ML18044A285
| ML18044A285 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 12/14/2017 |
| From: | Jesse Seymour, Bielby M NRC/RGN-III/DRS/OLB |
| To: | Exelon Generation Co |
| Seymour J | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17152A385 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML18044A285 (14) | |
Text
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Byron_______ Scenario No.: N17-1__________ Op-Test No.: 2017-301__
Examiners: ___________________________ Operators: ____________________________
Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is at full power, steady state, MOL, 845 ppm boron, equilibrium xenon.
Turnover: 1A CV pump is expected to be returned to service by end of shift from an oil change. Tech Spec 3.5.2 Condition A (ECCS trains) and TRM 3.1.d. Condition A (Charging pumps-operating) have been entered. 1BOL 5.2 and 1BOL 1.d have been initiated. 1A FW Pp is Out of Service for maintenance. Online Risk is Yellow. Protected Equipment: 1B CV Pump, 1B DG, ACB 1423, 1VD01CB, 1B FW Pump and 1C FW Pump.
Generation Dispatch will be requesting Byron U-1 to reduce load by 100 MWe at 4 mw/min Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 N Generation Dispatch requests Byron Unit 1 to lower power (BOP) 100MWe at 4 MW/min.
R (ATC, SRO) 2 MF RX21A I 1PI-455A fails low; causing PZR heaters to energize and sprays 1700 (ATC, to close if open. The RO will implement BHC 1-RY-P and select SRO) an operable PZR pressure controlling channel.. 1BOA Inst-2 will be entered and TS 3.3.1, TS 3.3.2, and TS 3.3.4 will be entered.
TS (SRO) 3 IOR C 1C Main Feed Pump Speed Controller fails low then swaps to ZAI1SK509C (BOP, manual; Flow from 1C FW Pp will lower causing high flow from 25 120 SRO) 1B FW pump. The crew will adjust 1C TDFP in manual per BHC IOR 1-SG to restore normal feedwater flow. The controller will be ZDI1SK509C operated in manual for the remainder of the scenario.
MAN 4 MF CV10 200 C 1CV121 fails open; 1CV121 will slowly fail open. ATC will 30 135 (ATC, establish manual control of charging flow per BAR 1-9-D3.
SRO) 5 MF TP01B C GC pump trip; 1B GC pump trips, 1A GC pump will not auto start (BOP, but can be manually started per BHC 1-18-A14 to manually start RF TP14A SRO) the 1A GC pump.
6 MF RP10B C Inadvertent Containment Phase A isolation; the crew will refer (BOP, to BAR 1-5-B7 and implement 1BOA Pri-13 Recovery from an ZLO1FP010 SRO) Inadvertent Phase A Containment Isolation. BOP will attempt to 2 ON manually close failed open 1FP010 Fire Protection Outside Isol TS ZLO1FP010 Vlv. US will enter TS 3.6.3. Crew will then continue to reset (SRO) 1 OFF CNMT Phase A, establish Instrument Air to Containment and regain normal PZR pressure control.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 7 MF NI08G 0 M NI channel failure N43 detector failure low causing an OTT (ALL) reactor trip signal and Train A FW isolation occurs; the MF RP09A reactor will fail to automatically trip. The crew will enter 1BEP-0, MF RP01 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and manually trip the reactor (preload) (manual reactor trip is successful.)
8 MF CV01B C Loss of Heat Sink / Feed and Bleed MF FW43 The following occur when the reactor trips:
MF FW44 1B CV pump will trip (preload) Aux Feedwater pumps will not start ZDI1RY456 1RY456 will not open AUTO (preload)
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 SCENARIO OVERVIEW Unit 1 is at full power, MOL, steady state, 845 ppm boron, equilibrium xenon. 1A CV pump is tagged out and for an oil change and is expected to be returned to service by end of shift. Tech Spec 3.5.2 Condition A (ECCS trains) has been entered in addition to LCO 3.1.d. Condition A (Charging pumps-operating) 1BOL 5.2 and 1BOL 1.d have been initiated. 1A FW Pp is Out of Service for maintenance. Online Risk is Yellow. Protected Equipment: 1B CV Pump, 1B DG, ACB 1423, 1VD01CB, 1B FW Pump and 1C FW Pump.
Generation Dispatch will be requesting Byron U-1 to reduce load by 100 MWe at 4 mw/min.
After completing shift turnover and reliefGeneration Dispatch will request Unit 1 to lower power 100MWe at 4 MW/min due to grid demand.
1PI-455A fails low; causing PZR heaters to energize and sprays to close if open. The RO will implement BHC 1-RY-P and select an operable PZR pressure controlling channel. 1BOA INST-2 will be entered and TS 3.3.1, TS 3.3.2, and TS 3.3.4 will be entered.
1C Main Feed Pump Speed Controller fails low then swaps to manua Flow from 1C FW Pp will lower causing high flow from 1B FW pump. The BOP will adjust 1C FW Pp in manual per BHC 1-SG to restore normal feedwater flow. The controller will be operated in manual for the remainder of the scenario.
1CV121 fails open 1CV121 will slowly fail open. The RO will establish manual control of charging flow per BAR 1-9-D3.
Automatic operation of 1CV121 will not be available for the remainder of the scenario.
GC pump trip 1B GC pump trips, 1A GC pump will not auto start. BOP will perform actions of BHC 1-18-A14 to manually start the 1A GC pump.
Inadvertent Containment Phase A isolation The crew will refer to BAR 1-5-B7 and implement 1BOA PRI-13 Recovery from an Inadvertent Phase A Containment Isolation. BOP will attempt to manually close failed open 1FP010 Fire Protection Outside Isol Vlv. US will enter TS 3.6.3. Crew will then continue to reset CNMT Phase A, establish Instrument Air to Containment and regain normal PZR pressure control.
NI channel N43 detector failure causing an OTT reactor trip signal and inadvertent FW isolation occurs.
The reactor will fail to automatically trip. The crew will enter 1BEP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and manually trip the reactor (manual reactor trip is successful.)
Loss of Heat Sink / Feed and Bleed The following events will occur when the reactor is tripped:
1B CV pump will trip.
Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps will fail to start (automatically and manually).
The crew will transition to 1BEP ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. The STA will monitor status trees and identify a RED path on HEAT SINK and notify the US. The crew will transition to 1BFR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. Due to no CV pumps running the crew will be directed to initiate bleed and feed.
When bleed path is initiated PZR PORV 1RY456 will not open. The crew will open Reactor Head vent valves to complete the bleed path.
Completion criterion: crew has initiated RCS bleed and feed so that the RCS depressurizes sufficiently for intermediate-head injection to occur per 1BFR H.1.
Critical Tasks
- 1. Manually trip the reactor from the control room prior to exiting 1BEP 0. (ERG Critical Task number -
CT-1) (K/A: EPE 029-EA1.08; importance - 4.5/4.5)
- 2. Initiate RCS bleed and feed so that the RCS depressurizes sufficiently for intermediate-head injection to occur. (ERG Critical Task number - CT-46) (K/A: 010-A4.03; importance - 4.0/3.8)
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Byron_______ Scenario No.: N17-2__________ Op-Test No.: 2017-301__
Examiners: __________________________ Operators: ____________________________
Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is at 10-3% power, BOL, 1343 ppm boron, Reactor startup in progress Turnover: CBD @ 130 steps, ready to raise power to 2-3%. SM directs raising pressure in 1B SI accumulator prior to raising power. Online risk is green.
Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 None N The BOP will raise 1B SI accumulator pressure using BOP (BOP, SI-8.
SRO) 2 None R Raise power to 2-3%; The crew will establish a startup rate to (ATC, raise reactor power and stabilize at 2-3% power.
SRO) 3 MF ED11B TS Loss of instrument inverter 112 will occur; Inst bus will be (SRO) powered from CVT. US will determine TS 3.8.7 applies.
4 IOR C Reactor Cavity Vent Fan Trip; The 1A Reactor Cavity Vent fan ZDI1VP05CA (BOP, trips. The crew will take action of the BAR 0-33-C5 to start the STOP SRO) 1B Reactor Cavity Vent fan per BOP VP-7.
5 MF RX13A I Pressurizer level transmitter 1LT-459A; the controlling 100 (ATC, channel, fails high. The RO will select an operable channel per SRO) BAR 1-12-B3 and the crew will re-enter 1BOA Inst-2. The US will determine TS 3.3.1 applies.
TS (SRO) 6 MF FW22B C 1B CD/CB pump trip; the BOP will perform actions of BHC 1-(BOP, 17-A9 to start the standby CD/CB pump and the crew will enter SRO) 1BOA SEC-1, Secondary Pump Trip.
7 MF C Control rod M12 drops into the core; the crew will enter 1BOA RD02M12 (ATC, ROD-3 for a dropped or misaligned rod. The crew will be SRO) directed to trip the reactor at step 3 with a dropped rod and less than 5% reactor power.
8 ED15D M Loss of all offsite power when the reactor trips a loss of offsite (ALL) power will occur for Unit 1. The crew will enter 1BCA 0.0.
9 ED08A C 1A and 1B DG will fail to automatically start. The crew will ED08B enter 1BCA 0.0, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER When safety injection is actuated at step 5 of 1BCA 0.0 the 1B DG will automatically start energizing Bus 142.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 10 MF TH11B C PZR PORV 1RY456 will open when the loss of offsite power 15 10 30 occurs. The crew will close the PZR PORV to stop the loss of RCS inventory.
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 SCENARIO OVERVIEW Unit 1 is at 10-3% power, BOL, 1343 ppm boron, Reactor startup in progress. Online risk is green. CBD
@ 130 steps, ready to raise power to 2-3%. SM directs raising pressure in 1B SI accumulator prior to raising power.
The BOP will raise 1B SI accumulator pressure using BOP SI-8 Raise power to 2-3%
The crew will establish a startup rate to raise reactor power and stabilize at 2-3% power.
Loss of instrument inverter 112 will occur.
Inst bus will be powered from CVT. US will determine TS 3.8.7 applies.
Reactor Cavity Vent Fan Trip The 1A Reactor Cavity Vent fan trips. The crew will take action of the BAR 0-33-C5 to start the 1B Reactor Cavity Vent fan per BOP VP-7.
Pressurizer level transmitter 1LT-459A The controlling channel Pressurizer level channel fails high. The RO will select an operable channel per BAR 1-12-B3 and the crew will re-enter 1BOA Inst-2. The US will determine TS 3.3.1 applies.
1B CD/CB pump trip The BOP will perform actions of BHC 1-17-A9 to start the standby CD/CB pump and the crew will enter 1BOA Sec-1, Secondary Pump Trip.
Control rod M12 drops into the core The crew will enter 1BOA ROD-3 for a dropped or misaligned rod. The crew will be directed to trip the reactor at step with dropped rod and less than 5% reactor power.
Loss of all offsite power When the reactor trips a loss of offsite power will occur for Unit 1. The crew will enter 1BCA 0.0.
1A and 1B DG will fail to automatically start The crew will enter 1BCA 0.0, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER When safety injection is actuated at step 5 of 1BCA 0.0 the 1B DG will automatically start energizing Bus 142.
PZR PORV 1RY456 will open after the loss of offsite power occurs.
The crew will close the PZR PORV to stop the loss of RCS inventory.
Completion criterion: The scenario is complete when the crew has transitioned from 1BCA 0.0 to 1BEP 0.
Critical Tasks
- 1. Energize at least one ac emergency bus before placing safeguards equipment handswitches in the pull-to-lock position.
(ERG Critical Task number - CT-24) (K/A: EPE 055-EA1.02; importance - 4.3/4.4)
- 2. Manually close the open PZR PORV prior to completing step 4 of 1BCA 0.0.
(ERG Critical Task number - CT-22) (K/A: EPE 009-EA1.15; importance - 3.9/4.1)
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Byron_______ Scenario No.: N17-3__________ Op-Test No.: 2017-301__
Examiners: ___________________________ Operators: ____________________________
Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is operating at 75.0% power due to a grid issue, steady state, MOL, 919 ppm boron, equilibrium xenon.
Turnover: The shift manager requests the BOP to perform RV/IV quarterly surveillance per 1BOSR 3.g.3-1. U-1 Boric Acid Transfer pump is running to recirculate the U1 Boric Acid Tank to support Chemistry weekly sample.
Generation Dispatch will be requesting Byron U-1 to raise load by 50 MWe at 1.6 mw/min.
Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 None N BOP will perform Monthly IV/RV Surveillance; 1BOSR 3.g.3-1.
(BOP, SRO) 2 MF CV03 C Boric acid transfer pump trips; the RO will align U-0 boric acid (ATC, transfer pump to support U1 using BOP AB-17.
SRO) 3 None N Power Team will request Unit 1 raise power. Crew performs (BOP) reactivity calculation and begins power ascension 50 MW at 1.6 MW/min.
R (ATC, SRO) 4 MF RM02U TS Rad Monitor Failure 1PR11J CNMT atmosphere rad monitor will (SRO) fail due to a loss of sample flow. Unit Supervisor will determine TS 3.4.15 applies.
5 MF MS04B C 1B SG PORV will spuriously open in AUTO and PORV low 100 (BOP, fluid level alarm is received; the BOP will manually Close valve.
SRO) The valve will not completely close and Unit Supervisor will MF PB2411 determine TS 3.7.4 and 3.6.3 applies.
ON TS (SRO)
ZLO1MS018 B2 ON 6 MF CV09 50 I 1TI-130 fails low; causing letdown temp control valve to close (ATC, resulting in actual letdown temperature rising and diverting SRO) letdown around the demineralizers. The RO will place 1TK130 in manual per BAR 1-8-C5 to control letdown temperature.
7 MF CH03D C 1D CRDM Exhaust Fan trips; BOP will refer to BAR 0-33-A5 (BOP,
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 SRO) and start an additional CDRM Fan per BOP VP-9.
8 MF FW16 I FW HTR Discharge Pressure 1PI-508 fails high. MS/FW HDR 1500 (BOP, P will rise. The BOP will take manual control of FW pump SRO) controller 1SK509A per BHC-1-SG and control in manual.
9 MF TH03A M 1A SG develops a 400 gpm tube rupture. The crew will trip the 400 (ALL) reactor, and actuate safety injection. The crew will enter 1BEP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and transition to 1BEP-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.
10 RF TH09 0 C Pressurizer Spray Valves fail to operate after Trip, the crew will attempt to establish PZR spray flow to depressurize the RCS, RF TH10 0 when determined unavailable the crew will utilize at least one ZLO1RY455 PZR PORV to depressurize the RCS and minimize break flow B1 ON and refill PZR ZLO1RY455 B2 OFF ZLO1RY455 C1 ON ZLO1RY455 C2 OFF
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 SCENARIO OVERVIEW Unit 1 is operating at 75.0% power due to Advanced Nuclear Dispatch, MOL, 919 ppm boron, equilibrium xenon. Following completion of turnover, the shift manager requests the BOP to perform RV/IV quarterly surveillance per 1BOSR 3.g.3-1. U-1 Boric Acid Transfer pump is running to recirculate the U1 Boric Acid Tank to support Chemistry weekly sample.
Generation Dispatch will be requesting Byron U-1 to raise load by 50 MWe at 1.6 mw/min.
BOP will perform Monthly IV/RV Surveillance BOP will perform 1BOSR 3.g.3-1.
Boric acid transfer pump trips The RO will align U-0 boric acid transfer pump to support U1 using BOP AB-17.
Power Team will request Unit 1 raise power Crew performs reactivity calculation and begins power ascension 50 MW at 1.6 MW/min.
Rad monitor Failure 1PR11J CNMT atmosphere rad monitor will fail due to a loss of sample flow. Unit Supervisor will determine TS 3.4.15 applies.
1B SG PORV will spuriously open in AUTO and PORV low fluid level alarm is received The BOP will manually Close valve and Unit Supervisor will determine TS 3.7.4 applies. The BOP will manually close valve. The valve will not completely close and Unit Supervisor will determine TS 3.7.4 and T.S.3.6.3 applies. The crew will direct isolating the SG PORV using manual isolation valve 1MS019B.
1TI-130 fails low This causes letdown temp control valve to close resulting in actual letdown temperature rising and diverting letdown around the demineralizers. The RO will place 1TK130 in manual per BAR 1-8-C5 to control letdown temperature 1D CRDM Exhaust Fan trips BOP will refer to BAR 0-33-A5 and start an additional CDRM Fan per BOP VP-9.
FW HTR Discharge Pressure 1PI-508 fails high. MS/FW HDR P will rise. The BOP will take manual control of FW pump controller 1SK509A per 1-BHC-SG and control in manual.
1A SG develops a 400 gpm tube rupture The crew will trip the reactor, and actuate safety injection. The crew will enter 1BEP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and transition to 1BEP-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.
Pressurizer Spray Valves fail to operate after Trip The crew will attempt to establish PZR spray flow to depressurize the RCS, when determined unavailable the crew will utilize at least one PZR PORV to depressurize the RCS and minimize break flow and refill PZR Completion criterion is RCS depressurization to match ruptured SG pressure, and SI termination in 1BEP-3. The lead evaluator may end the scenario when pressures have been matched, or after SI has been terminated.
Critical Tasks
- 1. CT-18 Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (ERG Critical Task number - CT-18) (K/A: EPE 038EA1.32; importance - 4.6/4.7)
- 2. CT-20 Depressurize RCS to meet SI termination criteria before water release from ruptured SG PORV or safety occurs (ERG Critical Task number - CT-20) (K/A: EPE 038EA1.04; importance - 4.3/4.1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Byron_______ Scenario No.: N17-4__________ Op-Test No.: 2017-301__
Examiners: ___________________________ Operators: ____________________________
Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is at 90% power per Generation Dispatch orders, MOL,877ppm boron, equilibrium xenon, Online risk is green Turnover: Crew is to perform surveillance 1BOSAR 0.5-2.AF.1-2, AF Valves Stroke Test, for 1B AF train 1AF013E - H only.
Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description RF RP34 Preload Slave K623 MS ISOL TRN A OUT RF RP35 Slave K616 MS ISOL TRN A OUT RF RP60 Slave K623 MS ISOL TRN B OUT RF RP61 Slave K616 MS ISOL TRN B OUT 1 None N AF stroke test; the BOP will perform the stroke test for 1B AF (BOP, train, 1AF013E/F/G/H.
SRO) 2 MF CV17 C, VCT level transmitter 1LI-185 fails high; causing 1CV112A to 100 (ATC, divert to the HUT. The RO will perform actions of BAR 1-9-A2 SRO) and realign 1CV112A to restore letdown flow to the VCT.
3 IOR C 0A CW Makeup Pump will spuriously trip; The BOP will refer ZDI0CW03PA (BOP, to BAR 0-38-A11 and start the standby 0B CW Makeup Pump TRIP SRO) per BOP CW-9, Circulating Makeup Pump Start-up. The crew may also enter 0BOA Sec-11, Inadequate Circulating Water Makeup.
4 MF PA0005 TS MSIV pressure alarm; Alarm 1-1-B5 alarms. Local report will (SRO) be low accumulator pressure on the 1A MSIV. US will determine TS 3.7.2 applies for the MSIV.
5 MF TH10A C PZR spray valve 1RY455B fails open; PZR spray valve 100 (ATC, 1RY455B slowly fails open. RO will take manual control per SRO) BHC 1-RY-P to close the spray valve.
6 MF FW35B C 1B HD Pump spuriously trips; The crew will perform actions of (BOP, BAR 1-17-D2 to start standby HD pump and enter 1BOA Sec-1 SRO) to verify plant is stable.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 7 MF FW35C C 1C HD Pump spuriously trips; The crew will perform actions of (BOP) 1BOA SEC-1 and initiate a turbine runback to 780MW at 20 MW/min.
R (ATC, SRO) 8 MF RP09A M Inadvertent Train A Feedwater Isolation Feedwater flow to all (ALL) steam generators is lost requiring a Reactor Trip. The reactor MF RP02A will fail to automatically and manually trip from the main control MF RP02B room. The crew will enter 1BEP-0, Reactor Trip / Safety Injection, and transition to 1BFR S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS.
9 MF RD09 8 C Rod speed is failed at 8 steps/min; the RO will place Rod (ATC) Bank Select Switch to manual per Immediate Action of 1BFR-S.1 step 1 RNO and insert control rods at 48spm.
10 MF TC03 C(BOP) Main turbine fails to trip automatically or manually via the Turbine Trip pushbutton. The BOP will then close the IOR governor valves at the DEHC panel per Immediate Action of ZDI1HSTG0 1BFR-S.1 step 2 RNO to isolate main turbine from steam 10 NORM generators.
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 SCENARIO OVERVIEW Unit 1 is at 90% power per Load Dispatcher orders, MOL,877ppm boron, steady state, equilibrium xenon, Online risk is green. Crew is to perform surveillance 1BOSAR 0.5-2.AF.1-2, AF Valves Stroke Test, for 1B AF train 1AF013E - H only.
AF stroke time test The BOP will perform the stroke test on 1B AF train 1AF013E/F/G/H.
VCT level transmitter 1LI-185 fails high 1CV112A will divert to the HUT. The RO will perform actions of BAR 1-9-A2 and realign 1CV112A to restore letdown flow to the VCT.
0A CW Makeup Pump will spuriously trip. The BOP will refer to BAR 0-38-A11 and start the standby 0B CW Makeup Pump per BOP CW-9, Circulating Makeup Pump Start-up. The crew may also enter 0BOA Sec-11, Inadequate Circulating Water Makeup.
MSIV accumulator pressure alarm Alarm 1-1-B5 alarms. Local report will be low accumulator pressure on the 1A MSIV. US will determine TS 3.7.2 applies for the MSIV PZR spray valve 1RY455B fails open.
PZR spray valve 1RY455B slowly fails open. RO will take manual control per BHC 1-RY-P to close the spray valve.
1B HD Pump spuriously trips The crew will perform actions of BAR 1-17-D2 to start standby HD pump and enter 1BOA Sec-1 to verify plant is stable.
1C HD Pump spuriously trips The crew will perform actions of 1BOA SEC-1 and initiate a turbine runback to 780MW at 20 MW/min.
Inadvertent Train A Feedwater Isolation Feedwater flow to all steam generators is lost requiring a Reactor Trip. The reactor will fail to automatically and manually trip from the main control room. The crew will enter 1BEP-0, Reactor Trip /
Safety Injection, and transition to 1BFR S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS.
Rod speed is failed at 8 steps/min The RO will place Rod Bank Select Switch to manual per Immediate Action of 1BFR-S.1 step 1 RNO and insert control rods at 48spm minimizing the needless continuation of an extreme or a severe challenge to the subcriticality CSF.
Main turbine fails to trip automatically or manually via the Turbine Trip pushbutton The BOP will then close the governor valves at the DEHC panel per Immediate Action of 1BFR-S.1 step 2 RNO to isolate main turbine from steam generators.
Completion criterion is transition from 1BFR S.1 back to 1BEP 0.
Critical Tasks
- 1. Insert negative reactivity into the core prior to dispatching operators to locally trip the reactor and/or the turbine (ERG Critical Task number - CT-52) (K/A: EPE 029EA1.09; importance - 4.0/3.6)
- 2. Isolate main turbine from SGs during ATWS (ERG Critical Task number - CT-50) (K/A: EPE 029EA1.13; importance - 4.1/3.9)
Attachment to Forms ES-D-1 Byron 2017 ILT NRC Exam Summary of Changes Changes to Forms ES-D-1 since outline submittal N17-1:
Turnover and Event Description, add protected equipment list to initial conditions on scenario guide as equipment tagged out as initial conditions would require protected equipment.
Event 6: 1FP010 indicates full open instead of dual indication Event 7, added inadvertent FW Isolation Events 8 and 9 combined, per initial NRC feedback, Event 8 and 9, component failures of 1B CV Pump and AF Pumps are both preloaded events with no credit taken for individual crew members and only exist to require the initiation of RCS Bleed and Feed. These would better be represented instead by being presented together as a second Major event versus the individual component failures.
Events 8 and 9, during initiation of bleed and feed PZR PORV 1RY456 will not open requiring the crew to open reactor head vent valves. This will provide actions for both ATC and BOP during performance of contingency action procedure.
N17-2:
Event 3: Moved TS 3.8.7 from scenario 17-3 to 17-2 in an effort to balance TS and remove having two TS 3.1.1 calls on scenario 17-2 per NRC recommendation following outline review.
Event 4: Deleted Annunciator malfunction. Will Annunciate at deletion of Fan Override.
Event 6: Changed the CD/CB pump trip from 1C to 1B CD/CB trip to match standard IC set.
Event 10: Changed failure from 1B SX failing to start on sequencer to PZR PORV 1RY456 failing open after the loss of offsite power. This changes the critical task to CT-22 N17-3:
Event 3 (previous): Moved TS 3.8.7 from scenario 17-3 to 17-2 in an effort to balance TS and remove having two TS 3.1.1 calls on scenario 17-2 per NRC recommendation following outline review. Renumbered the subsequent events.
Event 3: Determined ramp rate to direct crew to ramp up. Ops crew suggested rate of 1.6 mw/min vs. 0.6 mw/min based on initial guidance.
Event 5: 1B SG PORV fails open and crew closes valve. Crew had discussion on applicable tech specs. Changed from valve going full closed to showing dual indication and slightly open.
Tech Spec 3.6.3 also applies.
N17-4:
Event 1: Surveillance is no longer stroke time surveillance. Changed to perform exercise test of Train B valves.
Event 7: Changed from Normal Event to Component Failure. Better characterized by actions taken in accordance with Abnormal Operating Procedure; depressing runback pushbutton, adjusting Heater Drain Tank parameters.