceptable reason, are clearly acceptable methods for resolving environmental qualification deficiencies.
The more lengthy discussions with the licensee concerned the use of additional analyses or documentation.
Although the staff did not review the additional analyses or documentation, they discussed how analysis was being used to resolve deficiencies identified in the FRC TER, and the content of the additional documentation in order to determine the acceptability of these methods.
The licensee's equipment P.nvironmental qualification files will be audited by the staff during follow-up inspections to be performed by Region III, with assistance from IE Headquarters and NRR staff as necessary. Since a
- 4 ;..
significant amount of documentation has already been reviewed by the staff and FRC, the primary objective of the file audit will be to verify that they contain the appropriate analyses and other necessary documentation to support the licensee's conclusion that the equipment is qualified.
The inspections will verify that the licensee's program for surveillance and maintenance of environmentally qualified equipment is adequate to assure that this equipment is maintained in the as analyzed or tested condition.
The method used for tracking periodic replacement parts, and implementation of the licensee's commitments and actions, e.g., regarding replacement of equipment, will also be verified.
Based on discussions with the licensee and review of its submittal, the staff finds the licensee's approach for resolving the identified environmental qualification deficiencies acceptable.
Compliance With 10 CFR 50.49 In its June 15, 1984 submittal, the licensee has described the approach used to identify equipment within the scopP of paragraph (b)(l) of 10 CFR 50.49, equipment relied upon to remain functional during and following design basis events.
Consumers Power Company Equipment Qualification submittal dated September 1, 1981 provided a detailed summary of the design basis events that were considered in the selection of safety-related electrical equipment which has to be environmentally qualified.
The following design-basis accidents were considered in the equipment selection:
loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) and main steam line break (MSLB) inside containment (reference FSAR Chapter 14 and SEP Topic VI-3 "Containment Pressure and Heat Removal Capability"), MSLB outside containment (reference Special Report No. 6 "Analysis of Postulated High Energy Line Breaks Outside of Containment,"
June 30, 1975) and flooding outside containment (reference SEP Topic IX-3 "Station Service and Cooling Water System - SE dated February 22, 1982").
The list of safety-related equipment that was generated as defined in paragraph (b)(l) of 10 CFR 50.49 was based on reviews of the Final Safety Analysis Reoort (FSAR), Technical Specifications, Emergency Operating Procedures, piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs) and other procedures and design documents including the Plant Q-list. The original list has been revised several times to incorporate and delete equipment which resulted from plant modifications for TMI and other reasons.
The licensee's approach for identif.ving equipment within the scope of paragraph (b)(l) is in accordance with the requirements of that paragraph, and therefore, acceptable.
The method used by the licensee for identification of electrical equipment within the scope of paragraph (b)(2) of 10 CFR 50.49, nonsafety-related electric equipment whose failure under postulated environmental conditions could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of safety functions, is summarized below:
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 5 The following design-basis accidents were considered in the equipment selection:
LOCA and MSLB inside containment, MSLB outside containment and flooding outside containment.
The list of safety-related equipment that was generated as defined in paragraph (b}(l) of 10 CFR 50.49 was based on reviews of the FSAR, Technical Specifications, Emergency Operating Procedures, P&IDs and numerous other procedures and design documents including the Plant Q-list. The original list has been revised several times to incorporate and delete equipment which resulted from plant modifications for TMI and other reasons.
A review of all wiring diagrams of electrical components environmentally qualified was completed by Consumers Power Company for the Palisades Plant.
Five schemes were identified containing a combination of qualified and non-qualified components served off the same fuse.
Each of these schemes involves solenoid valve operators and valve position switches. During the recent refueling outage, Consumers Power Company modified each of the identified circuits to provide primary and secondary protection of the qualified circuits from unqualified device failure. This was achieved by separately fusing all unqualified devices.
These fuses have been sized to clear any faults prior to losing the common supply fuse or breaker.
The operation of all support systems and equipment either directly or indirectly connected were reviewed and the equipment was included on the qualification list as appropriate. This included room ventilation; component cooling, etc.
- 4.
All safety-related qualified equipment is electrically isolated via properly coordinated protective relays, circuit breakers, and/or fuses in accordance with applicable industry standards and NRC regulations.
The staff finds the methodology being used by the licensee is acceptable since it provides reasonable assurance that equipment within the scope of paragraph (b)(2} of 10 CFR 50.49 has been identified.
With regard to paragraph (b}(3) of 10 CFR 50.49, the licensee states that upon issuance of Regulatory Guide 1.97, 11 Instrumentation.*. to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions Durinq and Following an Accident," Consumers Power Company performed a variable-by-variable comparison of the specific requirements of this Guide.
An evaluation was then conducted to determine which instrumentation and sampling equipment required environmental qualification.
Two lists were generated of equipment types*.A, B, C variables, category 1 and 2, and type D, E variables, category 1 and 2.
The staff has not yet completed its review for conformance to Regulatory Gui de 1. 97.
The staff wi 11 detenni ne the acceptability of the licensee's evaluation as part of its review for conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.97.
This further staff review for Regulatory Guide 1.97 conformance may result in the licensee being required to include additional equipment in its environmental qualification program.
- The staff finds the licensee's approach to identifying equipment within the scope of paragraph (b)(3) of 10 CFR 50.49 acceptable since it is in accordance with the requirements of that paragraph.
Justification for Continued Operation The licensee has provided, in its June 15, 1984 submittal as supplemented by letter dated January 15, 1985, justification for continued operation addressing each itP.m of equipment for which the environmental qualification is not yet completed (see enclosure for the JCO equipment list).
The staff has reviewed each JCO provided by the licensee in its June 15, 1984 and January 15, 1985 submittals and finds them acceptable since they are based on essentially the same criteria that were used by the staff and its contractor to review JCO's previously submitted by licensees. These criteria, listed below, are also essentially the same as those contained in 10 CFR 50.49(i).
- a.
The safety function can be accomplished by some other designated equipment that is qualified, and failure of the principal equipment as a result of the harsh environment will not degrade other safety functions or mislead the operator.
- b.
Partial test data that does not demonstrate full qualification, but provides a basis for concluding the equipment will perform its function.
If it cannot be concluded from the available data that the equipment will not fail after completion of its safety function, then that failure must not result in significant degradation of any safety function or provide misleading information to the operator.
- c. Limited use of administrative controls over equipment that has not been demonstrated to be fully qualified.
For any equipment assumed to fail as a result of the accident environment, that failure must not result in significant degradation of any safety function or provide misleading information to the operator.
- 4. 0 CONCLUSIONS Based on the above evaluation, the staff concludes the following with regard to the qualification of electric equipment important to safety within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49.
0 0
0 Consumers Power's electrical equipment environmental qualification program complies with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49.
The proposed resolutions for each of the environmental qualification deficiencies identified in the April 25, 1983 SE and FRC TER are acceptable.
Continued operation until completion of the licensee's environmental qualification program will not present undue risk to the public health and safety.
- Justification for Continued Operation Equipment List Palisades Equipment ID LT-0751A, B, C, D LT-0752A, 8, C, D L T-0103 LT-0701, 0702, 0703, 0704 POS-3018, 3036, 3037, 3059, 30278, 30568 POS-2117, 2113, 2115, 0861, 0862, 0864, 0865, 0867, 0869, 0870, 0873 FT-0306 PT-0751A, 8, C, D 0752A, 8, C, D RE-1805, 1806, 1807, 1808 TE-0122CA, CB, CC, CD, HA, H8, HC, HO TE-OlllA, 8, H TE 0121A, 8, H TS-1849, 1850, 1851, 1852, 1856, 1857, 1858, 1859 NRC TER No.
57 142 58 49, 50 42, 44 60 63, 143 70 69 68 Description Foxboro Level Transmitters Foxboro Level Transmitters Fischer and Porter Level Transmitters Honeywell Limit Switches Honeywell Limit Switches Fischer and Porter Pressure Transmitter Foxboro Pressure Transmitters Victoreen Radiation Monitors Rosemount RTD's Johnson Controls Temperature Switches
~~~-
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION PALISADES PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-255 ENVIRONMENTAL CUALIFICATION OF ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Equipment which is used to perform a necessary safety function must be demonstratP.d to be capable of maintaining functional operability under all sP.rvice conditions postulated to occur during its installed life for the time it is required to opP.rate.
This requirement, which is embodied in General Desiqn Criteria 1 and 4 of Appendix A and Sections III, XI, and XVI! of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50, is applicable to equipment located inside as well as outside containment.
More detailed requirements ~nd guidancP. relating to the methods and procedures for demonstrating this capability for electrical equipment have been set forth in 10 CFR 50.49, "Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipme,,t Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-0588, "Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualification of SafPty-Related Electrical Equipment" (which supplemerts IEEE Standard 323 a,,d various NRC Regulatory Guides and industry standards),
and "Guidelines for Evaluating Environmental Qualification of Class lE Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors" (DOR Guidelines).
2.0 BACKGROUND
On February 8, 1979, the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE) issued to all licensees of operati,,q plants [except those included in the S_vstematic Evaluation Program (5FP)~ IE Bulletin {IEB) 79-01, "Environmental Qualification of Class IE Equipment." This 8ulletin, together with IE Circular 78-08 (issued on May 31, 1978), required the licensees to pPr~nrm reviews to assess the adequacy of their environmental qualification programs.
On Janua~v 14, 1980, NRC issued IEB 79-018 which included the DOR Guidelines and NUREG-0588 as attachments 4 and 5, respectively. Subsequently, on May 23, 1980, Conmission Memorandum and Order CLI-80-21 was issued and stated ttnit the DOR Guidelines and portions of NUREG-0588 form the require-mPnts that licensees must meet regarding environmental qualification of saf Pty-related electrical equipment in order to satisfy those aspects of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GOC) 4. Supplements to IE8 79-018 werP. issued for further clarification and definition of the staff's needs. These supplements were issued on February 29, September 30, and October 24, 1980.
- ? -
In addi the-staff issued orders cictt.ed Auqust 29, 1980 (amended in Septemb:. 980) and October ?.4, 1980 to all licensees.
The Auqust order required that the licensees provide a report, by November 1, 1980, documenting the qualification of sctfety-related electrical equipment.
The October order required the establishment of a central file location for the maintenance of all equipmP.nt qualification records. The central file was mandated to be established by December 1, 1980.
The staff subsequentl.v issued a Safety Evaluation (SE) on environmental qualification of safety-related electrical equipment to the licensee on June 1, 1981.
This SE directed the licensee to "either provide documentation of the missin9 qualification information which demonstrates that safety-related equipment meets the DOR Guidelines or NUREG-0588 requirements or col'llT'it to a corrective action [requalification, replacement (etc.)}." The licensee was required to respond to NRC within 90 days of receipt of the SE.
In response to the staff SE issued in 1981, the licensee submitted additional information regarding the qualification of safety-related electrical equipment.
This information was evaluated for the staff by the Franklin Research Center (FRC) in order to:
(1) identify all cases where the licenseP.'s response did not resolve the significant qualification issues, (2) evaluate the licensee's qualification documentat.ion in accordance with established criteria t.o determine which equipment had adequate documentation and which did net, and (3) evaluate the licenseP.'s qualification documenta-tion for safety-rel~ted electrical equipment located in harsh environments required for TMI Lessons Learned Implementation. A Technical Evaluation Report (TER) was issued by FRC on December 30, 1982.
An SE was subsequently issued to the Consumers Power Company on April 25, 1983, with the FRC TER as an attachment.
A final rule on environmental qualification of electric equipment important to safet.y ~or nuclear power plants became effective on February 22, 1983.
This rule, Section 50.49 of 10 CFR Part 50, specifies the requirements of electrical eauipment important to safety located in a harsh erwironment.
In accordance with this rule, equipment for Palisades may be quali~ied to the criteria specified in either the DOR Guidelines or NUREG-0588, except for replacement equipment.
Peplacement equipment installed subsequent to February 22, 1983 must be oualified in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.49, using the 9uidance of Regulatory Guide 1.89, unless there are sound reasons to the contrary.
A meetingi,was held with each licensee of plants for which a TER had bePn prepared f'or the staff by FRC in order to discuss all remaining open issues regarding environmental qualification, including acceptability of the environmental conditions for equipment qualification purposes, if this issue had not yet been resolved.
On January 10, 1984, a meeting was held to discuss Consumers Power's proposed method to resolve the environmental qualification deficiencies identified in the April 25, 1983 SE and December 30, 1982 FRC TER.
Discussions also included Consumers Power's gP.neral methodology for compliance with 10 CFR 50.49, and justification for continued operation for those equipment items for which environmental
---~1
- -**-- ------------ qualiffc*.* n is not yet completed.
The minutes of the meeting and proposed method of re~olution for each of thP. environmental qualification deficiencies are documented in February 14 and June 15 1 1984 submittals from the licensee.
- 3. 0 EVALUATION The evaluation of the acceptability of the licensee's electrical equipment environmental qualification program is based on the results of an audit review performed by the staff of:
(1) the licensee's proposed resolutions of the environmental qualification deficiencies identified in the April 25, 1983 SE and December 30 1982 FRC TER; (2) compliance with the requirem~nts of 10 CFR 50.49; and (3) justification for continued operation (JCO) for th~se equipment items for which the environmental qualification is not yet completed.
Proposed Resolutions of Identified Deficiencies The proposed rP.solutions for the equipment environmental oualification deficiencies, identified in the April 25, 1983 SE, and the FRC TER enclosed with it, are described in the licensee's FP.bruary 14 and June 15, 1984 submittals. During the January 10, 1984 meeting with the licensee, the staff discussed the proposed resolution of each deficiency for each equipment item identified in the FRC TER and found the licensee's approach for resolving the identified environmental qualification deficiencies acceptable.
The majority of deficiencies identified were
.documentation, similarity, aging, qualified life and replace~ent schedule.
All open items identified in the SE dated April 25, 1983 were also discusse~ and the resolution of these items has been found acceptable by the staff.
The approach described by the licensee for addressing and resolving the identified deficiencies includes replacing equipment, performing additional analyses, utilizing additional qualification documentation beyond that reviewed by FRC, obtaining additional qualification documentation and determining that some equipment is outside the scope of 10 CFR 50.49, and therefore not required to be environmentally qualiffect-*. e.g., located in a mild environment.
The staff discussed the proposed "-'9solutions in detail on an item by item basis with the licenseP.' dbrin9 the January 10, 1984 meeting. Replacing or exempting equipment~ for an acceptable reason, are clearly acceptable methods for resolving environmental qualification deficiencies. The m~re lengthy discussions with the licensee concerned the use of additional analyses or documenta~ion. Although the staff did not review the.additional analyses or documentation, they discussed how analysis was being used to resolve deficiencies identified in the FRC TER, and the content of the additional dncumentation in order to detennine the acceptability of these methods.
The licensee's equipment P.nvironrnental qualification files will be audited by t.hP. staff durina follow-up inspPctions to b~ perfonn~d by Region III, with assistance from IE HeadquartP.rs and NRR staff as necess~ry. Since a
)
'~~t.
signi-fica~~amount of documentation has already been reviewed by the staff and FRC, the primary objective of the filP. audit will be to verify that they contain the appropriate ~nalyses and other necPssary documentation to support the licensee's conclusion that the equipment is qualified. The inspections will verify that the licensee's prngram for surveillance and mainten~nce of environmentally qualified equipment is adequate to assure that this equipment is maintained in the as analyzed or tested condition.
The method used for tracking periodic replacement parts, and implP.Mentation of thP licensee's commitments and actions, e.g., regarding replacement of equipment, will also be verified.
Based on discussions with the licensee and review of its submittal, the staff finds the licensee's approach for resolving the identified environmental qualification deficiencies acceptable.
Compliance With 10 CFR 50.49 In its June 15, 19~4 submittal, the licensee has described the approach used to identify eouipment within the scopP of paragraph {b)(l) of 10 CFR 50.49, equipment relied upon to remain functional during and following design basis events. Consumers Power Company Equipment Qualification submittal dated September 1, 1981 provided a detailed summary of the desiqn basis evPnts that were considered in the selecticn of safety-related electrical equipment which has to be environmentally qu2lified.
The following design-basis accidents were considered in the equipMent selection: loss-of-coolant accide~t (LOCA) and main steaM line break (MSLB} insidP containment (reference FSAR Chepter 14 and SEP Topic VI-3 "Containment Pressure and Heat Removal Capability"}, MSLR outside containment (reference Special Report No. 6 "Analysis of Postulated High Energy Line Breaks Outside of Containment,"
June 30, 1975) and flooding outside containment (reference SEP Topic IX-3 11Statio11 Service and Cooling Water System - SE dated February 22, 1982").
The list of safety-related equipment that was generatP.d as defined in paraoraph (b~(l) of 10 CFR 50.49 was based on reviews of the Fin~l Safety Analysis Reoort (FSAR), Technical Specifications, Emergency Operating Procedures, piping anrl instrumentation dia~ra~s (P&IDs) and other procedures and design documents includinq the Plant Q-list. The original list has been revised sevP.ral times to incorporate and delete equipment which resulted from pl~nt m~difications for T~I ar.d other reasons.
The licensee's approach for identif.ving equipment within the scope of paragr~ph (b){l) is in accordance with the requirements of that paragraph, and therefore, *acceptable.
The method used by the licensee for identifi~ation of electrical equipment within the scope of paragraph (b)(2) of 10 CFR 50.49, nonsafety-related P.lectric equipment whose failure under postulated environmental conditions could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of safety functions, is summarized below:
--*-*- - ------- 1.
owin~ design-basis accidents were considered in the equipment select.ion:
LOCA and MSLB inside containment, MSLB outside containment and flooding outside containment.
The list of safety-related equipment that was generated as defined in paragraph (b)(l) of 10 CFR 50.49 was based on reviews of the FSAR, Technical Specifications, Emergency Operatin~ ProcP.dures, P&IDs and*numerous other procedures and design documents including the Plant 0-list. The original list has been revised several times to incorporate and delete equipment which resulted from plant modifications for TMI and other reasons.
- 2. A review of all wiring diagrams nf electrical componPnts environmentally qualified was complP.ted by Consumers Power Company for the Palisades Plant. Five schemes were identified containing a combination of aualified and non-qualified components served off the same fuse.
Each of these schemes involves solenoid valve operators and valve position switches.
During the recent refuelin9 outage, Consumers Power Company modified each of the identified circuits to provide primary and secondary protection of the qualified circuits from unaualified device failure. This was achieved by separately fusing all unqualified devices.
These fuses have been sized to clPar any faults prior to losing the COITIT!O~ supply fuse or breaker.
- 3.
The operation of all support s.vstems and equipment either directly or indirectly connected were reviewed and the equipment was included on the qualification list as appropriate. This included room ventilation; component coolin9, etc.
- 4.
All safPty-r~lated qualified equipment is electrically isolated via prl'perly coordinated protective* relays, circuit breakers, and/or fuses in accordanc~ with applicab1e industry standards and NRC regulations.
The staff finds the methodnlogy being used by the licensee is acceptable since it provides reasonable assurancP. that equipmP.nt within the scope of paragraph (b)(2) of 10 CFR 50.49 has been identified.
With regard to paragraph (b)(3) of 10 CFR 50.49, the licensee states that upon issuance of Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation *.* to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions C'lurin9 and Following an Accident," Consumers PC1wer Company performed a variable-by-variable comparison of the specific requirements of this Guide.
An evaluation was then conducted to determine which instrumentation and sampling equipment required environmental qualification.
Two lists were generated of equipment types A, B, C variables, category 1 and 2, and type D, E variables, category 1 and 2.
The staff has not yet completed its review for conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.97. The staff will determine the acceptability of the licensee's evaluation as part of its.review for conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.97.
This further staff review for Regulatory Guide 1.97 conformance may result in the licensee being required to include additional equipment in its environmental qualification program.
'9
- The st~f-* f 1nds thP. licensee's approach to identifying equipment within the scope of paragraph (b)(3) of 10 CFR 50.49 acceptable since it is in accordance with the requirements of that. paragraph.
Justification for Continued Operati-on The licenseP. has_ provided, in its June 15, 1984 submittal as supplemented by letter dated January 15, 1985, Justification for continued operation addressing each itP.m nf equipment for which the environmental qualification is not yet completed (see enclosurP. for the JCO equipment list).
The staff has reviewed each JCO provided by the licensee in its June 15, 1984 and ~lanuar.Y 15, 1985 submittals and finds them acceptable since they are based on essentially the same criteria that were used by the staff and its contractor to review JCO's previously submitted by licensees. ThP.se criteria, listed below, are also essentially the same as those contained in 10 CFR S0.49(i).
- a. The safPty function can be accomplished by some other designated equipment that is qualified, and failure of the principal equipment as a result of the harsh environment will not degrade other safety functions or mislead the operator.
- b.
Partial test data that does not demonstrate full qualification, but provides a basis for concluding the equipment will perform its function.
If it cannot be concluded from the available data that the eQuip~ent will not fail after completion of its safety function, then that failure must not result in significant de~radation of any safety function or provide misleading information to the operator.
- c. Limited use of administrative controls over equipment that has not been demonstrated to be fully qualified.
For any equipment assumed to fail as a result of the accident environment, that failure must not result in significant degradation of any safety function or provide misleading information to the operator.
- 4. 0 CONCLUSIONS>
Based on t'1e above evaluation, the staff co~cludes the following with regard to the qualification of electric equipment important to safety within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49.
0 0
0 Consumers Power's electrical equipment environmental qualification program complies with the requfrements of 10 CFR 50.49.
The proposed resolutions for each of the environmental qualification deficiencies identified in the April 25, 1983 SE and FRC TER are acceptable.
Continued operation until completion of the licensee's environmPntal qualification program will not present undue risk to the public health and safety.
1.
-- ----**-------.... J"usttfication for Continued Operation Equipment List Palisades Equipment ID LT-0751A, B, C, D LT-0752A, B, C, D LT-0103 LT-0701, 0702, 0703, 0704 POS-3018, 3036, 3037, 3059, 30270, 30568 POS-2117, 2113, 2115, 0861, 0862, 0864, 0865, 0867, 0869, 0870, 0873 FT-0306 PT-0751A, B, C, D 0752A, B, C, D RF-1805, 1806, 1807, 1808 TE-012?CA. ClJ, CC, CD. HA\\.HB, HC, HO TE-OlllA ** Jr.-. H TE 0121A, 8~ H TS-1849, 1850, 1851, 1852, 1856, 1857, 1858, 1859 NRC TER No.
57 142 58 49, 50 42, 44 60 63, 143 70 69 68 Description Foxboro Level Transmitters Foxboro Level Transmitters Fischer and Porter LPvel Transmitters Honeywell Limit Switches HoreywPll Limit Switches Fischer and Porter Pressure Transmitter Foxboro Pressure Transmitters Victoreen Radiatio" Monitors Rosemount RTO's Johnson Controls Temperature Switches
-....: ~ ' "
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Solenoid Valves Air Operated Valves Air Control Components Pressure Switches Tempera_ture Sw.itches
, Emerge~cy Power C~ntrol Systems
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PDR c Automatic Switch Co. FLORHAM PARK. NEw JERSEY 01s32 COPY NO (pQ....
r ATTACHMENT 4 EVALUATION OF THE DOSE RATE AND SHIELDING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE POST ACCIDENT SAivIPLE SYSTEM Prepared by Sentry Equipment Corp.
David M. Gaston June, 1982 Rev. 1 July 1982 Rev. 2 Sept. 1982
TABLE OF CONTENTS
~
Deserio ti on Page Section
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1 2.0 SHIELDING EVALUATION METHOD 2
Introduction 2
I R2 Discussion of Methods 2
Shield Penetration 5
3.0 SHIELDING EVALUATION RESULTS 9
Design Criteria 9
I R2 GSP Shielding Evaluation 9
CASP Shielding Evaluation 11 I Rl, R2
.. ry
~r Tables
- j 2-1 LINEAR ATTENTUATION COEFFICIENTS 6
2-2 COEFFICIENTS USED IN CAPO'S FORM 7
OF THE BUILDUP FACTOR 3-1 SOURCE TERMS 14 3-2 SOURCE VOLU~IES 16
- ')
3-3 DOSE RATES 17 I R2 3-4 GSP IXTEGRATED DOSES 18 3-5 CASP INTEGRATED DOSES 19 I Rl
'."I)
Figures FIGURE 2-1 8
FIGURE 3-1 20 FIGURE 3-2 21 FIGURE 3-3 22 FIGURE 3-4 23 FIGURE 3-5 24 I Rl FIGURE 3-6 25 REFERENCES 26
..... -------~*-... --... ---*-*-*-... *-* ""-***--*-*--... --***-*--*------------- ---- -* *-* -
i 0
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Sentry Equipment Corp. (SEC) has evaluated the shielding design for the Post Accident Sample System (PASS) equipment being provided by SEC for use in nuclear power stations. The PASS equipment consists of the following:
Grab Sample Panel (GSP)
Containment Air Sample Panel (CASP)
This equipment is designed to enable an operator to obtain samples of primary reactor coolant or containment atmosphere, which may be highly radioactive in the event of a reactor accident involving substantial fuel failure.
The results of the shielding analyses 'cc*:< __ ;'."~e5 ~:*. _ tl-ic: maximum integrated dosa -
approximately' 400 mrem.*=--
Page 1 of 26
- o I
2.0 SHIELDING EVALUATION METHODS 2.1 Introduction The dose rates due to direct radiation emitted from the process piping behind the GSP arid CASP were determined by the SEC radiation shielding design system computer codes. The* methods used are discussed in section 2.2 and are based on the equations given in volume 1, section 6.2 of the Eng-ineering Compendium on Radiation Shielding (Springer-Verlag New York Inc., 1968).
The dose rate contributions to the front of the GSP and CASP due to backscatter from the walls and floor behind the panels is not considered.
There are no "thin" sections or ducts in the shielding that would make scattered radiation of more concern than direct radiation.
T~e dose rate contributions due to various shield penetrations are discussed in section 2.3 2.2 Discussion of Methods The dose rates were calculated using the equations for shielded line sources.
Modeling was simplified by not considering shielding contributions of the piping walls or self absorption in the process fluid.
Obviously, this will result in a more conservative dose rate than if they had been considered.
The equations used for the geometries shown in Figure 2-1 are:
D.R. (mrad/hr) =
At P.2 & P3: D.R. (mrad/hr) =
where:
B Sy Ax 4'?\\' z c B Sy Ax 4-tr z c B = scattered buildup factor as discussed in section 2.2.1.
Page 2 of 26
~--*
)
Sy = volumetric source strength (photons/sec/cm3) as discussed in section 3.2.1 Ax = cross-sectional area of source material F(9,x) =
exp [:-x sec e) d0' I
e X --
c =
f' L
i=l 0
flux to dose conversion photons/ cm 2 /sec mrad/hr ti = shield. laminate thickness (cm)
Jli = linea~ attenuation coefficlent of shield laminate (cm"."1)
(Table 2-1) 2.2.1. Scattered Dose Buildup Factors The scattered buildup factor for multiple shields was determined by Broder's method discussed in chapter 3 of Weapons Radiation Shielding-Handbook (DNA-1893""'.3, Rev. 1; March 1972). This method is based on a buildup factor being calculated at each shield interface; once for each laminate material as if the entire shield consists of that material.
These buildup factors are then combined by Broder's recurrence equation:
N N-1 N
N-1 B C.E.uiti) = B ( i]µiti) + BN (2].Uiti) - BN C2J.uiTi) i=l i=l i=l i=l where B (
) indicates a function not a product.
Thus, the formula for total buildup is:
Pogc 3 of 26 R2
I 0
- 0 Ench individual buildup factor was calculated using Capo's point source polynomial approximation:
3 B = £,6i (ut)i i=o*
(after En~ineering Compendium on Radiation ::lhielding, Vol. 1) where JB i are the coefficients listed in Table 2-2 2.2.2 Gamma Source Definition The source terms were Representative divided into nine groups as follows:
Energy (MeV) 0.4 0.8 1.3 1.7 2.2 2.5 2.8 4.0 6.1 2.2.3 Flu.'C to Dose Conversion Energy Range (MeV) 0.1 - 0.5 0.5 - 0.9 0.9 - 1.35 1.35 - 1.8 1.8 - 2.2 2.2 - 2.6 2.6 - 3.0 3.0 - 5.0 6.1 The gamma flux calculated at the dose point is quantified in units of photons/sec/cm 2.
These are converted to dose rates in mrad/hr for each energy group as follows:
Energy Group Conversion Factor (MeV)
(photons-hr/sec/cm2/mrad) 0.4 1357 0.8 696.9 1.3 467.2 1.7 380.6 2.2 320.4 2.5 297.7 2.8 275.8 4.0 210.4 6.1 157.0 (after Nuclc11r Eni;incering Hnn<ibook, Section 7; McGraw-Hill)
Page 4 of 26
0
- O N.
- 0 2.3 Shield Penetration All penetrations passing through the shield are offset to minimize the dose due to radiation streaming and have negligible contribution to the dose rate.
However, the shielding evaluation for Sentry Equipment Corp. High Radiation Sample System considered the valve stem penetrations (which are identical to those used on the PASS) to have no offset.
Therefore, the evaluation of the valve stem penetrations will be included, realizing this will provide a conservative analysis.
Page 5 of 26
. -*.--**----*-------*-.---*--*..... *--*I'---****- ____., __
Table 2-1: Linear Attenuation Coefficients Energy Lead Iron (MeV) km-1)
(cm-1) 0.4 2.4948 0.7165 o.s C.9707 0.5174 1.3 0.6430 0.4139
.. ~-..
1.7 0.5477 0.3571
- .t')
2.2 0.5012 0.3182 N
2.5 0.4888 0.3026 1
2.8 0.4785 0.2894
~./
4.0 0.4695 0.2.575 VJ 6.1 0.4933 0.2373
'.'.:::)
(dter Nuclear Eng-ineering: Handb1y*1<, Section 7; McGraw-Hill)
Page 6 of 26
j Table 2-2: Coefficients Used in Capo's Form of the Buildup Factor 0
LEAD EncrrI)' (;\\'IeV)
BO Bl B2 B3 0.4 0.99993E+OO 0.24413E+OO
-0.17836E-01 0.59319E-03 0.8 0.10118E+OO 0.30992E+OO
-0.14248E-01 0.48683E-03 1.3 0.101'.l9E+ O 1 0.36963E+OO
-0. 78522E-02 0.26797E-03 1.7 0.10152E+Ol 0.38419E+OO
-0.28531E-02 0.11143E-03
. 2.2 0.10076E+Ol 0.37505E+OO 0.26969E-02
-0.30058E-05.
2.5 0.10026E+Ol 0.36026Et00 0.54705E-02
-0.11432E-04 2.8 0.99805E+OO 0.34141E+OO
- 0. 77384E-02 0.31761E-04 4.0 0.99061E+OO 0.25870E+OO 0.11135E-01 0.71922E-03 eo 6.1 0.10044E+Ol 0.19172E+OO
-0.14075E-02 0.29838E-02
,.._-:9
~
.. ()"
~
IRON.
Energy (MeV)_
BO Bl B2 B3
- 0 0.4 0.10025E+Ol 0.86091E+OO 0.97034E-01
-0.15664E-03 0.8 0.96274E+OO O.SG173E+OO 0.10918E-00
-0.15172E-02
- '"~
1.3 0.10160E+Ol C.73677E+OO 0.57451E-01
-0.48387E-03 1.7 0.10141E+Ol C.CJu60E+OO 0.42602E-01
-0.45168E-03 2.2 0.10074E+Ol 0.62416E+OO 0.33554E-01
-0.45419E-03
- 2.5 0.10043E+Ol G.53796E+OO 0.30177E-Ol
-0.43507E-03 2.8
- 0.10019E+Ol 0.55378E+OO 0.27590E-Ol
- ..a.40323E-03
- 1 4.0 0.99786E+OO 0.44092E+OO 0.21099E-Ol
-0.22404E-03 6.1 0.99809E+OO 0.31496E+OO 0.15465E-Ol 0.69837E-04
()
Page 7 of 26
N r-4
\\=
I C"*l N
- .J c
z
- c
(..}
c.;
rr
- i.
6,.
ei <:Qo
~.!T
. _/
3.0 S11IELDING EVALUATION RESULTS 3.1 Dcsiirn Criteria The shielding provided on the Grab Sample Panel (GS.i') and the Containment Air Sample Panel (CAtiPJ is designed to limit the integrated dose to an operator standing one (1) meter in front of the panel to 3 rem whole body and 18. 75 rem extremities from a single exercise.
3.2 GSP Shielding Evaluation 3.2.1 Source Terms The radiation source terms used in the GSP shielding evaluation are based on:
- an equilibriu:11 core: operating at a power level of 25ol !VI ~Yt
- release of iou*;o of the noble gas, 50% of the halogen, and 116 of the solid radionuclides to the reactor coolant
- .reJctc: coo.:...::.:~: vc::..: *.* c.Jf 9500 cuuic l.:.~t:
r"
~-
These source terms are listed in Taole 3-1.
3.2.2 The shielding evaluation is based on the "worst case" accident defined by the source terms above.
The types of samples which can be obtained during accident conditions are:
- l: 30 ml in-line prcs.su::'ized reactor cocL::t sample from which the gases are strip:>cd
- IS.ml sample of undiluted,* gas-stripped reactor coolant
- ;l.QOO_:} __ tj~J~ted, gas:-stt'ipped reactor coolant sam.ple
- !fa,000:1.*dnuted, *stripped *gases*:~
A purge of all lines connecting the GS.P to the reactor coolant system precedes the acquisition of each sample. After the purge is complete, the 30 ml in-line pressurized reactor coolant sample is isolated. At this time, any lines in the panel containing reactor coolant would be flushed with demincralized water to reduce the total active volume.
Then the in-line sample is stripped, separating the gases from the liquid. Now, any or all of the rcmainirig samples may be taken. Upon completion of the sample acquisition, the entire panel Puiie 9 of 26.
R2
'..n
- .i:J
~r
.:)
3
- .\\
is flushed with dem.ineralized water to remove the remaining active liquids and gases.
The process piping and component data used for this evaluation is:
- all lines in the panel are either 1/4 inch diameter by 0.166 inch bore tube or 1/8 inch diameter oy 0.067 inch bore tube.
- the volume of all 1/4 inch tuoe risin6 stem valves is 1 ml
- the volume of the thermocouple is the same as an equal length of 1/8 inch tube
- the volume of the VH.EL is the same as an equal length of 1/4 inch tube
- the now element is 3/8 inch diameter by 0.315 inch bore tube
&.11 ball valves have the same bore as their connecting tubing the volume of all 1/8 inch tube rising stem valves is 0.1 ml the volume of SFl is 30 ml the volume of EVl and EV2 is 300 ml (150 ml each)
The total source volumes are listed in Table 3-2.
Specific details on GSP operation are given in the Operation and Maintenan~e Manual.
3.2.3 GSP Shielding The GSP shidding design consists of a main panel shield and a shield surrounding the opening for the undiluted sample cask.
The main panel snield is comprised of 7 inches of lead shot hel.d between two 1/2 inch steel plates and runs from the floor to the top of the panel.
The shield surrounding the opening for the {~diluted sample::Cask*- is>
comprised-or. 4. in~J!~~ 9f sofi"<ltead betw'een l\\'vo
- 112 inch *steel. p~~ tes.
This shield is connected to the openin~ in the main panel shield and covers the interior side wall, rear wall, and ceiling of the opcnin1;t.
Refer to Figure 3-1 for an illustratio':l of the shielding.
Tfie-lead.. shof density usci:riri' th~ __ an_alysis was 7.14-g/cm?_.
This
-*-* --*.... - -~
value cQrresponds to* 63Vti"-~or*.the theoretical* lead dcns~~y _of l!.!34
- g/cm3 and is based on *mechanical and radiometric measurements mnde by Sentry Equipment Corp.
Page 10 of 26
....;...* -*.;..;;;*--....,;..** --*---..;;.--;;;;.;**.;.;;;*-;.;;;**.;;;;-..;;.**;.;;;*-;,,;;--*;;;,;.:-";;.;.** *=.:.*.:.;*-*-=--=-=-*:....;.* *=**:....=*
-c...:.*=..:-*=***=-:....=.:*=--=*=*=.,,,,,,,~=-
The maximum whole body nnd extremity dose rates are considered to be one and the same since use of the reach rod requires that the hands be close to the body. These dose rn:tcs arc listed in Table 3-3. The line source geometries are shown in Figures 3-2 through 3-4.
The dose point considered was directly in front of SFl at a distance of one (1) meter from the front of the panel.
No other points were considered as SFl will always contain the greatest concentrated active volume during sampling.
3.2.'1 Valve Stem Penetrations The valve stem penetrations used on the PAS.s are identical to those used on the HRSS. Therefore, the results from the HRtiS study were used in this study.
It should be und~!"stood that the radi2tbn streaming from one penetration is so r,ig'.'lly colli!ilr.t.::d that it ;*:ili not be additive to the exposure from any other penetration.
Therefore, the dose rate of 10 mrem/hr \\'."aS used for valve stem penetrations oased on "Evaluation of the Dose Rate and Shielding Requirements for the HRSS Equipment", NUS 3872; October 1981.
3.2.5 GS.I? Integrated Dose Results The integrated dose results are compiled in Table 3-4. T i:*..;s~ :-*
- ~s s
- r-e:*wcll-belo~v -:..~1e req~:i:?*~0nts of 3 rem wt.ol::: ~:Day <:
-* J R,7:;.. --~, r
.~;2 extremities Sf:~cified by th~ integrated dose eri *: eria.
3.3 CASP Shielding Evaluation 3.3.1 Source Terms The radiation source terms used in the CASP shielding evaluation are based on:
- an equilibrium core operating at a power level *of 2561 l\\H\\Tt Rl
- release of 100% of the noble gas and 25% halogen radionuclides to tile cont1:1inment atmosphere
- containment free volume of 158,562 cubic Ccet These source terms arc listed in Table 3-1.
Pngc 11 of 26
Lil N
0 e
\\
/
3.3.2 The shielding evaluation is based on the "worst case" accident defined by the source terms above.
The type of sample obtained during accident conditions is:
- _~2~_~1-sanfp1eof the,_-containment atmosphere (the-vo1ume of t!'le
~sample_. pef ore.. dilution is 24 ).11)_ *_
A purge of the sample lines in the CASP and its interconnecting lines to the containment precedes the acquisition of the sample.
After the purge is complete, the sample is trapped in the diluter valve and swept into the sample vial. Upon completion of the sample
' Rl acquisition, the entire panel is flushed with nitrogen to remove the remaining active gas.
The process piping and com?c::c:nt data used for this eva.luation is:
- all lines in the panel are ei:he:* 1/4 inch diameter by 0.166 inch bore tube or 1/8 inch. diameter by 0.067 inch bore tube.
- the eductor exhaust line has a. 0.166 inch bore containing radioactive gas the remainder of the bore is nonradioactive nitrogen.
the now element is 1/4 inch diameter by 0.166 inch bore tube.
all ball and plug valves have the same bore as their interconnecting tubing.
The total source volume is lis~ec in Table 3-2. Specific details en CASP operation are given in the Operation nnd 1\\-Iaintenance Manual.
3.3.3 CASP Shielding The CASP shielding design consists of a front panel shield and two side panel shields.
The front panel shield is comprised of *seven inches of lead shot held between two 1/2 inch steel plates and runs from the floor to the top of the panel.
The side shields are five inches of lead shot held between 2 1/2 inch steel plates and run from the floor to* the top of the panel.
Refer to Figure 3-5 for an illustration of the shielding.
The lead shot used in the nnnlysis was 7.14 g/cm3. This value Pugc 12 of 2G
N n corresponds to 63','6 of the theoretical lead density -of 11/34 g/cm3.
'fhe maximum whole oody and extremity dose rates are considered to be one and the same since use of the reach rod requires that the hands be close to the body.
These dose rates are listed in Table 3-3.
The line source geometry is shown in figure 3-6.
The pose point considered is one meter from the panel face, 0.8128 meter Rl aoove the floor, and 0.2032 meter from tne panel's right side.
3.3.4 Valve Stem Penetrations See Section 3.2.4.
3.3.5 CASP Integrated Dose Results The integrated dose results are compi1ed in Table 3-5. These results.
ure well below the r::::}ui:-cments of ::; rem whole ~:c.:dy ~::~: iS.75 rem 1 1
, R2 extremi:ics specifieG by :i:e i:1tegrated dose critc:ria.
I Page 13 of 20
r J'l Lfl
--~
()
a
~
I
\\.J Table 3-1: Source Terms Liquid Sources for a Non-Linebreak Accident Representative Energy (MeV) 0.4 0.8 1.3 1.7 2.2 2.5 2.8 4.0 6.1 Production Rate @ 1 Hour (photons/sec/cm 3) 0.3379£+11 0.42.25E+ll 0.1403E+ll 0.6152E+l0 0.3334E+10 0.2544E+10 0.1511E+iO 0.3101E+10 0.9508E+09 pegased Liquid Sources (30cm3 total volume)
Representative Production Rate @ 1 Hour Energy (MeV)
(photons/sec/cm 3) 0.4 0.3171E+ll.
0.8 0.4108E+ll 1.3 0.1363E+ll 1.7 0.5915E+10 2.2 0.311 'lE+lO 2.5 0.2290E+10 2.8 0.1511E+10 4.0 0.3098E+10 6.1 0.9S08E+09 Gas Sources (270 cm3 total volume)
Representative Energy (MEY) 0.4 0.8 1.3
- 1. '1 2.2 2.s*
2.8 4.0 6.1 Production Rate @ 1 Hour (photons/sec/cm 3) 0.2084E+l0 0.1174E+10 0.3970E+09 0.2371E+09 0.2175E+09 0.2538E+09 0.2488E+06 0.3374E+06 0.2492E+Ol Page 14 of 26
-..-----*-..,---*--w*--**--..---
U1
- "J
~
.J J
J Table 3-1: Source Terms (Con't)
Containment Atmosphere Sources for a Linebreak Accident Representative Energv (i\\leV) o.~
0.8 1.3 1.7 2.2 2.8 4.0 6.1 Production Rate @ 1 Hour (photons/sec/cm 3) 0.27U~E+lU 0.1253E+10 0.4237E+09 0.2028E+09 0.1450E+09 0.2528E+08 0.2606E+07 0.1357E+02 (Source terms were prepared by Sargent &. Lundy Engineers)
Page 15 of 2G
.....--~--=- ~--.-*---. --- --...... --**--*---
Rl
Table 3-2: Source Volumes GSP Operation Volume (cm3)
Purge 86.4 Capture in-line flask 116.4
~
. Diluted or undilute:d liquid 36.0
'....:'1 sample
.. CJ*
Diluted gas 303.4 (gas) 30.0 (liquid)
~'
)
-~
CASP d
Operation Volume (cm3)
- Rl Purge & Sampling 12.4
- "")
-~,
__ j Par;e lG of 26
~ - -.......... _ -*
r~.
~-'
Table 3-3: Dose Rates GSP Operation Dose Rate (mrem/hr)
Purge 1907
!""O
!..fl Capture in-line flask 2532
- 0 Diluted or undiluted liquid 554.7 sample
~
Diluted gas 331.6 9
CASP
':70 Operation Dose Rate (mrem/hr)
Rl
- ")
Purge & Sampling 15.6 Page 17 of 26
- - **-**-*--***--*---*--********-*. *-.- -~-*-*-*-----------
t.n
- O
- \\I
~
J
~
-~::9
- -:'.)
- -?*
0
- Table 3~: CSP Intccrnted Doses Operation Time in field (min)
Purge Capture in-line flask Strip gas 5
3 6
Subtotal for initial operations To obtain undiluted or 5
-diluted liquid sample Total To obtain diluted gas 5
Total Page 18 of 26 Dose (mrern) 158.9 126.6 62.5 348 46.2 I R2 394.2 I R2 27.6 375.6
~-*r-
.. ---*-.. ~--------**-----*-*-..... -- -
0
()
Operation Purge Sampling Tuble 3-5: CASP L'ltc{!'I"atcd Dose Time in field (min)
Dose (mrem) 3 0.8 1
0.3 TOTAL 1.1 Pngc 19 of 26 I
I I R1 I I I
I
! I
- =~-=--
- LEAD SHOT I*
1
~
.;.i~* ~-:.-
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ON "A-A" 2.l 0
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-;:f.
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I
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1p-!l----. *- -- -*--**-- *i..
.:t~J.. -.:s::~*r.s::::-~.~
I S lCTION "C-C"
=- --*-:..-:_-:,;:_-_[ij-*
0 9 [!]
- .-.: _!E_ --
-==-
... ~
~
II
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II I
- -- - - _ ** - -.J
.... -r "C"
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L FIGURE 3-2
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FIGURE 3-3
- i I
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~
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~.;.
H w
C")
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ru
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I i!..!------"'-------rz--------=- -----r-------""---~-?'....= -
I :
@i ~
- - - - - - --...1r----;.--r: ~
~=-=-=-~=-=-=:-=...=--=-=-=-=--::~~~"~
=---------------------%§ ----------
l gp§ II II.,
I I-
~ -
L _
ti IL-~
u LJ
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~-----
of9 a: 0
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@:"..:.I
~
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I II t.----~*
-=---= I I
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........ ---...u I
--,-----~---=-----
~--~
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,!f
- .o FIGUHE 3-6
References Arcieri, W.C., "Evaluation of the Dose Rate and Shielding Requirements for the HRSS Equipment", NUS 3872, (October 1981).
Etherington, Harold, Nuclear Engineering Handbook, McGraw-Hill.
Jaegar, R.G., Eng'ineering Compendium on Radiation Shielding, Volume *1, Springer-Verlag New York, Inc., (1968).
Stevens, Paul N. and Trubey, Da:: :; L, 11Weapons Radiation Shielding Hand-Book", DNA-1893-3, Rev.
, (.".:iarch 1972)
- Page 26 of 26
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This is to certity that the mic:rophotographic images appeari?lg on this roll ot mocrofilm are acClJr&te reproductions of the record.a ot:
Consumers Power co.,
and were microfilmed in the regular course of business pursuant to established routine comp&n1' pollc:r :f'or systems utilization and/
or for the maintenance and preservation ot such records through the *storage of such mic:rotilms in protected. locations.
It i..s f'tlrther certified. that the photographic processes used :f'or microfilm:iilg o:f' the above record.a were accomplished in a manner and on micro:f'ilm which meets the recommended. require-ments ot the Records Management Department for permanent microphotogra.phic reproductions.
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iai~crofilmed.
Camera Operator
- ~la~,(~6-0
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- Authorized SisMt~
consumers Power company EDD OF ROLL
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- consumers Power company START OF ROLL Cartridge Number
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- CERm'ICATE OF AU'l'HET.ICITI This is to certity tbat the microphotographic images appearing on this roll of mocrofilm are accurate reproductions of the record.a ot:
Consumers Power Co.,
and were microfilmed in the regular course ot business pursuant to established. routine c~
pollc:r tor systems utilization e:tJ.d/
or tor the maintenance a.nd preservation ot such records through the *storage of such microfilms in protected. locations.
It i.a f'urther certified. that the :photographic processes used for microfilming ot the above records were accomplished in & manner and 011.
microtilm wbich meets the recommended. require-ments ot the Records Mans.gement Department for permanen.t microphotographic reproductions.
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!J 6-g;;;;I Das:/ !dL r-na Operator
,(~6-"
Authorized Si~t~