ML18046B269

Forwards Final Evaluation of SEP Topic VI-4, Containment Isolation Sys for Palisades Nuclear Power Plant. Assessment May Be Revised in Future If Facility Design Changes or If NRC Criteria Are Modified Before Integrated Assessment

ML18046B269
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	02/08/1982
From:	Wambach T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Vandewalle D CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
References
TASK-06-04, TASK-6-4, TASK-RR LSO5-82-02-048, LSO5-82-2-48, NUDOCS 8202120175
Download: ML18046B269 (94)

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Docket No. 50-255 LS05 02-048 Mr. David.J. VandeWalle Nuclear Licensing Administrator Consumers Power Company 1945 W. Parnall Road Jackson, Michigan 49201

Dear Mr. VandeWalle:

.,. e.

February 08, 1982

SUBJECT:

FORWARDING BINAL EVALUATION REPORT OF SEP TOPIC VI-4, CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM FOR THE PALISADES NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Enclosed is a copy of our final evaluation of SEP Topic VI-4, Containment Isolation System.

This assessment compares your facility, as described in Docket No. 50-255, with the criteria currently used by the regulatory staff for 1 icensi ng new facilities.

In addition it was noted, by ~he staff during the reoi=nt site visit that at least one penetration (Number 19) had a threaded piped connection be-tween the containment and the outer most isolation valve.

The staff finds this practice to be unacceptable (See~ ASME Code Section 3 NE). It is our Lt,o'I

-i position that the containment isolation valve and it's associated piping

1 s are to be designed to the same standards as the containment.

/J With respect to the potential modifications outlined in the conclusion in

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this report, a determination of the need to actually implement these bStt 11&E b'U changes will be made during the same integrated assessment. This topic assessment may be revised in the future if your faci 1 ity design is changed At>i.>~

or if NRC criteria relating to this topic are modified before the integra-I I

ted assessment is completed.

T. fn::cl..~l

Enclosure:

As stated Sincerely, Thomas V. Wambach, Project Manager Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 Division of Licensing SURNAME.........................

DATE. ************************

NRC FORM 318 (10-80) NRCM 0240 USGPO: 1961-335-960

I 1.1'.i i* t t l f*

Mr. David J. VandeWalle cc M. I. Miller. Esquire

• Isham. Lincoln & Beale Suite 4200 One First National Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60670 Mr. Paul A. Perry. Secretary Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201 Judd L. Bacon, Esquire Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201 Myron M. Cherry. Esquire Suite 4501 One IBM Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60611 Ms~ Mary P. Sinclair Great Lakes Energy Alliance 5711 Summerset Drive Mfdland, Michi9an 48640

~alamazoo Public Library 315 South Rose Street Kalamazoo, Michigan 49006 Township Supervisor Covert Townshi Route l, Box 10 Van Buren County, Michigan 49043 Office of the Governor (2)

Room i - Capitol Building Lansing, Michigan 48913 William J. Scanlon, Esquire 2034 Pauline Boulevard Ann Arbor, Michigan 48103 Palisades* Plant ATTN:

Mr. Robert Montross Plant Manager Covert, Michigan 49043 9..

u. s: Environmental Protection Agency Federal Activities Branch Region V Office ATTN:

Regional Radiation Representative 230 South Dearborn Street Chicago, Jllinois 60604 Charles Bechhoefer. Esq ** Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555 Dr. George C. Anderson Department of Oceanography University of Washington Seattle. Washington 98195 Dr. M. Stanley Livingston 1005 Calle Largo Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501 Resident Inspector c/o u. s. NRC Palisades Plant Route 2, P. O. Box 155 Covert, Michigan 49043 James G. Keppier. Regional Administrator Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III Office of Inspection and Enforcement 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

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Containment $ystems Branch Evaluatior:i- -Repo-r.t on SEP -Topi.c:;. VI*4, Containment Isolation.System for the Palisades Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 Docket No. 50-255 Revision 1 I

Introduction I I The Palisades Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 began commercial operation in 1971. Since then safety review criteria h~ve changed.

As part of the Systematic Evaluation Program {SEP}, the.containment isolation sys-tem for the Palisades plant has been re-evaluated.

The purpose of this evaluation is to document the deviations from current safety cri-teria as they relate to the containment isolation system.

The signifi~

cance of the identified deviations, and recommended corrective measures to improve safety~ will be the subject of a subsequent, integrated asses-ment of the Palisades plant.

Review Criteria The safety criteria used in the current evaluation of the containment isolation system for the Palisades plant are contained in the following references:

1) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants {GDC 54, 55, 56 and 57).

2)

NUREG-75/087, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants {SRP 6.2.4, Containment Isolation System}.

3)

Regulatory Guide 1.11, Instrument Lines Penetrating Primary Reactor Containment.

ENCLOSURE

. REGUU\\ TORY DOCKET FILE C.OPY

1

.. 4)

Regulatory Guide 1.141, Revision 1, Containment Isolation Provisions for Fluid Systems.

III Related Safety Topics The review areas identified below are not covered in this report, but are related and essential to the completion of the re-evaluation of the con-tainment isolatiot:1 system for the Palisades *plant. These review areas are included in other SEP topics or ongoing Generic Reviews, as indi~ated below:

{l) III-1,

( 2) II I-4.C, (3) III-5.A,

( 4) III-5.B,

( 5) I I I-6,

{6} III-12, (7) VI-6,

( 8) VII-2,

( 9} YIII-2,

( 10) VIII-4~

Classification of Structures, Components and Systems

{Seismic and Quality)

Internally Generated Missiles Effects of Pipe Break on Structures, Systems and Compo-nents Inside Containment Pipe Break Outside Containment Seismic Design Considerations Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Equipment -

Containment Leak Testing

~ngineered Safety Feature System Control Logic and Design Onsite Emergency P.ower Systems - Di es el Generator Electrical Penetrations of Reactor Containment

( 11)

NUREG-0737~ Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements, Item II.E.4.2, Containment Isolation Dependability (12) NUREG-0660, NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the TMI-2 Accident, Item II.E.4.4, Containment Purging and Venting Requirements.

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.e J. IV.

Review Guidelines The containment isolation system of a nuclear power plant is an en-gineered safety feature that functions to allow the normal or emer-gency passage of fluids through the containment boundary while pre-serving the ability of the boundary to prevent.or limit the escape of fission products to the environs that may result from postulated accidents. General Design Criteria 54, 55, 56 and 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 pertain to the containment isolation system of a nuclear power plant.

General Design Criterion 54 establishes design and test requirements for the leak detection provisions, the isolation function and the con-.

tainment capability of the isolation barriers in lines penetrating the primary reactor containment.*

From the standpoint of containment i so-lation, leak detection providions should be capable of quickly detect-ing and responding to a spectrum of postulated pipe break accident con-ditions.

To accomplish this, diverse parameters should be monitored to initiate the conta1nment isolation function.

The parameters selected should assure a positiv~, rapid response to the developing accident condition.

This aspect of the containment isolation system review will be addressed during the review of the post-TM! requirements ap-proved for implement~tion, as stated in NUREG-0737 at Item II.E.4~2.

Leak detection capability should also be provided at the system level to alert the operator of the need to isolate a system train equipped with remote manual isolation valves.

SRP 6.2.4, at It~m II.11, pro-vides guidance in this regard.

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.. With respect to the design requirements for the isolation function, all non-essential systems shou!d be automatically isolated (with manual valves sealed closed), and valve closure times should be selected to as-

. sure rapid isolation of the containment in the event of an accident.

The review of the classification of systems as essential or non-essential, and the automatic isolation provisions for non-essential systems by appro-priate signals, will be addressed in conjunction with the review of the post-TMI requirements as stated in NUREG-0737 at Item 11.E.4.2. The clo-

. sure time of the containment ventilation system isolation valves will be evaluated in conjunction with the ongoing generic review of purgi~g prac-tices at operating plants (see NUREG-0660 at Item II.E.4.4).

The electrical power supply, instrumentation and controls systems should be designed to engineered safety features criteria to assure accomplish-ment of the containment isolation function.

This aspect of the review is co~ered under SEP Topics VII-2 and VIII-2. Also, resetting the isolation signal should not result in the automatic re-opening of containment isola-tion valves.

This will be addressed in conjunction with the review of the post-TM! requirements approved for implementation, as stated in NUREG-0737", at Item II.E.4.2.

With respect to the capabilities of containmment isolation barriers in lines penetrating primary containment, the isolation barriers should be designed to engineered safety feature criteria, and protected against

. missiles, pipe whip and jet impingement.

Typical isolation barriers include valves, closed systems and blind flanges.

Furthermore, provi-sions should be made to permit periodic l_eak testing of the isolation barriers.

t The adequacy of the missile, pipe whip and jet. impingement protection will be covered under SEP Topics III-4~C, III-5.A and III-5.B. The acceptability of the design criteria originally used in the design of the containment isolation system components will be covered in SEP Topics 111-1, III-6 and III-12.

The adequacy of the leak testing program will be covered under SEP Topic VI-6.

The acceptability of electrical penetrations will be covered in SEP*Topic VIII-4.

GDC 55, 56 and 57 establish explicit requirements for isolation valv-ing in lines penetrating the containment.

Specifically, they address the number and location of isolation valves (e.g., redundant valving.

with one located inside containment and the other located outside con-tainment), valve actuation provisions (e.g., automatic or remote manual isolation valves), valve position (e.g., locked closed, or the position of greater safety in the event of an accident or power failure), and valve type (e.g., a simple check valve is not a permissable automatic isolation valve outside containment).

Figures 1 and 2 depict the ex-plicit valve arrangements specified in GDC 55 and 56, and SOC 57, re-spectively.

GDC 55 and 56 also permit containment isolation provisions for lines penetrating the primary containment boundary that differ-from the ex-plicit requirements, provided the basis for acceptability is defined.

This proviso is typically invoked when establishing the containment isolation requirements for essential (i.e., safety.related) systems, or there is a clear improvement in safety.

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GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA. 55 AND 56 ISOLATION VALVE CRITERIA MISSILE PROTECTION INSIDE OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT INSIDE OUTSIDE SEALED CLOSED

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' *e GENERAL DESIGN CRITERION 57 ISOLATION VALVE CRITERIA MISSILE PROTECTION INSIDE OUTSIDE CLOSED SYSTEM CLOSED SYSTEM CONTAINMENT

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I II' Standard Review Plan (SRP) 6.2.4 at Item 11.3 presents ~uidelines for acceptable alternate containment isolation provisions for certain clas-ses of lines. Containment isolation provisions that are found acceptable on the "other defined basis" represent conformance with the GDC and do not constitute exceptions.

The following evaluation addresses deviations in the containment isola-tion provisions from the explicit requirements of the GDC.

V Evaluation The containment isolation provisions for the lines penetrating the pri-mary reactor containment of the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 are tabulated in Table 1. This information was obtained from the docu-ments referenced in Section VII.

The containment isolation provisions, as tabulated in Table 1, were evaluated against the requirements of GDC 54, 55, 56 and 57 (Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50), and the supplementary gui.dance of SRP 6.2.4 {Containment Isolation System), where applicable.

Deviations from the explicit requirements of GDC 54, 55, 56 and 57, and the acceptance criteria of SRP 6.2.4 are tabulated in Table 2.

We have transmitted a draft evaluation to the licensee.

As a result, Table 1 was revised and modified by the licensee to reflect changes in the plant.

This revised eva 1 uat ion report takes into account the comments and up-dated information received from the licensee.

Table 1 gives the licensee's penetration class designation for many of the lines penetrating containment.

The isolation valve arrangements for these penetration classes are shown in Figures 3 and 4.

The figures were

• *e obtained from Reference 8.

Following are evalu~tions of these penetra-tion classes against GDC 55~ 56 and 57.*

Penetration Class Al Penetration Class Al shows influent and effluent lines open to the con-tainment with two isolation valves in series outside containme~t.

GDC 56 applies to the lines in Penetration Class Al.

GDC 56 specifies that one valve should be located inside containment and one valve should be located outside containment.

Consequently, the.isolation valving arrangement for Penetration Class Al differs from the explicit requirements of GDC 56 from the standpoint of valve location.

Locating both containment isolation *valves outside containment may be acceptable if the criteria used in the design of the piping between the containment-the first valve are sufficiently conservative to provide adequate assur-ance of integrity. This matter is discussed under SEP Topiic 111-1.

The following containment penetrations are included in Penetration Class Al:

1, 4, 4a, 52 and 68.

Penetration Class A2 Penetration Class A2 shows three isolation configurations that are open to the containment.

GDC 56 applies to the lines in Penetration Class A2.

One of the isolation configurations (i.e.,, the line.having a locked-.

closed valve inside containment and a locked-closed valve outside contain-ment) satisfies the explicit requirements of GDC 56.

The following con-tainment penetrations have this isolation configuration in Penetration Class A2:

64, 66 and 72.

The isolation configuration having a blind flange inside containment and a locked closed valve outside containment differs from the explicit requirements of GDC 56 from the standpoint of isolation barrier type.

GDC 56 does not address the u~e of blind flanges.

However, a blind flange is an acceptable isolation barrier in lieu of a valve.

The ba-sis for this appears in SRP 6.2.4 at Item II~3. Also, the locked-closed valve could be an automatic isolation valve and still satisfy GDC 56.

The following containment penetrations have this isolation configuration in Penetration Class A2:

18, 18a and 27.

With regard to penetration 27 (ILRT fill line}, the power operated valve MDV-Pl outside containment is verified closed monthly under sur-veil.lance procedure MO 29 of the plant Technical Specifcations. Since.I the line is flanged and.gasket inside containment, the administrative I

control exercised over the valve is judged to be adequate.

Therefore, the valve is a sealed closed isolation valve in accordance with the guidelines of SRP 6.2.4 at Item II.3.

The isolation configuration having both a locked closed valve and a simple check valve outside containment differs from the explicit re-quire~ents of GOC 56 from the standpoint of valve location and valve type.

GDC 56 specifies that one valve should*be located inside con-tain~ent and one valve should be loc~ted outside containment, and,that a simple check valve may not be used as an automatic isolation valve outside containment.

For this configuration to be acceptable, the check valve should be located inside containment.

Also, the locked closed valve could be an automatic isolation valve to satisfy GOC 56.

'. - The following containment penetrations have th~ above isolation configur-ation in Penetration Class A2:

10 and 65.

A judgment regarding the ac-I ceptability of the simple check valve outside containment as a bonafide containment isolation valve will be made in conjun~ion with the inte-grated assessment of the plant.

With regard to penetration 65 (instrument air line), the acutation provi-sions for valve CV 1211 differ from the explicit requirements of GDC 56 in that the valve is remote manually isolated.

Since the instrument air line is non-essential, valve CV 1211 should be automatically isolated.

Penetration Class Bl Penetration Class Bl shows two series isolation valves outside containment in a line coming from the reactor coolant system.

As shown, one of the

• valves is an automatic isolation valve and the other is a normally open, manual valve.

Depending on the line, however, a simple check valve or re-I mote manual valve is used.

GDC 55 applies to the lines in Penetration Class Bl.

GDC 55 specifies that one valve should be locaed inside contain-ment and one valve should be located outside containment, with the vaves be-ing either locked closed or automatic isolation valves.

The isolation valving arrangement for Penetration Class Bl, therefore, dif-fers from the explicit requirements of GDC 55 from the standpoint'bf valve location, type, and actuation *. Locating both itolation valves outside containment may be acceptable if piping and valve design criteria are suf~

ficiently conservative to preclude a breach of integrity. This matter is

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discussed under SEP Topic III-1.

The use of a local manual valve for containment isolation is not acceptable, and should be upgraded to an automatic isolation valve.

The following containment penetrations are included in Penetration Class Bl. 36, 40 and 45.

For penetration 36 (reactor coolant* system letdown line), the parallel power operated valves CV 2012 and CV 2122 respond to controls to maintain a prescribed backpressure in the line. Although the valve controls are designed to ramp the valves closed in response to a drop in line pressure (e.g., as caused by a LOCA), the control circuitry is not safety-grade and does not assure valve closure throughout the course of an accident~

Therefore, valves CV 2012 and CV 2122 should have automatic.isolation ca-pability in response to the sensing of diverse parameters characteristic of postulated accidents. Also, the isolation actuation circuitry should be safety-grade and capable of overriding valve control circuitry for nor-mal plant operation.

For penetration 45 (charging pump discharge line),

the simple check valve outside containment is an inappropriate automatic isolation valve; a judgment regarding its acceptability will be made in conjunction with the integrated assessment of the plant. Also, the actu-ation provisions for the air bperated valve CV 2111 differ from the ex-plicit requirements of GDC 55 in that the valve is a remote manual iso-lation valve.

A remote manual isolation valve is provided in lieu of an automatic isolation valve because the line has a post-accident safety function (emergency core cooling) which necessitates the valve being open in the event of an accident.

Consequently, automatic isolation of

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• e 11 -

the line is not appropriate.

However, the capability does exist to re-mote manually isolate the line if the need to do so should arise. The actuation provisions for the valve is acceptable based on the guide-1 ines of SRP 6.2.4, at Item II.3.

Penetration Class B2 Penetration Class B2 shows a locked closed valve inside ctintainment and a locked closed valve outside containment in a reactor coolant system ef-fluent line.

GDC 55 applies to the lines in Penetration Class B2.

The isolation arrangement satisfies the explicit requirements of GDC 55.

The following containment penetration is included in Penetration Class B2:

35.

Penetration 35 shows two re 1 i ef va 1 ves (RV 3164 and RV 0401), located be-tween the two series isolation valves inside containment, which relieve to the containment.

Consequently, the relief valves also have a containment isolation function in the reverse flow direction.

Penetration Class Cl Penetration Class Cl shows two types of valve arrangements for closed systems inside containment that are missile protected; namely, a single simple check valve outside containment for influent lines and a single automatic isolation valve outside containment for effl~ent lines.* GDC 57 applies to the lines in Penetration Class Cl.

GDC 57 specifies that a single automatic, remote manual or locked closed isolation valve outside containment is acceptable, but a simple check valve is not a~ acceptable automatic isolation valve.

The isolation valve arrangement having a

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-~.,.;.~*~...:.. *-* single simple check valve outside containment differs from the explicit requirements of GDC 57 from the standpoint of valve type.

The following containment penetrations are included in Penetration Class Cl: 2, 3, 7, 8, 16 and 55.

For Penetrations 7 and 8, the main feedwater*isolation valves (18"-N218R-0702 and 18" -N218R-0701, respect i ve1y) should be power operated, auto-matic isolation valves.

In this regard, a power operated stop check r

valve would be acceptable.

For penetrations 16 and 55, the contain-ment isolations provisions satisfy the explicit requirements of GDC 57.

Penetration Class C2 Penetration Class C2 shows isolation valve arangements for influent and effluent lines of closed systems inside containment that are not missile protected.

The valve arrangements consist of two valves in series, out-side containment.

GDC 56 applies to the lines in Penetration Class C2.

GDC 56 specifies that one automatic or locked closed valve should be located inside con-tainment and one such valve should be located outside containment; also, a simple check valve may not be used as an automatic isolation valve out-side containment.

The valve arrangements of Penetration Class C2 differ from the explicit requirements of GDC 56 from the standpoint of valve location and valve type.

All valve arrangements would satisfy the explicit requirements of GDC 56 if one valve was located insi~e containment, particularly the simple check valve.

GDC 56 permits isolati~n valve arrangements that differ from the expli-cit requirer.ents provided the basis for acceptability is defined.

With respect to Penetration Class C2, then, locating both isolation valves outside containment may be acceptable since missile* protection is not provided inside containment.

The acceptability of this is contingent on the criteria used in the design of the piping between the contain-ment and first valve, and the first valve, which must provide adequate assurance of integrity.

The following containment penetrations are included in Penetration Class C2:

5, 6, 11, 14, 15, 25, 26, 37, 38, 40A, 408, 41, 42, 44, 46, 47, 49, 67 ~nd 69.

For penetrations 11, 14, 26, 27, 41, 42 and 67, the simple check valve is not an appropriate automatic isolation valve outside containment.

A power operated automatic isolation valve would be acceptable.

How-ever, a judg~ent decision regarding the acceptability of the simple check valve will be made at the time of the integrated assessment of the plant.

Penetration 25 shows a capped test connection which should be equipped with two loc<ed closed isolation valves in series. Penetration 44 shows a manual isclation vayve (3/4"-2084) which is.not depicted by the iso-lation valve arrangements of. Penetration Class C2, and which differs from the explicit requirements of GDC 56 from the standpoint of valve actuation; the subject valve should be a power operated valve that is automatically actuated.

-- Penetration Class C3 Penetration Class C3 shows two, locked closed isolation valves in series, outside containment, for effluent lines from systems that are closed in-side containment and not missile protected.

GDC 56 ~pplies to the lines in Penetration Class C3.

The valve arrangements described above differs from the explicit requirements of GDC 56 from the standpoint of valve location, namely, one valve should.be located inside containment.

How-ever, locating both valves outside containment may be acceptable, based on the discussion under Penetration Class C2.

The following containment penetration is included in Penetration Class C3: 33.

The following discussion pertains to those containment penetrations not covered by the Penetration Classes discussed above.

I '

a)

Penetartions 9, 20, 24, 29, 34, 43, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 70, i /

71 and 73:

• These containment penetrations are spares.

Of these, penetrations 21, 29 and 73 show pipe caps and blind flanges being used as isola-tion barriers. Threaded and/or tack welded pipe caps, and blind flanges without leak testing provisions, are not suitable isola-ti on barriers.

b)

Penetrations 12 and 13:

These containment penetrations satisfy the explicit 'requirements of GDC 56, and are acceptable.

However, with respect to the test, vent and drain lines, pipe caps are not suitable isolation barriers; two locked closed isolation valves in series should be provided for

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• e 15 -

these lines. Also, the flow element locat~d between the isolation valves at penetration 13 should be moved downstream of the outboard isolation valves, or the licensee should justify that the flow ele-ment is an acceptable isolation barrier.

c)

Penetrations 17 and 48:

These two containment penetrations serve the containment pressure instrumentation (8 lines). Since signals for the actuation of engi-neered safety features are derived from this instrumentation, it is imperative that these lines be open and remain open.

Consequently, power-operated valves, which could potentially spuriously close, are not provided in these lines.

The instrument lines, how~ver, are provided with test connections that are only capped.

Again, pipe caps are not suitable isolation barriers; two locked closed isolation.valves in series should be provided in each test line.

d)

Penetrations 19~ 50 and 51:

These containment penetrations. are the personnel air lock, emergency access air lock and* equipment hatch, respectively. Several lines are associated with these penetrations that**are equipped only with pipe caps for isolation barriers. Pipe caps are not suitable isola-tion barrier~ and should be replaced with locked closed manual valves or blind flanges that are leak testable

• rationale for accepting the isolation provisions of the emergency sump recirculation line? appears in SRP 6.2~4, at Item II.3.

h)

Penetrations 30 and 31:

With regard to penetrations 30 and 31 (containment spray pump dis-charge lines), the actuation provisions for the power operated valves CV-3001 (penetration 30) and CV-3002 (penetration 31) differ from the explicit requirements of GDC 56 in that they are remote manual isolation valves.

Remote manual isolation valves are pro-vided in lieu of automatic isolation valves because the lines, which are part of the containment spray system, have a post-acci-dent safety function (depressurization of the containment follow~

ing a pipe break accident) which necessitates their being opened in the event of an accident.

Consequently, automatic isolation of these lines is not appropriate.

However, the capability does exist

• to remote manually isolate these lines if the need to do so should arise.

The actuation provisions for these valves are acceptable based on the guidelines of SRP 6.2.4, at Item II.3.

i)

Penetration 39:

For penetration 39, the simple check valve.outside containment is replaced with a blank flange during plant operation.

To be an acceptable isolation barrier, the blank flange should be l~ak testable.

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CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM PENETRATidN ONTAI?\\'ME~'l'

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i

'. l Conclusions The following summarizes t~e deviations fro~ review guid~lines that have been identified and described in Section V of this report:

1. The isolation valving arrangements of the following containment penetrations do not meet the requirement~ of GDC 55 or 56 from the standpoint of valve location:

Penetrations 1, 4, 4a, 10,

2.

11, 21, 21a, 25, 26, 28, 30, 31~ 33, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 40a, 40b, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 52, 52a, 52b, 56, 65, 67, 68 and 69.

The isolation valves in these penetrations ftre located outside containment.

The acceptability of this is contingent on the ac-ceptability of the piping design criteria. Also, the licensee sh6uld discuss the unique characteristics of the valves closest to the containment to terminate valve shaft or bonnet seal leak-age, or the provisibns in the plant for control of leakage.

The isolation valves of the containment penetration numbers listed below differ from the explicit requirements of GDC 55, 56 and 57 from the standpoint of valve type by using one check valve in ser-ies with other type isolation valves located outside containment:

Penetrations 7, 8~ 10, 11, 14, 26, 30, 31, 37, 39, 41, 42, 45, 65 and 67.

A simple check valve located outside containment is not an appro-priate automatic isolation valve.

The judgment regarding its ac-ceptability will be made in conjunction with the integrated assess-ment of the plant.

I For penetrations 7 and 8, the main feedwater line, those check I I valves should be power operated, automatic isolation valves.

3.

The isolation barriers in the containment penetrations listed be-low differ from the explicit requirements of GDC 55, 56 and 57 from the standpoint that pipe caps or bljnd flanges are used as containment isolation barriers.

Penetrati~ns having pipes or test connections capped outside con-tainment:

13, 17, 17a, 21, 21a, 25, 27, 28, 29, 38, 39, 48 and 73; Penetrations having blind flanges inside containment: 18, 21, 29 and 73; or outside containment: 1, 4 and 39.

A blind flange inside or outside containmennt is an acceptable iso-lation barrier in lieu -of an isolation valve if the blind flange is leak testable.

Pipe caps used in lines penetrating containment or test connections are not acceptable isolation barriers and should be replaced with locked closed valves o~ blind flanges that are leak testable.

-There are spare penetrations equipped with pipe caps, such as pene-trations 21, 29 and 73.

To be acceptable, the *pipe cap should.be fully welded with the same quality as the containment weld, or re-placed with a blind flange that is leak testable.

• 4.

The power operated valves CV-3001 (penetration 30) and CV-3002 (penetration 31) of the containment spray pump discharge lines dif-fer from the explicit ~equirement 6f GDC 56 from th~ standpoint of valve actuation.

Remote manual isolation valv~s are provided in lieu of autom~tic isolation valves because the systems have a post-accident safety function which necessitates their being opened in the event of an accident.

The actuation provision for these valves are acceptable based on the guidelines of SRP 6.2~4, at Item II.3.

5.

The containment sump suction lines which are part of the ECCS and the containment heat removal system have post-accident safety func-tions. Therefore, automatic isolation of these lines (penetrations 53 and 54) is not desirable; remote manual isolation valves are a~

ceptable.

6.

Penetration 44 shows a manual isolation valve (3/4"-2084) in series with an air operated isolation valve, which differs from the ~xplicit requirements of GDC 56 from the standpoint of valve acuation. This manual valve should be a power operated automatic isolation valve.

7. There are several lines associated with the following penetrations which are equipped with pipe caps:

the personnel air lock (penetra-tion 19); emergency access air lock (penetration 50); and equipment hatch (penetration 51).

These pipe caps are not suitable isolation bar~iers and should be replaced with locked closed manual valves or blind flanges that are leak testable.

I

23 -

8.

GDC 55 and 56 specify that automatic isolation valves should, upon loss of actuating power, take the position that provides greater safety.

The position of an isolation valve for normal and shutdown operating conditions, and post-accident conditions, depends on the fluid system function.

In the event of power failure to a valve operator, the valve position should be consistent with the line function.

In this regard, sep~rate power supplies for isolation valves.in series may be required to assure the isolation of non-essential lines. The licensee has provided information (see Table 1) on the position of isolation valves, whether or not the line is essential and the isolation signals for each isolation valve.

This information shows that automatic isolation valves assume positions of greater safety on loss of actuating power and, 1

therefore, GDC 55 and 56 are satisfied.

I

---

~---,.-....,-------*--~.*---~-.----**-**

e*.

• e TABLE 1 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM SEP REVIEW ITEMS 1 PLANT:

PALISADES NOP UNIT 11 PAGE _1_ OF 13 PENE-SYSTEM NAME PENE VALVE VALVE LOCATION.

POSITION ESS-ACTUA-REHARKS TRATION AND SERVICE CLASS I OEtlT.

TYPE OR oc IC HOR-SltUT POST PWR EN-TION NO.

LINE SIZE NO.

NUMBER OESCR I rn ON MAL ON LOCA FAIL.

TIAL 1

Purge Alr Supply Al cv1007 AO BlITF Vt.V x

NC O/C c

c u

CIS Blank Flangedi Vent. Syet.

(110"~)

CV1008 AO BUTF Vt.V x

NC O/C c

c CIS Valves Presently Rot Used 506VAS MAN GL Tl;:fJT VLV x

LC c

c in Modes 1-4 TEn'i' CONNECT x

CAP 2

HBln Stm Line Cl cvo510 POS Cll'K VLV x

HO c,

c c

y LOW B/O Losa or Air, cY-0510 Remains (SGE50A)

MOV0510A.

MO BYPASS VLV x

NC c

c c

PRESS RM in Position Due to Croaa Con

( 36"~)

nection8 vlth Hlgh Presa Air and Accumulators

• 3 Hain Stm Line Cl cvo501 POS en* K VLV x

HO C*'

c c

y LOW 8/0 toes ot Air, CV-0501 Re111aina (SGE50D)

HOV0501A HO BYPASS VLV x

HC c

c c

PRESS RM in Poeition Due to Crose Con (36"!1'1) nectlon vith High Pre1111 Air end Accwnulatore

• 4 Purge Alr Exhaust Al CVlOOJ AO ntrrF VI.V x

HC O/C c

c H

CIB Blank Flangedi Vent. *s7st.

(l16"f11)

CV1605 AO mrrF VLV x

HC 0/C c

c CIB Valves Presently Hot Used CV1606

• AO BlITF VLV x

HC O/C c

c CIB in Modes 1-4 506VAS MAH G J, TES'r VLV x

LC c

c lia Purge Air Exhaust Al lOOVAS MAN <IA VLV x

LC c

c H -

Snmple Line lOlVAS MAN GA VLV x

LC c

c

( 3"11'1) 507VAS MAH GL TEST VLV x

LC c

c TEST COHN /w CAP x

c 5

srn (E50A)

C2 cvo767 AO AHCll,f: Vl.V x

HO c

c c

H CIB llottom Blow Dovn..

cvo771 110 ANGLF. Vt.V x

NO c

c c

CIS (2"~)

567MS.

MAH GL TEGT VLV x

LC c

c

'l'EST CONN /w CAP x

c 6

S/G (E50B)

C2 cvo768 AO llNGl.E VLV x

NO c

c c

H CIB Botto1n Blow Down cvono 110 JINGLE Vl.V x

NO c

c c

Cl9 (2"11'1) 56CNS MAH GI, 'l'EST x

LC c

c TEST CONN /w CAP x

c 1

Feedvnter. to Cl 7l16FW MAN GL VLV x

LC c

c 6/0 (E50A) 6' u210n-1ol1 CllF.CK Vl.V x

c c

c y

RE\\t6P Aux FW

( 16"~)

10' H210n-102 CllECK VLV x

0 0

c y

REV*P Hain FW

1'.*j

~ J

)

"),'

r;;

CONTAINMENT JSOLATION SYSTEM SEP REVIEW ITEMS PLANT:

PALISADES NOP UNIT 11 PENE-SYSTEM NAME PENE VALVE TRATION AND SERVICE CLASS IDENT.

HO.

LINE SIZE rm.

NUMOER 0

Feedwoter to Cl 1117FW S/G (E50D) 18 1 N218R-101 N218R-103

.. 9 G1ioro 10 Service Air A2 122CAS (2"~)

ltOlCAS llt2CA T

11 Condensate to C2 CV0939 Shield Cooling 1to1coo Burge Tank 536coo (l's"~)

5J6ACD T

• 12 Service Water x

cvoo*n Supply (16 11 ~)

cvo069 cvo865 CV0062 CV0870 571sws 57osw 5oosw 56osw 266SW 265sw 13 Service Water x

cvoo211 Return (16 11 ~)

572~W CV0067 cvoOl1J cvon61i cvoo63 cvoo61 CVOOJO cvoon cvoo12 TABLE I VALVE*

LOCATION TYPE OR oc IC DES CR I PTI ON MAH GJ, TlRAIN VLV x

CllF.CK Vl.V x

CllECK VI.V x

MAN GA VLV x

CllF.CK VLV x

MAN GL TEST VLV x

TC>T CONN /v CAP x

AO GA VLV x

CllECK VLV x

MAN oL* TEST VLV x

M/\\N GL TEST VLV x

T&>T CONN /v CAP x

AC mrrF VLV x

AC ntrrF VLV x

AC n1rrF Vl.V x

AC mrrr VLV x

AC mrrF VLV x

H/\\H GI\\ VLV x

MAN GA VI,V x

M/\\N C:A VLV x

MAN GI\\

VI~V x

MAN GA Vl.V x

MAN GA VLV x

AC ntfl'F Vl.V x

MA IN GA TEST VLV x

AC mrrF VLV x

AO Gt, VLV x

AC IJlrl'F VLV x

AO GI. VLV x

J\\C mn*F VLV x

AO Gt, VLV x

AC mrrF VLV x

AO m. vr.v x

POSITION NOR-SllUT POST MAL UN LOCA LC c

c 0

0 c

c c

c LC O/C C*

c O/C c

J,C c

c*

c NO 0

c 0

O/C c

LC c

c LC c

c c

NO 0

0 NO 0

0 NO 0

0 NO 0

0 NO 0

0 LC c

c LC c

c LC c

c LC c

c LC c

c LC c

c NO 0

0 LC c

c NC c

0 NO 0

0 NC c

0 NO

o.

0 NC c

0 NO 0

0 NC c

0 NO 0

0 ESS-PWR EN-FAIL.

TIAL ff y

y H

c H

0 y

0 y

0 T

0 y

0 y

H H

N N

lf 0

T H

0 y

c H

0 y

c H

0

.Y c

H 0

T I

H l\\CTUA-TION REV*P REVAP

-REV.aP CIS REV"P MAN M/\\N MAN MAH MAH -

MAH*

-DIS TC SIS TC SIS TC 919

'l'C PAGE 2 OF 13 REMARKS Main FW Aux FW BIS Tripe Honnol Fan Which in Turn Opens ValYe N

<.n

Tl\\RLE 1 COHTAINMENT ISOLATIOH SYSTEM SEP REVIEW ITEMS PLl\\NT:

Pl\\LISAOES NOP UNIT fl PENE-SYSTEM NAHE J'ENE VALVE VALVE LOCATION TRATION AND SERVICE CLASS IOENT.

TYPE OR oc IC NO.

LINE SIZE NO.

NUMBER OESCR I PTI ON 111 Component C2*

CV0910 AC mrrF VLV x

Coo.ling Woter 251-U910CC CllF.CK Vl.V x

in (10"~)

507cc Mf\\N GI, TF!JT Vt.V x

TE!iT CONrl /w CAP x

15 Component C2 cvo911 AC mr1°F/llD OP x

Cooling Water cvo9lio AC DlYl'F/110 OP x

Out (10"\\3) 500CC MAN GL TF!JT VLV x

'l'EST COHN /w CAP x

'l'ES'r CONN /w CAP x

16 BIG (E50A)

Cl cvo139 AO ANGLE VLV x

Surface Blov Down

( 2"ia) ll.

Containment H/A 1802 x

Preeeure 1002A x

Instrwnentation 16028 x

(Ii-ls"~)

1002C x

10011 x

lOOl1A x

18ol1n i

x 180l1C x

1812 x

1812A x

ioi2n x

1812C x

lBlh*

x 18ll1A x

lBlhD x

18lhC x

11a Containment Bump 18Jl1F.

x Level lnstrtunenta-610D-DHW x

ti on lOlhF x

lOJl1G x

TEST /wCAI' x

POSITION NOR-SHUT POST MAL ON LOCA HO NO c

0 0

c IC LC c

c NO 0

c HO 0

c I..C:

c c

c c

0 O/C c

1..0 0

0 t..o 0

0 LC c

c LC c

c LO 0

0 LO 0

0 1£ c

c 1.c c

c LO 0

0 LC c

c LO

0.

0 1£ c

c J,()

0 0

LC c

c 1£ c

c J,C c

c t..o 0

0 c

c c

LC c

c LC c

c CAP ESS-PWR EN-FAIL.

Tll\\L 0

H AI "

AI -

.c II y

If ACTUA-TlON SIB HEV"P SIB SIS CIB

. PAGE _l_ OF 13 REMARKS Auto Reopen on BIB Reeet Auto Reopen on BIB Reeet CY-0911 & 09110 has Accumulator*

for LoBll of Air PB-1002 (BIS

• CIB Initiation)

PB-1002A (BIB & CIB Inltlatlon P9-100li (BIS & CIB Initiati~n)

P-B-180lt (BIB &'. CIB Initiation Pl'-1012 Pl'-1812A PT:-lBili I*

. I N

O"I

TABLE 1 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTE~ SEP REVIEW ITEMS PLANT:

Pl\\LISl\\OES NOP UNIT 11 PAGE j_ OF.1J_

P£NE-SYSTEM Nl\\ME PENE VALVE VALVE LOCATION POSITION ESS-ACTUA-REMARKS TRATION AtlO SERVI CE CLASS IDENT.

TYPE OR oc IC NOR-SllUT POST PWR rn-* TION rm.

LIHE SIZE NO.

NUMBER OESCR I PTI ON MAL ON LOCA FAIL.

TIAL 18 &

Fuel Trans fer A2 MAN nl\\ VLV x

NC c

c ff Blind Flg v/ 2 0-Rlng Seale 18a 1'ube ( J6"~)

16" Fl.ANGE x

c c

Ineide Ctmt Ii" FLANGE x

c c

19 Pereonnel Lock x

P5A MAN GL TF..ST VLV LC O/C LC Outer Door l'llESS GAGE c

PRESS TUBE CAP l'RF.SS EQUAL VLV NC Inner Door PRESS TUBE CAP PRESS TUBE CAP 20 Spare PRESS EQUAL YLV NC 21 Hydrogen Monitoring SV-2l115A x

c c

O/C c

Return Line (~"~)

SV-2lil58 x

c c

O/C c

MV-WGS1Jl x

c c

CAP

• x 2la Hydrogen Monitoring SV-2l1lJA x

c c

O/C c

Supply Llne (Js"~)

SV-2111]8 x

c c

O/C c

MV-WGS1JO x

c c

CllP x

CAP 22 Redw1dnnt High x

MOJ060 MO GI, VLV x

NC c

0 AI y

SIB F.sF Related l'reooure Safety 3250 c11 1K vr.v x

c c

0 flIG InJectlon (6"~)

MOJ066 MO Cl!, VJ,V x

HC c

0 AI em 3251 cu* K vr.v x

c c

0 618 MOJ061i MO GL VLV x

NC c

0 AI SIB 3252 Cll 'K VI.V x

c c

0 SIS MOJ062 MO GI, vr.v x

NC c

0 Al SIS 3253 Cll'K VLV x

c c

0 SIB RV32611 REJ,JEF VLV x

c c

c M03012 MO GA VLV x

NC c

O/C AI CV30l8 1\\0 GA VLV x

HC c

o;o c

CV30J6 AC GI\\ VLV x

NO c

0 0

3265 MAN GI, VLV x

NO O*

0 3265/\\

MAN ClL VLV x

NO 0

0 Pl-0375

TADLE 1 COtHAIHMEHT ISOLATION SYSTEM SEP REVIEW ITEMS PLANT:..

PALISADES NOP UNIT 11 PAGE _5 _ OF..!L PENE-SYSTEM NAME PENE VALVE VALVE LOCATION POSITION ESS-AC TUA-REMARKS TRATION AND SERVICE CLASS I DEHT.

TYPE OR oc JC NOit-SllUT POST. PHR EN-HON N,O.

LINE SIZE NO.

NUMBER OESCR I PTI ON MAL ON LOCA FAIL.

TIAL 23 lligh PreHure x

MOJ007 MO GL VLV x

NC c

0 AI y

BIS Safety Injection 31011 Cll'K VLV x

c c

0 SIB ESF Related MOJ009 MO OL VLV x

NC c

0 AI BIB Actuation Signal Initiated 3ll9 Cll'K VLV x

c c

0 BIS By Chp or Per/Otrp (!1593Paia MO JOU MO GL VLV x

HC c

0 Al SIB Actuation Signal Initiated 31311 Cll 'K Vl.V x

c c

0 BIS By Chp or Per/Otrp (?1593Paia MO)Ol]

MO l1L VLV x

NC c

0 Al BIB Actuation Signal Initiated By Chp or Per/Ovp (~1593Pala

11*19 Cll'K VLV x

c c

0 llV3165 OELIEF VLV x

c c

c CVJ059 AC GA VLV

• x NO 0

0 0

CV)OJ1 AO GA VLV x

HC 0

O/C 0

3331 MAN GL TEST VLV x

0 BX-3337.

3337A MAN GL TEST VLV x

0 c

0 BX-3337 3100 MAN GL VLV x

NO 0

0 PT-0318 3180A MAN GL VLV x

NO 0

0 PT-0318

.2~

Spare 25*.

Clean Waste C2 cv1061t AO CL VLY.

x Hff 0

c

... c H

• crs Receiver Tank cv1065 AO GL VLV x

HO 0

c c

CIB Vent to Stack 512CRW MAH GL TEST VLV x

I.C c

c (2i*~)

TEST CONN /W CAr x

c 6l17cnw MAN UJ, VLV x

HO 0

0 PT-1065 1358 DOAIN CONH/W CAP x

c 26 Hltrogen t.o C2 CV1J50 AO GA VLV x

NC c

c c

N CIB Quench Tank l100N2 CllECK VLV x

c c

c

.581N2 MAN GA TEST VLV x

LC c

c TF.ST CONNECT c

27 Int Lenk Rate Teet A2 MOV-Pl MO Blll'F VLV x

NC c

c c

H Ml\\N FlanRed v/Oaoket Flll Line (6"10 6011 VAS MAN GL Vl.V x

LC c

c Inside Containment 605 VAS MAN Gf, VLV x

LC c

c Flanged v/Oaeket

'l'EOT CONN /W CAP x

c Inelde Containment

~.. '

TADLE 1 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM SEP REVIEW ITEJ"S PLANT:

PALISADES NOP UNIT 11 PEtlE-SYSTEM NAME PENE VALVE VALVE LOCATION TRATIOtC AND SERVICE CLASS IDDH.

TYPE OR oc IC NO, LINE SIZE NO.

NUMBER DES CR I PTI ON

'28 Containment 1110 VAS x

Air Sample Line 1111 VAS x

(~"IO) 1112 V/IS x

510 VAS x

TEST CAP x

I' 29 Capped Spare PIPF. FJ,ANGE x

PIPE END /W CAP x

JO Containment Spray x

. CV3001 AC GI. VJ.V x

3258 MAN GA'f1'~ VLV x

3226 CHECK vr.v x

33liliES GI.ODE VLV x*

TEST CONN /W CAP x

3227ES OLODE VLV x

31 Containment Spray x

CV3002

• AC GI. VLV x

3259 MAN GA VLV x

3216 CHECK VLV x

3217ES MAN GL VLV x

JJl16ES M GJ, TF.3T VLV x

TEfi'l' CONN lW CAP x

)2 Low Preeoure x

M0300fJ MO GL VJ.V x

Dnrcty InJcction 3101~::n CllF.CK Vl.V x

( 12"~)

. 1-103010 MO GJ, Vl.V x

3110F.3 cm;cK v 1.v x

MOJ012 MO m... Vl.V x

31 J)r-:1 CllF:CK Vl.V x

MO]OJ.11 MO Gr, Vl.V x

311101~

Clll~CK. V l.V x

3163E3 MAN GA VLV x

3196 MAN GA VLV x

3191 MAN GA VLV x

CVJ006 AC or. vr.v x

CVJ025 AO <H. vr.v x

3336 MAN GA VJ.V x

JlOOF.S MAN GI\\ VLV x

3101E3 MAN GI\\ Vl.V x

POSITION NOR-SllUT POST MAL ON LOCA LO u

0 LC c

c LC c

c LC c

c c

c c

NC c

0.

LO 0

0 c

c 0

LC c

c c

LC c

c HC c

0 LO 0

0 c

c 0

LC c

c LC.

c c

c HC c

0 c*

c 0

NC c

0 c

c 0

NC c

0 c

c 0

NC c

0 c

c 0

LC c

c NO 0

0 NO 0

0 HO 0

0 NC 0

O/C c

c.

c 0

0 0

0 0

0 ESS-PWR EN-FAIL.

TIAL N

N 0

y 0

y AI y

-Al -

AI -

H ----

0 c ---

ACTUA-TIOH CUP CUP BIB BIB BIB SIS nrn BIS

• arn BIO MAU MAH PAGE~ OF _!L REMARKS ESF Related Auto Open On Chp ESF Related Auto Open on Chp ESF Related

-~

Fl'-0307 f'l'-0307 I.

\\J

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM SEP REVIEW ITEMS PLANT:

PALISADES NOP UNIT 11 PEHE-SYSTEM HAME PEHE VALVE VALVE TRATIOH AND SERVICE CLASS IOENT.

TYPE on HO.

LINE SIZE NO.

NUMDER DESCRIPTION 32 Lov Pressure 1155PC MAN GA Vl,V cont.

Safety Injection 3123F.S M/\\N GA VLV

)122ES MAN GA VLV 11561'C M/\\H GA Vl.V 3130ES M/\\N. GA VLV 3137ES MAH GA VLV 1157PC MAH GA VLV 3153ES M/\\H GA VLV 3152ES MAH GA VLV 1158PC MAH GI\\ VLV RV-3162 HEf,IEF 33 Safety Injection CJ 32Jl1ES M/\\H UA VLV Tank Drain 3231F.S MAH GI\\ VLV (2"~)

33l16ES M/\\H GL TEST VLV

'l'EST COHH /W CAP 3221c:J MAH GL VLV 3236ES MAH GA VLV 3235ES M SAMPL LIME GAV 3211ES MAH GL VLV 31, Spare 35 Shutdown 82 MOVJ016 MO GA VLV Cooling Return MOV]Ol5 MO GI\\ VLV (1'4"'0 11V3164 llF.LIEF VLV RVOl1.0l llF.l,U:F Vl.V 32ol1ES MAN GL VLV 3205 MAH GA VLV PIPE FLANGE M0-3190 MO GA. VLV M0-3199 MO GL VLV 3163 MAH GA VLV 36 l.etdovn To Bl cv2009 AO GL VLV Purl flcatlon 2320CVC MAN GL TF.S!l' VLV Ion Exchanger T~T COHN /W CAP (1~"~)

2010CVC MAH GA VLV TADLE l LOCATION POSITION oc IC NOR-SllUT POST MAL Dtf LOCI\\

x c

c c

x 0

0 0

x 0

0 0

x c

c c

x 0

0 0

x 0

0 0

x c

c c

x 0

0 0

x 0

0 0

x c

c c

x c

c c

x LC c

c x

LC c

c x

LC c

c x

c x

I.C c

c x

LC c

c x

1.c c

c x

LC c

c x,

ELC 0

O/C x

ELC 0

O/C x

NC c

c x

HC c

c x

LC c

c x

LC c

c x

c c

c x

El.C 0

0 x

ELC o*

0 x

c c

c x

NO 0

c x

LC c

c x

c x

NO 0

0 ESS-PWR EN-FAIL.

TIAL y

n c

H c ---

-AI AI -

c n

AC TUA-TION WtH CIB PAGE _7_ OF

• 13 REMARKS FT-0309 Fl'-0309 Fl'-0311 Fl'-0311 Fl'-03lli Fl'-O]l!i Manual Control w

0

j I

I l

I i.

I*

j l

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM SEP REVIEW ITfMS PLANT:

PALISADES HOP UNIT 11 PENE-SYSTEM NAME PEHE VALVE TRATIOH AND SERVICE CLASS IOENT.

NO.

LINE SIZE NO.

NUMBER 36 Letdovn To Bl 21laOA cont.

Puri ficntlon cv2012 Ion Exchanger 21l19A

( 1!1"(11)

CV2122 31 Primary Syotem C2 CVlOOl Drain Pump laoJcnw neclrc ( 1~"(11) 50JCll\\I JO Condeneate Return C2 CV1501 From Steam Heating cv1502 Units (2"(11) 502VA 39 Containment x

CV1503 Heating Syetem

( la"(l1) 503VA lio Pri-Cooling Syetem Bl CVJ.910

. SllPlple Ll ne CV1911

(~"(11)

. lllOA 117011 l1oa Hydrogen t4onitcirlng SV-2la1l1A Return l.ine BV-2111118 (Degaeifler Room),

l29WOS

(~"(11) laOb.

Hydrogen Monitor sv-2*1121\\

Supply Line sv-21t12n (Degaelfler Room) l20WGS

~II~

.T/\\OLE 1 VALVE

~OCl\\TIOH TYPE OR oc IC

• HOR-UESCR I PTI ON Ml\\L MAN GA VLV x

NO AO GL VLV x

NO MAN GA VLV x

NO AO GL VLV x

NC I

AO GL VLV x

NC CllECK VLV x

c MAN Gf, TEST VLV x

LC TE3T CONN /W CAP x

c 1\\0 GA VLV x

NC AO GA VLV x

NC MAH GL TEST VLV x

LC VENT CONN /W CAI'

~

c TEST CONN /W CAI' x

c AO GA VLV x

HC CllF.CK VLV x

MAH GL TEST VLV

~

LC TEST CONN /W CAI' x

c VENT COHN /W CAI'

• x c

AO GL.VLV x

0/C AO GL VLV x

O/C MAH f::L TEST VLV x

LC MAH GL T~T Vl.V x

LC

'l'F.!JT CONN ['W CAP x

c SOLF.NOID x

c BO LENO ID x

c MAii 01, VLV x

c T1:::;T CONN /W CAI' x

c SOLENOID x

c SOLENOID x

c MAN GL VLV x

c

'l'E3T CONN /W CAI' x

c POSITION SllUT POST. PWR DN LOCA FAIL.

0 0

0 O/C c

0 0

c c

c c

c c

c c

c c

c*

O/C c

c 0/C c

c c

c c

c c

c c

O/C c

c O/C c

c c

c c

c c

O/C c

c O/C c

c c

c O/C c

c O/C c

c c

ESS-ACTUA-EN-TIOH Tll\\l H

CIB H

Cls Ii CIB CIS H

MAH MAN PAGE _a_ OF...u_

REMARKS Check Valve Repiaced v/Blank Flange When At Power I

w

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM SEP REVIEW ITEMS PLANT:

PALISADES NOP UNIT 11 PENE-SYSTEM NAME PENE VAl.VE VALVE TRATIOH

/\\NO SERVI CE.

CLASS IOEtH.

TYPE OR NO.

LINE SIZE NO.

NUMOER DES CR I PTI ON 111 Degneeifier C2

cvioot, AO GI, VLV Pump Dlecharge

~OlCRW CHECK VLV (J"Y')

506CRW HJ\\N GL TEST VLV TmT CONN /W CAP ii2 Deminernllzed C2 CV0155 AO GJ, VLV Water To V0155B CHECK VJ.V Quench Tank 1126PC MAN GI, TEST VLV (2"~)

TEST* CONN /W CAP 1,3 Bpare Controlled Bleed C2 CV208J AO GL VLV Off From RCP'B 208li Ml\\N GL VLV

( 3/li"Y')

2083 HJ\\N GA TEST VLV 208.JA MAH GA 'CEST VLV TF.ST CONN /W

• CAP.

li5 Charging Pwnp Bl*

2110 CHECK VLV Discharge (2 11~)

CV2111 AC GL VLV

"(W/ HD OPERATOR) 116.

Containment C2 CVUOl AO GL VLV Verit Hender

. CV1102 AO GI, VLV

( li"Y')

51IWGS MAN GL TEST VLV TEST corm lW ~AP 117 Primary Syotem C2 cv1002 Ao m. v1.v Drain Tank Pwnp cv1001 AO GL v1.v Suction 502CRW MAN GL TEST vr.v TEST CONN /W CAI' 118 Containment x

V-1801 MAH GA Vl.V Pressure V-1001A MAN GA VLV tnotrumcntntlon V-10018 MllN GA Vl.V

( 11-~"gl Linea)

V-1801C MAN GA VLV V-1003 MAN OA Vl.V V-180JA*

MAH GA VLV Tl\\RLE 1 LOCI\\ Tl ON POSITION oc IC NOR-SllUT POST MAL DN LOCA.

x NO 0

c x

0 0

c x

LC c

c x

c x

NC c

c x

c c

x LC c

c x

c x

NO 0

c x

HO 0

0 x

LC c

c x

LC c

c x

c x

0 0

0 x

HO 0

0 x

NO 0

c x

NO 0

c x

LC c

c x

c x

NO 0

c x

NO 0

c x

LC c

c x

c x

LO 0

0 x

LO 0

0 x

r.c c

c x

LC c

x LO 0

0 x

LO 0

0 ESS-PWR.

EN-FAIL.

TIAL c

ff c

N c

y 0

c c -

c c -

ACTUA-TIOtl CIB CIS CIB MAR CIB CIB PAGE _2._ OF iJ_

REMARKS PS-1601 (BIS & CIS Initiation)

PS-1801A (BIS & CIS Initiation, PS-1803 (SIB l CIS Initiation)

PIJ-lOOJA (818 l CI8 lnltlatlon w

t->

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM SEP REVIEW ITEMS PLANT:

PALISADES NOP UHIT 11.

PENE-SYSTEM NAME PENE VALVE VALVE TRATIOH AND SERVICE CLASS IDENT.

TYPE OR NO.

LINE SIZE NO.

NUMDER.

DESCRIPTION 118 Containment x

V-10038 MAN GA Vl.V cont.

Preeeure V-lOO]C MAN GA VLV Instrumentation V-1005 MAN GA VLV (b-1:!"~ Linea)

V-1005A MAN GA VLV V-10058 MAN GA Vl.V V-l005C MAN GA VLV V-1015 MAN GA VLV V-1015A MAN OJ\\ VLV V-1815B MAN GA VLV V-1615C MAH GA VLV li9 Clean Waote C2 CV1036 AO GL VLV Receiver Tonk CVlOJ6 AO OL VLV Circulation PUJDp 513CRW MAN GL 'ff.ST VLV Suction ( 3"~)

TEST CONN /W CAP 51l1CRW MAN DRAIN VLV 50 Emergency* Acceoo x

l'nr.3 EQIJ/IL VLV Inolde Ct.mt l'llESS TIJIJE PRESS TUnE.

Outside Ct.mt PRE31J EQUAL VLV PRF.SS GAGE PllESS 'l'UllE P6VA MAH 0 TEST VLV TEST CONN /W CAP 0-RINO TEST COHN 51

.Equipment Door x

0-RtNO TE:3T CONHECT /W CAP 52

.Containment Sump Al CVUOJ AO GJ, Vl.V Droln to Sump Tonk cv11ol1 AO GL Vl.V 500DRW MAN GL TEST VLV

'l'EST CONN VLV TAOl.E 1 LOCATION POSITION oc IC HOR-SllUT POST MAL DH LOCA x

LC c

c x

LC c

c x

LO 0

0 x

LC c

c x

LO 0

0 x

LC c

c x

LO 0

0 x

1.c c

c x

LC c

c*

x LC c

c*

x NO 0

c x

NO 0

c x

LC c

c x

c x

LC c

c x

NC x

CAP x

CAP x

NC x

c x x

.LC x

c x

c x

c x

NC c

c x

NC c

c x

LC c

c x

c ESS-PWR EN-FAIL.

TIAL c

n c -

c ff c -

ACTUA*

TlllH AUTO BY CIB BIS CHR PAGE ~

OF 2:!_

REMARKS PT-1805 1"1'-0105A Pl'.-1815

~" Tube Betveen ~e Beale Canned w

.w.

e*

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM SEP REVIEW ITEMS PLANT:

PALISADES NOP UNIT 11 P£NE-SYSTEM NAME PENE VALVE VALVE 111/HIOH ANO srnv1r.£ r:t.ASS lllrtll.

TYPE OR

!!11.

u Ill.

~ ** II.

llO.

m111111.n II[ SCIU 1'11 Otl 52a Containment 610onw HAN GA VLV riwnp Level 616FDnW MAN GA VLV Tnotrumentat.lon 61mrnnw MAN *r.A VLV

( J/8"~0 610F.DllW MAH GA Vt.V 610GDllW MAM GA VJ,V 618ADllW MAN GA Vl.V 616nnnw MAN GA VLV 616CDRW MAN llA VLV 610DDllW MAH GA VLV 3 TF.S'r CONN/WCAP 52b Containment 619onw MAH GA VLV 6wnp Level 619FDllW MAH GA VLV lnotrwnentatlon 61911DllW MAN GA VLV 619r.onw t1AN GA VLV 619aonw MAN GA VLV 619/\\DRW MAN GA VLV 619ennw HAN GA VLV 619CDRW MAN GA VLV 619nnnw MAH GA Vl.V 3 'l'Fli'r CONH/WCAP 53 Containment Spray lt CVJ029 AIR OP VLV l'W!IP Suction 3102Fli MAN GL 'l'FliT VLV TEf>T CONN /W CAI' 5h Contnlnmcnt Spray*

x CV3030 AIR OP Vl.V Pwnp Suction J167f;S MAH TE:lT VLV TF..ST conn /W CAP 55 SIG ( E50D) Sur race' Cl cvonB AO Vl.V Blovdown ( 2"")

W/ llAND OPERATOll 56 Containment Sump 606A-VAS

[.eve) 619n-nnw lnotrumentation 6o6D-VAS 6o6C-VJ\\S TfliT CONN /W CAI' 57 Snore TABLE 1 LOCATION POSITION oc IC HOR-SllUT POST MAL ON LOCA x

J,()

0 0

x 1£ c

c x

LC c

c x

LC c

c x

1.c c

c x

LO 0

0 x

1£ c

c x

[£ c

c x

LC c

c x

c x

LO 0

0 x

1.c c

c x

1£ c

c x

LC c

c x

LC c

c x

LO 0

0 x

LC c

c x

r.c c

c x

LC c

c x

c x

NC c

0 x

1.c c

c x

c x

NC c

0 x

LC c

c x

c x

0 O/C c

x 1.0 0

0 x

c c

c x

r.c c

c x

1.c c

c x

c I

ESS-PWR EH-FAIL.

Tl Al Al T

AI y

c AC TUA-TlON 61"WT LL BIRWT LL CIB PAGE 11 or 13 -

REMARKS LT-0382 LT-0383 Poet Loca Open On Slrv LL Poot Loca Open On Blrv LL LT-0383 I

w

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION.SYSTEM SEP REVIEW IT(MS PLANT:

PALISADES NOP UNIT 11.

Pr NE-SYSTEM NAME PEHE VALVE Vl\\LVE TRATIOH AND SERVICE CLASS IDENT.

• TYPE OR NO.

LINE SIZE NO.

NUMBER DES CR I PTI ON 56 Spare c;Q Son re 60 Spare 61 Spare

• 62 Spare 63 Spare 64 Reactor Cavity A2 121SFP MAN GA VLV Fill & Reclrc 120SFP MAH GI\\ VLV (6.

1116) 5lliSFP MAN GL TEST Vl.V

'fEST CONN /W CAr 65 Instrwnent Alr A2 CV1211 AC GL VLV (2"~)

lioocAs CllECK VLV 612cAS MAN GL TF.ST VLV TEST CONN /W CAP 611CAS MAH GA VLV 66

• ILRT x

. 601VAS MAH GA Vl.V Instrwnent Line L6VAS MAN GA VLV

( l~"~)

60JVAS MAN GL T~T VLV TF.ST CONN /W CAP 602VA MAN GL TEST VLV

'l'EST CONN /W CAP 61 Clean Waste C2 CVlOJT AO GL VLV

• Receiver Tank

• 110-cnw CllECK VLV Pump Reclrc 515cnw MAN GL TEST Vl.V

( 3"~)

TEST CONN /W CAI' TABLE l LOCATION oc IC HOR-Ml\\l x

LC x

LC x

LC x

c x

NO x

0 x

LC x

c x

NO x

LC x

1.c x

. LC x

c x

LC x

c x

NO x

0 x

LC x

c POSITION SllUT POST PWR ON LOCA FAIL.

c c

c c

c c

0 0

0 0

c c

0 0

c c

c c

c c

c c

0 c

c 0

c c

c ESS-rn-TIAL H

II II

~------ -- --------------...

PAGE _!L OF..!L.

ACTUA-REMARKS TION MAH PS1220 CIB w

U1

TABLE 1 CONTAltlMFJH ISOLATION SYSTEM SEP REVIEW.ITEMS PLANT:

• PALISADES HOP UNIT #1 PAGE 13 OF 13 PEHE-SYSTEM NAME PENE VALVE VALVE LOCATION POSITION ESS-AC TUA-REMARKS TRATION AHO SERVICE CLASS IOENT.

TYPE OR oc IC HOR-SllUT POST PWR EH-TIOH NO.

LlflE SIZE NO.

HUMBER OESCR I PTI OH MAL ON LOCA FAIL.

TIAL 66 Air Supply To Al CV1813 AO lllITF VLV x

1.c O/C c

c H

CIB Alr Supply To CV-1813 &

Air Room cv1011i AO DU1'F VLV x

1.c O/C c

c CV-1814 Ia Aleo Teated Under

( 12"~)

505VAS MAN GI, TEST VLV x

LC c

c LLRT TEG'r corm /W CAP x

c 69 Cleon Woate C2 cv10115 AO GI, VLV x

NO 0

c c

H CIB Receiver Tonk

cv101i1, AO GJ, VLV x

NO 0

c c

Pump Suction 510CHW MAN GJ, TEST Vl.V x

LC c

c

( '*"~)

TEST COHN /W CAP x

c 70 Svare 71 Svare 12 Reactor Refueling A2 117SFP MAN GA VALVE x

LC c

c H

Cavity Drain 110SFP MAH GI\\ VALVE x

LC c

c (6"~)

515SFP MAN GL TEST VLV x

• LC c

c TEJT CONN /W CAP x

c 73

• Capped Spare PIPE FI.ANGE x

DC c

c If PIPE END /W CA*P x

c c

c 509VAS MAN OL TEST Vl.V x

I.C c

c

'l'ES'r CONN /W CAP x

c c

C.

3=1

• TABLE l NOTES

l. Vilve Type or Description - AO means air-to-open a:od AC means air-to-close.

2.

Normal. Position -

NO -

NC

~c -

LO -

LC ELO ELC Norma.J.ly open No:rmaJ:ly closed

.Bolted ciosed {e.g. !la:oge)

Locked. Open Locked Closed Elect.ricall.Y' wcked Open {key lock switch)

Electrically Locked. Closed. {key lock switch)

3.

Shutdo;m Position - Ass'Ullles normal shutd.ovn vitb the i:>ia:ot en shutd.ov:o cooling.

4.

Pover Fail\\ll"e Position - Position sho*"D is for either loss of pover or loss of air u:oless othervise noted.

5.

Actuation - Signal 'Which auto:c:.a.ticall.Y' causes valve to reposition unless otherwise specified.

Symbols are:

CIS -

SIS -

CBP -

CER MAN Contai:cment Isolation Signal Safety Injection Signal Containment Higb Pressure Sigoe.l Contaimnent High Radiation Signal RemoteJ.y actuated by Manual Operator action

TABLE

c -

PLANT; P!ILi'~ADC~ p04,,,.~N1T 1 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM

• SEP REVIEW FINDINGS I

EXCEPTIONS 7

PAGE 2. OF_ 'J J4i/

~~~~0%f I

~~ LIN£.

~u & &' w ~ ~

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SERVICE*

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CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM PLANT: ?AL,-WPc:i R:1-1N(uw1J; I "SEP. REVIEW FINDINGS I

£XC£PTIDNS I

PAGE 2 OF.. r;

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~(J ~ &' w ~ ~

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s--(o P,fc df5.,/Jec~or Acc.Gpm8tc-isoC.ATitiN

£.& TUIC!v (I(',, c:b) 8/JRRl(:.-R:;.

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I I

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TABL***

I;:

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYST£t1.

PLANT: j};:Jj;5,11J);:_~ RI UNIT 1 I

. SEP REVIEW FINDINGS I

£XC£PTIONS I

PAGE 3 OF_ '7

• ~v.

}~~%0%~/

i~ LIN£

~(J ~ &' w ~ ~

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.,,, JJ j ff ~ $ ff.

REVIEWER:S COMMENTS

.;i4 '5ffie&-

"C/~J.J WllSTE.ka1vee..

TG1/ Ct7NNC.G}lor.... J lv'~/Js Tu.Jo L. c_ VA.Lvcs.

~.5 71J>.J~ Ve1f{ TO '5TAC/::::...

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31

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~*

~---**-.--*-***

TABL£ r:1 CON INMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM PLANT: 'ffl!.,-1@es a:!-uw; '.

SEP R£V/£W FINDINGS I

£XC~PTIONS J PAGE 4 OF.. '7

,*t.q~~%0%'1/

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~ ~

~

~

1-'Q~J' f I~~ 11 REV!EWER:S COMMENTS

~~

~~ LIN£ I./. SERVICE 4 3 5fA££:-

44 CcwTRt>t/ c'P Blce:o oFF IF.lbl.1 Rep :s c -3//f;t.)

~~

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CONTA.INMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM PLANT: i3L;5p~::.c; ?iI LJN1T;.

Ti B E

)

. SEP REVIEW FINDINGS I

EXCEPTIONS I

PAGE 5 OF:. 'J.

Jqfj J~%%;4%~ I

~/S" LIN£

~(J

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}>

.,, ~.f I ~ $ ff

. REVIEWERS COMMENTS.

<t ~

SERVICE.

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I VI. Reference

1. License DPR-20-Palisades Plant - response to SEP Topic: VI Containment Isolation System, 7/14/80.

2.

Independent review of containment penetrations, MPR-639, Vol. I & II, MPR Association, Inc, 11/15/79.

3. License DPR-20-Palisades Plant - IE Bulletin 79-06B respons~

update, 8/16/79 * . 14. DPR-20-Palisades Plant requirements resulting from review of TMI-2 accident actions taken in response to NRC, 12/27/79.

5. Consumers Power Co. Licensee event report 80-021, Rev. 1, Misaligned containment sump valve, 8/20/80.

6.

CE Post-TM! evaluation task 5 - containment isolation, 12/13/79.

7. Palisades plant design drawing:

M-201 (rev. 22), M-202(21), M-203(19), M-204(16), M-205(23), M-206(11), M-207(33}, M-208(19), M-214(15), M-215(14), M~218(20), M-219(10), M-220(17)~ M-221(10}, M-222(10), M-223(7), M-224(7), M-225(8), M-226(8), E-15(1), E-16(1), E-17(6).

8. Palisades plant #1, Final Safety Analysis Report, Vols. 1, 2 & 3.

9.

Letter from R. A. Vincent {Consumers Power Company) to

9. M. Crutchfield, dated August. 10, 1981, Providing Comments on CSB Evaluation Report on SEP Topic VI-4 for the Palisades Nuclear P 1 ant, Unit 1.

lD. Lett~r from R. A. Vincent (Consumers Power Company) to D. M. Crutchfield, dated January 4, 1982, Providing Informatfon on SEP Topic VI-4 for the Palisades Nuclear Plant, Unit 1.

l;..* ,J I,. Containment $ystems Branch Evaluatior:i- -Repo-r.t on SEP -Topi.c:;. VI*4, Containment Isolation.System for the Palisades Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 Docket No. 50-255 Revision 1 I Introduction I I The Palisades Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 began commercial operation in 1971. Since then safety review criteria h~ve changed. As part of the Systematic Evaluation Program {SEP}, the.containment isolation sys-tem for the Palisades plant has been re-evaluated. The purpose of this evaluation is to document the deviations from current safety cri-teria as they relate to the containment isolation system. The signifi~ cance of the identified deviations, and recommended corrective measures to improve safety~ will be the subject of a subsequent, integrated asses-ment of the Palisades plant. Review Criteria The safety criteria used in the current evaluation of the containment isolation system for the Palisades plant are contained in the following references:

1) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants {GDC 54, 55, 56 and 57).

2)

NUREG-75/087, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants {SRP 6.2.4, Containment Isolation System}.

3)

Regulatory Guide 1.11, Instrument Lines Penetrating Primary Reactor Containment. ENCLOSURE . REGUU\\ TORY DOCKET FILE C.OPY

1 .. 4) Regulatory Guide 1.141, Revision 1, Containment Isolation Provisions for Fluid Systems. III Related Safety Topics The review areas identified below are not covered in this report, but are related and essential to the completion of the re-evaluation of the con-tainment isolatiot:1 system for the Palisades *plant. These review areas are included in other SEP topics or ongoing Generic Reviews, as indi~ated below: {l) III-1, ( 2) II I-4.C, (3) III-5.A, ( 4) III-5.B, ( 5) I I I-6, {6} III-12, (7) VI-6, ( 8) VII-2, ( 9} YIII-2, ( 10) VIII-4~ Classification of Structures, Components and Systems {Seismic and Quality) Internally Generated Missiles Effects of Pipe Break on Structures, Systems and Compo-nents Inside Containment Pipe Break Outside Containment Seismic Design Considerations Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Equipment - Containment Leak Testing ~ngineered Safety Feature System Control Logic and Design Onsite Emergency P.ower Systems - Di es el Generator Electrical Penetrations of Reactor Containment ( 11) NUREG-0737~ Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements, Item II.E.4.2, Containment Isolation Dependability (12) NUREG-0660, NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the TMI-2 Accident, Item II.E.4.4, Containment Purging and Venting Requirements.

,j l .e J. IV. Review Guidelines The containment isolation system of a nuclear power plant is an en-gineered safety feature that functions to allow the normal or emer-gency passage of fluids through the containment boundary while pre-serving the ability of the boundary to prevent.or limit the escape of fission products to the environs that may result from postulated accidents. General Design Criteria 54, 55, 56 and 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 pertain to the containment isolation system of a nuclear power plant. General Design Criterion 54 establishes design and test requirements for the leak detection provisions, the isolation function and the con-. tainment capability of the isolation barriers in lines penetrating the primary reactor containment.* From the standpoint of containment i so-lation, leak detection providions should be capable of quickly detect-ing and responding to a spectrum of postulated pipe break accident con-ditions. To accomplish this, diverse parameters should be monitored to initiate the conta1nment isolation function. The parameters selected should assure a positiv~, rapid response to the developing accident condition. This aspect of the containment isolation system review will be addressed during the review of the post-TM! requirements ap-proved for implement~tion, as stated in NUREG-0737 at Item II.E.4~2. Leak detection capability should also be provided at the system level to alert the operator of the need to isolate a system train equipped with remote manual isolation valves. SRP 6.2.4, at It~m II.11, pro-vides guidance in this regard.

t' ...t. 1 .. With respect to the design requirements for the isolation function, all non-essential systems shou!d be automatically isolated (with manual valves sealed closed), and valve closure times should be selected to as- . sure rapid isolation of the containment in the event of an accident. The review of the classification of systems as essential or non-essential, and the automatic isolation provisions for non-essential systems by appro-priate signals, will be addressed in conjunction with the review of the post-TMI requirements as stated in NUREG-0737 at Item 11.E.4.2. The clo- . sure time of the containment ventilation system isolation valves will be evaluated in conjunction with the ongoing generic review of purgi~g prac-tices at operating plants (see NUREG-0660 at Item II.E.4.4). The electrical power supply, instrumentation and controls systems should be designed to engineered safety features criteria to assure accomplish-ment of the containment isolation function. This aspect of the review is co~ered under SEP Topics VII-2 and VIII-2. Also, resetting the isolation signal should not result in the automatic re-opening of containment isola-tion valves. This will be addressed in conjunction with the review of the post-TM! requirements approved for implementation, as stated in NUREG-0737", at Item II.E.4.2. With respect to the capabilities of containmment isolation barriers in lines penetrating primary containment, the isolation barriers should be designed to engineered safety feature criteria, and protected against . missiles, pipe whip and jet impingement. Typical isolation barriers include valves, closed systems and blind flanges. Furthermore, provi-sions should be made to permit periodic l_eak testing of the isolation barriers.

t The adequacy of the missile, pipe whip and jet. impingement protection will be covered under SEP Topics III-4~C, III-5.A and III-5.B. The acceptability of the design criteria originally used in the design of the containment isolation system components will be covered in SEP Topics 111-1, III-6 and III-12. The adequacy of the leak testing program will be covered under SEP Topic VI-6. The acceptability of electrical penetrations will be covered in SEP*Topic VIII-4. GDC 55, 56 and 57 establish explicit requirements for isolation valv-ing in lines penetrating the containment. Specifically, they address the number and location of isolation valves (e.g., redundant valving. with one located inside containment and the other located outside con-tainment), valve actuation provisions (e.g., automatic or remote manual isolation valves), valve position (e.g., locked closed, or the position of greater safety in the event of an accident or power failure), and valve type (e.g., a simple check valve is not a permissable automatic isolation valve outside containment). Figures 1 and 2 depict the ex-plicit valve arrangements specified in GDC 55 and 56, and SOC 57, re-spectively. GDC 55 and 56 also permit containment isolation provisions for lines penetrating the primary containment boundary that differ-from the ex-plicit requirements, provided the basis for acceptability is defined. This proviso is typically invoked when establishing the containment isolation requirements for essential (i.e., safety.related) systems, or there is a clear improvement in safety.

- r -t - I p

e I

GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA. 55 AND 56 ISOLATION VALVE CRITERIA MISSILE PROTECTION INSIDE OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT INSIDE OUTSIDE SEALED CLOSED

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' *e GENERAL DESIGN CRITERION 57 ISOLATION VALVE CRITERIA MISSILE PROTECTION INSIDE OUTSIDE CLOSED SYSTEM CLOSED SYSTEM CONTAINMENT . INSIDE OUTSIDE Figure 2 AUTOMATIC OR

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I II' Standard Review Plan (SRP) 6.2.4 at Item 11.3 presents ~uidelines for acceptable alternate containment isolation provisions for certain clas-ses of lines. Containment isolation provisions that are found acceptable on the "other defined basis" represent conformance with the GDC and do not constitute exceptions. The following evaluation addresses deviations in the containment isola-tion provisions from the explicit requirements of the GDC. V Evaluation The containment isolation provisions for the lines penetrating the pri-mary reactor containment of the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 are tabulated in Table 1. This information was obtained from the docu-ments referenced in Section VII. The containment isolation provisions, as tabulated in Table 1, were evaluated against the requirements of GDC 54, 55, 56 and 57 (Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50), and the supplementary gui.dance of SRP 6.2.4 {Containment Isolation System), where applicable. Deviations from the explicit requirements of GDC 54, 55, 56 and 57, and the acceptance criteria of SRP 6.2.4 are tabulated in Table 2. We have transmitted a draft evaluation to the licensee. As a result, Table 1 was revised and modified by the licensee to reflect changes in the plant. This revised eva 1 uat ion report takes into account the comments and up-dated information received from the licensee. Table 1 gives the licensee's penetration class designation for many of the lines penetrating containment. The isolation valve arrangements for these penetration classes are shown in Figures 3 and 4. The figures were

• *e obtained from Reference 8.

Following are evalu~tions of these penetra-tion classes against GDC 55~ 56 and 57.* Penetration Class Al Penetration Class Al shows influent and effluent lines open to the con-tainment with two isolation valves in series outside containme~t. GDC 56 applies to the lines in Penetration Class Al. GDC 56 specifies that one valve should be located inside containment and one valve should be located outside containment. Consequently, the.isolation valving arrangement for Penetration Class Al differs from the explicit requirements of GDC 56 from the standpoint of valve location. Locating both containment isolation *valves outside containment may be acceptable if the criteria used in the design of the piping between the containment-the first valve are sufficiently conservative to provide adequate assur-ance of integrity. This matter is discussed under SEP Topiic 111-1. The following containment penetrations are included in Penetration Class Al: 1, 4, 4a, 52 and 68. Penetration Class A2 Penetration Class A2 shows three isolation configurations that are open to the containment. GDC 56 applies to the lines in Penetration Class A2. One of the isolation configurations (i.e.,, the line.having a locked-. closed valve inside containment and a locked-closed valve outside contain-ment) satisfies the explicit requirements of GDC 56. The following con-tainment penetrations have this isolation configuration in Penetration Class A2: 64, 66 and 72. The isolation configuration having a blind flange inside containment and a locked closed valve outside containment differs from the explicit requirements of GDC 56 from the standpoint of isolation barrier type. GDC 56 does not address the u~e of blind flanges. However, a blind flange is an acceptable isolation barrier in lieu of a valve. The ba-sis for this appears in SRP 6.2.4 at Item II~3. Also, the locked-closed valve could be an automatic isolation valve and still satisfy GDC 56. The following containment penetrations have this isolation configuration in Penetration Class A2: 18, 18a and 27. With regard to penetration 27 (ILRT fill line}, the power operated valve MDV-Pl outside containment is verified closed monthly under sur-veil.lance procedure MO 29 of the plant Technical Specifcations. Since.I the line is flanged and.gasket inside containment, the administrative I control exercised over the valve is judged to be adequate. Therefore, the valve is a sealed closed isolation valve in accordance with the guidelines of SRP 6.2.4 at Item II.3. The isolation configuration having both a locked closed valve and a simple check valve outside containment differs from the explicit re-quire~ents of GOC 56 from the standpoint of valve location and valve type. GDC 56 specifies that one valve should*be located inside con-tain~ent and one valve should be loc~ted outside containment, and,that a simple check valve may not be used as an automatic isolation valve outside containment. For this configuration to be acceptable, the check valve should be located inside containment. Also, the locked closed valve could be an automatic isolation valve to satisfy GOC 56.

'. - The following containment penetrations have th~ above isolation configur-ation in Penetration Class A2: 10 and 65. A judgment regarding the ac-I ceptability of the simple check valve outside containment as a bonafide containment isolation valve will be made in conjun~ion with the inte-grated assessment of the plant. With regard to penetration 65 (instrument air line), the acutation provi-sions for valve CV 1211 differ from the explicit requirements of GDC 56 in that the valve is remote manually isolated. Since the instrument air line is non-essential, valve CV 1211 should be automatically isolated. Penetration Class Bl Penetration Class Bl shows two series isolation valves outside containment in a line coming from the reactor coolant system. As shown, one of the

• valves is an automatic isolation valve and the other is a normally open, manual valve.

Depending on the line, however, a simple check valve or re-I mote manual valve is used. GDC 55 applies to the lines in Penetration Class Bl. GDC 55 specifies that one valve should be locaed inside contain-ment and one valve should be located outside containment, with the vaves be-ing either locked closed or automatic isolation valves. The isolation valving arrangement for Penetration Class Bl, therefore, dif-fers from the explicit requirements of GDC 55 from the standpoint'bf valve location, type, and actuation *. Locating both itolation valves outside containment may be acceptable if piping and valve design criteria are suf~ ficiently conservative to preclude a breach of integrity. This matter is

10 - discussed under SEP Topic III-1. The use of a local manual valve for containment isolation is not acceptable, and should be upgraded to an automatic isolation valve. The following containment penetrations are included in Penetration Class Bl. 36, 40 and 45. For penetration 36 (reactor coolant* system letdown line), the parallel power operated valves CV 2012 and CV 2122 respond to controls to maintain a prescribed backpressure in the line. Although the valve controls are designed to ramp the valves closed in response to a drop in line pressure (e.g., as caused by a LOCA), the control circuitry is not safety-grade and does not assure valve closure throughout the course of an accident~ Therefore, valves CV 2012 and CV 2122 should have automatic.isolation ca-pability in response to the sensing of diverse parameters characteristic of postulated accidents. Also, the isolation actuation circuitry should be safety-grade and capable of overriding valve control circuitry for nor-mal plant operation. For penetration 45 (charging pump discharge line), the simple check valve outside containment is an inappropriate automatic isolation valve; a judgment regarding its acceptability will be made in conjunction with the integrated assessment of the plant. Also, the actu-ation provisions for the air bperated valve CV 2111 differ from the ex-plicit requirements of GDC 55 in that the valve is a remote manual iso-lation valve. A remote manual isolation valve is provided in lieu of an automatic isolation valve because the line has a post-accident safety function (emergency core cooling) which necessitates the valve being open in the event of an accident. Consequently, automatic isolation of ~---~* *-------------------------------

• e 11 -

the line is not appropriate. However, the capability does exist to re-mote manually isolate the line if the need to do so should arise. The actuation provisions for the valve is acceptable based on the guide-1 ines of SRP 6.2.4, at Item II.3. Penetration Class B2 Penetration Class B2 shows a locked closed valve inside ctintainment and a locked closed valve outside containment in a reactor coolant system ef-fluent line. GDC 55 applies to the lines in Penetration Class B2. The isolation arrangement satisfies the explicit requirements of GDC 55. The following containment penetration is included in Penetration Class B2:

35.

Penetration 35 shows two re 1 i ef va 1 ves (RV 3164 and RV 0401), located be-tween the two series isolation valves inside containment, which relieve to the containment. Consequently, the relief valves also have a containment isolation function in the reverse flow direction. Penetration Class Cl Penetration Class Cl shows two types of valve arrangements for closed systems inside containment that are missile protected; namely, a single simple check valve outside containment for influent lines and a single automatic isolation valve outside containment for effl~ent lines.* GDC 57 applies to the lines in Penetration Class Cl. GDC 57 specifies that a single automatic, remote manual or locked closed isolation valve outside containment is acceptable, but a simple check valve is not a~ acceptable automatic isolation valve. The isolation valve arrangement having a

I -~.,.;.~*~...:.. *-* single simple check valve outside containment differs from the explicit requirements of GDC 57 from the standpoint of valve type. The following containment penetrations are included in Penetration Class Cl: 2, 3, 7, 8, 16 and 55. For Penetrations 7 and 8, the main feedwater*isolation valves (18"-N218R-0702 and 18" -N218R-0701, respect i ve1y) should be power operated, auto-matic isolation valves. In this regard, a power operated stop check r valve would be acceptable. For penetrations 16 and 55, the contain-ment isolations provisions satisfy the explicit requirements of GDC 57. Penetration Class C2 Penetration Class C2 shows isolation valve arangements for influent and effluent lines of closed systems inside containment that are not missile protected. The valve arrangements consist of two valves in series, out-side containment. GDC 56 applies to the lines in Penetration Class C2. GDC 56 specifies that one automatic or locked closed valve should be located inside con-tainment and one such valve should be located outside containment; also, a simple check valve may not be used as an automatic isolation valve out-side containment. The valve arrangements of Penetration Class C2 differ from the explicit requirements of GDC 56 from the standpoint of valve location and valve type. All valve arrangements would satisfy the explicit requirements of GDC 56 if one valve was located insi~e containment, particularly the simple check valve. GDC 56 permits isolati~n valve arrangements that differ from the expli-cit requirer.ents provided the basis for acceptability is defined. With respect to Penetration Class C2, then, locating both isolation valves outside containment may be acceptable since missile* protection is not provided inside containment. The acceptability of this is contingent on the criteria used in the design of the piping between the contain-ment and first valve, and the first valve, which must provide adequate assurance of integrity. The following containment penetrations are included in Penetration Class C2: 5, 6, 11, 14, 15, 25, 26, 37, 38, 40A, 408, 41, 42, 44, 46, 47, 49, 67 ~nd 69. For penetrations 11, 14, 26, 27, 41, 42 and 67, the simple check valve is not an appropriate automatic isolation valve outside containment. A power operated automatic isolation valve would be acceptable. How-ever, a judg~ent decision regarding the acceptability of the simple check valve will be made at the time of the integrated assessment of the plant. Penetration 25 shows a capped test connection which should be equipped with two loc<ed closed isolation valves in series. Penetration 44 shows a manual isclation vayve (3/4"-2084) which is.not depicted by the iso-lation valve arrangements of. Penetration Class C2, and which differs from the explicit requirements of GDC 56 from the standpoint of valve actuation; the subject valve should be a power operated valve that is automatically actuated.

-- Penetration Class C3 Penetration Class C3 shows two, locked closed isolation valves in series, outside containment, for effluent lines from systems that are closed in-side containment and not missile protected. GDC 56 ~pplies to the lines in Penetration Class C3. The valve arrangements described above differs from the explicit requirements of GDC 56 from the standpoint of valve location, namely, one valve should.be located inside containment. How-ever, locating both valves outside containment may be acceptable, based on the discussion under Penetration Class C2. The following containment penetration is included in Penetration Class C3: 33. The following discussion pertains to those containment penetrations not covered by the Penetration Classes discussed above. I ' a) Penetartions 9, 20, 24, 29, 34, 43, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 70, i / 71 and 73:

• These containment penetrations are spares.

Of these, penetrations 21, 29 and 73 show pipe caps and blind flanges being used as isola-tion barriers. Threaded and/or tack welded pipe caps, and blind flanges without leak testing provisions, are not suitable isola-ti on barriers. b) Penetrations 12 and 13: These containment penetrations satisfy the explicit 'requirements of GDC 56, and are acceptable. However, with respect to the test, vent and drain lines, pipe caps are not suitable isolation barriers; two locked closed isolation valves in series should be provided for

---

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• e 15 -

these lines. Also, the flow element locat~d between the isolation valves at penetration 13 should be moved downstream of the outboard isolation valves, or the licensee should justify that the flow ele-ment is an acceptable isolation barrier. c) Penetrations 17 and 48: These two containment penetrations serve the containment pressure instrumentation (8 lines). Since signals for the actuation of engi-neered safety features are derived from this instrumentation, it is imperative that these lines be open and remain open. Consequently, power-operated valves, which could potentially spuriously close, are not provided in these lines. The instrument lines, how~ver, are provided with test connections that are only capped. Again, pipe caps are not suitable isolation barriers; two locked closed isolation.valves in series should be provided in each test line. d) Penetrations 19~ 50 and 51: These containment penetrations. are the personnel air lock, emergency access air lock and* equipment hatch, respectively. Several lines are associated with these penetrations that**are equipped only with pipe caps for isolation barriers. Pipe caps are not suitable isola-tion barrier~ and should be replaced with locked closed manual valves or blind flanges that are leak testable

• rationale for accepting the isolation provisions of the emergency sump recirculation line? appears in SRP 6.2~4, at Item II.3.

h) Penetrations 30 and 31: With regard to penetrations 30 and 31 (containment spray pump dis-charge lines), the actuation provisions for the power operated valves CV-3001 (penetration 30) and CV-3002 (penetration 31) differ from the explicit requirements of GDC 56 in that they are remote manual isolation valves. Remote manual isolation valves are pro-vided in lieu of automatic isolation valves because the lines, which are part of the containment spray system, have a post-acci-dent safety function (depressurization of the containment follow~ ing a pipe break accident) which necessitates their being opened in the event of an accident. Consequently, automatic isolation of these lines is not appropriate. However, the capability does exist

• to remote manually isolate these lines if the need to do so should arise.

The actuation provisions for these valves are acceptable based on the guidelines of SRP 6.2.4, at Item II.3. i) Penetration 39: For penetration 39, the simple check valve.outside containment is replaced with a blank flange during plant operation. To be an acceptable isolation barrier, the blank flange should be l~ak testable. ( : ' CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM PENETRATidN ONTAI?\\'ME~'l' . \\\\"ALL I SOI.AT ION r----- SIGNAL I RMC +------ - SIGNAL CON'l'AINM~N'l' WAL CLASSES II ISOLATIO?~ :<;; ISOLATION r - - - SIGNAL ~ r- - -SIGNAL I Cl) 1 1 t-' _ _ _ RMC

• t;

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.. - i 9 - CONTAINMENT ~~O~TION SYSTEM PENETRATIC,:-* CLASSES CLASS C CONTAINMENT

E:

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~ ISOLATION r- - -- SIGNAL MISSILE PROTECTED

• t t---------------~.,........,,_......,.....,..--------------.....1~

I RMC f.------ I SIGNAL c t;J. tr.> o* ..:I u CONTAINMEl.qT WALL LC LC Inside-. .. Outside NON-MISSILE PROTECTED LEGEND

---

1\\.l"L... M~AL VALVE

~ ~NORMALLY OPEl'~ _M-MANUAL VAI..VE e YLC! . LOCKED CLOSED ~ CHECK VALVE f ~BLIND FLANGE Figure 4 Q ~ tr.l 0 ~ tJ I ISOLATION r-- SIGNAL I 1 RMC I t- ~ - SIGNAL I ISOLATION r--- --~IGNAL 1. RMC t--'_. -- --- SIGNAL Inside ~Outside NON-MISSILE PROTECTED 1 -- ISOLATION I SIGNAL* 1--_: RMC I 'SIGNAL A!R OPEAATED WITH REMOTE MANUAL CONTROL AND AUTO-MATIC ISOLATION

VI I I le I i '. l Conclusions The following summarizes t~e deviations fro~ review guid~lines that have been identified and described in Section V of this report:

1. The isolation valving arrangements of the following containment penetrations do not meet the requirement~ of GDC 55 or 56 from the standpoint of valve location:

Penetrations 1, 4, 4a, 10,

2.

11, 21, 21a, 25, 26, 28, 30, 31~ 33, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 40a, 40b, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 52, 52a, 52b, 56, 65, 67, 68 and 69. The isolation valves in these penetrations ftre located outside containment. The acceptability of this is contingent on the ac-ceptability of the piping design criteria. Also, the licensee sh6uld discuss the unique characteristics of the valves closest to the containment to terminate valve shaft or bonnet seal leak-age, or the provisibns in the plant for control of leakage. The isolation valves of the containment penetration numbers listed below differ from the explicit requirements of GDC 55, 56 and 57 from the standpoint of valve type by using one check valve in ser-ies with other type isolation valves located outside containment: Penetrations 7, 8~ 10, 11, 14, 26, 30, 31, 37, 39, 41, 42, 45, 65 and 67. A simple check valve located outside containment is not an appro-priate automatic isolation valve. The judgment regarding its ac-ceptability will be made in conjunction with the integrated assess-ment of the plant. I For penetrations 7 and 8, the main feedwater line, those check I I valves should be power operated, automatic isolation valves.

3.

The isolation barriers in the containment penetrations listed be-low differ from the explicit requirements of GDC 55, 56 and 57 from the standpoint that pipe caps or bljnd flanges are used as containment isolation barriers. Penetrati~ns having pipes or test connections capped outside con-tainment: 13, 17, 17a, 21, 21a, 25, 27, 28, 29, 38, 39, 48 and 73; Penetrations having blind flanges inside containment: 18, 21, 29 and 73; or outside containment: 1, 4 and 39. A blind flange inside or outside containmennt is an acceptable iso-lation barrier in lieu -of an isolation valve if the blind flange is leak testable. Pipe caps used in lines penetrating containment or test connections are not acceptable isolation barriers and should be replaced with locked closed valves o~ blind flanges that are leak testable. -There are spare penetrations equipped with pipe caps, such as pene-trations 21, 29 and 73. To be acceptable, the *pipe cap should.be fully welded with the same quality as the containment weld, or re-placed with a blind flange that is leak testable.

• 4.

The power operated valves CV-3001 (penetration 30) and CV-3002 (penetration 31) of the containment spray pump discharge lines dif-fer from the explicit ~equirement 6f GDC 56 from th~ standpoint of valve actuation. Remote manual isolation valv~s are provided in lieu of autom~tic isolation valves because the systems have a post-accident safety function which necessitates their being opened in the event of an accident. The actuation provision for these valves are acceptable based on the guidelines of SRP 6.2~4, at Item II.3.

5.

The containment sump suction lines which are part of the ECCS and the containment heat removal system have post-accident safety func-tions. Therefore, automatic isolation of these lines (penetrations 53 and 54) is not desirable; remote manual isolation valves are a~ ceptable.

6.

Penetration 44 shows a manual isolation valve (3/4"-2084) in series with an air operated isolation valve, which differs from the ~xplicit requirements of GDC 56 from the standpoint of valve acuation. This manual valve should be a power operated automatic isolation valve.

7. There are several lines associated with the following penetrations which are equipped with pipe caps:

the personnel air lock (penetra-tion 19); emergency access air lock (penetration 50); and equipment hatch (penetration 51). These pipe caps are not suitable isolation bar~iers and should be replaced with locked closed manual valves or blind flanges that are leak testable. I

23 -

8.

GDC 55 and 56 specify that automatic isolation valves should, upon loss of actuating power, take the position that provides greater safety. The position of an isolation valve for normal and shutdown operating conditions, and post-accident conditions, depends on the fluid system function. In the event of power failure to a valve operator, the valve position should be consistent with the line function. In this regard, sep~rate power supplies for isolation valves.in series may be required to assure the isolation of non-essential lines. The licensee has provided information (see Table 1) on the position of isolation valves, whether or not the line is essential and the isolation signals for each isolation valve. This information shows that automatic isolation valves assume positions of greater safety on loss of actuating power and, 1 therefore, GDC 55 and 56 are satisfied. I

---

~---,.-....,-------*--~.*---~-.----**-**

e*.

• e TABLE 1 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM SEP REVIEW ITEMS 1 PLANT:

PALISADES NOP UNIT 11 PAGE _1_ OF 13 PENE-SYSTEM NAME PENE VALVE VALVE LOCATION. POSITION ESS-ACTUA-REHARKS TRATION AND SERVICE CLASS I OEtlT. TYPE OR oc IC HOR-SltUT POST PWR EN-TION NO. LINE SIZE NO. NUMBER OESCR I rn ON MAL ON LOCA FAIL. TIAL 1 Purge Alr Supply Al cv1007 AO BlITF Vt.V x NC O/C c c u CIS Blank Flangedi Vent. Syet. (110"~) CV1008 AO BUTF Vt.V x NC O/C c c CIS Valves Presently Rot Used 506VAS MAN GL Tl;:fJT VLV x LC c c in Modes 1-4 TEn'i' CONNECT x CAP 2 HBln Stm Line Cl cvo510 POS Cll'K VLV x HO c, c c y LOW B/O Losa or Air, cY-0510 Remains (SGE50A) MOV0510A. MO BYPASS VLV x NC c c c PRESS RM in Position Due to Croaa Con ( 36"~) nection8 vlth Hlgh Presa Air and Accumulators

• 3 Hain Stm Line Cl cvo501 POS en* K VLV x

HO C*' c c y LOW 8/0 toes ot Air, CV-0501 Re111aina (SGE50D) HOV0501A HO BYPASS VLV x HC c c c PRESS RM in Poeition Due to Crose Con (36"!1'1) nectlon vith High Pre1111 Air end Accwnulatore

• 4 Purge Alr Exhaust Al CVlOOJ AO ntrrF VI.V x

HC O/C c c H CIB Blank Flangedi Vent. *s7st. (l16"f11) CV1605 AO mrrF VLV x HC 0/C c c CIB Valves Presently Hot Used CV1606

• AO BlITF VLV x

HC O/C c c CIB in Modes 1-4 506VAS MAH G J, TES'r VLV x LC c c lia Purge Air Exhaust Al lOOVAS MAN <IA VLV x LC c c H - Snmple Line lOlVAS MAN GA VLV x LC c c ( 3"11'1) 507VAS MAH GL TEST VLV x LC c c TEST COHN /w CAP x c 5 srn (E50A) C2 cvo767 AO AHCll,f: Vl.V x HO c c c H CIB llottom Blow Dovn.. cvo771 110 ANGLF. Vt.V x NO c c c CIS (2"~) 567MS. MAH GL TEGT VLV x LC c c 'l'EST CONN /w CAP x c 6 S/G (E50B) C2 cvo768 AO llNGl.E VLV x NO c c c H CIB Botto1n Blow Down cvono 110 JINGLE Vl.V x NO c c c Cl9 (2"11'1) 56CNS MAH GI, 'l'EST x LC c c TEST CONN /w CAP x c 1 Feedvnter. to Cl 7l16FW MAN GL VLV x LC c c 6/0 (E50A) 6' u210n-1ol1 CllF.CK Vl.V x c c c y RE\\t6P Aux FW ( 16"~) 10' H210n-102 CllECK VLV x 0 0 c y REV*P Hain FW

1'.*j ~ J ) "),' r;; CONTAINMENT JSOLATION SYSTEM SEP REVIEW ITEMS PLANT: PALISADES NOP UNIT 11 PENE-SYSTEM NAME PENE VALVE TRATION AND SERVICE CLASS IDENT. HO. LINE SIZE rm. NUMOER 0 Feedwoter to Cl 1117FW S/G (E50D) 18 1 N218R-101 N218R-103 .. 9 G1ioro 10 Service Air A2 122CAS (2"~) ltOlCAS llt2CA T 11 Condensate to C2 CV0939 Shield Cooling 1to1coo Burge Tank 536coo (l's"~) 5J6ACD T

• 12 Service Water x

cvoo*n Supply (16 11 ~) cvo069 cvo865 CV0062 CV0870 571sws 57osw 5oosw 56osw 266SW 265sw 13 Service Water x cvoo211 Return (16 11 ~) 572~W CV0067 cvoOl1J cvon61i cvoo63 cvoo61 CVOOJO cvoon cvoo12 TABLE I VALVE* LOCATION TYPE OR oc IC DES CR I PTI ON MAH GJ, TlRAIN VLV x CllF.CK Vl.V x CllECK VI.V x MAN GA VLV x CllF.CK VLV x MAN GL TEST VLV x TC>T CONN /v CAP x AO GA VLV x CllECK VLV x MAN oL* TEST VLV x M/\\N GL TEST VLV x T&>T CONN /v CAP x AC mrrF VLV x AC ntrrF VLV x AC n1rrF Vl.V x AC mrrr VLV x AC mrrF VLV x H/\\H GI\\ VLV x MAN GA VI,V x M/\\N C:A VLV x MAN GI\\ VI~V x MAN GA Vl.V x MAN GA VLV x AC ntfl'F Vl.V x MA IN GA TEST VLV x AC mrrF VLV x AO Gt, VLV x AC IJlrl'F VLV x AO GI. VLV x J\\C mn*F VLV x AO Gt, VLV x AC mrrF VLV x AO m. vr.v x POSITION NOR-SllUT POST MAL UN LOCA LC c c 0 0 c c c c LC O/C C* c O/C c J,C c c* c NO 0 c 0 O/C c LC c c LC c c c NO 0 0 NO 0 0 NO 0 0 NO 0 0 NO 0 0 LC c c LC c c LC c c LC c c LC c c LC c c NO 0 0 LC c c NC c 0 NO 0 0 NC c 0 NO

o.

0 NC c 0 NO 0 0 NC c 0 NO 0 0 ESS-PWR EN-FAIL. TIAL ff y y H c H 0 y 0 y 0 T 0 y 0 y H H N N lf 0 T H 0 y c H 0 y c H 0 .Y c H 0 T I H l\\CTUA-TION REV*P REVAP -REV.aP CIS REV"P MAN M/\\N MAN MAH MAH - MAH* -DIS TC SIS TC SIS TC 919 'l'C PAGE 2 OF 13 REMARKS Main FW Aux FW BIS Tripe Honnol Fan Which in Turn Opens ValYe N <.n

Tl\\RLE 1 COHTAINMENT ISOLATIOH SYSTEM SEP REVIEW ITEMS PLl\\NT: Pl\\LISAOES NOP UNIT fl PENE-SYSTEM NAHE J'ENE VALVE VALVE LOCATION TRATION AND SERVICE CLASS IOENT. TYPE OR oc IC NO. LINE SIZE NO. NUMBER OESCR I PTI ON 111 Component C2* CV0910 AC mrrF VLV x Coo.ling Woter 251-U910CC CllF.CK Vl.V x in (10"~) 507cc Mf\\N GI, TF!JT Vt.V x TE!iT CONrl /w CAP x 15 Component C2 cvo911 AC mr1°F/llD OP x Cooling Water cvo9lio AC DlYl'F/110 OP x Out (10"\\3) 500CC MAN GL TF!JT VLV x 'l'EST COHN /w CAP x 'l'ES'r CONN /w CAP x 16 BIG (E50A) Cl cvo139 AO ANGLE VLV x Surface Blov Down ( 2"ia) ll. Containment H/A 1802 x Preeeure 1002A x Instrwnentation 16028 x (Ii-ls"~) 1002C x 10011 x lOOl1A x 18ol1n i x 180l1C x 1812 x 1812A x ioi2n x 1812C x lBlh* x 18ll1A x lBlhD x 18lhC x 11a Containment Bump 18Jl1F. x Level lnstrtunenta-610D-DHW x ti on lOlhF x lOJl1G x TEST /wCAI' x POSITION NOR-SHUT POST MAL ON LOCA HO NO c 0 0 c IC LC c c NO 0 c HO 0 c I..C: c c c c 0 O/C c 1..0 0 0 t..o 0 0 LC c c LC c c LO 0 0 LO 0 0 1£ c c 1.c c c LO 0 0 LC c c LO

0.

0 1£ c c J,() 0 0 LC c c 1£ c c J,C c c t..o 0 0 c c c LC c c LC c c CAP ESS-PWR EN-FAIL. Tll\\L 0 H AI " AI - .c II y If ACTUA-TlON SIB HEV"P SIB SIS CIB . PAGE _l_ OF 13 REMARKS Auto Reopen on BIB Reeet Auto Reopen on BIB Reeet CY-0911 & 09110 has Accumulator* for LoBll of Air PB-1002 (BIS

• CIB Initiation)

PB-1002A (BIB & CIB Inltlatlon P9-100li (BIS & CIB Initiati~n) P-B-180lt (BIB &'. CIB Initiation Pl'-1012 Pl'-1812A PT:-lBili I* . I N O"I

TABLE 1 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTE~ SEP REVIEW ITEMS PLANT: Pl\\LISl\\OES NOP UNIT 11 PAGE j_ OF.1J_ P£NE-SYSTEM Nl\\ME PENE VALVE VALVE LOCATION POSITION ESS-ACTUA-REMARKS TRATION AtlO SERVI CE CLASS IDENT. TYPE OR oc IC NOR-SllUT POST PWR rn-* TION rm. LIHE SIZE NO. NUMBER OESCR I PTI ON MAL ON LOCA FAIL. TIAL 18 & Fuel Trans fer A2 MAN nl\\ VLV x NC c c ff Blind Flg v/ 2 0-Rlng Seale 18a 1'ube ( J6"~) 16" Fl.ANGE x c c Ineide Ctmt Ii" FLANGE x c c 19 Pereonnel Lock x P5A MAN GL TF..ST VLV LC O/C LC Outer Door l'llESS GAGE c PRESS TUBE CAP l'RF.SS EQUAL VLV NC Inner Door PRESS TUBE CAP PRESS TUBE CAP 20 Spare PRESS EQUAL YLV NC 21 Hydrogen Monitoring SV-2l115A x c c O/C c Return Line (~"~) SV-2lil58 x c c O/C c MV-WGS1Jl x c c CAP

• x 2la Hydrogen Monitoring SV-2l1lJA x

c c O/C c Supply Llne (Js"~) SV-2111]8 x c c O/C c MV-WGS1JO x c c CllP x CAP 22 Redw1dnnt High x MOJ060 MO GI, VLV x NC c 0 AI y SIB F.sF Related l'reooure Safety 3250 c11 1K vr.v x c c 0 flIG InJectlon (6"~) MOJ066 MO Cl!, VJ,V x HC c 0 AI em 3251 cu* K vr.v x c c 0 618 MOJ061i MO GL VLV x NC c 0 AI SIB 3252 Cll 'K VI.V x c c 0 SIS MOJ062 MO GI, vr.v x NC c 0 Al SIS 3253 Cll'K VLV x c c 0 SIB RV32611 REJ,JEF VLV x c c c M03012 MO GA VLV x NC c O/C AI CV30l8 1\\0 GA VLV x HC c o;o c CV30J6 AC GI\\ VLV x NO c 0 0 3265 MAN GI, VLV x NO O* 0 3265/\\ MAN ClL VLV x NO 0 0 Pl-0375

TADLE 1 COtHAIHMEHT ISOLATION SYSTEM SEP REVIEW ITEMS PLANT:.. PALISADES NOP UNIT 11 PAGE _5 _ OF..!L PENE-SYSTEM NAME PENE VALVE VALVE LOCATION POSITION ESS-AC TUA-REMARKS TRATION AND SERVICE CLASS I DEHT. TYPE OR oc JC NOit-SllUT POST. PHR EN-HON N,O. LINE SIZE NO. NUMBER OESCR I PTI ON MAL ON LOCA FAIL. TIAL 23 lligh PreHure x MOJ007 MO GL VLV x NC c 0 AI y BIS Safety Injection 31011 Cll'K VLV x c c 0 SIB ESF Related MOJ009 MO OL VLV x NC c 0 AI BIB Actuation Signal Initiated 3ll9 Cll'K VLV x c c 0 BIS By Chp or Per/Otrp (!1593Paia MO JOU MO GL VLV x HC c 0 Al SIB Actuation Signal Initiated 31311 Cll 'K Vl.V x c c 0 BIS By Chp or Per/Otrp (?1593Paia MO)Ol] MO l1L VLV x NC c 0 Al BIB Actuation Signal Initiated By Chp or Per/Ovp (~1593Pala

11*19 Cll'K VLV x

c c 0 llV3165 OELIEF VLV x c c c CVJ059 AC GA VLV

• x NO 0

0 0 CV)OJ1 AO GA VLV x HC 0 O/C 0 3331 MAN GL TEST VLV x 0 BX-3337. 3337A MAN GL TEST VLV x 0 c 0 BX-3337 3100 MAN GL VLV x NO 0 0 PT-0318 3180A MAN GL VLV x NO 0 0 PT-0318 .2~ Spare 25*. Clean Waste C2 cv1061t AO CL VLY. x Hff 0 c ... c H

• crs Receiver Tank cv1065 AO GL VLV x

HO 0 c c CIB Vent to Stack 512CRW MAH GL TEST VLV x I.C c c (2i*~) TEST CONN /W CAr x c 6l17cnw MAN UJ, VLV x HO 0 0 PT-1065 1358 DOAIN CONH/W CAP x c 26 Hltrogen t.o C2 CV1J50 AO GA VLV x NC c c c N CIB Quench Tank l100N2 CllECK VLV x c c c .581N2 MAN GA TEST VLV x LC c c TF.ST CONNECT c 27 Int Lenk Rate Teet A2 MOV-Pl MO Blll'F VLV x NC c c c H Ml\\N FlanRed v/Oaoket Flll Line (6"10 6011 VAS MAN GL Vl.V x LC c c Inside Containment 605 VAS MAN Gf, VLV x LC c c Flanged v/Oaeket 'l'EOT CONN /W CAP x c Inelde Containment

~.. ' TADLE 1 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM SEP REVIEW ITEJ"S PLANT: PALISADES NOP UNIT 11 PEtlE-SYSTEM NAME PENE VALVE VALVE LOCATION TRATIOtC AND SERVICE CLASS IDDH. TYPE OR oc IC NO, LINE SIZE NO. NUMBER DES CR I PTI ON '28 Containment 1110 VAS x Air Sample Line 1111 VAS x (~"IO) 1112 V/IS x 510 VAS x TEST CAP x I' 29 Capped Spare PIPF. FJ,ANGE x PIPE END /W CAP x JO Containment Spray x . CV3001 AC GI. VJ.V x 3258 MAN GA'f1'~ VLV x 3226 CHECK vr.v x 33liliES GI.ODE VLV x* TEST CONN /W CAP x 3227ES OLODE VLV x 31 Containment Spray x CV3002

• AC GI. VLV x

3259 MAN GA VLV x 3216 CHECK VLV x 3217ES MAN GL VLV x JJl16ES M GJ, TF.3T VLV x TEfi'l' CONN lW CAP x )2 Low Preeoure x M0300fJ MO GL VJ.V x Dnrcty InJcction 3101~::n CllF.CK Vl.V x ( 12"~) . 1-103010 MO GJ, Vl.V x 3110F.3 cm;cK v 1.v x MOJ012 MO m... Vl.V x 31 J)r-:1 CllF:CK Vl.V x MO]OJ.11 MO Gr, Vl.V x 311101~ Clll~CK. V l.V x 3163E3 MAN GA VLV x 3196 MAN GA VLV x 3191 MAN GA VLV x CVJ006 AC or. vr.v x CVJ025 AO <H. vr.v x 3336 MAN GA VJ.V x JlOOF.S MAN GI\\ VLV x 3101E3 MAN GI\\ Vl.V x POSITION NOR-SllUT POST MAL ON LOCA LO u 0 LC c c LC c c LC c c c c c NC c

0.

LO 0 0 c c 0 LC c c c LC c c HC c 0 LO 0 0 c c 0 LC c c LC. c c c HC c 0 c* c 0 NC c 0 c c 0 NC c 0 c c 0 NC c 0 c c 0 LC c c NO 0 0 NO 0 0 HO 0 0 NC 0 O/C c

c.

c 0 0 0 0 0 0 ESS-PWR EN-FAIL. TIAL N N 0 y 0 y AI y -Al - AI - H ---- 0 c --- ACTUA-TIOH CUP CUP BIB BIB BIB SIS nrn BIS

• arn BIO MAU MAH PAGE~ OF _!L REMARKS ESF Related Auto Open On Chp ESF Related Auto Open on Chp ESF Related

-~ Fl'-0307 f'l'-0307 I. \\J

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM SEP REVIEW ITEMS PLANT: PALISADES NOP UNIT 11 PEHE-SYSTEM HAME PEHE VALVE VALVE TRATIOH AND SERVICE CLASS IOENT. TYPE on HO. LINE SIZE NO. NUMDER DESCRIPTION 32 Lov Pressure 1155PC MAN GA Vl,V cont. Safety Injection 3123F.S M/\\N GA VLV )122ES MAN GA VLV 11561'C M/\\H GA Vl.V 3130ES M/\\N. GA VLV 3137ES MAH GA VLV 1157PC MAH GA VLV 3153ES M/\\H GA VLV 3152ES MAH GA VLV 1158PC MAH GI\\ VLV RV-3162 HEf,IEF 33 Safety Injection CJ 32Jl1ES M/\\H UA VLV Tank Drain 3231F.S MAH GI\\ VLV (2"~) 33l16ES M/\\H GL TEST VLV 'l'EST COHH /W CAP 3221c:J MAH GL VLV 3236ES MAH GA VLV 3235ES M SAMPL LIME GAV 3211ES MAH GL VLV 31, Spare 35 Shutdown 82 MOVJ016 MO GA VLV Cooling Return MOV]Ol5 MO GI\\ VLV (1'4"'0 11V3164 llF.LIEF VLV RVOl1.0l llF.l,U:F Vl.V 32ol1ES MAN GL VLV 3205 MAH GA VLV PIPE FLANGE M0-3190 MO GA. VLV M0-3199 MO GL VLV 3163 MAH GA VLV 36 l.etdovn To Bl cv2009 AO GL VLV Purl flcatlon 2320CVC MAN GL TF.S!l' VLV Ion Exchanger T~T COHN /W CAP (1~"~) 2010CVC MAH GA VLV TADLE l LOCATION POSITION oc IC NOR-SllUT POST MAL Dtf LOCI\\ x c c c x 0 0 0 x 0 0 0 x c c c x 0 0 0 x 0 0 0 x c c c x 0 0 0 x 0 0 0 x c c c x c c c x LC c c x LC c c x LC c c x c x I.C c c x LC c c x 1.c c c x LC c c x, ELC 0 O/C x ELC 0 O/C x NC c c x HC c c x LC c c x LC c c x c c c x El.C 0 0 x ELC o* 0 x c c c x NO 0 c x LC c c x c x NO 0 0 ESS-PWR EN-FAIL. TIAL y n c H c --- -AI AI - c n AC TUA-TION WtH CIB PAGE _7_ OF

• 13 REMARKS FT-0309 Fl'-0309 Fl'-0311 Fl'-0311 Fl'-03lli Fl'-O]l!i Manual Control w

0

j I I l I i. I* j l CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM SEP REVIEW ITfMS PLANT: PALISADES HOP UNIT 11 PENE-SYSTEM NAME PEHE VALVE TRATIOH AND SERVICE CLASS IOENT. NO. LINE SIZE NO. NUMBER 36 Letdovn To Bl 21laOA cont. Puri ficntlon cv2012 Ion Exchanger 21l19A ( 1!1"(11) CV2122 31 Primary Syotem C2 CVlOOl Drain Pump laoJcnw neclrc ( 1~"(11) 50JCll\\I JO Condeneate Return C2 CV1501 From Steam Heating cv1502 Units (2"(11) 502VA 39 Containment x CV1503 Heating Syetem ( la"(l1) 503VA lio Pri-Cooling Syetem Bl CVJ.910 . SllPlple Ll ne CV1911 (~"(11) . lllOA 117011 l1oa Hydrogen t4onitcirlng SV-2la1l1A Return l.ine BV-2111118 (Degaeifler Room), l29WOS (~"(11) laOb. Hydrogen Monitor sv-2*1121\\ Supply Line sv-21t12n (Degaelfler Room) l20WGS ~II~ .T/\\OLE 1 VALVE ~OCl\\TIOH TYPE OR oc IC

• HOR-UESCR I PTI ON Ml\\L MAN GA VLV x

NO AO GL VLV x NO MAN GA VLV x NO AO GL VLV x NC I AO GL VLV x NC CllECK VLV x c MAN Gf, TEST VLV x LC TE3T CONN /W CAP x c 1\\0 GA VLV x NC AO GA VLV x NC MAH GL TEST VLV x LC VENT CONN /W CAI' ~ c TEST CONN /W CAI' x c AO GA VLV x HC CllF.CK VLV x MAH GL TEST VLV ~ LC TEST CONN /W CAI' x c VENT COHN /W CAI'

• x c

AO GL.VLV x 0/C AO GL VLV x O/C MAH f::L TEST VLV x LC MAH GL T~T Vl.V x LC 'l'F.!JT CONN ['W CAP x c SOLF.NOID x c BO LENO ID x c MAii 01, VLV x c T1:::;T CONN /W CAI' x c SOLENOID x c SOLENOID x c MAN GL VLV x c 'l'E3T CONN /W CAI' x c POSITION SllUT POST. PWR DN LOCA FAIL. 0 0 0 O/C c 0 0 c c c c c c c c c c c* O/C c c 0/C c c c c c c c c c O/C c c O/C c c c c c c c O/C c c O/C c c c c O/C c c O/C c c c ESS-ACTUA-EN-TIOH Tll\\l H CIB H Cls Ii CIB CIS H MAH MAN PAGE _a_ OF...u_ REMARKS Check Valve Repiaced v/Blank Flange When At Power I w

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM SEP REVIEW ITEMS PLANT: PALISADES NOP UNIT 11 PENE-SYSTEM NAME PENE VAl.VE VALVE TRATIOH /\\NO SERVI CE. CLASS IOEtH. TYPE OR NO. LINE SIZE NO. NUMOER DES CR I PTI ON 111 Degneeifier C2

cvioot, AO GI, VLV Pump Dlecharge

~OlCRW CHECK VLV (J"Y') 506CRW HJ\\N GL TEST VLV TmT CONN /W CAP ii2 Deminernllzed C2 CV0155 AO GJ, VLV Water To V0155B CHECK VJ.V Quench Tank 1126PC MAN GI, TEST VLV (2"~) TEST* CONN /W CAP 1,3 Bpare Controlled Bleed C2 CV208J AO GL VLV Off From RCP'B 208li Ml\\N GL VLV ( 3/li"Y') 2083 HJ\\N GA TEST VLV 208.JA MAH GA 'CEST VLV TF.ST CONN /W

• CAP.

li5 Charging Pwnp Bl* 2110 CHECK VLV Discharge (2 11~) CV2111 AC GL VLV "(W/ HD OPERATOR) 116. Containment C2 CVUOl AO GL VLV Verit Hender . CV1102 AO GI, VLV ( li"Y') 51IWGS MAN GL TEST VLV TEST corm lW ~AP 117 Primary Syotem C2 cv1002 Ao m. v1.v Drain Tank Pwnp cv1001 AO GL v1.v Suction 502CRW MAN GL TEST vr.v TEST CONN /W CAI' 118 Containment x V-1801 MAH GA Vl.V Pressure V-1001A MAN GA VLV tnotrumcntntlon V-10018 MllN GA Vl.V ( 11-~"gl Linea) V-1801C MAN GA VLV V-1003 MAN OA Vl.V V-180JA* MAH GA VLV Tl\\RLE 1 LOCI\\ Tl ON POSITION oc IC NOR-SllUT POST MAL DN LOCA. x NO 0 c x 0 0 c x LC c c x c x NC c c x c c x LC c c x c x NO 0 c x HO 0 0 x LC c c x LC c c x c x 0 0 0 x HO 0 0 x NO 0 c x NO 0 c x LC c c x c x NO 0 c x NO 0 c x LC c c x c x LO 0 0 x LO 0 0 x r.c c c x LC c x LO 0 0 x LO 0 0 ESS-PWR. EN-FAIL. TIAL c ff c N c y 0 c c - c c - ACTUA-TIOtl CIB CIS CIB MAR CIB CIB PAGE _2._ OF iJ_ REMARKS PS-1601 (BIS & CIS Initiation) PS-1801A (BIS & CIS Initiation, PS-1803 (SIB l CIS Initiation) PIJ-lOOJA (818 l CI8 lnltlatlon w t->

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM SEP REVIEW ITEMS PLANT: PALISADES NOP UHIT 11. PENE-SYSTEM NAME PENE VALVE VALVE TRATIOH AND SERVICE CLASS IDENT. TYPE OR NO. LINE SIZE NO. NUMDER. DESCRIPTION 118 Containment x V-10038 MAN GA Vl.V cont. Preeeure V-lOO]C MAN GA VLV Instrumentation V-1005 MAN GA VLV (b-1:!"~ Linea) V-1005A MAN GA VLV V-10058 MAN GA Vl.V V-l005C MAN GA VLV V-1015 MAN GA VLV V-1015A MAN OJ\\ VLV V-1815B MAN GA VLV V-1615C MAH GA VLV li9 Clean Waote C2 CV1036 AO GL VLV Receiver Tonk CVlOJ6 AO OL VLV Circulation PUJDp 513CRW MAN GL 'ff.ST VLV Suction ( 3"~) TEST CONN /W CAP 51l1CRW MAN DRAIN VLV 50 Emergency* Acceoo x l'nr.3 EQIJ/IL VLV Inolde Ct.mt l'llESS TIJIJE PRESS TUnE. Outside Ct.mt PRE31J EQUAL VLV PRF.SS GAGE PllESS 'l'UllE P6VA MAH 0 TEST VLV TEST CONN /W CAP 0-RINO TEST COHN 51 .Equipment Door x 0-RtNO TE:3T CONHECT /W CAP 52 .Containment Sump Al CVUOJ AO GJ, Vl.V Droln to Sump Tonk cv11ol1 AO GL Vl.V 500DRW MAN GL TEST VLV 'l'EST CONN VLV TAOl.E 1 LOCATION POSITION oc IC HOR-SllUT POST MAL DH LOCA x LC c c x LC c c x LO 0 0 x LC c c x LO 0 0 x LC c c x LO 0 0 x 1.c c c x LC c c* x LC c c* x NO 0 c x NO 0 c x LC c c x c x LC c c x NC x CAP x CAP x NC x c x x .LC x c x c x c x NC c c x NC c c x LC c c x c ESS-PWR EN-FAIL. TIAL c n c - c ff c - ACTUA* TlllH AUTO BY CIB BIS CHR PAGE ~ OF 2:!_ REMARKS PT-1805 1"1'-0105A Pl'.-1815 ~" Tube Betveen ~e Beale Canned w .w.

e* CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM SEP REVIEW ITEMS PLANT: PALISADES NOP UNIT 11 P£NE-SYSTEM NAME PENE VALVE VALVE 111/HIOH ANO srnv1r.£ r:t.ASS lllrtll. TYPE OR !!11. u Ill. ~ ** II. llO. m111111.n II[ SCIU 1'11 Otl 52a Containment 610onw HAN GA VLV riwnp Level 616FDnW MAN GA VLV Tnotrumentat.lon 61mrnnw MAN *r.A VLV ( J/8"~0 610F.DllW MAH GA Vt.V 610GDllW MAM GA VJ,V 618ADllW MAN GA Vl.V 616nnnw MAN GA VLV 616CDRW MAN llA VLV 610DDllW MAH GA VLV 3 TF.S'r CONN/WCAP 52b Containment 619onw MAH GA VLV 6wnp Level 619FDllW MAH GA VLV lnotrwnentatlon 61911DllW MAN GA VLV 619r.onw t1AN GA VLV 619aonw MAN GA VLV 619/\\DRW MAN GA VLV 619ennw HAN GA VLV 619CDRW MAN GA VLV 619nnnw MAH GA Vl.V 3 'l'Fli'r CONH/WCAP 53 Containment Spray lt CVJ029 AIR OP VLV l'W!IP Suction 3102Fli MAN GL 'l'FliT VLV TEf>T CONN /W CAI' 5h Contnlnmcnt Spray* x CV3030 AIR OP Vl.V Pwnp Suction J167f;S MAH TE:lT VLV TF..ST conn /W CAP 55 SIG ( E50D) Sur race' Cl cvonB AO Vl.V Blovdown ( 2"") W/ llAND OPERATOll 56 Containment Sump 606A-VAS [.eve) 619n-nnw lnotrumentation 6o6D-VAS 6o6C-VJ\\S TfliT CONN /W CAI' 57 Snore TABLE 1 LOCATION POSITION oc IC HOR-SllUT POST MAL ON LOCA x J,() 0 0 x 1£ c c x LC c c x LC c c x 1.c c c x LO 0 0 x 1£ c c x [£ c c x LC c c x c x LO 0 0 x 1.c c c x 1£ c c x LC c c x LC c c x LO 0 0 x LC c c x r.c c c x LC c c x c x NC c 0 x 1.c c c x c x NC c 0 x LC c c x c x 0 O/C c x 1.0 0 0 x c c c x r.c c c x 1.c c c x c I ESS-PWR EH-FAIL. Tl Al Al T AI y c AC TUA-TlON 61"WT LL BIRWT LL CIB PAGE 11 or 13 - REMARKS LT-0382 LT-0383 Poet Loca Open On Slrv LL Poot Loca Open On Blrv LL LT-0383 I w

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION.SYSTEM SEP REVIEW IT(MS PLANT: PALISADES NOP UNIT 11. Pr NE-SYSTEM NAME PEHE VALVE Vl\\LVE TRATIOH AND SERVICE CLASS IDENT.

• TYPE OR NO.

LINE SIZE NO. NUMBER DES CR I PTI ON 56 Spare c;Q Son re 60 Spare 61 Spare

• 62 Spare 63 Spare 64 Reactor Cavity A2 121SFP MAN GA VLV Fill & Reclrc 120SFP MAH GI\\ VLV (6.

1116) 5lliSFP MAN GL TEST Vl.V 'fEST CONN /W CAr 65 Instrwnent Alr A2 CV1211 AC GL VLV (2"~) lioocAs CllECK VLV 612cAS MAN GL TF.ST VLV TEST CONN /W CAP 611CAS MAH GA VLV 66

• ILRT x

. 601VAS MAH GA Vl.V Instrwnent Line L6VAS MAN GA VLV ( l~"~) 60JVAS MAN GL T~T VLV TF.ST CONN /W CAP 602VA MAN GL TEST VLV 'l'EST CONN /W CAP 61 Clean Waste C2 CVlOJT AO GL VLV

• Receiver Tank
• 110-cnw CllECK VLV Pump Reclrc 515cnw MAN GL TEST Vl.V

( 3"~) TEST CONN /W CAI' TABLE l LOCATION oc IC HOR-Ml\\l x LC x LC x LC x c x NO x 0 x LC x c x NO x LC x 1.c x . LC x c x LC x c x NO x 0 x LC x c POSITION SllUT POST PWR ON LOCA FAIL. c c c c c c 0 0 0 0 c c 0 0 c c c c c c c c 0 c c 0 c c c ESS-rn-TIAL H II II ~------ -- --------------... PAGE _!L OF..!L. ACTUA-REMARKS TION MAH PS1220 CIB w U1

TABLE 1 CONTAltlMFJH ISOLATION SYSTEM SEP REVIEW.ITEMS PLANT:

• PALISADES HOP UNIT #1 PAGE 13 OF 13 PEHE-SYSTEM NAME PENE VALVE VALVE LOCATION POSITION ESS-AC TUA-REMARKS TRATION AHO SERVICE CLASS IOENT.

TYPE OR oc IC HOR-SllUT POST PWR EH-TIOH NO. LlflE SIZE NO. HUMBER OESCR I PTI OH MAL ON LOCA FAIL. TIAL 66 Air Supply To Al CV1813 AO lllITF VLV x 1.c O/C c c H CIB Alr Supply To CV-1813 & Air Room cv1011i AO DU1'F VLV x 1.c O/C c c CV-1814 Ia Aleo Teated Under ( 12"~) 505VAS MAN GI, TEST VLV x LC c c LLRT TEG'r corm /W CAP x c 69 Cleon Woate C2 cv10115 AO GI, VLV x NO 0 c c H CIB Receiver Tonk

cv101i1, AO GJ, VLV x

NO 0 c c Pump Suction 510CHW MAN GJ, TEST Vl.V x LC c c ( '*"~) TEST COHN /W CAP x c 70 Svare 71 Svare 12 Reactor Refueling A2 117SFP MAN GA VALVE x LC c c H Cavity Drain 110SFP MAH GI\\ VALVE x LC c c (6"~) 515SFP MAN GL TEST VLV x

• LC c

c TEJT CONN /W CAP x c 73

• Capped Spare PIPE FI.ANGE x

DC c c If PIPE END /W CA*P x c c c 509VAS MAN OL TEST Vl.V x I.C c c 'l'ES'r CONN /W CAP x c c C.

3=1

• TABLE l NOTES

l. Vilve Type or Description - AO means air-to-open a:od AC means air-to-close.

2.

Normal. Position - NO - NC ~c - LO - LC ELO ELC Norma.J.ly open No:rmaJ:ly closed .Bolted ciosed {e.g. !la:oge) Locked. Open Locked Closed Elect.ricall.Y' wcked Open {key lock switch) Electrically Locked. Closed. {key lock switch)

3.

Shutdo;m Position - Ass'Ullles normal shutd.ovn vitb the i:>ia:ot en shutd.ov:o cooling.

4.

Pover Fail\\ll"e Position - Position sho*"D is for either loss of pover or loss of air u:oless othervise noted.

5.

Actuation - Signal 'Which auto:c:.a.ticall.Y' causes valve to reposition unless otherwise specified. Symbols are: CIS - SIS - CBP - CER MAN Contai:cment Isolation Signal Safety Injection Signal Containment Higb Pressure Sigoe.l Contaimnent High Radiation Signal RemoteJ.y actuated by Manual Operator action

TABLE

c -

PLANT; P!ILi'~ADC~ p04,,,.~N1T 1 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM

• SEP REVIEW FINDINGS I

EXCEPTIONS 7 PAGE 2. OF_ 'J J4i/ ~~~~0%f I ~~ LIN£. ~u & &' w ~ ~ p .,, 0'> f ~ ~ $ f REV!EWER:S COMMENTS _ ~ SERVICE* t Pve&c;:. /he 5uppl( ( 1-B"ci:>) _s-~ /( 2 M111JJs71?i11 "-1 L /A.J E- ~7 (5C,./=6'-oA) C3&, "cf>) 3 MA1JJ '°i'T57}W'J L/J.JE-5'7 (5<=i-ESe>8) C?t;,¢> ) 4 puet:rG /};,e Gvj-//Ju5 T 5cP x C4-8</?) 4a PuRerc: JJl,e Ex/l/lusr s&:, SA-Npl.G-L1'N& (:311¢-) \\ I S/q(GSt:>A J Borro!V} IX 5 81.ow ])mf/AI {.2 11¢>) ~0 I .cP 5/c=f CEso/3J 13vrwM S-&, IN.Aw ~WA./ Cz 11cb) 7 tt:E-DWJJT~ TO S/~ 51 x MFw 1sol.Ar10JJ vALVt:j ~He>1.1LD BG P<Jwse~- (E.S-oA) {/'/"'1¢ ) . RAf}~*i>:r;./J~MllTIL ~oJ!'_Tto,c.J.,t'f/;:./i_~ TO S!JTr>Fy (.,,:::_

• 7

,.,...... *1<J. .n.e **.,

• ATJD I

f3 /=EG-D l'.!1rp=z ro 5"7 x I/* 5/ & {. E- <:;(_) 8) q.SP/J£G- <;El.? VI CG- /J1e *.. * ])ECJS10,.J ON /}CcEp"["n81l1Ty OF 51A-/p(,e ClfE<;J::. /0 ~{p ?< x VALVt:: ouTJ1l>c CPAJr-A1NMEJJI 1$ AIEGl>li-C>. {24-.) wf'J DEiN51JJCi TD 51/1&LD I I I Cod1AJ<f Wi?&G T/l/JK:. s-~ >< x II J.? 5E\\hC e-- Wl1Tc!Z. S-CP <: I P/7 I ' I (I /,... ~~f '

1, i TABL£ ,,,../ f ,(__, CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM PLANT: ?AL,-WPc:i R:1-1N(uw1J; I "SEP. REVIEW FINDINGS I £XC£PTIDNS I PAGE 2 OF.. r; \\

1. ~ LIN£

• ~v Ii SERVICE *J~%%~%~/

~(J ~ &' w ~ ~ j!JJ j } ~ # ff REV/EWER:S COMMENTS /3 t:;ER.. Vi c.e WIJTE£. s--(o P,fc df5.,/Jec~or Acc.Gpm8tc-isoC.ATitiN £.& TUIC!v (I(',, c:b) 8/JRRl(:.-R:;. 14 (c,/,A{bNG.AJT&Joi 1/v6, 5l~ 1)l:Ct';1 cJ~ of.1 ~ccepr.A8!L1ry cp~1Mple-WA7e-,e iJJ {te>c/:>) x ..::I/cc.le VAlvG" t9t.17'j1[)t::- Ceo>1'r,1)1NN1:.rJr is A.!cc!ZD 10 GoM?='!Je-AJ T CooL 1i..J<f

>(p X/,l}fel? t!JLJT C 10'1 ¢>)

I 4:> 5 IG(t;S-OIJ- )'Xlq1Jcc- ;;-7 ~Low 'f><>w/.J cz/0>) 17 C.a-.i[Jt1>-1/..IC1JT fR.E-5-5 u l!C- ~~ x fifb C/Jf':S /9Rc A.Jor /JCL&pT/JBCC t5e>CA7irJM //JS fRO/J~~77JT1cJJ..l (4.~'fP.1 ~!lRtG:fZ i G; DC 5U, MeT ON 'ScJMi: oJl/fl ~1=1f'-lt=ri 8.4'51~. 17q CoNT"9A1Ne/.JT JU/vlf> 5"~ ND INF°OfC..LIA/ICJN c:>>J 1-soLAnolV VALV65 .I l..e-v~t /vs7eaµcµ{/}710A/ ,AR/2.AAl¢5/l-IE1JT (?1:"-Tcll ~u-t'Zc..;J)) i ~ i 18~ -,Z,EL 7/!ANYj=EilZ 5-(p x 6.I>C. SC:, tlleT oJ.I S'o/11£ 07/IER /Jlf/Nt-0 I /Aa °N.DE- (3<:, I/ cf) /3/HJ!J ()CE ~;?p<:;,,2.4, I Te/vi.Jr, 3 ). I i ,q fGESoNNEl wet:_ P!J~c.;111'; Aee; 1Vo1/-JccE>r~fJCe I CKJT GR.. "J;co 12.... "'* I A I t=-/Z n.,...,,.. p !-;ol..AT1cJ.A..I f31+R..e1§ic?S 1: i,. '?f/Jl!.G- \\ 20 I i J../y'PR66EIJ /1.l1JN1roe11J~ ,No INP'teM/-JT10A/ CJAI 1)",tJU'fT/OM VfiLvE>

• I;

-z/ 5"fo ;;<. {G/uf!.AJ /_1',JtE- ( Yz_ '1¢') rJ!.!t2,4&JcS.=*A-/JJT C5KeTCI/ ~t(lu1Cc*D ). /-IYP.eo6e/../ ~/e>N1f4!11J:f Z/Q -s-to ><. /I 5vppt.y L/J..Jt;; C~':/-) /I /?Gi>uNl>.ANT /-IJ6f/ /RS). SS I zz CS11fGTy IN.JECT/OM (G~ I I l/,<;1-1 /P£:5-7ul!E 23 ~Arr--=ry /Njrc l' ri1-J ~s-

TABL*** I;: CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYST£t1. PLANT: j};:Jj;5,11J);:_~ RI UNIT 1 I . SEP REVIEW FINDINGS I £XC£PTIONS I PAGE 3 OF_ '7

• ~v.

}~~%0%~/ i~ LIN£ ~(J ~ &' w ~ ~ /'l SERVICE .,,, JJ j ff ~ $ ff. REVIEWER:S COMMENTS .;i4 '5ffie&- "C/~J.J WllSTE.ka1vee.. TG1/ Ct7NNC.G}lor.... J lv'~/Js Tu.Jo L. c_ VA.Lvcs. ~.5 71J>.J~ Ve1f{ TO '5TAC/::::... ~lo >< f./rrRoSsoJ To ~ueNoj I PEc:.:1-;10"1 C>N 1Ja:.epTJJB1u7y OF 511vtf7Le- ~&:, TAJ.It. 5&:, x X* c.HE~ V.11lVC? ou?:J1iJ& Ce>N7711NA,/c:;VT i'JA!£ef)c~ 27 IJ1-1t ~KIYJ[s- ]et;T 5& VALV MoV-PI ISA 1c/IL CL.ofe:t>/jo{ATJON f=t'LL L/A1 Ct;,~) f3/}R£1~-e (5ciG i /ep~.z.4-, J://&Fv/ JI, 3 ). ~'6 ~IJ7N,>JAIE").} T,A 1R S&> )(. //1,06- ~ rJ NO/ /JCCGp_Tn8lG- /jCJUJ Tit!'JIJ 5.,qMµ L1'NE:-o/z11¢.J 8/IRR1e-e.

i6J CA-f'f/G-0 5f'lfRG-

,Bl/AJt>.. ;:tH/.lqE A.lt.J?T EJC:-ia:JJ::. 7BT/J8l~ j P1,PE-CAP 1s1Jor /Jece-p17J6'le*1-Jd1JTto/J ~LvG. 30 CbNTAINMroT 5ff.'9 f s-" x x x (/JC.fc.J.1'1-f'ON p&vr510"1sop CV-.300/ Al.JD C.V-3Po z M'!"£T <SOC. S"C, OAI 5oMG' o7l/cl2. 31 '1C.cwp111-1M£J.JT5f~IJ ( !J 1AEf'11.Jc;l> 8/-J-513 (51i'G 5R..j-Jrp.2,4,J'Tc-"-1~3 ) I S-C, x

x.

]),!;.C1S1t>/..} C'/\\./ Acct:pr/JB1t.fTJ ~F 51Mp'-G-cl/t::c..t:.. VAl\\/65 ~uT1t!JG c TM /<, A.!Eeh"E-D. 3Z Low f-pes~oeG-5/JFET)' s-s-JN.]GC.T10IJ. 33 5JJ,t=eTy INJEC T,.Cl/..f ~~ >< 7/IJJ !:: l>R 111)..) 34 5fflEE-

3?

5tlurl>~w,J c~L,~tj-5"S-- lfE1ueAJ (_14'1cf.) IE{/:>OWN rofl;bp1CA7101., sS-x ~ v.... 2012 ::;J_ c. v 2 / 2 z ') Hc-VLV BrS-HUfl:JMAT'n. 3 ~ Il';JExCl./.hl<-;c:t:: {11:./:f.) x tsolA-TtON \\Q~L VGS. ~* ~---**-.--*-***

TABL£ r:1 CON INMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM PLANT: 'ffl!.,-1@es a:!-uw; '. SEP R£V/£W FINDINGS I £XC~PTIONS J PAGE 4 OF.. '7

,*t.q~~%0%'1/

Ci)' ~ ~ ~ ~ 1-'Q~J' f I~~ 11 REV!EWER:S COMMENTS ~~ ~~ LIN£ I./. SERVICE 4 3 5fA££:- 44 CcwTRt>t/ c'P Blce:o oFF IF.lbl.1 Rep :s c -3//f;t.) ~~ 45 Gl/Ai'$1~,0Mp s--~ J>iso/A~ifE- {2 1'¢-) *. I 4~ ~Tfiltv/<lcJJT V!iN T

--~

HEi9/Jef? <-4<1>) .47 ?1!1J./llR.j "5l'3._"!CM l¥?/'1N_ ~I: f/UJ..ljJ 5uqioAl .5"°Lo ~-*-* x x x x x* x x

x.

I x x litc1J1 o -J C>Al kc&j?TA/31 ll ly oF 51M pl& a/Ed<:... VAlV6 OCIT-j1D6' ~J..Jr~1A)ME1.JI 1 S ~ 1~.;=-l> <<:. ri ISolATu't--1 '516/A/nl s J)o Nor P/l.bv1D6-f-JppRope1A r~ f)1 VCR-!11Ty J.ICJ!J--S'!>E-/.JTIAL l1AJ6 5r/Oulf).6G-x ,4vn?MA Tic.At-Ly. I -so '-AT/), cv-i,oB'/- 11-/oulP 13'5 hM AllroiVtlJTIL,,

• 1-Sc/l.ll Tl ON VALVe, c V-Zll / ACTUli7tOJ.J P/2.£)1//~/CWj A(ET q/)c.,-!;T)

< fJ "::>OME o7llce lJe-.,c:11.. 1t:b BA-sl'!> { ~R.P~.2.<1. 1 ~j:ll. *3). ":1~ 1nl,i:.O:::HEcK. 11.J/ui:=-,-n,,ri.;.f'IS.. C°7A *T i<C. /\\/1'1...-,, TF,

i ~ L \\ CONTA.INMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM PLANT: i3L;5p~::.c; ?iI LJN1T;. Ti B E ) . SEP REVIEW FINDINGS I EXCEPTIONS I PAGE 5 OF:. 'J. Jqfj J~%%;4%~ I ~/S" LIN£ ~(J &' w ~ ~.. }> .,, ~.f I ~ $ ff . REVIEWERS COMMENTS. <t ~ SERVICE. o' 4B WNiA1A/"1NT /;pt?.J7ol&- /AJ5{R<IJ.ft::7J7JI po.Al { 4/i.h 5"0:> 4Gf ic::LGl'>J K//}5Tlt' /lc.61 VE-l: ::;-&, x ]'A).Jf:.. C1Rcul.AntJA1 PvM/> I ...,-u~ T11?A 1 r ~,,;,c. 1 5o ,l:=MG.l.7c$11J~ /kcESS Pt pc <:..:Af'S 11e NOT /}CC cpr~Bte-. 15ot..ATta.J IAJ-5 1J:>l& TM T 8Pell1t=eS. OVIJ I OF c:.. T,-v.,- t; I b-&>a1 f'Nt:7.J r AX'~. If' . // 5'2 Cc::>A.1T/111*!UENr s Li"-' p s-~* >( l> £A !Al /l::> ) UMP ""j;q f.I J::. ?za ~1711>.JA.-fCJ.JT 5uuF. 5""~ NO IN,~e. t)A} V"1LVG'" ARRAIJQ~A/e7JT iU: ~ IA15"f£ ll/llEJ..1771 t' otJ x (<;/ce-rc n fEcti'D)

• Co;AJTA1>JME:JVT 5"u,t/f' 52b Lsvel INSTRll.AJE°f'J{JITIDN 5""{c, >(

// II 53 Co1>JT,q1AJ~1t:7JT 5fl?..4 y 5(p Mee(S ~Dt:.. S"C'o ON fo1V1t5 07H1::-e PE;/=1A1/> Puuf' Sue-T,-OAJ BM1~ (<;Er: 5t<P<;,*.z.4. I"le-M :u, 3 ). 54 ~1>JTA1/JM1;;1JT 5f'l!A )' puµp 1'UCT1 ON ?~ /I II 5? <;' I4(£Sof}) fo~c& >7 8LtJwlJoivJ..J* ( 2 '/,p) CoNT/J1NME:?JT ~(.J/t/F c 50 5"~ x lGVGf. hJqRu/.f.::"J.JjA710Al '57 '5fA-e&- 7B 5f/1RG-

• ~ **- ----

TABLE Z CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM PLANT: fAL/5AP6S" PUJ1J[tJN/E I SEP REVIEW FINDINGS I EXCEPTIONS I PAGE~* OF_ i7 I "~r J~%%%~f I. tf*<!) LIN£** ~(J ~ ~ w ~ ~ <(I SERVICE ..,, JJ j ~ ~ $ ~l REVIEWERS COMMENTS ?61 5pfi!2&-. t:,o 5p,nee:- c, I Sfll£~ b2 5pJJee-

• C 03 5;?.Ill!.;-

64.

R'E,lk.roe CAv1ry f=/li. -J(p

/ RcoRc.

(tf,~.¢>) 65 JN-rTRuMt:JJT /}IR ~~ x x ~V-121/ 5;/()ulP BefiN/}uroll411r1c. I, V.' )/u,Ple x CJ/EGJ::. VALVG" C>(.JT"'Jt/JC:- UPA/TA1AJMelv'/ 1 ~,c.. uJ"r (Z. ¢') '°' ~-"' - ~....,Ll T !=""'

• ILRT /A.J'}/RUME:NT L/AJ.Ei.

t,0 S-&, (!Yz¢) 07 ct GAiJ Wfi->T E /.&e:-IVcl<. -r,4/.Jk /-:ZMf> f 6£.1 ~C *{3 ~ ~~ x x ~Ct'ilC'N DN /)CCepr-Al31l1Ty 6,F'511<4pU5-ofed:..i.- V4lVG" OUT';l[)c Ce>t-1TA1"1.vtNT I'S AJe.-e-pl::-D. /liR 5uppl..y TO fi/R RccM 68 s-&> x (12 11 ¢>) c i

i.

6.q c:..i.CiA "1 WMT G:" fc~/11 G/:. lJlJ.J/:: !buf' Sc1cnoJ * (4 '¥) S--(p x 70 5p/1R. E:- '7 I ~f,RJ.!C:-

.. //-\\ 0,_ t::. c:-*. ' CON "AINMENT ISOLATION 5YST£f1 PLANT; [}}Li)P-OEj lifl" UA/JT.1.. l SEP REVIEW FINDINGS* I £XC£PTIONS I . PAGE 7 OF. *r;. ~v.. J~0%~%~/ f~ LIN£ ~0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ l~.!' SERVICE "'~ I } ~ $ ff. REVIEWERS COMMENTS 72 /?E1Je-7oe /?Erud,Aler <Avrry ])RA1tJ (8".:P>

• 5(p LApf G-P 5jJA£6--

/?;,Pe C/lf? /"j NOT t4Ct_EpTIJ8lG 1-Sou:JTIC'N 73 81>e.e1t:fl.,* /Jl..1 }.//) /=UJwC?c; Uu5/ /3ff IG11t. n">7P!J.:.E. I I

I VI. Reference

1. License DPR-20-Palisades Plant - response to SEP Topic: VI Containment Isolation System, 7/14/80.

2.

Independent review of containment penetrations, MPR-639, Vol. I & II, MPR Association, Inc, 11/15/79.

3. License DPR-20-Palisades Plant - IE Bulletin 79-06B respons~

update, 8/16/79 * . 14. DPR-20-Palisades Plant requirements resulting from review of TMI-2 accident actions taken in response to NRC, 12/27/79.

5. Consumers Power Co. Licensee event report 80-021, Rev. 1, Misaligned containment sump valve, 8/20/80.

6.

CE Post-TM! evaluation task 5 - containment isolation, 12/13/79.

7. Palisades plant design drawing:

M-201 (rev. 22), M-202(21), M-203(19), M-204(16), M-205(23), M-206(11), M-207(33}, M-208(19), M-214(15), M-215(14), M~218(20), M-219(10), M-220(17)~ M-221(10}, M-222(10), M-223(7), M-224(7), M-225(8), M-226(8), E-15(1), E-16(1), E-17(6).

8. Palisades plant #1, Final Safety Analysis Report, Vols. 1, 2 & 3.

9.

Letter from R. A. Vincent {Consumers Power Company) to

9. M. Crutchfield, dated August. 10, 1981, Providing Comments on CSB Evaluation Report on SEP Topic VI-4 for the Palisades Nuclear P 1 ant, Unit 1.

lD. Lett~r from R. A. Vincent (Consumers Power Company) to D. M. Crutchfield, dated January 4, 1982, Providing Informatfon on SEP Topic VI-4 for the Palisades Nuclear Plant, Unit 1.}}