ML18033A933

and

equipment

being declared

inoperable,

paragraph

6. c.

A TS violation was identified when

two fire doors

were

found

open without compensatory

measures

taken,

paragraph

6.e.

e

This item was significant in that the two doors were

on

a frequently

traveled

path to the control

room

and plant

personnel

did not

question this condition.

The

licensee

demonstrated

good

planning

and

work control

in

successfully

completing the

condenser

vacuum test.

The maintenance

department

has

reversed

an

upward trend

and decreased

the

number of

open

MRs over the past

several

months.

The number of open

CA(Rs in

the maintenance

area

has

been

cut in half during this time period

also.

Greater

emphasis

has

been

placed

on

eliminating

late

preventive

maintenance

items.

These

improvements

were

observed

while

maintenance

provided timely support for accomplishing

the

condenser

vacuum test

and in-leakage

reduction.

A licensee

identified violation

was

identified

concerning

the

control of high radiation areas,

paragraph

4.

The licensee

action

to correct this problem was acceptable

and aggressive.

Housekeeping

in the

SBGT room should

be improved,

paragraph

6.d.

An unresolved

item concerning

SBGT

LCO was identified, paragraph

6b.

This item needs

to be resolved with a

TS change prior to restart.

REPORT DETAILS

Persons

Contacted

Licensee

Employees:

~0. -Zeringue, Site Director

~G.

Campbell,

Plant Manager

R. Smith, Project Engineer

J. Hutton, Operations

Superintendent

A. Sorrell, Maintenance

Superintendent

D. Mims, Technical

Services

Supervisor

G. Turner, Site equality Assurance

Manager

~P. Carier, Site Licensing Manager

"P. Salas,

Acting Compliance Supervisor

~J.

Corey, Site Radiological Control Superintendent

R. Tuttle, Site Security Manager

Other

licensee

employees

or contractors

contacted

included

licensed

reactor

operators,

auxiliary operators,

craftsmen,

technicians,

and

public safety officers;

and quality assurance,

design,

and engineering

personnel.

NRC Attendees

W. Little, Section Chief

~D. Carpenter,

Site Manager

"C. Patterson,

Restart

Coordinator

"E. Christnot,

Resident

Inspector

"W. Bearden,

Resident

Inspector

"K. Ivey, Resident

Inspector

"Attended exit interview

Acronyms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.

Surveillance

Observation

(61726)

The

inspectors

observed

and/or

reviewed

the

procedures

discussed

below.

The inspections

consisted

of

a review of the SIs for technical

adequacy

and

conformance

-to

TS,

verification of test

instrument

calibration,

observation

of the

conduct

of the test,

confirmation of

proper

removal

from service

and return to service of the

system,

and

a

review of the test

data.

The

inspector

also verified that limiting

conditions for operation

wer e met, testing

was accomplished

by qualified

personnel,

and the SIs were completed at the required frequency.

a.

The

inspector

reviewed

and

observed

the

performance

of 2-SI-2,

Instrument

Checks

and Observations.

The SI stated

the following:

This Surveillance

Instruction will ensure

instrument

checks

and

observations,

as

required

by the Technical Specifications

(TS),

are

performed.

The majority of the

instrument

checks

and

observations

are

required

on

a

once

per shift, daily,

or

semi-weekly

frequency.

A separate

Surveillance

Instruction is

not warranted to govern their performance.

This instruction fulfills most

once

per four hours,

once per

shift, daily,

and

weekly instrument

checks

and observations

required

by

the

Technical

Specification.

Although this

instruction

addresses

the majority of the requirements,

many

are

addressed

by other Surveillance

Instructions.

The waste

gas

radiation monitors

and liquid'effluent radiation monitors

are

two examples.

Attachment

C provides

a cross

reference

of

subject

Technical

Specification

and

the

section

of this

Surveillance Instruction which satisfies

the requirement.

This Surveillance

Instruction will be performed

once per week.

the

required

frequency

for individual surveillance

items

are

addressed

within this instruction

to fulfill both Technical

Specification,

Final

Safety

Analysis

Report,

and

regulatory

commitment requirements.

The

inspector

noted

that

by

the

use

of attachments

the

data.

entries

cover

a

seven

day period,

from

Sunday at 12:00

a.m.

to

Saturday

at

12:00 p.m.

Attachment

"A" covers

information

on

applicable

parameters

monitored

such

as

RHR Discharge

Pressure

and

Primary Containment

Oxygen

and Hydrogen Concentration.

Attachment

B

is divided

up into three shifts with Shift One covering the morning

shift, Shift Two the

day shift,

and Shift Three the evening shift.

This attachment

is

used to record the various parameter

values.

The

NRC inspector

also

noted that the data

on Attachment "B" references

information that

can

be obtained

from Attachment "A".

The entries

reviewed

in the

were legible,

personnel

interviewed displayed

adequate

knowledge

of the SI,

and

the

covered

the

necessary

information needed to status

the unit on

a shift to shift basis.

b.

The

inspector

reviewed

a draft to Unit 2 surveillance

instruction

2-SI-3.3. 1.B,

ASME Section

XI Hydrostatic

Pressure

Testing of the

Reactor

Pressure

Vessel

and

Main Steam

Piping

(ASME Section III,

Class

l.and

Class

2).

The

NRC inspector

noted items involving the

use

of

second

party

verification

instead

of

independent

verification,

the

adequacy

of identifying equipment

by number

and

name,

and the detail of individual step instructions.

These

items

were

discussed

with licensee

representatives.

The licensee

stated

that

an

approved

SI for the pressure

boundary test will be submitted

to the

NRC at least

30 days prior to performance.

C.

The inspector

observed

the July 20,

1989,

performance

of procedure

3-SI-4.5.C. 1(2)

"EECM Pump Operation Surveillance Instruction" which

was

to establish

the operability

of the

"Dl"

EECM

pump.

This

performance

was

required

when

the

licensee

identified that

the

July 14

performance

did not include

required

pump vibration data

(see

paragraph

6.b).

No deficiencies

were identified during .this

performance

of the SI.

No

violations

or

deviations

were

identified

in

the

Surveillance

Observation

area.

3.

Maintenance

Observation

(62703)

Plant

maintenance

activities

of selected

safety-related

systems

and

components

were observed/reviewed

to ascertain

that they were

conducted

.

in accordance

with requirements.

The following items

were considered

during this

review:

the limiting conditions for operations

were

met;

activities

were

accomplished

using

approved

procedures;

functional

testing

and/or calibrations

were performed prior to returning components

or system to service; quality control records

were maintained; activities

were

accomplished

by qualified personnel;

parts

and materials

used were

properly certified; proper tagout clearance

procedures

were

adhered

to;

Technical

Specification

adherence;

and

radiological

controls

were

implemented

as required.

Selected

maintenance

requests

were

reviewed

to determine

status

of

outstanding

jobs

and

to

assure

that priority

was

assigned

to

safety-related

equipment

maintenance

which might affect plant safety.

The

inspectors

observed

the

below listed maintenance

activities during

this report period:

MR

101084

- This

MR involved the troubleshooting

and repair of a

failed relay in the Unit 3 Diesel

Generator

3D.

The failed relay

woul d not al 1 ow the

shutdown of the

DG from the control

room.

The

licensee

replaced

the

relay

and

returned

the

DG to the 'operable

status.

The

system

engineer traced the hardware failure to a set of

contacts

on the relay.

MR 864197

and

864198

- These

MRs involved a failure of an equipment

drain line on the

emergency chiller for the Unit 1 and

2 Shutdown

Board

Rooms

"A" and "B".

The chiller filled with water

and spilled

over dripping onto the top of the

4160

V Shutdown

Board "A".

The

licensee

maintenance

personnel

disconnected

the drain line, flushed

it out,

used

a hose

and barrel to drain out the system,

and returned

the system to normal.

Activities involved with the

above

were controlled,

adequately

documented,

and

communications

between

the

various onsite

groups

were

satisfactory.

During this reporting period the licensee

was involved in an effort aimed

at establishing

a

vacuum

in the Unit 2 condenser.

The

NRC inspector

observed

and

reviewed

the following

MRs written to fix leaks,

repair

equipment,

and adjust instrumentation:

MR 900734 - Involved the

replacement

of gaskets

on the

Low Pressure

Turbine manways.

MRs 870030

and

101012x - Involved repairs

to the Unit 2 Mechanical

Vacuum

Pumps

"2A" and "2B".

A total of 25

MRs were identified during this evolution.

Although these

MRs involved non-safety

related activities

the

NRC inspector

considered

this as

a part of the

RTP.

Additional

were

reviewed

on

a

day to

day

basis

by the

outage

management

group.

Personnel

involved in these activities,

which were

required

to support

the

RTP procedure

displayed

a cooperative

attitude

and

a

systematic

approach

in accomplishing

the individual tasks.

The

licensee

representatives

also displayed the

same type of cooperation with

the

NRC inspector

as

they

have

had

when safety related activites

were

involved.

The maintenance

organization

over the past

few months

made

a significant

impact in reducing

the

number of open

and

CA(Rs.

From January

to

June

1989,

the number of open

MRs steadily increased

to 7500.

Since June,

the

number

of

has steadily

decreased

to

6225 except for a slight

increase

centering

around

the

condenser

vacuum test.

The number of open

CA(Rs related

to maintenance

has

been

reduced

from 59 in May to

28 in

August.

Increased

emphasis

has

been

placed

on eliminating

late

preventive

maintenance

items

in preparation

for restoring

systems

to

operation.

No

violations

or

deviations

were

identified

in the

Maintenance

Observation

area.

Control of High Radiation Areas

On July 18,

1989, at 6:20 p.m.,

a contract engineer

was found by a health

physics

technician

alone

inside the high radiation area posted

around the

Unit 2 fuel pool 'cooling

HX.

Contrary to the high radiation area entry

requirements

of Unit

2

RWP

number

89-2030,

revision

4 and Technical Specification 6.8.3

~ 1,

the engineer did not have in his possession

a dose

warning device,

a

dose

rate

instrument,

nor was

he accompanied

by anyone

who

had

one of these

devices

in their possession.

This area

was posted

with the

maximum

whole

body

dose

rate of 110 mr/hr.

The person

was

~ removed

from the

area

and

based

on his

PRD

had received

30

mRem during

the entry.

Discussion with the individual indicated that

he worked in

the

same

area

the previous

day and

had not obtained

a dose warning device

for that entry either.

Subsequently,

the individual's

TLD was processed

and

he was assigned

a total

dose for the quar ter of 145

mRem.

The root cause

for this event is personnel

error

due to inattention to

detail

by the contract

engineer.

The

engineer

failed to pay proper

attention to and comply with the requirements

stated

on the

RWP.

This is

considered

an isolated

event.

The last

known similar event

occurred in 1983.

As

a result of the event,

the licensee

took the following corrective

actions:

Removed individual from c-zone

and radiologically controlled area

Pulled individual's

TLD badge.

Revoked individual's Health Physics

general

employee training.

Revoked individual's access

to

BFNP protected

area.

Rewrote

RWPs to separate

high radiation areas

from radiation areas.

Instituted

use

of

a

stamp

on the

RWP requiring individuals to

contact

RADCON before entering

a high radiation area.

Initiated

a

RIR

and

Condition

Adverse to Quality Report for the

event.

While this event is

a violation of the

RWP requirements

and

TS 6.8.3. 1,

the event

meets

the criteria for a licensee

identified violation.

The

event

was

discovered

by the licensee,

no other

known similar

events

have

occurred

since

1983,

exposure

limits were not exceeded,

and corrective

actions

were promptly completed.

This licensee

identified violation

is'ot

being cited

because

criteria specified in Section

V.G. of the

NRC

Enforcement

Policy were satisified..

No other follow-up on

NCV 259,

260,

296/89-33-01,

"Entry into High Radiation

Area Without Proper Monitoring

Device", is required.

Modifications (37700)

EECW Piping Modifications

The inspectors

continued

to review selected activities associated

with a

major

ongoing modification to

the Unit 2

EECW and

RCW systems.

This

modification is identified by

DCN H5121A and is part of the licensee's

corrective

actions

due

to the

discovery

of the

presence

of multiple

discharge

flowpaths which include vitrified clay piping in portions of

the

RCW buried yard piping.

Vitrified clay piping cannot

be seismically

qualified and the affected lines are part of the

EECW discharge

flow path

for various

safety related

components.

Additional information

on this

issue is included in

NRC Inspection

Report 89-10.

DCN

H5121A reroutes

the

EECM discharge

piping for the Unit 2 Shutdown

Board

Room Air Conditioning Units from the Unit 2 Reactor

Building RCW

discharge

line to the Unit 2

EECW discharge

piping which is seismically

qualified.

The

inspectors

observed

ongoing activities including welding of a

new

section

of six inch diameter

stainless

piping and

removal

of abandoned

EECM discharge

piping that

had

connected

to the

RCM system.

The unused

EECW connection to the 24-inch diameter

carbon steel

RCW was capped.

Although completed Quality Control inspection

records associated

with the

work were not yet available for review by the

NRC inspector,

no problems

associated

with any

ongoing

work were

noted.

Completed

pipe welding

appeared

adequate

with no visible flaws.

In this area, violations of deviations

were not identified.

6.

Operational

Safety Verification (71707)

The

NRC inspectors

were kept informed of the overall plant status

and any

significant

safety

matters

plant

operations.

Daily

discussions

were

held with plant

management

and various

members

of the

plant operating staff.

The

inspectors

made

routine visits to the control

rooms.

Inspection

observations

included

instrument

readings,

setpoints

and

recordings;

status

of operating

systems;

status

and alignments

of emergency

standby

.

systems;

onsite

and offsite

emergency

power

sources

available

for

automatic

operation;

purpose

of temporary

tags

on equipment controls

and

switches;

annunciator

alarm status;

adherence

to procedures;

adherence

to

limiting conditions

for operations;

nuclear

instruments

operability.;

temporary alterations

in effect; daily journals

and logs;

stack monitor

recorder

traces;

and control

room manning.

This inspection activity also

included

numerous

informal discussions

with operators

and supervisors.

General

plant tours

were

conducted.

Portions of the turbine buildings,

each

reactor

building,

and

general

plant

areas 'ere

visited.

Observations

included valve positions

and

system

alignment;

snubber

and

hanger conditions;

containment

isolation alignments;

instrument readings;

housekeeping;

proper

power supply

and

breaker

alignments;

radiation area

controls;

tag controls

on

equipment;

work activities in progress;

and

radiation

protection

controls.

Informal

discussions

were

held with

selected

plant personnel

in their functional areas

during these tours.

a.

Unit Status

All three units

remained

in an

extended

outage

as part of the

BFNP

recovery

plan.

Units

1

and

3

are

defueled with Unit 2 in cold

shutdown

with fuel

loaded.

Mork activities continued

toward the

restart of Unit 2 in 1990.

No activity had begun

on Unit 1 and 3.

b.

TS

LCO for SBGT Exceeded

On July 17,

1989,

at 4:25 a.m.,

the licensee identified that

a

LCO

had expired

due. to the inoperability of SBGT train "C" for more than

7 days.

TS 3.7.B. la and 3.7.B.3 require that all three trains of the

SBGT be

at all times

when

secondary

containment is required except

that

one

SBGT train

may

be inoperable for seven

days during reactor

power operations

or fuel handling activities.

If these

requirements

'annot

be

met,

TS

3'.B.4 requires

that the unit be placed

in

a

condition where the

SHGT is not required.

SHGT train

"C" was

declared

on July 10,

1989,

at 4:25

a.m.,

when its

emergency

power

source,

the

"3D" Diesel

Generator

(DG),

was

taken

out of service for scheduled

maintenance.

The "3D"

DG was returned

to service at 4:45 a.m.,

on July 17,

1989,

and at

that time

SBGT train "C" was declared

operable.

This resulted in-

the

LCO being

exceeded

for 20 minutes.

Unit 2 could not be placed

in

a condition

where

the

SBGT: was

not required

because

secondary

containment

integrity is required

to

be maintained

at all times

except

when

certain

conditions

can

be

met,

including primary

containment

integrity.

Primary containment integrity could not be

met since Unit 2 was in cold shutdown with the reactor

and drywell

heads

removed.

The

delay

in returning

SBGT train

"C" to service

was

caused

by

delays

in the completion of work activities

on the "3D"

DG and were

not directly related

to the

SBGT.

Unit 2 was in cold shutdown with

the

reactor

vessel

loaded

and

no fuel

handling activiti'es

were

taking place.

The licensee

interpreted

the

TS

LCO as

meaning that the

seven

day

exclusion

applied

only during power operations

or while conducting

activities

above

the fuel pool.

The

NRC inspectors

questioned this

interpretation

and

raised

this

question

to the licensee's

Senior

management.

At the exit interview the licensee

committed to review

the

TS

LCO and submit

a TS change to the

NRC.

This is identified as

an

URI 259,

260,

296/89-33-02,

TS

LCO Exceeded

for

SBGT pending

NRC

review of the licensee's

TS review and change submittal.

Failure to Follow SI Procedure

On July 10,

1989,

the "Dl" EECW pump

was declared

when

its emergency

power source,

the

"3D"

DG,

was

taken out of service

for

scheduled

maintenance.

On

July

14,

1989,

procedure

3-SI-4.5.C. 1(2)

"EECM

Pump Operation

Surveillance

Instruction"

was

completed

to establish

operability of the "Dl" EECW

pump

and the

pump

was

subsequently

declared

on July 17,

1989,

when the

",3D"

DG was

returned

to service.

However,

on July 20,

1989, while

conducting

technical

reviews for the

SI, the licensee

identified

that the

SI performers

failed to take

complete

pump vibration data

as

required

by step

7. 13.24.

Vibration data

was required to satisfy

acceptance

criteria in the

and

the vibration acceptance

step

(7. 13.25)

was

signed off as being within the specified limits.

This

performance

was

then

invalidated

and

the

"Dl"

EECW

pump

was

declared

inoperable.

Therefore,

the

"Dl"

EECW pump

was

declared

on July 17, without completion of its operability test

and

was

not

per

the

TS.

The

licensee

reperformed

3-SI-4.5.C. 1(2) successfully

on July 20,

1989,

and declared

the "Dl"

EECW pump operable.

Further

review of this

event

by the

licensee

revealed

that

a

completed

analysis

of the test

data

was

not performed within four

working days of the test

as

required

by 3-SI-4.5.C. 1(2) step

3.7.

Test

data

review was

not completed until July 21,

1989,

six days

after

completion of the test.

This review discovered

the missing

vibration data.

TS

6. 8. 1. 1. c

requires

that written

procedures

be established,

implemented

and maintained

covering surveillance

and test activities

for safety

Site Directors

Standard

Practice

(SDSP)

2. 1, "Site Procedures

and Instructions,"

requires

that the

site

be operated

and maintained in accordance

with written, approved

procedures

and instructions

which

have

been

formally issued

and

distributed for use.

The failure to follow procedure 3-SI-4.5.c. 1(2)

was identified

as

a violation of Technical Specification 6.8. l. 1. c

(VIO 259,

260,

296/89-33-03,

Failure to Follow SI Procedure).

The

violation was

licensee

identified

, however,

since failure to follow

surveillance

procedures

is

a recurring problem that is yet to

be

corrected,

this violation will not

be

considered

a non-cited

violation.

Special

attention

should

be focused

on the root cause of

these

failures to preclude

their recurrence

in the

use

of any

procedure.

Safety

System

Malkdown

During

a routine tour of the

SBGT

rooms

on August 2,

1989,

the

NRC

inspectors

noted the following:

Mater dripping from the overhead

onto

SBGT. Train "C" panel

4596

which contains

the

SBGT Train "C" control switch (0-HS-65-69B)

and

SBGT .Train "C" Outlet

Damper control switch (O-HS-65-67B).

The shift supervisor

was immediately notified of this problem.

The

moisture

indicating

switch for all three trains

were

removed.

A tag indicated

the switches

had

been

sent

back to

the factory to

be rebuilt.

These

switches

alarm in the control

room when relative humidity in the filter trains

exceeds

80K.

A possible fire hazard

from an

open

green poly bag containing

charcoal.

A radiological

control

concern

with yellow poly found in

a

green trash

can in the

SBGT building.

The "A" train fan motor contained

pieces

of metal

inside the

motor stator

casing in a ventilation opening.

There

was

an

open

conduit

above

the

charcoal

temperature

switches for all three trains.

A welding machine, tagged with an equipment-in-use

tag

showing

the location of the machine in the diesel

generator

room.

A loose

unsecured

ladder

was

on the floor.

Several

burnt out light bulbs in the building were found.

A sink or

wash basin

mounted

on

a cart not secured

or wheel

locked.

Numerous

leaks

in the

room

and

some indication of building

settlement

noted

by caulking or sealant pulled away at various

building seams.

0

A radioactive material

storage

sign lying on the floor.

In discussion

with the shift supervisor,

all trains of

SBGT were

considered

with no

known compensatory

measures

in place for.

any missing

alarms

or instrumentation.

All of the

above

concerns

were. discussed

with operations

management

immediately following the

tour.

Operations

management

took prompt action to correct

these

items

and

kept the

NRC inspector

informed of the corrective actions

taken.

Breach of Fire Doors

At 5:00

p.m.

on August 6,

1989 while on backshift plant tour the

NRC

inspector

identified

two

examples

of breached

fire doors.

TS

3. 11.G. l.a

requires

that

"with

one

or

more

of the

required

fire-rated

assemblies

and/or

sealing, devices

inoperable, within one

hour establish

a continuous fire watch

on at least

one side of the

affected

assembly(s)

and/or

sealing

device(s)

or verify the

operability of fire detectors

on at least

one side of the inoperable

assembly(s)

or sealing

device(s)

and establish

an hour fire watch

patrol."

Procedure

FPP-2,

Revision 3, "Fire Protection-Attachments",

implements

the

above

TS requirements.

Per FPP-2,

Attachment

F, Fire

Protection

Equipment

and Barrier Penetration

Removal

From Service

Permit should

have

been

completed

and

approved

by the

SOS prior to

blocking the fire doors

open.

Additionally, step

5.7 of FPP-2,

Attachment

F requires

that

a copy of the permit shall

be placed at

the

location of the

impairment

and step

5.0 requires

compensatory

measures

be in place, if required,

before the impairment.

Mhile on tour,

the

NRC inspector

noted fire rated

door

607 wedged

open with two welding leads

running

down to the landing between Unit

1

8

2 cable

spreading

rooms.

Craftsmen in the area

were setting

up

for work when

asked if they

had

a valid Attachment

F.

They were

unsure

and di,rected

the

NRC inspector

to the job foreman.

The

NRC

inspector

was

on

the

way to the

ASOS to check the Attachment

F

printout

when fire rated

door

455

located

by the control

bay

elevator

was

observed

wedged

open.

Inspection of the door indicated

the

door

knob

was missing,

thus it too was impaired.

No attachment

F was

posted.

The Attachment

F printout did not

have either door

listed

as authorized

to

be impaired.

The

SOS

was contacted

and

he

had

no

knowledge of either

door being authorized

as impaired and

no

compensatory

measures

were in effect.

The

SOS took prompt action

on

both situations.

The significance

of this issue

is that both doors

are in the main

route

to the control

room.

The

NRC inspectors

observations

were

made just after shift change.

Someone

must have passed

through

one

or both of the propped

open fire doors before the

NRC inspector,

but

they took

no action to resolve the unacceptable

condition.

This is

an

example of licensee

personnel

having "blinders"

on while in the

plant for situations

that

are

not their

primary

assignments.

Additionally,

the

individuals

who

impaired

the

doors

failed to

0

10

follow procedures,

violated

TS,

and

compromised

the

BFN fire plan.

This is

a violation (259,

260,

296/89-33-04,

Breach of Fire Rated

Door.)

f.

At 10: 00

a. m.,

on August

10,

1989,

an engineered

safety feature

(ESF) actuation

occurred

when

a high radiation isolation signal

was

received

due to the control

room air supply duct radiation monitor,

O-RH-90-259B,

source

being inserted for an

unknown

reason.

There

were several

pipe insulators working in the vicinity of the radiation

monitor

and

they

may

have

inadvertently

caused

insertion of the

calibration

source.

The

ESF actuation

resulted

in

a control

room

ventilation isolation

and

auto start of train "A" of the control

room emergency

ventilation

(CREV) system.

The "B" train of CREV was

out of service for maintenance.

An operability

and functional test

were performed

before placing the radiation monitor back in service.

The licensee

made

a 4-hour

non-emergency

ENS report to the

NRC duty

officer.

This issue will be followed up during the review of the

associated

LER;

At 5:50 p.m.,

on August

10,

1989,

diesel

generator

"B" became

when

both starting air

compressors

were lost during

maintenance.

This

made

the

"2C"

pump

and

"2C" Core Spray

pump

as well.

At the time of the event,

Loop II of both the

system

and

the

Core

Spray

system for Unit 2 as well

as

the

standby

coolant

supply valve (j.-FCV-23-57) were already

for maintenance.

This left only the

2A

pump

and the

2A Core

Spray

pump available

for makeup to the Unit 2 reactor vessle.

Mith

the Unit 2 reactor

vessel

at atmospheric

pressure,

the

minimum

TS

requirements

are

2