text
NRC FORH 366 (5-92)
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY C(salISSION APPROVED BY (NQI NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 L1CENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)
ESTIMATED BURDEN PER
RESPONSE
TO COHPLY MITH THIS INFORHATIOH COLLECTION REQUEST:
50.0 HRS.
FORNARD COHMENTS REGARDING BURDEN 'ESTIMATE TO THE INFORHATION AND RECORDS HAHAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714),
U.ST NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION, NASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERIJORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3180-0104),
OFFICE OF HANAGEMEHT AND BUDGET NASHINGTON DC 20503'.
FACILITY NAME (1)
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Unit 3 DOCKET NOSER (2) 05000296 PAGE (3) 1 OF 5
TITLE (4)
A Deficiency Regarding Raychem Tubing Used'For Enviromental Qualification Applications EVENT DATE 5
LER NINBER 6
REPORT DATE 7
OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 8 HONTH 10 DAY YEAR 31 94 YEAR 94 SEQUENTIAL NUHBER 002 REVISION NUMBER 00 HONTH DAY 02 07 FACILITY NAHE YEAR N/A FACILITY NAME N/A DOCKET NUHBER DOCKET NUMBER OPERATING HOOE (9)
POUER LEVEL (10)
N 000 THIS REPORT IS SUBHITTED PURSUANT 20.402(b) 20.405(a)(1)(i) 20.405(a)(1)(ii) 20.405(a)(1)(iii) 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 20.405(a)(1)(v) 20.405(c) 50.36(c)(1) 73.71(b) 73.71 (c) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 50'3(a)(2)(vii)
OTHER Voluntar Re rt 50.36(c)(2)
( )( )(
i)(A) y po 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 50.73 a
2 vii 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR
=
Check one or more 11 LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER 12 NAHE Clare S. Hsieh, Compliance Licensing Engineer TELEPHONE NUHBER (Include Area Code)
(205) '729-2635 C(NIPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH C(NPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 13
CAUSE
SYSTEH B
BJ COHPONENT TBG MANUFACTURER R098 REPORTABLE TO NPRDS N
CAUSE
SYSTEH COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 14 YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).
X'O EXPECTED SUBHISS ION DATE (15)
HONTH DAY YEAR ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)
(16)
A deficiency regarding Raychem material was discovered on October 31, 1994, during the usage of the Raychem tubing for Environmental Qualification (EQ) applications.
The Raychem tubing, type WCSF-070-N (Lot IN15057), used to insulate the splice connection of Conax ECSA conductors to their field cable conductors, could not be installed in a manner meeting the installation acceptance criteria.
No immediate safety hazard exists since the equipment affected by the Raychem tubing is not required with Units 1 and 3 defueled and its failure does not impact the operating Unit 2.
TVA'hipped the Lot PN15057 tubing to the manufacturer for evaluation.
The Unit 2 EQ applications are not affected by this problem since the tubing has not been used in any required Unit 2 EQ splices.
TVA is evaluating the Unit 3 work issues to determine if the referenced Raychem material, Lot
- number, and contract were used on EQ components.
The above condition is not reportable per 10 CFR 50.72, 50.73, oi 10 CFR Part 21.
- However, TVA is submitting a voluntary report on this deficiency because other utilities may also have this particular type of tubing.
9502160290 950207 PDR ADOCK 05000296 S
PDR
4l lyap
'NRC FORM 366A (5-92)
U.S NUCLEAR REGULATORY C(NBIISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY QNI NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/3'I/95
'ESTIMATED BURDEN PER
RESPONSE
TO COHPLY IIITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST:
50 0 MRS'ORNARD COHHENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE INFORHATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714),
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, NASHINGTOH, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERNORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104),
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
- BUDGET, NASHIHGTON DC 20503 FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET NLNBER (2)
YEAR LER NLNBER (6)
SEQUENTIAL NUHBER REVISION NUHBER PAGE (3)
Browns Ferry Unit 3 05000296 94 002 OO 2 of 5 TEXT If more s ce is r ired use additional co ies of NRC Form 366A (17)
I ~
ZI.
PLANT CONDITIONS
Unit 2 was in cold shutdown as part of the Unit 2 Cycle 7 refueling outage.
Units 1 and 3 were defueled.
Unit 1 was in lay-up status, and recovery activities were in progress on Unit 3.
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT
Ao Eventl This voluntary report describes a deficiency regarding Raychem material that was identified during the performance of the Unit 3 recovery activities.
The Raychem tubing [TBG], type WCSF-070-N (Lot gN15057),
used to insulate the splice connection of Conax ECSA conductors to their field cable conductors, could not be installed in a manner meeting the. installation acceptance criteria.
On October 31,
- 1994, TVA discovered that the tubing could not be
,shrunk (i.e., recovered),
down enough in order to provide the required indicators signifying.a proper seal on the Kapton insulated ECSA pigtail.
The pigtail, which measured at 0.067 inches (rounded to 0.07 inches per vendor instructions), is near the lower limit of the usage range (0.07 0.14 inches) of the Raychem WCSF-070-N tubing.
On November 1,
- 1994, TVA sent samples of the Lot PN15057 tubing to the manufacturer for evaluation.
On November 4,
- 1994, Raychem indicated in a written response to TVA that the WCSF-070-N tubing from Lot fN15057 is only acceptable for those installed single conductor in-line splices where the wire diameter is greater than 0.081 inches but not larger than 0.14 inches.
Although the component involves the tubing used in Environmental Qualification (EQ) applications such as splices or terminations for Units 1 and 3, no immediate safety hazard exists.
The equipment affected by the Raychem tubing is not required with Units 1 and 3 defueled and its failure does not impact the operating Unit 2.
Additionally, the Unit 2 EQ applications are not affected by this problem since the tubing from Lot SN15057 has not been used in any required Unit 2 EQ splices.
Therefore, this condition is not reportable per 10 CFR 50.72 or 50.73.
The above condition is also not reportable per 10 CFR Part 21.
The manufacturer requirements are part of the installati.on and inspection criteria.
Thus, this deficiency would have been
- detected, and the material rejected, during TVA visual
4l "P $
', %c$(5-92)
U S NUCLEAR REGULATORY CQNISSI ON LICENSEE EVENT REPORT TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY QNI NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER
RESPONSE
TO COMPLY IJITH THIS INFORHATIOH COLLECTIOH REOUEST:
50.0 HRS.
FORNARD COMMENTS REGARDIHG BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714),
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONS NASHIHGTOH, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERNORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104),
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET/
NASHIHGTON, DC 20503 FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET RINGER (2)
YEAR LER NWSER (6)
SEQUENTIAL HUMBER REVISION NUMBER PAGE (3)
Browns Ferry Unit 3 05000296 '4 002 00 3 of 5 TEXT lf more s ce is r uired use sdditionsl co ies of NRC Form 366A (17)
B.
inspections, as part of the Unit 3 recovery effort.
Nevertheless, TVA is submitting a voluntary report because other utilities may also have this particular type of tubing.
Ino erable Structures Com onents or S stems that Contributed to the Events C.
None.
Dates and A
roximate Times of Ma or Occurrences!
The Raychem material was originally received in 1992.
The above deficiency was discovered on October 31, 1994 during the usage of the Raychem tubing for EQ applications.
On November 1,
- 1994, samples of the Lot PN15057 tubing were sent to Raychem for evaluation.
D.
E'o Other S stems or Seconda Functions Affected:
None.
Method of Discove F.
As part of the Unit 3 recovery activities, the Raychem tubing was used to insulate the splice connection of cables in EQ applications.
Zt was during the insulation of the splice connection of Conax ECSA conductors to the conductors of their respective field cables that the Raychem tubing was found not to be acceptable.
0 erator Actions:
G.
None.
Safet S stem Res onses:
None.
CAUSE'F THE EVENT Ao Immedi:ate Cause:
'The condition occurred when Raychem tubing could not be shrunk down enough in order to provide a proper seal on the Kapton insulated ECSA pigtail.
1 0
t(5-92)
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY CQIIISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT TEXT CONTZNUATZON APPROVED BY MS NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER
RESPONSE
TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0'RS.
'FORlJARD COMMENTS REGARDIMG BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MHBB 7714),
U.S.
,NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, MASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERllORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104),
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
- BUDGET, llASHIMGTON DC 20503 FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET NWBER (2)
LER NWBER (6)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION'UMBER PAGE (3)
Browns Ferry Unit 3 05000296 94 002 00 4 of 5 TEXT tf more s ce is r ired use additional co ies of NRC Form 366A (17)
B.
Root Cause!
IV TVA has not been able to.determine the root cause of this condit'ion.
TVA suspects that it must be rooted in the manufacturing process since other lots do not exhibit similar problem.
ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT
The Raychem splice was for Unit 3 work in progress for the design package on the analog trip units for Essential Core Cooling System
.(ECCS)/Reactor Protection System instrumentation.
The splice was for a division ZZ cable at the conduit seal for a level transmitter.
The transmitter provides the reactor vessel. level for the division ZI ECCS high vessel level trip to the High Pressure Coolant Zn)ection turbine.
The potential failure of the splice (since it was not shrunk down) was lack of an adequate moisture barrier seal.
Although the high humidity from a high energy line break could possibly force moisture into the conductor, this deficiency does not provide an immediate safety concern as Unit 3 is in a defueled mode.
Additionally, the condition is discernable under inspection criteria required for each splice installation.
Vo
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Immediate Corrective Actions:
Bo TVA contacted the Raychem technical representative and sent samples of the Lot gN15057,tubing to Raychem for evaluation.
Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence(
TVA has completed an inventory of the affected material in the power stores, and the Lot gN15057 tubing found were returned to RayChem.
TVA is evaluating Unit 3 work issues to determine if the referenced Raychem material, Lot number, and contract were used on EQ components.
Additionallyr TVA is reviewing material requisitions for the affected material and Lot number that has been issued from power stores for use but has not been installed and is also reviewing the completed work for EQ applications.
4i C~
t i
f I
I 1(5-92)
U.S NUCLEAR REGULATORY CQNIISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY (NIB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER
RESPONSE
TO COMPLY IlITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST:
50.0 HRS.
FORllARD COMHENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714),
U.S.
NUCLEAR
'REGULATORY COMMISSION>>
HASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERllORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104),
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
- BUDGET, llASHINGTON, DC 20503 FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET NWSER (2)
LER NINBER (6)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER
'REVISION NUMBER PAGE (3)
Browns Ferry Unit 3 05000296 94 002 00 5 of 5 TEXT If more s ce is r ired use additional co ies of NRC Form 366A (17)
VZ ~
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
A>>
Failed Com onents:
B, Raychem tubing (Type WCSF-070-N, Lot gN15057) constructed and supplied by the Raychem Corporation.
Previous LERs an Similar Events:
VIZ.
None.
Commitments
There are no commitments in this report.
The actions described in Section V.B of this report are actions: being taken to determine the location of other similar type material.
Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) system and component codes are identified in the text with brackets (e.g.,
[XX]).
'E c
I 4
I
|
|---|
|
|
| | | Reporting criterion |
|---|
| 05000260/LER-1994-001-02, :on 940214,loss of Unit 2,Division II ECCS Instrumentation Due to Blown Fuse.Caused by Failure of Atu Inverter Control Card.Blown Fuse & Control Card in ECCS Division II Atu Inverter Replaced |
- on 940214,loss of Unit 2,Division II ECCS Instrumentation Due to Blown Fuse.Caused by Failure of Atu Inverter Control Card.Blown Fuse & Control Card in ECCS Division II Atu Inverter Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1)(B) | | 05000259/LER-1994-001-01, :on 940304,EECW Pump A3 Inadvertently Auto Started During Performance of SI O-SI-4.2.B.-67.Caused by Personnel Error.Electrical Maint Procedures Will Be Revised. Walkdown of 4 Kv Shutdown Will Be Performed |
- on 940304,EECW Pump A3 Inadvertently Auto Started During Performance of SI O-SI-4.2.B.-67.Caused by Personnel Error.Electrical Maint Procedures Will Be Revised. Walkdown of 4 Kv Shutdown Will Be Performed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000296/LER-1994-001-04, :on 941018,unexpected auto-start of Unit 3 DGs Occurred During Performance of SI Due to Personnel Error. Electrical Maint Personnel Briefed on Event |
- on 941018,unexpected auto-start of Unit 3 DGs Occurred During Performance of SI Due to Personnel Error. Electrical Maint Personnel Briefed on Event
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000259/LER-1994-002-03, :on 940428,GE Akr Circuit Breakers Failed Trip Time Tests Due to Different Testing Equipment Used by TVA & GE for Breaker Testing.Akr Breakers Returned to GE for Addl Rework & Retest |
- on 940428,GE Akr Circuit Breakers Failed Trip Time Tests Due to Different Testing Equipment Used by TVA & GE for Breaker Testing.Akr Breakers Returned to GE for Addl Rework & Retest
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000260/LER-1994-002-02, :on 940412,noncompliance w/10CFR50,App R Resulted in Plant Being Outside Design Basis.Caused by Personnel Error.C/As:Engineering Dept Personnel Will Review Circumstances That Led to Events |
- on 940412,noncompliance w/10CFR50,App R Resulted in Plant Being Outside Design Basis.Caused by Personnel Error.C/As:Engineering Dept Personnel Will Review Circumstances That Led to Events
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000296/LER-1994-002-04, :on 941031,discovered Deficiency Re Raychem Tubing Used for Environ Qualification Applications.Condition Occurred When Tubing Could Not Be Shrunk Enough to Provide Proper Seal Per Vendor Specs |
- on 941031,discovered Deficiency Re Raychem Tubing Used for Environ Qualification Applications.Condition Occurred When Tubing Could Not Be Shrunk Enough to Provide Proper Seal Per Vendor Specs
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000260/LER-1994-003-02, :on 940104,standby Gas Treatment Trains Declared Inoperable as Result of Inoperable Edgs.Caused by Fuel Oil Leak.Tripping Time Relay Replaced & Testing Ongoing |
- on 940104,standby Gas Treatment Trains Declared Inoperable as Result of Inoperable Edgs.Caused by Fuel Oil Leak.Tripping Time Relay Replaced & Testing Ongoing
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000259/LER-1994-003-03, :on 940713,defect Discovered in Pressure Rating for Air Conditioning Units (Acu) Supplied by Ellis & Watts. on 940823,determination Made That Event Reportable Per 10CFR21.All Acus Will Be Reworked |
- on 940713,defect Discovered in Pressure Rating for Air Conditioning Units (Acu) Supplied by Ellis & Watts. on 940823,determination Made That Event Reportable Per 10CFR21.All Acus Will Be Reworked
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) 10 CFR 21.21(c)(3)(ii) 10 CFR 21.21(c)(3)(i) | | 05000260/LER-1994-004-02, :on 940415,Unit 2 Received a Full Scram from Full Power Due to RPS Trip Signal Generated by Low Scram Pilot Air Header Pressure Signal.Failed Module in Temp Detection Loop |
- on 940415,Unit 2 Received a Full Scram from Full Power Due to RPS Trip Signal Generated by Low Scram Pilot Air Header Pressure Signal.Failed Module in Temp Detection Loop
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000260/LER-1994-005-01, :on 940418,unit 2 Reactor Automatically Scrammed from 15 Percent When MSIVs Unexpectedly Closed. Caused by Low Main Steam Pressure.Corrective Action:Ehc Setpoint Potentiometer Was Replaced |
- on 940418,unit 2 Reactor Automatically Scrammed from 15 Percent When MSIVs Unexpectedly Closed. Caused by Low Main Steam Pressure.Corrective Action:Ehc Setpoint Potentiometer Was Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000260/LER-1994-006-03, :on 940831,received Alarms That Indicated Loss of Unit 2 ECCS Instrumentation.Caused by Random Failure of ECCS Division I,Atu Inverter.Atu Inverter Was Replaced by Replacing Shorted SCR |
- on 940831,received Alarms That Indicated Loss of Unit 2 ECCS Instrumentation.Caused by Random Failure of ECCS Division I,Atu Inverter.Atu Inverter Was Replaced by Replacing Shorted SCR
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000260/LER-1994-007, :on 940929,discovered That Condition Involving Noncompliance w/10CFR50 App R,Criterion III.L.2.d Existed. Caused by Failures to Correctly Interpret/Implement Requirements of Calculations.Rept Initiated |
- on 940929,discovered That Condition Involving Noncompliance w/10CFR50 App R,Criterion III.L.2.d Existed. Caused by Failures to Correctly Interpret/Implement Requirements of Calculations.Rept Initiated
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000260/LER-1994-008-01, :on 941002,primary Containment Penetrations & Main Steam Isolation Valves Leak Rates Exceeding TS Limits Occurred.Cause of Leakage Initially Investigated.Valves Will Be Repaired |
- on 941002,primary Containment Penetrations & Main Steam Isolation Valves Leak Rates Exceeding TS Limits Occurred.Cause of Leakage Initially Investigated.Valves Will Be Repaired
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(v) 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(vii) 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000260/LER-1994-008, :on 941002,containment Penetration & MSIV Leak Rates Exceeded TS Limits.Caused by Abnormal Rib Guide Wear. MSIVs Repaired & Retested.Maint Instructions Will Be Written for Valves to Address Proper Shimming Requirements |
- on 941002,containment Penetration & MSIV Leak Rates Exceeded TS Limits.Caused by Abnormal Rib Guide Wear. MSIVs Repaired & Retested.Maint Instructions Will Be Written for Valves to Address Proper Shimming Requirements
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000260/LER-1994-009-01, :on 940420,missed TS Surveillance Before Reactor Startup as Result of Misunderstanding of Ts.Util Will Submit TS Change to Clarify Frequency for IRM & APRM Instrumentation Funtional Tests |
- on 940420,missed TS Surveillance Before Reactor Startup as Result of Misunderstanding of Ts.Util Will Submit TS Change to Clarify Frequency for IRM & APRM Instrumentation Funtional Tests
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000260/LER-1994-010-01, Forwards LER 94-010-01,clarifying Analysis of Event Section Which Division I & Division II ECCS Equipment Remained Operable for Automatic Initiation | Forwards LER 94-010-01,clarifying Analysis of Event Section Which Division I & Division II ECCS Equipment Remained Operable for Automatic Initiation | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000260/LER-1994-010, :on 941005,loss of ECCS Division II Instrumentation Resulting from Blown Fuse in Atu Inverter. Caused by a Failed Capacitor.Blown DC Input Fuse Was Replaced |
- on 941005,loss of ECCS Division II Instrumentation Resulting from Blown Fuse in Atu Inverter. Caused by a Failed Capacitor.Blown DC Input Fuse Was Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2)(v) | | 05000260/LER-1994-011-01, :on 941001,magnesium Alloy Rotor Motor on Reactor Water Recirculation Sys Pump Discharge Isolation Valve Failed,Placing Facility in Lco.New Operator Motor Installed & Associated Breaker Replaced |
- on 941001,magnesium Alloy Rotor Motor on Reactor Water Recirculation Sys Pump Discharge Isolation Valve Failed,Placing Facility in Lco.New Operator Motor Installed & Associated Breaker Replaced
| | | 05000260/LER-1994-011, Forwards Voluntary LER 94-011 Re Failure of Magnesium Alloy Rotor Motor on Reactor Water Recirculation Sys Pump Discharge Valve.Rept Submitted Because of Potential Generic Applicability of Issues Surrounding Event to Other Util | Forwards Voluntary LER 94-011 Re Failure of Magnesium Alloy Rotor Motor on Reactor Water Recirculation Sys Pump Discharge Valve.Rept Submitted Because of Potential Generic Applicability of Issues Surrounding Event to Other Utils | | | 05000260/LER-1994-012-01, :on 941113,RHR Shutdown Cooling Valve Inadvertently Closed.Caused by Personnel Failure to Follow Procedure During Surveillance Instruction.Personnel Involved in Event Counseled |
- on 941113,RHR Shutdown Cooling Valve Inadvertently Closed.Caused by Personnel Failure to Follow Procedure During Surveillance Instruction.Personnel Involved in Event Counseled
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000260/LER-1994-013, :on 941202,Unit 2 Received Full Automatic Scram from 54% Reactor Power.Caused by Mechanical Degradation of Stator Cooling Water Temp Switch.Affected Systems Restored to Operable Status & Temp Switch Replaced Before Restart |
- on 941202,Unit 2 Received Full Automatic Scram from 54% Reactor Power.Caused by Mechanical Degradation of Stator Cooling Water Temp Switch.Affected Systems Restored to Operable Status & Temp Switch Replaced Before Restart
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000260/LER-1994-013-01, :on 941202,Unit 2 Scrammed from 54% Power Due to Balance of Plant Equipment Failure.Caused by Mechanical Degradation of Stator Cooling Water Temp Switch. Affected Sys Restored to Operable Status |
- on 941202,Unit 2 Scrammed from 54% Power Due to Balance of Plant Equipment Failure.Caused by Mechanical Degradation of Stator Cooling Water Temp Switch. Affected Sys Restored to Operable Status
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) |
|