ML18051A423
| ML18051A423 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 05/26/1983 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18051A422 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8305270010 | |
| Download: ML18051A423 (15) | |
Text
UNITED STATES r\\JUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 SAFETY EVILU.~ nori BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION REVIEW IN-~CCORDANCE WITH APPENDIX R SECTIONS III.G AND III.L
~-
l.0 INTRODUCTION CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY PALISADES PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-255 On February 19,
~9~1, the fire protection rule for nuclear power plants, 10 CFR 50 and ApJe~dix R to 10 CFR 50, became effective. This rule required all licensees of plants licensed prior to January 1, 1979, to subnit.by March 19, 1981; (1) plans and schedules for meeting the applicable requi~enents of Appendix R, (2) a design description of any modifications proposed to provide alternative safe shutdown capability pursuant to Paragraph III.G.3 of Appendix R, and (3) exemption requests for which the tolling provision of Section 50.48(c)(6) was to be invoked *
. Sections III.G o~_Appendix R is a retrofit item to all pre-1979 plants regardless of pr~vio~s SER positions and resolutions.
We evaluated the ?~lisades alternative safe shutdown capability against the requirements o~ Section III.G.3 and III.L of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 for fires in those areas identified by the licensee and tabulated in Table l:
TABLE l FIRE ARE~S FOR WHICH ALTERNATIVE SAFE SHUTDOWN IS PROVIDED
- i. Control Room
- 2.
Cable Spreading Room
- 3.
Engineered Safeguards Panel Room
- 4.
Corridor Between the Charging Pump Room and Switchgear Room 1-C -
These four fire ~reas are the same areas i denti fi ed in our SER dated September l~ 1973.
8305270010 830526 PDR ADOCK 05000255 F
- Tbe licensee provided plans for alternative shutdown capability in the event of a fire in fire areas 1-4 and stated that, by providing alter-native safe shutdown *capability for those areas in accordance with the requirements of Seetions III.G.3 and III.L of Appendix R, the Palisades Plant would be io compliance with Section III.G of Appendix R.
As a result of our review of the licensee's submittal, we notified the licensee that a fifth fire area, the auxiliary shutdown control panel area., had to be included in the fire areas which required alternative shutdown capability; the licensee then included fire., area 5 in the review.
We interpret the licensee's statements to mean that all areas other than fire areas 1-5 which required safe shutdown capability in the event of a fire already meet the requirements of Section III.G.2 o~.D.ppe~dix R.
While the licensee does not propose to provide any new systems for safe shutdovn capao~lity in fire areas 1-4.
Consumers Power Company does plan to provide an auxiliary shutdown control panel in the southwest electrical penetration -room to protect against a fire in areas 1-4. This panel is mainly to control use of the AFW system (utilizing the turbine-driven AFW pump) to attain and maintain hot shutdown.
The licensee will install instrumentation needed as backup to instrumentation which might become unavailable in the event of a fire in fire areas 1-4.
The turbine-driven AFW pump can be started from tbe new auxiliary shutdown pane 1. _The controls for the auxiliary feed1'1'ater valves and the steam supply valve to the turbine-driven AFW pump will also be on the new auxiliary shutdown panel. These controls are enabled by means of a transfer switch in the southwest electrical penetration room which also isolates the controls in the control room and causes an annunciator in the control room to signal transfer of the control functions.
A fire in fire area 5 could result in the inability to operate the auxiliary feedwater system in the control room or at the auxiliary panel due to faulting of the control wiring to the two AFW pump discharge valves.
The licensee stated that ~hould this occur hot shutdown tould be ~ccom plished utilizing the third AFW pump which is being added.
This third AFW pump (the third high pressure safety injection pump) and a path to the steam generators which is separate from the existing auxiliary feedwater system will be utilized. If the fire in fire area 5 does not result in damage to the auxiliary shutdovm control panel or the transfer switch, hot shutdown would be accomplished by means of the motor driven AFW pump f0om the control room.
The transition from hot to cold shutdown employs the same equipment as does hot shutdown except that the reactor is cooled by releasing steam to the atmosphere by means of the steam jet ejector instead of being released to the atmosphere by means of the code safety valves on the secondary system.
.. Cold shutdown will be initiated when the primary system pressure is low enough; sensible and decay heat will be removed by means of one of the two low pressur~ safety injection pumps, taking suction from the primary system.
Heat will~e transferred to the component*.cool.ing system through a shutdown heat exchanger and then to the service water system through a component cooling water heat exchanger.
Valves which cannot be initiated or powered electrically will be operated manually.
At least one train of all other systems required for operation during hot or cold shutdown will be available in the event of a fire in fire areas 1-4 or in the event of a fire in the area of the shutdown control panel (fire area 5).
A detailed discussion is provided (below) showing how the safe shutdown capability is provided for the plant in the event of a fire in fire areas 1-4, and in the event of fire in the area of the alternative shutdown control panel.
2.0 REQUIREMENTS FOR SHUTDOWN A.
Systems and Components Required for Safe Shutdown
- 1.
Hot Shutdovm When the operator becomes aware of the onset of a plant disabling fire, the reactor will be tripped manually; a fire of sufficient severity may cause the plant to be tripped automatically. Control rod insertion is suf-ficient to reduce reactivity so that hot shutdown may be attained.
Boron, in the form_of boric acid solution,
~ill be added to the reactor vessel by means of one of the two fire protected charging pumps in order to main-tain the reactor *in the subcritical state for subsequent cooldown, as needed.
The charging pump which is selected for use will employ either the safety injection and refueling water (SIRW) tank or the boric acid tank (BAT) as the source of! borated water to be injected into the reactor vessel. The charging pump will also inject water into the reactor vessel as necessary to maintain the proper water level. The charging pump selected for use can be started in the control room or at its circuit breaker, and all valves in the system can be positioned manually.
The primary system pressure can be maintained by means.
of the pressurizer heaters.
If the heaters are not avail ab 1 e, th*e charging pump system wi 11 be used to maintain Ure system pressure between 1500 psi a and operating pressure.
The licensee stated that the primary system pressure will not fall to 1500 psia for 11 several 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br />, allowing the plant operators sufficient time to respond in the event all the pressurizer heaters are lost.
If plant control is being performed at the auxiliary shutdown control panel the steam turbine-driven AFW pump may be used to supply water to either or both steam generators,.as necessary.
The motive steam for the turbine, however, will come from Steam Generator i~o. l (E-50-A) due to the fact that control for the steam admission valve from only that steam generator wilT be av~ilable at the auxiliary shutdown control panel.
The turbine-driven pump normally takes suction from the condensate storage tank (CST).
The fire mains, drawing water from Lake Mighigan, can also be used to supply water to the turbine-driven AFW pump in the event the water supply in the CST is depleted or cannot be utilized. Manually operated valves can be used to shift the AFW pump suction to the fire mains.
Plant steam will be_released to the atmosphere by means of the code safety valves in the secondary (steam) system.
~ir is required to.operate the valve supply~ng_steam to the turbine-driven AFW pump (CV0622B), the valve (PCVOSLA) regulating the steam_pressure to the turbine, and the two control valves (CV0736A and CV0737A) *in the AFW system, each of which opens to permit feedwater to enter one of the tvJo steam generators.
The 1 i censee will install a 2400 psi nitrogen cylinder manifold in the AHJ pump room 'to supply compressed gas to operate the steam supply and regulating valves in the case of loss of the normal offsite power for the air compressors.
Similarly, the licensee will install a 2400 psi nitrogen cylinder manifold in the component cooling pump areas to supply compressed gas to operate the two control valves upon failure of the normal air supply.
This standby source of compressed gas (nitrogen cylinders) will pro-vide a source of compressed gas for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
The licensee further stated that the air compressors which provide compressed air to those valves can be transfetred to an onsite, non-lE power source before the 12 hou,.*nitrogen supply is exhausted.
The.licensee will modify the electrical system to assure the avail-ability of 125 voe operating and control power and 2400V Class lE power in the event of a fire in switch-gear.room lC, in the control room, in the cable spreading room, in the engineered safeguards panel room, or in the corridor between the charging pump and switchgear room lC.
We fiad the licensee's plans for systems to be used to achieve hot shutdown after a fire in fire areas 1-5 acceptable.
- 2.
Cold Shutdown ln the transition from hot shutdown.to cold shutdown the decay and sensible heat is removed by use of one of the steam generators \\'Ii th feedwater supp 1 i ed from the CST or fire.mains by the steam turbine-driven AFW pump (in the eveat of a fire in fire areas 1-4) with the turbine-driven pump controlled from the auxiliary shutdown control panel.
When the primary system pressure has been reduced to below 250 psig, one of the two low pressure safety injection.pumps will be started (if not already operating) to provide shutdown cooling with suction from the primary system (Loop 2).
The decay heat from the primary system will b~_transferred to the component cooling system via a shutdown cooling heat exchanger;.in turn, the decay heat \\'l'ill be transferred to the service water system via a component cooling water heat exchanger.
One low pressure safety injection pump, one shutdown heat exchanger, one component cooling water heat excbanger, one component cooling system pump and one service water pump are needed for this service.
At least one train containing each of the fdregoing components will be available for operation in.the event of a fire in fire areas 1-4 or in the event of a fire in the area of the auxiliary shutdown control panel (fire area 5, see Section 1.0).
We find the licensee's plans for systems to be used to achieve cold shutdown after a fire in fire areas 1-5 acceptable.
B.
Areas Where Alternative Safe Shutdown is Required The Palisades plant_was required to provide alternative safe shutdown capability in the event of fires in the following five fire areas:
- 1.
Control room
- 2.
Cable spreading room
- 3.
Engineering safeguards panel room
- 4.
Corridor between charging pump and switchgear room lC
- 5.
Alt~rnate shutdown control panel area.
As stated previously, the licensee will install an auxiliary shutdown control panel in the southwest electrical penetration room to provide alternative *safe shutdown for fire areas 1-4.
The panel will provide control for the AFW system turbine-driven pump in order to achieve hot shutdown and to make the transition from hot shutdown to the point at which cold shutdown may be initiated. The panel will also be used to display indications of instrumentation necessary for proper control.
In the event of a fire in fire area 5 the plant would normally be brought to hot shutdown by means of the motor-driven ~FW pump with operation controlled from the control room.
If, however, a fire in area 5 enables the auxiliary hot shutdown panel~ both AFW pumps will be inoperable and hot shutdown will be effected by mean6 of a new AFW system proposed by the licensee which would use the third high pressure safety injection pump.
C.
Instrumentation The licensee addressed the following instrumentation requirements:
- 1.
Source range flux monitor,
- 2.
Boron Addition Tank (BAT) tank level indicator,
- 3.
Safety Injection and Refueling Water (SIRW) tank level indicator,
- 4.
Charging pump flow rate indicators,
- 5.
Pressurizer level indication,
- 6.
Primary system pressure indication,
- 7.
Steam generator pressure indication,
- 8.
Steam generator level indication,
- 9.
Auxiliary feedwater flow rate to steam generators,
- 10.
Reactor coolant hot leg temperature,
- 11.
Reactor coolant cold leg temperature,
- 12.
Component cooling system surge tank level indication,
- 13.
Service water pump flow rate indication, and
- 14.
Condensate storage tank level indication.
The licensee committed to provide a source range flux monitor at the auxiliary shutdovm control panel.
However in order to make the source range flux monitor bperational, the operator must disco~nect cables from the flux monitor to the control room where those cables penetrate containment and must reconnect those cables to cables running to the auxiliary shutdown panel.
\\iie have revie\\'1ed this v1iring modification and agree v:ith. the licensee thc.t:
- 1.
Changing cables is simple and can be performed by any plant operator without special tools or special kno~-Jl edge,
- 2.
Changing cables can be performed in a short length of time, and
- 3.
Changing cables will be incorporated in the procedure used to enable the auxiliary shutdown control panel.
The licensee stated that the containment penetration which contains the cables in question is in the same room as.the auxiliary shutdown control panel and that disconnecting the cables to the control room and connecting the new cables will be made part of the procedure to enable the auxiliary shutdown control panel.
We find this wiring change acceptable.
The licensee discussed elimination of the need for a steam generator pressure measurement, citing the possibility of using the primary system temperature as a guide.
Such a measurement is adequate only if the seconda~y (steam) side is at equilibrium.
At nonequilibrium conditions the temperature of the primary side could not be utilized to show secondary side pressure. Maintaining equilibrium conditions on the secondary side may not be possible during and after a fire.
~Y letter dated April 14, 1983, the licensee agreed to install steam generator pressure indication at the auxiliary shutdown panel.
The licensee noted that a BAT level was not required since both tanks are required to be full to comply with plant Technical Specifications so that the contents of one BAT, when inserted into the primary system, are sufficient to bring the plant to cold shutdown.
The BATs_have local indicators which the operators.use to confirm that the volume in the tank complies with the Technical Specifications during plant operation.
The licensee will install a local instrument to indicate SIRW tank level; the plarrt Technical Specifications require that the volume of borated water in the SIRW tank be sufficient to bring the plant to cold shutdown at any time during core life.
SIRW tank indication is now provided only in the control room to permit the operator to.confirm that the volume in the tank complies with the Technical Specifications duri.ng plant operation.
The licensee noted that there is a local flow indicator, which is operable in the event of a fire and which does not require power for its use, for reading charging pump flow.
A new indicator will be installed on the auxiliary shutdown panel to provide a readout for primary system pressure. Other* information (including pressurizer level, water level in eath steam generator and au xi 1 i ary feedv.rater fl m*1 to each steam generator) v:i.11 be provided by the instrumentation which is normally supplied to the control room; a transfer switch, in the southwesf.electrical penetration room, will enable the instrument cbannels on the auxiliary panel and isolate these in the contra 1 room.
The 1 i censee has committed to pro vi de hot leg and cold leg reactor coolant temperature on the new shutdown panel.
The licensee stated that there is a local indicator_to provide the level in the component cooling system surge tank. With regard to the service vJater pump, the licensee uses pump discharge pressure (read from local indicators) to assess pump flow for water at different temperatures.
The licensee proposed to provide guidance for the operator in verification of pump flow and performance by means of the service water pump discharge pressure.
The licensee will use a local bypass rotameter to measure the component cooling water flow through the shutdown heat exchangers.
'* The licensee noted that there were no condensate storage tank (CST) level indicators outside of the control room.
Instead_of CST level indication, the licensee will provided the turbine-driven AFW pump with a.low suction pressure switch and an alarm light at the auxiliary shutdown panel to indicate loss or depletion of the water supply which is normally obtained from the CST.
The Palisades Plant Technical Specificati-0ns require that a minimum total combined volume of 100,000 gallons of water be maintained in the CST and in the primary coolant system makeup tank. There is a low level alarm which.is set to alarm when the volume of water in CST drops to 72,000 gallons.
An alternate supply of water for the turbine-driven AFW pump may be obtained from the fire mains.
The volume of water in the AFW system_required for safe shutdown has been reviewed in the Syst~matic Evaluation Program (SEP).
The review concluded that sufficient water could be provided for shutdown by the condensate storage tank, together with the primary coolant tank, with backup from the fire mains.
A fire in the area of the auxiliary shutdown control panel may cause a transfer of some instrument channels to the_area of the fire. These channels include indication of pressurizer level, water level in each steam generator and auxiliary f eedwater fl ov1 to each steam generator.
In this case, operation will continue in the control room with at least one channel of the transferred indications available in the control roo:n.
In summary, we find the licensee's plans to provide the required instrumentation acceptable and in accordance with the requirements of
.:.ppendi x R.
Section III.G.2 of Appendix R The licensee stated that, by providing alternative safe shutdown capability for fire areas 1-5 in accordance with the requirem~nts of Sections III.G.3 and III.L of Appendix R, the Palisades plant would be in compliance with Section III.G of Appendix R.
We interpret this to mean that.all areas other_than fire areas 1~5 which require safe shutdown capability in the event of a fire already meet or will meet the requirements of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R.
3.0 EVALUATION A.
Performance Goals The performance goals of reactivity control, inventory control, maintaining hot standby and subsequently attaining cold shutdown will be met using the systems and equipment described in Section 2.0.
- l 0 -
To proceed from hot to cold shutdown, heat removal is accomplished by means of a steam generator \\>Jith the steam released to the atmos-phere by_ the steilln jet air ejector, which is downstream of the MSIVs.
In the event t~ MSIVs close,_the operator may bypass the MSIVs by opening hand-operated bypass.valves to permit the steam jet air ejector to re 1 ease the generator steam to the atmosphere..The turbine-driven AFVJ pump wi 11 feed vrnter to the steam generator from the CST or fire mains.
When pressure in the:primary side is reduced below 250 psi, one low pressure safety injection pump and one shutdown cooling heat exchanger will be used, together with one service water pump, one component cooling water_pump and one component cooling water heat exchanger to achieve and maintain cold shutdovm.
The licensee will provide compressed nitrogen as a backup pressurized gas supply for air-operated valves and.will modify the electrical system to provide power for operation and for control (See Section 2.A.1).
- B.
Procedures The licensee. has committed to.prepare procedures for tak.ing the plant to hot shutdown in the event a fire prevents use of the control room.
The licensee has agreed to extend these procedures so that hot and cold shutdown will be covered in the event of a fire in fire areas 1-4 or in the area of the new auxiliary shutdown control panel.
The licensee has also agreed to prepare procedures for operator guidance in maintaining primary system pressure by means of the charging pump during hot shutdown in the event all the pressurizer heaters are lost during a fire.
We find this acceptable.
C.
Personnel Requirements The Palisades Technical Specifications require three members of the minimum_shift crew, free from other duties during a fire emergency, to be available to conduct safe shutdown activities._ The licensee stated.this ensures that adequate manpower will be available to shut the.plant down safely, from either the control room~r safe shutdown area.
We find this acceptable.
D.
72 Hour Requirement The licensee stated that cold shutdown can be achieved within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> following initiation of shutdown due to fire and loss of offsite power.
We find this acceptable.
11 -
E.
Repairs The licensee needs to disconnect and reconnect wires to the source range flux monttor.while achieving and maintaining ~ot shutdown (see Section 2.C, above).
As stated previously we consider these wiring modifications to be simple and capable of being done in a short time.
On this basis we find them compatible with the requirements of Appendix R and, therefore, acceptable.
The licensee is also examibing operator actions dealing with associated circuits to prevent spurious_action (see Section 3.F below).
The licensee has committed to verify that such actions meet or will be modified to meet Appendix R requirements concerning repair or to provide an exemption request from Appe~dix R.
F.
Associated Circuits In accordance with staff recommendations in regard to associated circuits, tbe licensee reviewed the cables in the fire areas 1-4 and in the vicinity of the auxiliary shutdovm panel and listed them and the function of each in the following categories:
- 1.
All cables in the fire areas connected to the same pov,ier supply as the alternative or dedicated shutdown cable,
- 2.
All cables in the fire area that were considered for possible spurious operation which would adversely affect shutdovm,
- 3.
All cables in the r1re area that shared a common enclosure with circuits of the alternative or dedicated shutdown systems.
These categories are discussed below:
- 1.
Power Source Case The licensee noted that all instrumentation, control and povJer cables in areas 1-4 in the vicinity of the auxiliary shutdown control panel (in the southwest penetration room) \\'l'hi ch are connected to the same power supply as the alternative shutdown system are electrically protected. This electrical protection is coordinated so that the failed cable portion will be disconnected from the portion containing the power supply before the power supply, itself, is disconnected or fails.
12 -
- 2.
Spurious Siqnal Case The licensee ~as provided a list of all cables in areas 1-4 and in~the vicinity of the auxiliary shutdown panel which were considered for possible spurious actuation which would adversely affect hot or cold shutdown, together.with the function of each cable.
In some cases, the operator may be required to take further action (denoted as 11 appropriate action 11 by the licensee) or in some cases act to remove DC power from the particular component in order to protect against some action adversely affecting hot or cold shutdovm.
The licensee has committed to reviel'i all such 11 appropriate actions 11 and those involving removal of DC power necessary to attain or maintain hot shutdol'm and* to modify such actions so that repairs are not requ fr.ed.* *
- 3.
Common Enclosure Case The licensee has identified those cables in fire areas 1-4 and in the area of the auxiliary shutdown panel which share a £ommon enclosure with circuits of the alternate shutdown systems, together with the function of eac~
cable listed. The licensee concluded that fire damage to all such circuits either would not occur because such circuits are electrically protected (by fuses, breakers, or other means), or such fire damage would not affect shutdown.
In summary, we find the licensee 1s response* relating to the problem of associated circuits acceptable with the licensee 1 s commitment to review the 11 appropriate actions 11 and.actions which require DC p6\\ver removal identified above.
G.
Pressure Isolation at High-Low Pressure Interface The only high-low pressure interface identified is in the shutdown cooling line connecting.the reactor coolant system to the suction of the low.pressure safety injection pumps.
Isolation is provided by two valves.in series (M0-3015 and M0-3016).
In order to preclude inadvertent opening of both valves due to fire induced circuit faults, the licensee committed to provide an operating procedure which would require a check to assure both valves are closed and operating power disconnected_before raising the reactor coolant system pressure to a level greater than 260 psig.
We find this acceptable.
.. H.
Communication lhe licensee stated that portable radios will be used for communications~etween the new shutdown panel and other locations which have to be manned to assure safe shutdown.
vle find this acceptable.
I. Administrative Control We previously discussed the fact that operation of the transfer switch to enable operation of the auxiliary shutdown control panel for control of systems for safe shutdown (and disabling such control at the main control panel) will_be annunciated in the control room.
As a further administrative control, the licensee stated that a magnetic _card lock access to the area of the auxiliary shutdown control panel (a vital security area) will be maintained.
We find this acceptable.
4.0 CONCLUSION
The staff concludes that the licensee's plan to bring the Palisades Plant to safe shutdovm after a fire in fire areas 1-4 or in the area of the auxiliary shutdown control panel is in compliance with the requirements of Sections III.G.3 and III.L of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50.
In a submittal of July l, 1982, the licensee addressed the problem of associated circuits.
The staff finds the licensee's resolution of the problem of associated _circuits to be acceptable with the licensee's commitment to revievJ actions v1hich are called "appropriate actions 11 or which involve the removal of DC power and to verify that such actions meet or will be nodified to meet the requirements of Appendix R or to provide an exemption request from Appen_9ix R.
This completes our reviev.1 of associated circuits in the Palisades Plant with regard to Appendix R.
The licensee has agreed to the following:
- l. To prepare procedures for taking the plant from operating conditions to _hot shutdown and thence to cold shutdown in the event of a fire in fire areas 1-4 or in the area of the auxiliary shutdown control panel,
- 2.
To prepare procedures_for maintaining system pressure during hot shutdown in the event the pressurizer heaters are lost in a fire, and
- 3.
To prepare an operating procedure to require a check to assure that the valves in the high-low pressure interface in tbe ~hutdown coolina line are closed.
and power remo,.ed before raising~the reactor coolant system to a pressure in excess of 260 psig, and
- 4.
To verify that the steam jet air ejector can be used to achieve cold shutdown within the 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> required by Appendix R.
The proposed modifications discussed above will also resolve the open items from our previous SER of September 1, 1978.
5.0 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The following NRC employees have contributed to this Safety Eval~ation:
N.
l~agner T.
l~ambach Dated:
May 26, 1983
.. REFERENCES
- 1. Letter from Br~an D. Johnson, Consumers Dennis M. Crutchfield, USNRC,.
Subject:
License DPR Palisades Plant - Fire Modifications," dated.March 19, 1981.
Power Compqny to "Docket 50-255 -
Protection
- 2.
Letter.from Brian D. Johnson, Consumers Power Company to Dennis M. Crutchfield, USNRC,
Subject:
"Docket 50-255 -
License DPR Palisades Plant - Post Fire Safe Shutdown Reviev1:
Additional Information in Response to NRC Questions, 11 dated February 16, 1982.
- 3. Letter from 0. J. VandeWalle~ Consumers Power Company to Dennis M. Crutchfield, USNRC,
Subject:
11 Docket 50-255 License DPR Palisades Plant - Fire -Protection, 11 dated July l, 1982.
- 4.
Letter from Brian 0. Johnson, Consumers Dennis M. Crutchfield, USNRC,
Subject:
License DPR Palisades Plant - Fire Modifications, 11 dated May 19, 1981.
Power Company to "Docket 50-255 Protection
- 5.
Letter from Brian 0. Johnson, Consumers Power Company to Dennis M. Crutchfield, USNRC,
Subject:
"Docket 50-255 -
License DPR Palisades Plant - Response to NRC Reviewers Questions Regarding the July 1982 Palisades Fire Protection Submittal," dated October 25, 1982.
- 6.
i*!UREG-0820, "Integrated Plant Safety Assessment - Systematic Evaluation Program - Palisades Plant - Consumers.Power Company -
Docket 50-255 - Final Report, 11 October 1982.
- 7.
Letter ffom Brian D. Johnson, Consumers Power Company to Dennis M. Crutchfield, USNRC,
Subject:
11 Docket 50-255 -
License DPR Palisades Plant - Additional Information in Response to NRC Reviewers Questions on July 1, 1982 Fire Protection Submittal, 11 dated December 6, 1982.
- 8. Letter from Brian D. Johnson, Consumers Power Company to Dennis M. Crutchfie1d, USNRC,
Subject:
"Docket 50-255 -
License DPR Palisades Plant - Steam Generator Pressure Indication for Appendix R Requirements, dated April 14, 1983.