ML18036A471
| ML18036A471 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 11/26/1991 |
| From: | Kellogg P, Patterson C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18036A469 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-91-40, 50-260-91-40, 50-296-91-40, NUDOCS 9112120116 | |
| Download: ML18036A471 (34) | |
See also: IR 05000259/1991040
Text
gp,fl ASCII
UNITEDSTATES
~ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos.:
50-259/91-40,
50-260/91-40,
and 50-296/91-40
Licensee:
Valley Authority
6N 38A Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga,
TN
37402-2801
Docket Nos.:
50-259,
50-260,
and 50-296
License Nos.:
and
Facility Name:
Browns Ferry Units 1, 2,
and
3
Inspection at Browns Ferry Site near
Decatur,
Inspection
Conducte
October
17 - November 15,
1991
Inspector:
C.
atterson
>or
ide
I
pector
Da e
S gne
Accompanied
by:
E. Christnot, Resident Inspector
W. Bearden,
Resident
Inspector
Approved by:
Pau
J.
Ke
ogg,
ion
f,
In p
TVA Projects
D v'on
rl Z~
Date
S
ne
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine resident
inspection
included surveillance
observation,
maintenance
observation,
operational
safety
verification,
modifications,
Unit 3 restart activities, cold weather preparation,
and action
on previous inspection findings.
Results:
One violation with three
examples
for failure to follow procedure
for control of electrical
systems
was identified,
paragraph
four.
The first two examples
resulted
in unexpected electrical transients.
Inadequate
identification of electrical
components
attributed to one
of the transients
and
was the reason for the third example.
The first example
occurred
when
an
operator
failed to follow
procedure
to
open
the
generator field excitation
breaker
after
opening
the generator
output breaker.
This resulted
in actuation
9112120116
911127
ADOCK 05000259
8
0
of the reverse
power relay causing
an electrical transient.
Plant
operators
tripped
the
reactor
due
to
the
number of unexpected
equipment
responses.
The second
example occurred
when auxiliary plant operators
pulled the
wrong fuses
during
a routine tagout of a diesel
generator.
The hold
order clearance
was not followed to specific unique identification or
physical
location of the fuses.
Plant operators
were unaware of the
fuse tabulation drawings
and fuse unique identifiers
on configuration
control drawings.,
The fuse control
program
was established
in part
under
the Nuclear
Performance
Plan.
A contributing'factor to this
was the use of less
experienced
auxiliary plant operators
instead of
licensed operators
to pull fuses.
The third example
was for failure to maintain labeling of a drywell
blower
power
supply
following
a modification.
The
inspector
identified the breaker
power supply labeled
on two different power
sources.
An unresolved
item
was identified
concerning
the
control
of
a
telecommunications
sub-contractor,
paragraph five.
A stop work order
was issued
by the licensee's
equality Assurance
department
because
the
sub-contractor
work activities
were
being
performed without work
packages.
The licensee
is conducting
an incident investigation of
this problem.
The licensee
conducted
a thorough, timely, self-critical evaluation
of the manual trip that occurred
on October
18, 1991,
paragraph four.
However,
the
number of items
needing correction
on the simulator and
operator
awareness
indicated
a
weakness
in conducting
a
plant
shutdown evolution.
A contractor
work release
program
and associated
pilot programs
has
been
established
for Unit 3 construction
contractors,
paragraph
6.
Initial discussion
with Unit 3 managers
indicated
a general
lack of
understanding
of these
programs.
0
0
REPORT
DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees:
- 0. Zeringue,
Vice President,
Browns Ferry Operations
- H. McCluskey, Vice President,
Browns Ferry Restart
- J. Scalice,
Plant Manager
J. Swindell, Restart
Manager
M. Herrell, Operations
Manager
J. Rupert, Project Engineer
- M. Bajestani,
Technical
Support Manager
- R. Jones,
Operations
Superintendent
A. Sorrell, Maintenance
Manager
G. Turner, Site guality Assurance
Manager
- R. Baron, Site Licensing Manager
- J. McCarthy, Unit 3 Licensing
P. Salas,
Compliance Supervisor
- J. Corey, Site Radiological Control Manager
Other
licensee
employees
or contractors
contacted
included
licensed
reactor
operators,
auxiliary operators,
craftsmen,
technicians,
public
safety officers, quality assurance,
design,
and engineering
personnel.
NRC Personnel:
P. Kellogg, Section Chief
- C. Patterson,
Senior Resident
Inspector
- E. Christnot, Resident
Inspector
W. Bearden,
Resident
Inspector
- Attended exit interview
and initialisms used
throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
Surveillance Observation
(61726,
61700)
The inspectors
observed
and reviewed the performance of required SIs.
The
inspections
included
reviews
of the
SIs for technical
adequacy
and
conformance
to
TS,
verification of test
instrument
calibration,
observations
of the conduct of testing,
confirmation of proper
removal
from service
and return to service of systems,
and reviews of test data.
The inspectors
also verified that
LCOs were met, testing
was accomplished
0
0
by qualified personnel,
and the SIs
were
completed within the required
frequency.
The following SIs were reviewed during this reporting period:
a
~
O-SI-4.7.B.l.b-2,
Standby
Gas
Treatment Filter Train
B Humidity
Control Heater Test.
b.
C.
This testing is performed
to determine
the operability of the
Filter Train
8 Humidity Control circuitry per ANSI N510-l975
and to
verify that the heaters
have
an actual
output of at least
40
KW in
compliance with the
requirements of'S 4.7.B.l.b.
The inspector
reviewed
the
documentation
associated
with
the
most
recently
completed
performance
for this
surveillance
requirement.
The
activity has
an annual periodicity and was performed last on January
17,
1991.
The inspector did not identify any deficiencies
with the
completed surveillance test.
2-SI-4.4.A.2,
Standby Liquid Control Functional Test.
This testing is performed
to determine
the operability of the
System in compliance with the requirements
of TS 4.4.A.2 and 4.6.G.l
The inspector
reviewed
the
documentation
associated
with the most
recently
completed
performance
for this surveillance
requirement.
The activity is performed
once per operating cycle and was performed
last
on
December
3,
1990.
The inspector
did not identify any
deficiencies with the completed surveillance test.
2-SI-4.7.A.5.c, Control Air/Drywe11 Air Isolation Verification.
This test verifies that the control air supply valve to the Drywell
Control Air System is closed to satisfy the requirements
specified in
TS 4.7.A.5.c.
The inspector
reviewed
the documentation
associated
with
the
two
most
recently
completed
performances
for this
surveillance
requirement.
The activity is performed
once
per month
and
was performed last
on October 6,
1991
and November 3,
1991.
The
inspector
did not identify any deficiencies
with the
completed
surveillance tests.
d.
2-SI-4.2.B-21FT,
Pump Discharge
Pressure
Functional Test.
This test is performed to determine operability of Core Spray
Pump
Discharge
Pressure
Channels,
2-PS-75-7,
2-PS-75-16,
2-PS-75-35,
and
2-PS-75-44,
in order
to satisfy
requirements
of
The
inspector
observed
portions
of the
ongoing testing
performed
on
November
7,
1991.
The inspector did not identify any deficiencies
wi.th conduct of the surveillance test.
No violations
or
deviations
were
identified
in
the
Surveillance
Observation
area.
~
~
~
~
~
3.
Maintenance
Observation
(62703)
Plant
maintenance
activities
were
observed
and
reviewed
for selected
safety-related
systems
and
components
to ascertain
that
they
were
0
conducted
in accordance
with requirements.
The following items
were
considered
during
these
reviews:
LCOs maintained,
use of approved
procedures,
functional testing and/or calibrations
were performed prior to
returning
components
or
systems
to service,
gC
records
maintained,
activities accomplished
by qualified personnel,
use of properly certified
parts
and
materials,
proper
use
of
clearance
procedures,
and
implementation of radiological controls
as required.
Work documentation
(MR,
WR, and
WO) were reviewed to determine
the status
of outstanding
jobs
and
to
assure
that priority was
assigned
to
safety-related
equipment maintenance
which might affect plant safety.
The
inspectors
observed
the following maintenance
activities
during this
reporting period:
a.
Unit 2 Preferred
Motor Generator
WO 91-42556-00
was
used
to troubleshoot
the Unit 2 Unit Preferred
Motor Generator battery to armature voltage fluctuations.
The
WO had
originated
on October
25,
1991,
when
the fluctuations
were first
observed
but
the majority of the
work activities
occurred after
the unit experienced
a loss of
120
VAC Unit Preferred
Power
on
November 3, 1991.
The inspectors
followed the ongoing work activities
and
observed
work in progress
in the field.
Work performed
under
this
WO included
replacement
of the
tachometer
which
was
found
grounded,
replacement
of the
SK circuit card
which
had
a
blown
capacitor,
removal
and calibration of the
OVR and
2UFR, overvoltage
and underfrequency
relays.
The inspector also reviewed documentation
associated
with this
WO and determined
that the work instructions
were
adequate
to support
the
ongoing
work activities.
Trouble-
shooting
was
performed in accordance
with EMI-106, Troubleshooting
and
Configuration
Control of Electr ical
Equipment.
Controls
and
independent
verification for wire determination
and retermination
associated
with the card
and relay replacements
was provided
by the
appropriate
attachment
in accordance
with EMI-106.
Although
no
deficiencies
were identified with the observed
work activities,
the
inspectors
are concerned that the actual
cause of the problem may not
have
been found.'he
inspectors
plan to closely monitor licensee
activities in this area during the next reporting period.
b.
Recirculation
Loop Flow Gain Adjustments
The inspector
reviewed portions of the completed work package for WO
91-42570-00
which controlled performance
of gain adjustments
on the
flow summer for recirculation loop, 2-Fg-68-5.
Under this
WO the
applicable
portions
of 2-SI-4.2.C-7(A-1),
Power
Range
Neutron
Monitoring System
Loop
A Flow Bias Instrumentation
Calibration
and
Functional Test,
were performed.
2-SI-4.2.C-7FT,
Power
Range
Neutron
Monitoring System
Flow Bias
Instrumentation
Functional
Test,
was
performed
on the entire
loop following the completion of the gain
0
0
e
readjustments.
No deficiencies
were identified with the performance
of this
WO.
c.
Spent
Fuel
Pools
The inspector
monitored the licensee's
activities involved with the
three
spent fuel pools.
This activity included
removal of non-fuel
material,
vacuum cleaning
the spent fuel pools,
and video taping the
pools after vacuum cleaning.
All activities observed
were controlled
and adequate
results
were being achieved.
No violations or deviations
were identified in the Maintenance
Observation
area.
4.
Operational
Safety Verification (71707)
The
NRC inspectors
followed the overall plant status
and
any significant
safety matters
related
to plant operations.
Daily discussions
were held
with plant
management
and various
members of the plant operating staff.
The
inspectors
made
routine visits to the control
rooms.
Inspection
observations
included
instrument
readings,
setpoints
and
recordings,
status
of operating
systems,
status
and alignments of emergency
standby
systems,
verification of onsite
and offsite
power supplies,
emergency
power sources
available for automatic operation,
the purpose of temporary
tags
on
equipment
controls
and
switches,
alarm
status,
adherence
to
procedures,
adherence
to
LCOs,
nuclear
instruments
operability,
temporary alterations
in effect, daily journals
and logs,
stack monitor recorder traces,
and control
room manning.
This inspection
activity also
included
numerous
informal discussions
with operators
and
supervisors.
General
plant tours
were conducted.
Portions of the turbine buildings,
each reactor building, and general
plant areas
were visited.
Observations
included
valve
position
and
system
alignment,
and
hanger
conditions,
containment
isolation
alignments,
instrument
readings,
housekeeping,
power
supply
and
breaker
alignments,
radiation
and
contaminated
area controls,
tag controls
on equipment,
work activities in
progress,
and radiological protection controls.
Informal discussions
were
held with selected
plant personnel
in their functional areas
during these
tours.
a ~
Unit Status
During
a controlled
shutdown
to repair
a leak in the drywell,
a
manual scram occurred
on October
18,
1991.
The details of the trip
are in the next paragraph.
The unit returned to service
on October
21,
1991
and remained at power during the rest of the report period.
Q
5
b.
Manual Reactor Trip During Controlled Shutdown
Control
Room Operations
On
October
18,
1991,
at 4:58 a.m.,
the Unit
2 reactor
was
manually scrammed
by plant operators.
The unit was undergoing
a
planned controlled
shutdown for repairs
associated
with a leak
in the drywell
when the
unplanned
manual trip occurred.
The
main
turbine
was
manually
tripped
at
4:47
a.m.,
due
to
increasing
vibration
on
number four bearing.
The operators
performed
the
necessary
steps
in
the
procedure
as
the
generator's
output breaker
was
opened
and the turbine's
steam
control valves closed.
Approximately nine minutes after opening
the
output
breaker
a reverse
power trip was
received
which
opened
two switchyard breakers.
This resulted in isolation of
Unit Station Transformers
2A and
2B.
The
4KV Recirculation
Pump
Boards failed to transfer to the
161
KV supply resulting in a
loss of recirculation flow at approximately
8% reactor
power.
The
was
initiated within two minutes
as
a
conservative
step
due to
a large
number of unexpected
equipment
responses
which occurred.
This decision
was
reached
prior to
operations
personnel
recognizing
that the recirculation
pumps
had also tripped
a condition which would require,
by TS,
an
immediate
manual
2)
The licensee's
subsequent
evaluation
determined
that the next
step in the procedure
OI-47, directed the operators
to open the
generator field excitation breaker after opening the generator
output breaker.
This
was not performed
and
as
a result the
reverse
power relays
actuated.
This is the first example of
three
examples
for failure to follow procedure for control of
electrical
system
as
required
by
Procedures.
This
violation is identified as
VIO 259,
260, 296/91-40-01,
Failure
to Follow Procedures
for Control of Electrical
Systems.
Technical
Support
Group
The inspector
reviewed
and
observed
the licensee's
Technical
Support group activities following the reverse
power trip on the
main generator.
These activities also involved the failure of
the recirculating
pump switchgear
to transfer
from the
normal
power source to the alternate
source.
The licensee
began
a troubleshooting
action plan which involved
the checking of the various relays
associated
with the reverse
power logic network.
The results
of the
troubleshooting
indicated that all relays
and logic network functioned within
acceptable
parameters
and
responded
to
a
reverse
power
indication.
Additional review by the licensee
indicated that
with the generator
output breaker
open,
the field breaker
closed
and the turbine in
a coast
down, the network would attempt to
maintain voltage
and current
from the exciter.
Under these
conditions
a reverse
power trip could be actuated.
0
0
When
this
occurred,
two
breakers
opened
and
disconnected
the Unit 2 main transformer
from the grid.
This
cut off the
normal
power to the
2A and
2B
USSTs
and in turn to
the
2A,
2B,
2C Unit Electrical
Switchboards
and
the Unit 2
Recirculation
Switchboard.
The three unit electrical
boards
transferred
to their respective alternate
power supplies
and the
recirculation electrical
board did not.
This resulted in a loss
of unit recirculation
pumps
and
the
reactor
was
manually
scrammed.
The Unit 2
1E electrical
system
was not affected
because
a loss of power or a degraded
voltage condition did not
exist as
a result of the switchyard breaker actuations.
The
licensee
determined
that the failure to transfer of the
recirculation switchboard
was most likely caused
by the transfer
switch being in the manual position.
This was the only way that
the post trip testing could duplicate the failure.
The inspector
determined
from this review and observations
that
the licensee
performed
an indepth troubleshooting
and testing
process
and achieved
acceptable
results.
3)
Unit 2 Trip Report
The inspector
reviewed
Final
Event Report II-B-91-158, which
documented
the
licensee's
evaluation
of this
event.
The
inspector
noted that the report
was signed
by the Plant Hanager
and Site Vice President within two days after the event.
This
represents
a considerable
improvement
compared to the timeliness
of review for the most recent reactor
scram which occurred
on
September
14,
1991.
Additionally, the inspector
noted that the
Final
Event Report
was self critical in nature
and identified.
several
short
term
and
long term corrective action items.
As
the result
of the
review of this report several
areas
for
corrective action were identified.
The exciter field breaker
does not open automatically after
opening the generator
output breaker.
The simulator
does
not accurately
mimic the operation of
the exciter field breaker following a turbine trip.
The
recirculation
pump
boards
did
not automatically
transfer.
Operations
personnel
had difficulty performing the
RWN SI.
The
SOS
was
concerned
with establishing
plant conditions
for maintenance
too early
and before
the plant
was in a
stable
steady state condition.
0
2-FCV-2-29A flow controller was left in manual
control
by
procedure
but this caused
offgas
and
SJAE problems.
The
RBN received
a spurious
inoperable trip at 25K power.
2-FCV-2-190 would not control in automatic.
Operations
did
not start
adjustments
for reduced
load at the
recommended
points.
Scheduling of plant shutdown
was
done without reference
to
the Operations shift coverage
schedule.
Operations
crew
was
not briefed
on
expected
vibration
changes
on
main
turbine
during
power
reduction
and
heater
removal.
The
simulator
scenarios
place
2-FCV-2-29A in the
auto
position
but operators
normally have this valve in the
manual position.
A question
was raised
on timeliness of the crew recognition
that recirculation
pump trips require
an immediate
The operations
crew was unable to close various
valves from the control
room.
Pressure
indicator 2-PI-2-46
was broken.
Operators
had
no
indication
of
condensate
pressure
downstream
of the
demineralizers.
Plant
management
determined
the
crew
involved in the
incident needed additional training before assuming shift.
The operations
crew was not able to obtain
a controlled SI
copy in a timely manner to return the recirculation
pumps
to service.
Each of the
items
were
given either
short
or
long
term
corrective actions
to
be completed.
Although the trip report
was very thorough
and self-critical, the number of items needing
correcting indicated
a weakness
in controll.ing a plant shutdown.
b.
Incorrect
Fuses
Pulled
1)
Equipment Clearance Violation
259,
260,
296/91-38-03,
concerning
fuse
labeling
and
identification was identified after plant operators
pulled the
incorrect fuses while tagging the
1B
DG for routine maintenance.
This
caused
the
4160 volt shutdown
board to transfer
from the
0
normal
power
supply to the alternate
supply.
The inspector
concluded
that
hold
order
0-91-657,
was
not
prepared
in
accordance
with plant procedure
SDSP 14.9,
Equipment Clearance
Procedure,
Section 6.3. Establishing
a Clearance
requires that,
for components
that
are
not uniquely identified,
tags will
identify as specifically as possible
the location of the tagged
component.
For
example,
"one
inch valve three
feet
from
1-HCV-2-36".
In the preparation of tag
number 16, fuse unique identification
was not used nor was the physical location adequately
described.
Tag
number
16 read
"BKR 1822 Line Side
PT Fuse
4
Kv S/D Bd
B
Compt 3".
PT fuses
are
located
in a front and rear
panel of
breaker
compartment
3.
The line side
fuses
are in the front
panel.
The only labeling
on the front panel
is "auxiliary
panel".
On the
back
panel
the fuses
are
labeled
by
a fuse
unique identification label
and
a caution sign stating,
"CAUTION
COMPARTMENT AUTOMATIC ACTIONS MAY RESULT
UPON OPENING,
OBTAIN
SHIFT
ENGINEERS
APPROVAL PRIOR
TO OPENING".
The logical choice
for a person pulling the fuses
would be the rear panel
since the
caution signs
discusses
PT compartment.
The hold order tag did
not state
the location or use
the fuse
unique identification
indicated
on the fuse label
and drawing.
Accordingly, this is
a violation of
SDSP
14.9,
Equipment
Clearance
Procedure.
TS 6.8. 1.1
requires
that
written
procedures
shall
be established,
implemented,
and
maintained
covering those
recommended
in Appendix A of RG 1.33, Revision 2,
February
1978.
Listed
in administrative
procedures
are
procedures
for equipment control.
This is the second
example of
VIO 259,
260, 296/91-40-01,
Failure to Follow Plant Procedures
for Control of Electrical Systems.
Incident Investigation
In discussion
with plant personnel
and review of the licensee's
incident investigation II-B-91-151, it was identified that plant
operators
were
not
using
UNIDS.
Inaccuracies
in the plant
drawings
was the stated
reason.
Also, in this particular
case
the
UNIDS were
reversed
for the line
and
load fuses.
The
licensee
corrected
this
using
a
PDD form.
The
inspector
discussed
with licensee
management
that the drawings listing the
fuses
were
CCDs
and
a confidence
question
should not exist.
Any
drawing
problem
should
be identified
and
promptly corrected.
Licensee
management
stated
the
UNIDS would be used for the many
drawings having
UNIDS for fuses.
0
3)
NPP Commitment for Fuse Identification
The
inspector
reviewed
the
licensee
commitments for the fuse
program.
The licensee
committed in the
NPP that prior to Unit 2
restart all class
1E fuses
would
be identified
by the
fuse
tabulation.
The fuse tabulation lists
each
fuse
by
a unique
identifier.
Also, temporary
fuse labels
have
been
placed
on
electrical
cabinets
throughout
the plant.
Remaining
to
be
completed
is
placing
the
fuse
unique identifier
on plant
electrical
drawings.
Although
many
drawings
have
been
completed,
some drawings are not complete.
In a letter titled, Status
and Schedule for Completion of Unit 2
Post-Restart
Issues,
dated
September
20,
1991,
the
licensee
identified the
commitments
made in this area.
In IR 89-59 and
in NPP two post-restart
commitments
were identified.
One was to
remove
the reference
to amperage
from the drawings
and replace
them with the
unique identifier from the
fuse
tabulation
controlled
document prior to startup
from the next refueling
outage
(cycle 6).
The
second
commitment
was
to install
permanent
fuse labeling prior to startup
from the next refueling
outage
(cycle 6).
In addition
a long term post restart
commitment
was to include
non-restart
fuses into the fuse tabulation
and drawing revision.
A submittal
would be forwarded to the
NRC providing
a plan for
these actions
by January
15,
1992.
c.
Labeling and Indication
In IR 91-38,
the inspector identified
a
URI involving the labeling
and identification of the Unit 2 Drywell Blowers.
Additional reviews
of
DCN W6839B, Modification for Cable Reroute/Replace/Retag,
and
CCD
Drawings
1-45E751-4,
2-45E751-4,
3-45E751-4,
2-453E751-1
and
2-45E75-2,
Wiring Diagram 480V Reactor
MOV Boards, indicated that the
labelling for the installation of modifications
was adequate.
The
inspector
noted that for items that were deleted
by modifications,
the
removal of outdated
labels
was not adequate.
The end result of
this activity was that the plant labeling did not reflect the
CCDs
and
various
equipments
indicated
as
having
more
than
one
power
source.
12.53,
Component
Labeling
Signs
and
Operator
Aids,
requires
that operations
be responsible
for preparing
and
hanging
labels
as modifications are
completed.
This is considered
the third
example of VIO 259,
260,
296/91-40-01,
Failure to Follow Procedure
for Control of Electrical
Systems.
One violation was identified in the Operational
Safety Verification area.
1
0
I
10
5.
Modifications (37700,
37828)
The inspectors
maintained
cognizance
of modification activities to support
the operation of Unit 2.
This included
reviews of scheduling
and work
control, routine meetings,
and observations
of field activities.
a.
Work Activities by Sub-Contractor
The inspector
was informed by TVA gA management
that
a sub-contractor
was
performing
work in
spaces
important to safety without task
management
from site modifications or on site design support from NE.
The inspector
informed
TVA representatives
that information had also
been
received
that
the
sub-contractor,
Key
Services,
was
disconnecting
some
PREAS
card
readers.
Plant
Maintenance
was
receiving
WRs to repair the card readers
and were concerned that this
could have
an impact on the upcoming
EP drill.
After further review by the inspector plus information received that
the
work being
performed
by
Key Communications
was in the
cable
spreading
rooms
and various locations
on the
1C level of the control
bay the inspector
determined that adequate
design controls
were not
followed.
This item is identified
as
UNR 259,
260,
296/91-40-02,
Adequacy of Design Controls
During Sub-Contractor Activities.
The
licensee's
gA group issued
a stop work order
on the sub-contractor.
The licensee
is also
conducting
an incident investigation of the
problem.
The inspector will review this further after completion of
the investigation.
A walkdown was
conducted
by the inspector
along
with the licensee's
gA and modifications organization.
All cable
were sealed into the cable spreading
room.
No immediate
safety concerns
were identified.
b.
Unit 1 and
2 Cable Spreading
Room
The inspector identified
some
temporary telecommunication
equipment
on the wall in the cable
spreading
room.
There were disconnected
wires, wires in cable trays,
and equipment
covers
on the floor.
The
licensee
did not think this
was part of the sub-contractor
work but
is reviewing this area.
The inspector
stated
the structure
may not
be securely
mounted
on the wall or in the cable trays.
The licensee
is performing
a calculation for the seismic
adequacy.
This will be
considered
part of UNR 90-40-02 until resolved.,
6.
Unit 3 Restart Activities
(30702)
The inspector
reviewed
and
observed
the licensee's
activities involved
with the Unit 3 restart.
This included reviews of procedures,
post-job
activities,
and completed field work; observa'tion of pre-job field work,
in-progress field work, and gA/gC activities; attendance
at restart craft
level,
progress
meetings,
restart
program
meetings,
and
management
meetings;
and periodic discussions
with both TVA and contractor personnel,
skilled craftsmen,
supervisors,
managers
and executives.
0
a.
Contractor Activities
1.)
Inplant Craft Work
During this reporting period
commenced inplant craft work.
This involved installation of scaffolding in the Unit 3 Drywell
and
was performed
by carpenters.'WEC
provided the supervision
of the craft and
overview and management.
The
inspector
also
noted craft work being
performed
under
management
outside
the plant.
This activity involved moving of
trailers
and hookup of electrical services.
As of this reporting
period
had not completed
the training and certification of
the work plan writers.
This training is expected
to be completed
by December 9, 1991.
2.)
Walkdowns
Walkdown activities associated
with Unit 3 can
be put into three
groupings.
These
are
integrated
walkdown activities,
design
scoping,
and RFIs.
'a ~
Integrated
walkdown activities are
90% complete
in civil
and mechanical
areas,
except for the Unit 3 torus.
These
are
scheduled
to
be
completed
on
November
22,
1991.
Electrical
walkdowns are
90% completed,
excluding vertical
drop
cable
calculations,
Eg cable
walkdowns,
and
CCRS
validation walkdowns,
which are
scheduled
to be completed
in January
1992.
b.
Design
scoping
walkdowns
are
increasing
due
to
the
establishment
of requirements
to schedule
these activities
through the daily work schedule.
c ~
RFI's
are
used
as
BNA internal
tracking
and
control
document for information requests
between
the various
BNA
site organizations.
RFI's are screened
to determine if the
informa'tion is already available
from another
source prior
to performing
a walkdown.
A total of 391 RFI's
have
been
issued with 173 completed.
b.
Contractor
Work Release
Program
The licensee
has
established
a
CWR program to improve control of
contractors.
This is to ensure
the
necessary
prerequisites
are
completed
before the contractor is released
to perform work.
Key
attributes
of the
program
are
organizational
interface,
quality
assurance
oversight,
and authorization
from plant operations prior to
performing physical plant work.
t
0
12
This
program
has
been initiated for contractor
work associated
with
Unit 3 restart.
Included with the
CWR are
several pilot program.
The table below lists the programs.
Contractor
Work Release
1.
Complete
Scaffolding, fire watches
and nonsafety
related
work outside the Power Block
2.
11/12/91
Nonsafety-related
work inside the
Power
Block
3.
11/18/91
Receipt,
storage,
handling,
and issuance
of material
4.
11/20/91
Work document preparation,
(work plans,
work orders,
and work requests)
5.
12/09/91
6.
BNA
7.
Pacific Nuclear
Safety-rel ated
work
and
acceptance
inspection
Integrated
design
changes
Plant decontamination
Pilot Programs
1.
BNA
2.
3.
4.
SWEC/BNA
Complete
Walkdown
11/17/91
Work Document Preparation
12/02/91
guality Control Inspection Certification
Design
Change
processing -
A/E to
constructor
5.
BNA
Integrated
design
change
The inspector discussed
with various Unit 3 managers
the
NRC interface
expected
with the pilot programs
in a meeting
on November
12,
1991.
There
was
a general
lack of under standing of the pilot programs
by
Unit 3 managers.
This was discussed
with the Vice President for Unit
3.
Jet
Pump
Beam Exchange Activity
The inspector
reviewed
and monitored the Unit 3 jet pump
beam exchange
activities.
This was performed
by
GE under
Part
of the activity involved the
use of
a cutting wheel
to cut the
retaining ring from the attachment.
During this time frame
a cutting
wheel
broke
and approximately
75 percent of the wheel
was recovered
I
0
13
d.
from the Unit 3 reactor vessel.
The licensee
commented
that the
remaining
25 percent would not pose
a problem because
of the size
and
the material
that the cutting wheel
was
made of.
Also during this
time frame
a jet
pump
beam
was
dropped
and successfully
recovered.
The inspector will continue to monitor this activity.
Pilot Programs
The inspector
reviewed
and discussed
the
BFN pilot programs
approach
to starting
up contractor
work activities inside the
power
block.
This program applies
to both units.
The approach
involves
a close
step
by step monitoring of the initial work activities to verify the
adequacy of the process.
This program was established
to help ensure
that problems
would
be identified prior to
a significant amount of
actual
work being completed in the field.
The pilot program reviewed
involved
the
work plan writing for
DCN
P0623
which
exchanged
Temperature
Recorder
1-TR-74-80 with a new type recorder.
7.
Action on Previous
Inspection
Findings
(92701,
92702)
a ~
b.
(CLOSED)
URI 260/91-38-02,
Dual Labeling of Drywell Blower Supply.
This item was
opened
when the inspector,
during
a plant tour, noted
that Drywell Blower 2B-3
was
labeled
as
being
supplied
from two
different electrical
sources.
After additional
revi'ews of CCDs, the
inspector
determined that this was
a violation and was identified as
the third example of VIO 259,
260, 296/91-40-01,
Failure to Follow
Procedures
for Control of Electrical
Systems.
(CLOSED)
259,
260,
296/91-38-03,
Fuse
Labelling
and
Identification.
This
item
was
opened
when
the
inspector
reviewed
the
licensee
activities
involved with the pulling of the
wrong
fuses
while
performing
an
equipment
tag
out for the
B
DG.
The
inspector
determined
after further
review of the
licensee's
method for
controlling fuse pulling that this was
a violation and was identified
as
the
second
example of VIO 259,
260,
296/91-40-01,
Failure to
Follow Procedures
for Control of Electrical
Systems.
8.
Cold Weather Preparations
(71714)
The inspector
reviewed the licensee's
program to protect plant systems
and
equipment
important to safety
from cold weather conditions.
The
BFNP
areas
subject to cold weather
include the intake structure
which houses
the
RHRSW pumps,
the ultimate heat sink, the
CCW pumps
and the fire pumps,
the reactor building roof which supports
the condensate
transfer
system
head
tank,
the
condensate
storage
tanks
located
near the Unit 3 turbine
C
I ~
0
0
14
building, the
two
DG buildings located
on the east
and west sides of the
reactor building, the fire protection
system valve pits, the five cooling
water towers,
and the diesel
driven fire pump buildings.
The inspector
reviewed procedures
O-GOI-200-1,
Freeze Protection Inspection,
and
EMI-46, Freeze
Protection
Program.
The inspector also observed
the
licensee's
field activities.
The inspector
noted that portable
heaters
were pre-staged
in the intake building, the Unit 3
and various other plant areas.
The inspector
observed
that
a tarpaulin
was being used to cover, the grating over the
RHRSW intake structure.
This
and additional observations
were discussed
with the licensee.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection
scope
and findings were
summarized
on
November
15,
1991
with those
persons
indicated
in paragraph
1
above.
The
inspectors
described
the
areas
inspected
and
discussed
in detail
the inspection
findings listed below.
The licensee
did not identify as proprietary any
of the material
provided to or reviewed
by the inspectors
during this
inspection.
Dissenting
comments
were not received
from the licensee.
Item Number
Description
and Reference
259, 260, 296/91-40-01
VIO, Failure to Follow Plant Procedures
For
Control of Electrical Systems,
paragraph
4.
259,
2600 296/91-40-02
URI,
Adequacy
of
Design
Control
During
Subcontractor Activities, paragraph
5.
Licensee
management
was informed that
2 URIs were closed.
Acronyms and Initialisms
ANSI
BFNP
BNA
CCD
CCRS
.CFR
CWR
DCN
'MI
Eg
American National Standards
Institute
Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant
Bechtel
North American
Configuration Control Drawing
Consolidated
Cable Rating System
Component
Cooling Water
Code of Federal
Regulations
Contractor
Work Release
Design
Change Notice
Diesel Generator
Electrical Maintenance Instruction
Emergency
Preparedness
Environmental gualification
Flow Control Valve
0
15
GOI
IR
KV
KW
LCO
NE
NRC
PDD
PREAS
SDSP
SOS
TS
UNIDS
USST
WP
General
Operating Instructions
Inspection
Report
Kilovolt
Kilowatt
Limiting Condition for Operation
Motor Operated
Valve
Maintenance
Request
Nuclear Engineering
Nuclear Performance
Plan
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Operating Instruction
Potential
Drawing Discrepancy
Personnel
Radiological Accountability System
Potential
Transformer
Quality Assurance
Quality Control
Rod Block Monitor
Request for Information
Regulatory
Guide
Residual
Heat
Removal Service Water
Standby
Gas Treatment
System
Site Director Standard
Practice
Surveillance Instruction
Shift Operations
Supervisor
Site Standard
Practice
Stone Webster Engineering Corporation
To Be Determined
Technical Specifications
Valley Authority
Unique Identifiers
Unresolved
Item
Unit Service Station Transformer
Violati on
Work Order
Work Plan
Work Request