ML18036B178
| ML18036B178 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 02/25/1993 |
| From: | Kellogg P, Patterson C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18036B176 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-93-02, 50-259-93-2, 50-260-93-02, 50-260-93-2, 50-296-93-02, 50-296-93-2, NUDOCS 9303080045 | |
| Download: ML18036B178 (30) | |
See also: IR 05000259/1993002
Text
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos.:
50-259/93-02,
50-260/93-02,
and 50-296/93-02
Licensee:
Valley Authority
6N 38A Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga,
TN
37402-2801
Docket Nos.:
50-259,
50-260,.
and 50-296
License Nos.:
and
Facility Name:
Browns Ferry Units 1,
2,
and
3
Inspection at Browns Ferry Site near Decatur,
Inspection
Conducted:
January
16 - February
17,
1993
Inspector:
atters
n,, Senlo
esI ent
nspector
ate
Soigne
Accompanied
by:
.J.
Munday, Resident
Inspector
R. Musser,
Resident
Inspector
Approved by:
au
e
ogg,
C se
,
Reactor Projects,
Section
4A
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
ate
cygne
Scope:
This routine resident
inspection
included surveillance
observation,
maintenance
observation,
operational
safety
verification, modifications, refueling activities, Unit 3 restart
activities, site organization,
and self assessment.
One hour of backshift coverage
was routinely worked during the
work week.
Deep backshift inspections
were conducted
on January
25, January
30,
and February 7,
1993.
9303080045
930225
ADOCK 05000259
6
Results:
Unit 2 be
an
a
119 da
refu
9
y
cling outage, on January
29,
1993,
paragraph
four.
The unit was shutdown
and fuel off-loaded in a
controlled manner.
The licensee
implemented
the
NUHARC guidelines
for shutdown risk for the outage.
An unresolved
item was identified concerning mislabeling of fuses,
paragraph
four.
As plant equipment
has
been
tagge'd out during the
outage,
plant operators
have discovered that plant drawings
identifying fuse
numbers did not match the labeling in the plant.
Apparently, during the last year over
a thousand
drawing changes
have
been
made
as administrative
changes
to assign
unique fuse
identification numbers to fuses,
but this evolution was not
coordinated with plant operations.
One violation with three
examples
was identified concerning
failure to perform surveillance testing
and properly control work
activities,
paragraphs
two and three.
The first two examples
were
identified by the licensee
but collectively these
examples
indicate additional attention is needed
to ensure
compliance with
technical specifications
and procedures.
,The first example
was
for failure to conduct
a required surveillance test of the reactor
building crane prior to new fuel movement.
This step
was signed
as complete
based
on verbal
communication
but
an adequate
verification was not performed.
The second
example
was for
failure to perform
an adequate
post maintenance
test to ensure
system operability following maintenance.
The work order required
calibration of a temperature
switch, but the physical
work
required
removal of charcoal
trays which was outside of the scope
of the work plan instructions.
The third example identified by an
NRC inspector while observing work on the high pressure
coolant
injection system.
A procedure
step to verify the job
prerequisites
were complete
was not signed.
i
REPORT DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees:
- 0. Zeringue,
Vice Pr'esident
- J. Scalice,
Plant Manager
J. Rupert,
Engineering
and Modifications Manager
D. Nye, Recovery
Manager
- H. Herrell, Operations
Manager
- J. Haddox,
Engineering
Manager
- H. Bajestani,
Technical
Support
Manager
A. Sorrell, Special
Programs
Manager
C. Crane,
Maintenance
Hanager
- G. Pierce,
Acting Licensing Manager
- R. Baron, Site guality Manager
- J. Corey, Site Radiological
Control
Manager
A. Brittain, Site Security Manager
Other licensee
employees
or contractors
contacted
included licensed
reactor operators,
auxiliary operators,
craftsmen,
technicians,
and
public safety officers;
and quality assurance,
design,
and engineering
personnel.
NRC Personnel:
P. Kellogg, Section Chief
- C. Patterson,
Senior Resident
Inspector
- J. Munday, Resident
Inspector
- R. Husser,
Resident
Inspector
- Attended exit interview
and initialisms used throughout this report
ar'e listed in the
last paragraph.
Surveillance
Observation
(61726)
The inspectors
observed
and/or reviewed the performance of required SIs.,
The inspections
included reviews of the SIs for technical
adequacy
and
conformance to TS, verification of test instrument calibration,
observa-
tions of the conduct of testing, confirmation of proper removal
from
service
and return to service of systems,
and reviews of test data.
The
inspectors
also verified that
LCOs were met, testing
was accomplished
by
qualified personnel,
and. the SIs were completed within the required
frequency.
The following SIs were reviewed during this reporting
period:
a.
SI 4.2.J. I-IA, Seismic Monitoring Triaxial Time History
Accelerographs
(SHA-2) Channel
Check
0
On January
26,
1993 the inspector
observed
the performance of
portions of SI 4.2.J. 1-1A, Seismic Honitoring Triaxial Time
History Accelerographs
(SHA-2) Channel
Check.
This surveillance
provides
a channel
check of the strong motion accelerographs
which
satisfies
the channel
check requirements
of TS Tables 3.2.J
and
4.2.J.
This procedure verifies proper operation of the batteries.
It also perturbates
the seismic
sensor
and verifies the proper
response
is received.
The inspector
noted
no deficiencies with
this evolution.
O-SI-4.7.C-1,
Three
Zone Secondary
Containment Integrity Test
On January
30,
1993,
the inspectors
observed
portions of Surveil-
lance Instruction O-SI-4.7.C-1,
Three
Zone Secondary
Containment
Integrity. Test.
The purpose of the test is to verify secondary
containment integrity in accordance
with TS 4.7.c. 1.'a
and 4.7.c.2
when the three reactor building zones
and the refueling floor zone
are interconnected.
During the test,
normal
second'ary
containment
ventilation is secured
and the standby
gas treatment
system is
started.
The test verifies the capability to maintain -.25 inches
of water pressure
with inleakage
less
than
12,000 scfm.
During
the surveillance,
the inspectors verified that each
zone
was able
to maintain at least
a -.25 inches of water dp with the areas
outside the building.
Total flow required to achieve the dp was
approximately
10,000 scfm, leaving
a margin of approximately
2,000
scfm.
No discrepancies
were identified.
SI-4.10.D,
Reactor Building Crane
On January
27,
1993, while performing
an annual
audit of
operations activities, quality assurance
identified that SI
4. 10.D, Reactor Building Crane,
had not been 'performed prior to
the crane
being
used to move
new fuel.
Verification of the
surveillance
being performed is accomplished
by performance of
step 4.3. 1 in O-GOI-100-2,
New Fuel Operations.
This step
was
signed
as completed
by the refuel floor .shift manager following
confirmation from the mechanical
foreman.
New fuel'andling
activities were then
commenced.
Upon discovering the surveillance
had not been
performed
crane activities were suspended
and the
surveillance
was performed satisfactorily.
Incident Investigation
93-006
was initiated to determine
the root cause
and corrective
action.
TS 4. 10.D requires
the Reactor Building crane operability
surveillance
be performed prior to the handling of new or spent
fuel
and quarterly thereafter.
TS 6.8. l.l.c requires that
procedures
shall
be established
covering surveillance 'activities
of safety related
equipment;
This is verified by the satisfactory
performance of SI-4. 10.D.
Contrary to this requirement,
the
reactor building crane
was used to move
new fuel between
January
10,
1993
and January
18,
1993 without first satisfactorily
performing SI-4. 10.D.
This is identified as the first example of
~
s.
VIO 259,
260,
296/93-02-01,
Test
and
Procedural
Step.
d.
Local
Leak Rate Test,
LLRT, on the
RCIC Exhaust
Vacuum Breaker
2-71-598
On February 9,
1993 the inspector
observed
portions of a LLRT, on
the
RCIC exhaust
vacuum breaker
2-71-598,
and
packing.
The controlling procedure
was 2-SI-4.7.A.2.g-'2/PBa,
Local
Leak Rate Test Rotameter
Method:
and
RCIC Turbine Exhaust
Vacuum Breaker
and is
performed to satisfy the requirements
of TS 4.7.A.2.g.
The
inspector verified the calibration equipment
was current
and set
up properly.
Conversation with the operator indicated
he was
knowledgeable
about the operation of the equipment.
A test
box
encapsulates
the valve being tested .and is then pressurized
with
,air or nitrogen.
During this test the seal for the test
box
leaked but after replacement
the test
was completed
satisfactorily.
The inspector
had
no concerns with the
performance of this surveillance.
One example of a violation was identified in the Surveillance
Observation
area.
Maintenance
Observation
(62703)
Plant maintenance
activities were observed
and/or reviewed for selected
safety-related
systems
and components
to ascertain
that they were
conducted
in accordance
with requirements.
The following items were
considered
during these
reviews:
LCOs maintained,
use of approved
procedures,
functional testing and/or calibrations were-performed prior
to returning components
or systems to service,
gC records maintained,
activities accomplished
by qualified personnel,
use of properly
certified parts
and materials,
proper
use of clearance
procedures,
and
implementation of radiological controls
as required.
Work documentation
{MR, WR,
and
WO) were reviewed to determine
the
status of outstanding
jobs
and to assure
that priority was assigned
to
safety-related
equipment
maintenance
which might affect plant safety.
The inspectors
observed
the following maintenance activities during this
reporting period:
a
~
Fuel
Pool Cooling Piping
On January 20,'993,
the inspector
observed
maintenance
being
performed
on the
1A fuel pool cooling suction piping.
The piping
drain valve BFN-1-DRV-078-0584 was being refurbished
because it
could not be operated.
The system is needed
to support the unit
2
outage
and other repairs
were needed that required draining this
section of piping.
The repairs
were controlled under work order
92-49785-00.
The inspector
noted quality control personnel
monitored the work.
Radiological
procedures
were followed
satisfactorily.
No defi'ciencies
were
noted.'ontrol
Room Emergency Ventilation
On November 28,
1992
an access
panel
and charcoal
tray was
removed'rom
CREV, Unit B, to access'he
sensing
bulb for a temperature
switch requiring calibration.
Following completion of the work,
the charcoal
tray was replaced,
the panel
closed,
and
a smoke test
performed to verify no leaks existed
around the panel
seal.
Work
Order 92-50412-02
was written to perform the maintenance
but
failed to add instructions to remove the access
panel
and the
charcoal filter.
The licensee
stated that the procedure
used to
perform this maintenance
did not state that disassembly
of the
CREV unit was required.
Therefore the planner did not include
this in the work instructions nor the required surveillance.
as
a
post maintenance
test.
The craft performing the maintenance
removed the panel
and charcoal tray to gain access
to the sensing
bulb and performed the work.
On December 30,, 1992, following
completion of identical
work on
CREV Unit A, technical
support
determined that SI 4.7.E.3.A, Control
Room Emergency Ventilation
System Charcoal
Halogenated
Hydrocarbon Test, test
was
needed.
The licensee
then realized the test
was not performed for the
B
unit.
Two root causes
were identified in Incident Investigation II-B-92-
81.
The first was insufficient detail in the work order,
due to
the controlling procedure
not stating that disassembly
was
required.
As
a consequence
the appropriate
post maintenance
test
was not assigned.
The second
was unauthorized
removal of the
charcoal tray,
again
due to an inadequate
procedure
and lack of
attention
by craft personnel,
SSP-6.50,
Post-Maintenance
Testing,
Section 3. 1.2 requires that
post-maintenance
testing shall
be sufficiently comprehensive
to
ensure that corrective and/or preventive maintenance
work does not
adversely affect equipment operability, in this case satisfactory.
performance of the surveillance test.
TS Section 6.8. l.l.c
requires that procedures
shall
be implemented
covering surveil-
lance activities of safety-related
equipment.
Failure to perform
SI O-SI-4.7.E.3.B,
following removal of a charcoal
tray from CREV
Unit
B is
a violation of this requirement
and is identified as the
second
example of VIO 259,
260, 296/93-02-01,
Hissed Surveillance
Tests
and Procedural
Step.
HPCI Turbine Steam Supply Valve
On February ll, 1993 the inspector
observed electrical
maintenance
personnel
reconnecting
the motor power supply for the 2-73-0016,
HPCI Turbine Steam Supply Valve.
The work was being controlled
by
WO 93-00507-1
which was written to provide support to mechanical
maintenance
by disconnecting
and reconnecting
the motor power
5,
supply.
The electrical craft had previously disconnected
the
motor leads
and were in the process
of reconnecting
the leads
following mechanical
maintenance.
The inspector,
upon -reviewing
the
WO noted that the prerequisites
had not yet been
signed off by
the electrical
foreman.
The signature
was required prior to any
work commencing.
The craft were questioned
as to why the
prerequisites
had not been
signed
and they replied that the
foreman just missed it.
Failure to verify that the prerequisites
were satisfied prior to commencing
work is
a violation of SSP-6.2,
Haintenance
Hanagement
System,
and is the third example of VIO
259,260,296/93-02-01,
Hissed Surveillance
Tests
and Procedural
Step.
Two examples of a violation were identified in the Haintenance
Observation
area,
Operational
Safety Verification (71707)
The
NRC inspectors
followed the overall plant status
and
any significant
safety matters related to plant operations.
Daily discussions
were held
with plant management
and various
members of the plant operating staff.
The inspectors
made routine visits to the control
rooms.
Inspection
observations
included instrument readings,
setpoints
and recordings,
status of operating
systems,
status
and alignments of emergency
standby
systems,
verification of onsite
and offsite power supplies,
emergency
power sources
available for automatic operation,
the purpose of
temporary tags
on equipment controls
and switches,
alarm
status,
adherence
to procedures,
adherence
to LCOs, nuclear instruments
operability, temporary alterations
in effect, daily journals
and logs,
stack monitor recorder traces,
and control
room manning.
This
inspection activity also included
numerous
informal discussions
with
operators
and supervisors.
General
plant tours were conducted.
Portions of the turbine buildings,
each reactor building,
and general
plant areas
were visited.
Observations
included valve position
and system alignment,
and
hanger conditions,
containment isolation alignments,
instrument
readings,
housekeeping,
power supply and breaker alignments,
radiation
and contaminated
area controls,
tag controls
on equipment,
work
activities in progress,
and radiological protection controls.
Informal
discussions
were held with selected
plant personnel
in- their functional
areas
during these tours.
a ~
Unit Status
Unit 2 was shutdown for a scheduled
119 day refueling outage
on
January
29,
1993.
This ended
121 continuous
days of power
operation'.
The generator
was taken off-line at 8:15 a.m.
and a-
manual scram initiated at 9:08 a.m.
Cold shutdown
was achieved
at
10: 15 p.m.
on January
30,
1993.
Fuel offload was completed
on
February
10,
1993.
Danger Tags
Operations
is replacing the old hold order tags with a new larger
style tag.
The old tag
was smaller
and was white with a red
border.
The new tag is red
and
much larger.
This will improve
visibility of the tags
and help to prevent hold order violations.
Operations
has posted large "stop sign" shaped
signs throughout
the plant identifying the
new and old tags
and their purpose.
Use
of the
new tags
should reduce the probability of a person
erroneously
operating
a piece of equipment
removed
from service
by
a hold order.
On February
1,
1993 while on
a plant tour, the inspector
noted the
Standby Liquid Control local discharge
pressure
gauge indicator
needle
was bent
and missing
a hold-down screw.
Because
a
surveillance
which depended
on the accuracy of this gauge
had
been
performed satisfactorily- the day before,
work order 93-01295
was
written to determine .if the accuracy
was affected
by this damage.
Haintenance
determined
the gauge
was out of calibration
and would
indicate high approximately twenty psi throughout its entire
range.
The gauge
could not be repaired
so it was replaced.
The
inspector
questioned
the validity of the surveillance
performed
the day before.
The .ASHE code,
Section XI, Article IWP-4000,
requires
instruments
to have
an accuracy of two percent
and the
inaccuracy of this gauge
was only one percent.
The licensee
stated that for this reason
the surveillance did not need to be
re-performed.
Lube Oil Control
The inspector
reviewed the licensee's
lube oil control
program due
to
a recent industry event where the wrong oil was put in a
component.
HPI-O-OOO-LUB001, Lubrication of Equipment,
provides
guidance
on the handling, disposal,
and the addition of oil to
plant equipment.
.The procedure
provides
a detailed list of plant
components
and the lubricant required for that component.
In
addition, the list provides the plant location,
system designation
and lubrication points for each
component.
When lubricant needs
to be added to
a component,
Haintenance
personnel
submit
a request
to Power Stores for the type designated
in the procedure.
Power
Stores
personnel
then drain the requested
amount of oil from a
fifty-fivegallon drum into a smaller container.
If all the oil
is not used
by maintenance, it is poured into
a waste oil barrel
and later disposed of.
The inspector
noted
no deficiencies.-
Reactor, Recirculation
Pump
On February
11,
1993, while on
a plant tour, the inspector
noted
that Reactor Recirculation
Pump breaker
1452 did not have
clearance
tags or control
power fuses
hanging
from it although it
had
been previously cleared
out and was obviously de-energized.
The inspector later discussed
this with an
from 'the
Operations
Work Control
Group who determined that the breaker
had
been
under clearance
2-93-0198 since January
31,
1993
and should
have
had clearance
tags
on the control
power fuses.
When the
inspector
and the
SRO went back to the breaker to investigate,
the
control
power fuses
were pulled
and the clearance
tags
were in
place.
The inspector then informed the
SOS of the findings.
Further investigation
by the Operations
Manager indicated that
an
AUO had previously been directed to remove the tags
from this
breaker
because it was believed to be hanging
on the wrong fuses.
After further review by Operations, it was determined that the
tags
were hanging
on the right. fuses
but the fuses
wer e
mislabeled,
so the tags
were rehung.
This confusion over fuse
labelling resulted "in the clearance
tags not being
hung
as
.indicated
on the Clearance
Sheets.
The mislabelling of these
fuses resulted
from drawings
being
changed
through the
DCN process
without changing
the labels in the
field.
Pending further review of the li'censee's
program in this
area this item will tracked
as
URI 259,260,296/93-02-02,
Mislabel-
ling of Fuses.
One Unresolved
Item was identified in the Operational
Safety
Verification area.
5.
Hodifications'(37700,
37828)
.
The inspectors
maintained
cognizance of modification activities to
support the restart of Unit 2.
.This included reviews of scheduling
and
work control, routine meetings,
and observations
of field activities.
Throughout the observation of modifications being performed in the field
gC inspectors
were observed monitoring and documented verification at
work activities.
a 0
DCN W17049A, Installation of Emergency Lighting System in Cabling
Spreading
Rooms
The inspector toured the cable spreading
room on January
12,
1993
and inspected
the installation of the battery racks for .this
modification.
The purpose of the emergency lighting was to allow
for safe exit in the event of a lighting failure and carbon
dioxide release
into the rooms.
The batteries,
as installed,
were
not seismically mounted since there were gaps
between
the
batteries
and the support brackets.
Also; an identification label
on the lighting system cabinets
was marked
as "S/L EXP. 2/07/93."
The apparent shelf life of some
component
would be reached
in one
month.
The system engineer
reviewed this and found that the
battery charger
had
been placed in service to energize
the battery
although the
DCN was not closed.
This addressed
the concern
about
the shelf life.
The inspector
reviewed the
DCN and addressed
in the safety
assessment
was that the battery packs
and conduits
were
seismically supported.
The inspe'ctor reviewed the vendor
certification for the battery racks.
The licensee
analyzed
the
gaps at the ends of the battery
and concluded that in a seismic
event only movement of three to four inches
would occur.
The gaps
were greater
than six inches
and if additional batteries
were ever,
added
then side bars
would be required.
Security Upgrade Project
On January
21,
1993,
the inspector
performed
a walkdown of,
portions of the security upgrade project.
These
areas
included
modifications in the security diesel
generator building and the
new secondary
alarm station.
The inspector
reviewed various work
documents
at the work sites.
Included in these
documents
were
work plans
0031-93
and 0811-92.
These
work plans dealt with the
~
removal of old conduit
and the installation of new conduit
and
boxes to support the installation of new cardreaders.
During the
review of the work documents,
the inspector
noted that'one of the-
activities were designed
to have site
gC involvement.
The
inspector
brought this to the attention of the licensee's
site
quality organization.
On January
22,
a meeting
was conducted
between
the inspector,
Site guality and
RUST engineering
personnel
to discuss
the matter
of site quality non-involvement with the workplans specified
above
(RUST is the licensee's
contractor in charge of implementation of
the security upgrade project).
As
a result of the discussion,
the
inspector
was satisfied with the non-involvement of site quality
personnel
with WPs 0031-93
and 0811-92.
However, it was-evident
that
some confusion existed
as to what involvement site quality
would have with the post modification testing of the site security
upgrade.
The meeting
was concluded with the understanding
that
RUST personnel
and
TVA site quality would meet to determine
the
involvement of site quality with the remainder of the
modification.
This meeting
was conducted
on January
26.
On
January
27, the inspector
was briefed
on the results of the
January
26 meeting.
The inspector
was satisfied that the level of
site quality involvement with the remainder of the security
upgrade project would be adequate
and meet the requirements
specified in SSP-3.2
and SSP-8.3.
On February
10,
1993, the inspectors
were informed that
numerous
deficiencies of failure to follow modification and design control
procedures
were identified related to the security upgrade project
and that this matter would be documented
on
SCAR number
BFSCAR930002.
As
a result of these findings, site management
took
the following actions:
l.
A TVA reviewer will review and approve all future
security upgrade
WPs.
2.
RUST Engineering will utilize TVA Modifications and
Addition Instructions
and SSP-9.3 for DCN work
activities.
3.
Prior to performing work activities inside the power
block,. RUST Engineering
must obtain both the
concurrence of the Site equal'ity manager
and
Hodifications manager.
4.
Design Engineering will perform
an evaluation
on- the
conditions identified.
5.
RUST Engineering will review and
TVA will concur with
each individual existing
WP to ensure similar
conditions
do not exist prior to resuming
any work
activities.
The inspectors will continue to monitor the licensee's
actions
as
they relate to the security upgrade project.
Installation of the Hardened
Wetwell Vent
During the inspection period, installation of the hardened
wetwell
vent modification continued.
Work was simultaneously
being
performed
on piping inside
and outside of the unit 2 reactor
building in accordance
with DCNs 17337
and
17491.
The inspectors
routinely toured both work sites to ensure
the modification was
being performed in accordance
with the specified requirements.
On February 8,
1993, while touring the
common header portion of
the
HWWV. outside the reactor building, the inspector
noted that
a
60 foot run of the
14 inch pipe between
two 90 degree
elbows
was
bowed.
The offset of the piping was approximately
6 inches.
The
pipe apparently
b'ecame
bowed when
a horizontal
support block was
removed
from the section of piping in question.
As the block was
removed,
the piping section
downstream
from the area in question,
due to its mass
and elevation difference
(drop in elevation of
approximately
30 feet),
caused
the pipe to shift.
Since the pipe
was located in a trench,
the pipe shifted until pinned against
the
trench wall and'then finally causing
a bowed condition.
The inspector
informed the licensee's
engineering
organization of
the observation.
In response
to the inspectors
observation,
site
engineering
personnel
were to inspect the area in question
and
inform the inspector of their determination of the condition the
following morning.
The next morning the inspector
questioned
engineering
personnel
as to whether they had
come to any
conclusion
on this matter.
Engineering
personnel
involved stated
they hadn't
had
a chance
to observe
and evaluate
the piping.
Following this conversation,
the inspector
proceeded
to the area
in question
and discovered that the piping had
been buried.
Engineering
personnel
were apparently
unaware that the piping was
,
i,
10
scheduled
to be buried and.therefore
did not postpone that action.
Portions of the involved piping were
exhumed
and
some
measurements
taken.
An engineering calculation of the piping bow over the
60
foot length determined that stresses
within the pipe were within
allowable limits for 14 inch schedule
30 piping.
The inspectors
will continue to monitor the modification through'ts
completion.
Refueling Activities (60710)
a 0
b.
Refueling Test
Program
On January
29,
1993, Unit 2 was
shutdown to begin its cycle
6
refueling outage.
The outage is scheduled for 119 days
and
contains
numerous
work activities.
Due to the extensive
modifications
and maintenance
work, the licensee
has determined
that it will be necessary
to perform
a simplified
on
some
systems prior to the completion of the outage.
This process,
called the System
Review Checklist, is described
in TI-270,
Refueling Test
Program.
This TI is currently being revised to
clarify the process.
In early February,
the licensee
published
a
list of systems that will undergo this proce'ss.
The inspectors
have reviewed. these
systems
and
have determined
the list to be
adequate.
In addition to providing instructions for performing
a system
review checklist,
TI-270 provides
a method to ensure that all'pen
items affecting plant operability are completed or dispositioned
prior to commencing fuel load
and startup.
Appendix 2, the Fuel
Load Review Checklist,
must
be completed prior to fuel load.
Appendix 3, the Startup
Review Checklist, will be completed, prior
. to unit startup.
Both checklists
are concurred
on by all major
plant department
managers,
the
and the Plant Hanager.
The TI
also contains
those
SIs which are to be performed during the
initial startup after
a refueling outage.
Th'ese .tests
are
delineated
in Appendix
1 of the TI.
The inspectors will monitor
the licensee's
use of the TI throughout the refueling outage to
ensure that regulatory requirements
are being adhered to.
.Core Off-load
Core off load for the Unit 2 cycle
6 refueling outage
began
on
February 3,
1993,
and
was completed
on February
10.
During this
period, the inspectors
observed defueling operations
on numerous
occasions.
During the initial fuel movement observation,
the
inspector
noted that
no licensed
operators
the refueling bridge during fuel movement.
In lieu of riding the
bridge,
an
SRO was present
in the area of the spent fuel pool
and
was monitoring the defueling evolution.
TS 6.2.2.f states
that
a
SRO shall
be present
during alteration of the core to directly
supervise
the activity.
The inspector consulted
experienced
regional
management
on this matter
and
was informed that the
did not have to be
on the bridge to directly supervise
the
alteration of the core.
The inspector
observed
defueling operations
from the bridge
on
February
5 and February
9.
Movement of numerous
spent fuel
bundles
from the reactor to the spent fuel pool
as well as
installation of double blade guides
was observed.
Two unlicensed
auxiliary operators
trained in fuel handling were
on the bridge
during all fuel movements.
All fuel movements
were tracked with
fuel movement
sheets
by the bridge operators,
the refueling floor
SRO,
an
AUO maintaining-the refueling floor status
board
and
an
operator in the control
room.
A status
board in the control
room
was also maintained to track fuel movements.
The operators
that
were observed
moving fuel were highly proficient and
knowledgeable.
In the areas
surrounding
the reactor cavity and spent fuel pool,
the licensee
established
a loose object/foreign material
control
zone.
All persons
as well as
any loose tools/objects
were logged
into the area.
An individual was assigned
to control this
process.
All loose objects,
such
as
eye glasses,
were required to
be secured
to the individual with lanyards.
Overall, the foreign
material control associated
with -the defueling operation
appeared
to be
a well controlled process.
LPRM Changeout
The inspector
reviewed the plans to changeout
23
LPRM strings out
of 43 total in the core.
The strings
are being
changed
due to the
high failure rate of a certain type using
a one-sixteenth
inch
conductor that fails due to vibrations."
The
23
new strings all
have one-eighth
'inch diameter conductors.
The remaining '20
strings
are
a type having one-eighth
inch diameter conductors
also
- and have not experienced
the
same type of failures.
The strings will be changed
out during the outage after the vessel
is defueled.
There were
no extra considerations
required for
shutdown risk due to the plant configuration.
The procedure to
changeout
the
LPRM's was SII-O-XX-92-051,
LPRM Maintenance
and
Testing Instruction.
The inspector
reviewed procedure
and
additional testing guidance
provided
by General Electric.
The
inspector will continue to follow these activities
as the
changeout
occurs.
Control Blade Inspections
The inspector
observed
operations
associated
with unlo'ading,
inspecting
and placing
new control blades into the Unit 2 spent
fuel pool.
These activities were controlled by notes
and
precautions
contained in General
Operating Instruction,
O-GOI-100-2,
New Fuel Operations.
Once the shipping crate lid was
removed riggers
used the refuel floor overhead
crane to lift the
12
blade from the crate.
It was then inspected
by certified
inspectors
and placed into the spent fuel pool.
The Refuel Floor
Shift Hanager,
an
SRO, supervised
the entire activity.
The
inspector
noted that
no procedures
were in hand
and being used.
The Refuel Floor Shift Hanager stated that
a prejob briefing
described
the method of lifting the'blade
from the shipping crate
,and was'onsidered
to be skill of the craft.
He also stated that
the inspection criteria were obtained
from a General
Electric
do'cument
and put in the form of a checklist.
He stated that the
checklist
was short
and not required to be in hand during the
inspection
but the information obtained
would be transferred
to
the checklist later.
During the inspection three blades
were
found with bent top handles
and determined to be unacceptable
for
use.
It could'ot
be determined
how the top handles, got bent.
The inspector also questioned
the method for removing the blade
.
from 'the shipping crate.
A strap
was attached
to the top handle
and slowly raised
by the overhead
crane while laborers lifted and
supported
the blade to keep the weight off the top handle.
Once
the blade
was in a vertical position the laborers released'he
blade
and allowed it to be supported
by the top handle
and the
crane.
The
GE document required that
a specialized lifting sling
,
be used.
The Refuel Floor Shift Hanager stated that
TVA didn'
have this type sling but that
GE had approved
the method they were
using.
The inspector
noted
no other discrepancies
with this
activity.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Unit 3 Restart Activities
(30702)
The inspector
reviewed
and observed
the licensee's
activities involved
with the Unit 3 restart.
This included reviews of procedures,
post-job
activities,
and completed field work; observation of pre-job field work,
in-progress field work,
and gA/gC activities; attendance
at restart
craft level, progress
meetings,
restart
program meetings,
and management
meetings;
and periodic discussions
with both
TVA and contractor person-
nel, skilled craftsmen,
supervisors,
managers
and executives.
a 0
System
.The licensee
had
commenced
a
SPOC review of five systems.
The
systems
selected
were
as follows:
¹5
¹8
¹7
¹37
¹53
Turbine Drains
and Hisc. Piping
Turbine Extraction Traps
and Drains
Gland Seal
Water
Demineralizer
Backwash Air System
These
systems
were chosen to exercise
the process
and required
only minor work.
Only a
Phase
I (system ready for testing)
review is being performed at this time for these
systems.
'
13
Additionally, the licensee
has developed
a listing of sy'stems
requiring
SPOC for Unit 3 restart.
The systems
were grouped into
three categories;
1) systems
which require
a
SPOC that were not
previously reviewed for Unit 2; 2) systems
which require
a minor
system
SPOC and,;
3) systems
which will not require
a
SPOC.
The
inspector
reviewed the list and
no problems
were identified.
Examples of systems
requiring
a minor
SPOC were the five systems
listed above.
Cleanup Demineralizer
On January
27,
1993, during
a routine tour of the refuel floor,
the inspector
observed that
a radiation monitor reading
1000 mr/hr
was not in alarm although indicating above the labeled
alarm
setpoints.
The monitor was located
18 inches
above
a temporary
cleanup demineralizer
skid used to maintain the Unit 3 reactor
cavity water while modifications were performed
on the
RWCU.
The
alarm setpoint
was labeled at alert
700 mr/hr and alarm 950 mr/hr.
This was discussed
with the health physics technician
assigned
to
the refuel floor.
The alarm setpoint
had
been
changed
to 1400
mr/hr but the labeling
had not changed.
This was because
the
. previous
weekend
CRDs were exercised
on Unit 3 causing
some crud
release
resulting in the radiation increases.
The inspector
reviewed the temporary skid for adequacy of labeling
and locking as
a high radiation, area.
TS requir'es that a-high
radiation area
be locked if greater
than
1000 mrem/hr.
The
monitor probe
was hanging
18 inches
above the skid.
The skid was
wrapped in lead blankets to provide shielding.
Temporary barriers
were erected
on each side of the skid with a lock and chain,
However,
in front of the skid were several
valves
and associated
piping not inside the barrier.
Also, there
was
no barrier to
prevent
anyone
from climbing the front of the skid onto the top of .
the skid.
This was discussed
with the radiological control
manager.
The licensee
stated that the barriers
were adequate
since it would require
a malicious intent to go on top of the
skid.
The inspector
contended that there
was
no locked door or
structure
in front of the skid to prevent
a person
from climbing
on top of the skid.
This concern
was reviewed
by Region II health
physics inspectors
during February 8-12,
1993,
and concluded that
the licensee controls were adequate.
Unit Separation
Program
SSP 12.50, Unit Separation
For Recovery Activities, describes
the
controls established
to ensure that Unit 3 recovery work does
not
impact Unit 2 operations..
This was accomplished
by labelling
equipment
and areas
needed to support Unit 2 operation
and then
limiting personnel
access
to these
areas.
Equipment operation
needed to support unit separation
was controlled by clearances.
14
d.
Unit 3 recovery personnel'ere
identified by.a blue hard hat
and
a
picture
badge with a blue dot.
The blue dot prevented
a Unit 3
person
from wearing
someone else's
hard hat
and entering
a Unit 2
space.
These
personnel
could only enter
a Unit
2- operating
space
following authorization
by the Unit 2 SOS/ASOS
and issuance
of a
black and orange'adge
signifying their approval.
During the time
from cold shutdown of Unit 2 for the cycle six refueling outage
until reload of fuel in the reactor vessel
the
use of black and
orange
badges will be suspended.
Unit 3 personnel will continue
to wear blue hard hats but the use of the blue dot on the their
badges will be discontinued indefinitely.
This is being done
because
past mistakes
were not made
as
a result of. the wrong
personnel
being in the wrong place.
Other aspects
of the unit
separation
program will not be modified.
Cooling Tower Phase II SPOC
On January
21,
1993, the inspector participated
in a followup
.walkdown of cooling towers
1, 5,
and
6 as part of Phase II of the
SPOC process.
The inspector
had previously accompanied
licensee
personnel
on the
Phase
I walkdown on December
7,
1992.
The latest
walkdown was performed to ensure deficiencies
noted during
previous
walkdowns
had
been corrected.
No major discrepancies
were noted.
8.
Site Organization
On February
16,
1993, the licensee
announced
a reorganization
of the
Site guality, Licensing,
and
ISEG organizations
on plant site.
Under
the
new plan", these
groups will be combined to form a new organization
titled Nuclear Assurance
and Licensing.
The new organization will be
headed
by R;R. Baron,
who previously held the position of Site guality
Manager.
Directly reporting to Hr. Baron will be the guality Control
and Support Hanager,
guality Assurance
Manager,
Independent
Review/Analysis
Manager,
and the Licensing Manager.
Hr. Baron will
report directly to Hr. J. Haciejewski,
Corporate
Nuclear Assurance
General
Hanager,
and indirectly to Hr. O.J.
Zeringue, Site Vice
President.,
Although effective immediately,
the organization will be in
a transition period for approximately four months.
9.
Self Assessment
(40500)
a.
On February
10,
1993, the inspector
attended
a weekly meeting of
the
PORC.
The meeting
was conducted
in accordance
with, TS 6.5
requirements.
For
13 agenda
items presented,
two items required
additional clarification and
one was disapproved.
The
members
provided
an effective review for the items questioning
manual
operator action requirements
and unnecessary
cable
replacement.
15
b.
Outage
Risk Hanagement
The inspector
reviewed processes
established
by the licensee for
reducing plant outage risks.
Although plant procedures
have not
yet been revised to include
NUHARC guidance
on shutdown
manage-
ment, the guidance
was incorporated
into the planning of the
current outage.-
In December,
1992,
an evaluation
was conducted
by
site
and corporate
personnel
of the Unit 2 cycle
6 outage
schedule
as
recommended
by NUHARC-91-06, Guidelines for Industry Actions to
Assess
Shutdown
Hanagement.
The team identified
a number of items
to improve the schedule
including such things
as maintaining
HPCI/RCIC available until the reactor
head
was removed,
not
performing tests
which breach the main steam
system until the
steam line plugs were installed,
and delaying reactor
bottom drain
work until the fuel pool gates
were reinstalled.
These
items were
appropriately. dispositioned.
Overall the
t'earn concluded that the
schedule
had adequately,
considered
the. concept of defense
in depth
and
had
been constructed
conservatively with respect
to nuclear
safety issues.
Additionally the licensee
developed
a matrix
which identifies the systems
available for decay heat removal,
fission product barriers, reactivity control
systems,
systems
available for fuel pool cooling, switchyard activities,
AC and
power available,
etc.
This matrix is updated daily and.is
included in the Plan of the Day package.
The inspector
noted that
the= main steam line plugs were sealed
by the use of station
service air, without a backup supply.
This was brought to the
attention of the Haintenance'Hanager,
who stated that the plug has
an air supplied bellows type seal
and
an 0-ring type seal.
This
design
ensures
the plug" does not leak if one of the seals fail.
10:
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection
scope
and findings were
summarized
on February
19,
1993
with those
persons
indicated
i.n paragraph
1 above.
The inspectors
described
the areas
inspected
and discussed
in detail the inspection
findings listed below.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary
any
of the material
provided to or. reviewed
by the inspectors
during this
inspection.
Dissenting
comments
were not received
from the licensee.
Item Number
Descri tion and Reference
259,
260,
296/93-02-01
259,
260,
296/93-02-02
VIO, Hissed Surveillance Test
and
Procedural
Step,'aragraphs
two and three.
URI, Hislabelling of Fuses,
paragraph
four.
ll.
and Initialisms
ASHE
American Society of Hechanical
Engineers
ASOS
,
CFR
'CRDR
DCN
'DP
HWWV
ISEG
LCO
NRC
.RO
TI
TS
WP
Assistant Shift Operations
Supervisor
Auxiliary Unit Operator
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
Code of Federal
Regulations
Control
Rod Drive System
Control
Room Design
Review
Control
Room Emergency Ventilation
Design
Change Notice
Differential Pressure
'eneral
Electric
General
Operating Instruction
High Pressure
Coolant Injection
Hardened
Wetwell Vent
Independent
Safety Engineering
Group
Limiting Condition for Operation
Local
Leak Rate Test
Local
Power
Range Monitor
Maintenance
Request
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Plant Operations
Review Committee
Quality Assurance
Quality Control
Reactor
Core Isolation Cooling
Reactor Operator
Reactor
Water Cleanup
Standard
Cubic Feet
Per Minute
Surveillance Instruction
System Pre-Operability Checklist
Senior Reactor Operator
Site Standard
Practice
Technical Instruction
Technical Specification
Unresolved
Item
Violation
Work Order
Work Plan
Work Request
1
'