ML18019A518
| ML18019A518 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 01/07/1986 |
| From: | Zimmerman S CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| CON-FIN-B-2952 NLS-85-436, NUDOCS 8601140307 | |
| Download: ML18019A518 (43) | |
Text
REGULATORY ~OR<~ihTION DISTRIBUTION SY I1 (RIDS)
ACCE SION g48R: 8601140307 DOC. DATE: 86/01/07 NOTARIZED:
NO DOCKET 0 FAC IL.: 50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Unit ii Carolina 05000400 ARITH. MANE AUTH:R AFFILIATION ZINNERNANiS. R.
Carolina Power 5 Light Co.
REC IP. MANE REC IP IEN I AFFILIATION DENTQNg H. R.
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulationi Director (post 851125 SUB JFCT:
Forwards addi clarifying info re Question 410. 40 "High/Low Pressure Interfacei " per 850926 submittal re SRP Section
- 9. 5. ii "Fire Protection Program. " Sunmaries of analyses include RCS high/low interface.
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
B002~i COPIES RECEIVED: LTR ENCL SIZE:
TITLE: Licensing Subnittai: Fire Protection NOTES:
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CSQ9 Carolina Power 8 Light Company pe 071986 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 SERIAL: NLS-85-036 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NO.
1 - DOCKET NO.50-000,
Dear Mr. Denton:
In a letter dated April 18, 1980 (Mr. G. W. Knighton to Mr. E. E. Utley), Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L) was requested to provide some additional information regarding our submittals for compliance with Standard Review Plan Section 9.5.1 entitled, "Fire Protection Program."
The requested additional information was provided in a letter dated September 26, 1985 (Mr. S. R. Zimmerman to Mr. H. R. Denton, NLS-85-300). Following review of this submittal by your staff, CP&L was requested to provide some additional clarifying information concerning our response to Question 010.00 - High/Low Pressure Interface.
Enclosed are summaries of our analyses performed for the following high/low interfaces:
1.
Reactor Coolant Vent System 3.
Regenerative Heat Exchanger Letdown Isolation System 0.
RHR Suction Isolation Valves The enclosed summaries should provide the necessary information to complete your review of our response to Question OIOAO.
Should you have further questions on the subject or require additional information, please contact Mr. Patrick P. Carier (919/836-8165).
Yours very truly, PPC/ccc (3082PPC)
Enclosures S.. Zi merman nager Nuclear Licensing Section CC:
Mr. B. C. Buckley (NRC)
Mr. G. F. Maxwell (NRC-SHNPP)
Dr. 3. Nelson Grace (NRC-RII)
Mr. Travis Payne (KUDZU)
Mr. Daniel F. Read (CHANGE/ELP)
Wake County Public Library Mr. Wells Eddleman Mr. John D. Runkle Dr. Richard D. Wilson Mr. G. O. Bright (ASLB)
Dr. 3. H. Carpenter (ASLB)
Mr. 3. L. Kelley (ASLB)
Mr. H. A. Cole g o<
411 Fayettevilte Street
~ P. O. Box 1551 e Raleigh, N. G. 27602 860ii40307 860i07 PDR ADOCK 05000400 PDR
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SUMMARIES OF ANALYSES FOR:
I.
REACTOR COOLANT VENT SYSTEM 3.
REGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER LETDOWN ISOLATIONSYSTEM 0.
RHR SUCTION ISOLATIONVALVES (3082PPC/ccc 1
HIGH-LOW INTERFACE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM
SUMMARY
OF ANALYSIS Page 1
FIRE,AREA PORV 1RC-P527SN (SSD-L)
VS BLOCK 1RC-V526SN (SSD-2)
PORV 1RC-P528SN (SSD-1)
VS BLOCK 1RC-V527SN (SSD-2)
PORV 1RC-P529SN (SSD-2)
VS BLOCK 1RC-V528SN (SSD-1)
FAASGA (1-A-SWGRA) 2.
3.
l.
2.
Block Valve will be used Cable 10160P is an alarm cable not required to close the valve.
An in-line fuse is added to the circuit in the Aux.
Transfer Panel B (Located in Cable Spreading Room B) so that any fault to the cable will not disable the controls of the valve.
The other block 3.
valve cables are not in this area (Separated by 3 HR fire barriers)
Block will be used Cable 10161J is an alarm cable and not required to close the valve.
An in-line fuse is added to the circuit in the Aux.
Transfer panel-B (Located in Cable Spreading Room B) so that any short to the cable will not disable the controls of the valve.
The other block valve cables are not in this area (separated by 3 HR fire barriers) 1.
PORV 1RC-P529SN will fail close on loss of power. Valve is fed from panel DP-1A-2 which is located in SWGR "B" Room and fed from a panel in SWGR "A" Room.
- 2. Other PORV Cables are
-not in this area (separated by 3HR fire barriers FAASGB (1-A-SWGRB) 1.
PORV will be used PORV will be used
- 1. Block valve will be used 2.
PORV cables in conduit 2.
are protected with 3 HR protective envelopes from block valve cables PORV cables in conduit 2.
The block valve cables are are protected with 3 HR not in this area (separated protective envelopes fiom by 3 HR fire barriers) the block valve cables.
FAACSA (1-A-CSRA)
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PORV will be used.
PORV cables are not in this area (separated by 3 HR fire barriers) 1.
2.
PORV will be used.
PORV cables are not in this area (separated by 3 HR fire barriers) 1.
PORV will be used.
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HIGH-LOW INTERFACE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM
SUMMARY
OF ANALYSIS Page 2
FIRE AREA PORV 1RC-P527SN (SSD-1)
VS Block 1RC-V526SN (SSD-2)
PORV 1RC-P528SN (SSD-1)
VS Block 1RC-V527SN (SSD-2)
PORV 1RC-P529SN (SSD-2)
VS Block 1RC-V528SN (SSD-1)
FAACSB (1-A-CSRB) 1.
PORV will be used 1.
PORV will be used 1.
PORV will be used 2.
PORV Cables are protected with 1
HR protective envelopes and suppression system 2.
PORV cables are protected with 1
HR protective envelopes and suppression system 2.
PORV Cables are protected with 1 HR protective envelopes and suppression system FAAEPA (1-A-EPA)
Cables
- 14443A, C to battery chargers may be damaged.
(Chargers are in SWGR A Room).
PORV will fail-close, on loss power.
Cables
- 14443A, C to battery chargers may be damaged.
(Chargers are in SWGR A Room).
PORV will fail-close, on loss of power.
- 1. Cables
- 14443A, C to battery chargers may be damaged (Chargers are in SWGR "A" Room).
PORV will fail-close, on loss of power.
FAAEPB (1-A-EPB) 1.
PORV will be used 2.
PORV cables are not in this area (separated by 3 HR fire barriers) 1.
PORV will be used 2.
PORV cables are not in this area separated by 3 HR fire barriers) 1.
PORV will be used 2.
PORV cables are not in this area (separated by 3 HR fire barriers)
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SUMMARY
OF ANALYSIS Page 3
FIRE AREA PORV 1RC-P527SN (SSD-1)
VS Block 1RC-V526SN (SSD-2)
PORV 1RC-P528SN (SSD-1)
VS Block 1RC-V527SN (SSD-2)
PORV 1RC-P529SN (SSD-2)
VS Block 1RC-V528SN (SSD-1)
FAAACP (1-A-ACP) 1.
PORV will be used 2.
Cable 10157J to ACP is located in this area but not required to control the valve from the Main Control Room.
There will be no spurious operation as the circuit is normally disconnected at Transfer Panel A (Located in SWGR "A" Room).
1.
PORV will be used.
2.
Cable 10158J to ACP is located in this area but not required to control the valve from Main Control Room.
There will be no spurious operations as the circuit is normally disconnected at Transfer Panel A
(Located in SWGR "A" Room).
1.
PORV will be used
- 2. Cable 10156J to ACP is located in this area but not required to control the valve from the Main Control Room.
There will be no spurious operations as the circuit is normally disconnected at Transfer Panel B
(Located in SWGR "B" Room)
FAABA3 1.
Block valve will be used.
1.
Block valve will be
- 1. Block valve will be used.
used.
FAABA4 (1-A-BAL-A) 2.
Block Valve Cables
- 10160A, C are protected with 1 HR protective envelopes and supression system 2.
Block Valve Cables 2.
10161A,C are protected with 1 HR protective envelopes and suppression system Block valve cables are not in this area (separated by 3 HR fire barriers)
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HIGH-LOW INTERFACE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM
SUMMARY
OF ANALYSIS Page 4
FIRE AREA PORV 1RC-P527SN (SSD-1)
VS Block 1RC-V526SN (SSD-2)
PORV 1RC-P528SN (SSD-1)
VS Block lRC-V527SN (SSD-2)
PORV 1RC-P529SN (SSD-2)
VS Block 1RC-V528SN (SSD-1)
FAABB4 FAABB5 (1-A-BAL-B)
Northside 2.
Cable 10160H to ACP is located in this area but not required for closing the valve from Main Control Room. There will be no spurious operation as the circuit is normally disconnected at the Aux.
Transfer Panel B (located Room).
1.
Block Valve will be used 1.
Block Valve will be used.
2.
Cable 10161H to ACP is located in this
- area, but not required for closing the valve from Main Control Room.
There will be no spurious operation as circuit is normally disconnected at Aux.
Transfer Panel B
(Located in the Cable Spreading Room B) 1.
PORV will be used.
2.
PORV Cable 10156J to ACP is located in this area but not required for closing the valve from Main Control Room. There will be no spurious operation as the circuit is normally.
disconnected at the Transfer Panel B
(Located in the SWGR "B" Room) 3 ~
Power Cables required are protected with 1 HR protective envelopes and suppression system.
3.
The other block valve cables are not in this area (separated by 3 HR wall barriers) 3.
Power cables to the valve are on the southside, which is more than 20'rom the block valve cables, and the Diesel Gen.
lA-SA cables
- 11701A, B,
C are protected within a 1HR protective envelopes and suppression system.
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SUMMARY
OF ANALYSIS Page 5
FIRE AREA PORV 1RC-P527SN (SSD-1)
VS Block 1RC-V526SN (SSD-2)
PORV 1RC-P528SN (SSD-1)
VS Block 1RC-V527SN (SSD-2)
PORV 1RC>>P529SN (SSD-2)
VS Block 1RC-V528SN (SSD-1)
Southside 1.
Same as above 1.
Same as above 1.
PORV will be used.
2.
PORV will fail close on loss of power.
FAABC5 (1-A-BAL-C) 1.
PORV will be used.
1.
PORV will be used.
1.
PORV will be used.
2.
PORV Cables
- 10157F, K are protected with 3 HR protective envelopes from block valve cables.
2.
PORV Cables
- 10158F, 2.
K are protected with 3 HR protective envelopes from block valve cables.
PORV Cable 10156J to ACP is located in this area but not required for closing the valve from Main Control Room.
There will be no spurious operation as the circuit is normally disconnected at the Transfer Panel B
(Located in the SWGR "B" Room)
FCA-RCB (1-C) 1.
Cable 10157B from penetration to valve cannot cause spurious opening of valve since cable is routed in dedicated conduit.
1.
Cable 10158B from penetration to valve cannot cause spurious opening of valve since cable is routed in dedicated conduit
- 1. Cable 10156B from penetration to valve cannot cause spurious opening of valve since cable is routed in dedicated conduit IBMD-SPECl-OS4
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HIGH-LOW INTERFACE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM
SUMMARY
OF ANALYSIS Page 6
FIRE AREA PORV 1RC-P527SN (SSD-1)
VS Block 1RC-V526SN (SSD-2)
PORV 1RC-P528SN (SSD-1)
VS Block 1RC-V527SN (SSD-2)
PORV 1RC-P529SN (SSD-2)
VS Block 1RC-V528SN (SSD-1)
FCACRC FCACRM (12-A-CRC1)
(12-A-CR) 1.
Both PORV and Block Valve will be controlled from ACP 1.
Both PORV and Block Valve will be controlled from ACP 1.
Both PORV and Block Valve will be controlled from ACP Piping downstream of the PORV is designed to withstand pressure transients associated with opening of these valves.
Inadvertant opening the valves has been analyzed in the SHNPP FSAR Chapter 15.6.
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Page 1
HIGH-LOW INTERFACE REACTOR COOLANT VENT SYSTEM
SUMMARY
OF ANALYSIS FIRE AREA 2RC-V280SB (SSD-1) 2RC-V281SA (SSD-1) 2RC-V282SB (SSD-1)
Vs 2RC-V283SA (SSD-1) 2RC-V284SA (SSD-2) 2RC-V285SB (SSD-2)
FAASGA (1-A-SWGRA) 1.
Cables to valves 2RC-V285SB are not routed through this area (separated by 3 HR fire barriers).
2.
On loss of power, valve 2RC-V284SA will fail close.
Cable (10137B) is in a dedicated-conduit and will not cause spurious opening of the valve.
FAASGB (1-A-SWGRB) l.
On loss of power, valve 2RC-V285SB will fail close.
There will be no spurious operation as these power cables are 3 phase power cables.
2.
Cable 10137B to valve 2RC-V284SA is protected with 3 HR protective envelope.
All other cables to the valve are not in this area (separated by 3 HR fire barriers).
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HIGH-LOW INTERFACE REACTOR COOLANT VENT SYSTEM SlRiMARY OF ANALYSIS FIRE AREA 2RC-V280SB (SSD-1) 2RC-V281SA (SSD-1)
Vs 2RC-V282SB (SSD-1) 2RC-V283SA (SSD-1) 2RC-V284SA (SSD-2) 2RC-V285SB (SSD-2)
FAACSA (1-A-CSRA)
Cables 10134B,C, 10136B,C,
- 10133C, 10135C to valves 2RC-V281SA, 2RC-V283SA, 2RC-V280SB and 2RC-V282SB respectively are protected with 1 HR. protective envelopes and suppression system.
Power cable 11481A is not protected but will not cause spurious opening of the valve.
FAACSB (1-A-CSRB) 1.
Cables for valves 2RC-V281SA and 2RC-V283SA are not in this area (separated by 3 HR fire barriers).
2.
Cables 10133B,C to valve 2RC-U280SB and cables
- 10135B, C to valve 2RC-V282SB are protected in conduit with 1 HR.
protective envelope and suppression system.
3.
Power cable 11481C to valve 2RC-V282SB are not protected but will not cause spurious opening of the valve.
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HIGH-LOW INTERFACE REACTOR COOLANT VENT SYSTEM StRMARY OF ANALYSIS FAAEPA 2RC-V280SB (SSD-1) 2RC-V281SA (SSD-1)
Vs 2RC-V282SB (SSD-1) 2RC-V283SA (SSD-1) 2RC-V284SA (SSD-2) 2RC-V285SB (SSD-2)
FAAEPA (1-A-EPA)
Cables to valve 2RC-V285SB are not in this area (separated by 3 HR fire barriers).
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4.
Cable 10137B for valve 2RC-V284SA is protected with 1 HR protective envelope and suppression system.
Cable 10847A (power) for valve 2RC-V284SA will not cause spurious opening of the valve.
On loss of power, valve 2RC-V284SA will fail close.
FAAEPB (1-A-EPB) 1.
Cables to valve 2RC-V284SA are not in this area (separated by 3 HR fire barriers).
2.
Cable 10138B to valve 2RC-V285SB is protected with 1 HR protective envelope and suppression, so that valve 2RC-V285SB is available.
FACRCB (1-C) 1.
Cable 10137A to valve 2RC-V284SA is routed in a dedicated conduit.
There will be no spurious opening of the valve.
2.
Cable 10138A to valve 2RC-V285SB is routed in a dedicated conduit.
There will be no spurious opening of the valve.
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HIGH-LOU INTERFACE REACTOR COOLANT VENT SYSTEM
SUMMARY
OF ANALYSIS FIRE AREA 2RC-V280SB (SSD-1) 2RC-V281SA (SSD-1)
Vs 2RC-V282SB (SSD-1) 2RC-V283SA (SSD-1) 2RC-V284SA (SSD-2) 2RC-V285SB (SSD-2)
FCACRM FCACRC (12-A-CR)
(12-A-CRC1)
Controls to valves 2RC-V284SA and 2RC-V285SB will be available from the alternate shutdown locations (Aux. Transfer Panel A and B in Cable Spreading Rooms A and B) after the transfer from the Main Control Room.
The piping design for the vent system utilizes 3/4" piping at the reactor coolant interface for the pressurizer and a flow restrictor in the reactor head vent system to ensure that the discharge from the charging pump will adequately make-up for any loss in the system.
FAAACP Cables to valves 2RC-V284SA and 2RC-V285SB are not in this area (separated (1-A-ACP)
. by 3 HR fire barriers).
FAABC5 (1-A-BAL-C) 1.
Cables to valve 2RC-V284SA are not in this area (separated by 3 HR fire barriers).
2.
Cable 10138B to valve 2RC-V285SB is protected with 3 HR protective envelope.
Other power cables in this area are not protected but will not cause spurious opening of the valve.
On loss of power, the valve will fail close.
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HIGH-LOW INTERFACE REACTOR COOLANT VENT SYSTEM
SUMMARY
OF ANALYSIS FIRE AREA 2RC-V280SB (SSD-1) 2RC-V281SA (SSD-1) 2RC-V282SB (SSD-1) 2RC-V283SA (SSD-1)
Vs 2RC-V284SA (SSD-2) 2RC-V285SB (SSD-2)
FAABB4 FAABB5 (1-A-BAL-B)
NORTHSIDE SOUTHSIDE 2.
2.
Cables to valve 2RC-V285SB are protected with 1 HR protective envelope and suppression.
Cables to valve 2RC-V284SA are more than 20'way and on the south side of col.
27 on El. 261'-0 and El. 286'-0.
Intermediate tray runs have fire-breaks installed.
Hence controls for the valve will be available to close (Cable 10137B is in a dedicated conduit and protected with 3 HR protective envelope).
Cables to valve 2RC-V285SB are protected with 1 HR protective envelope and suppression Cable 10137B is in a dedicated conduit and protected with 3 HR protective envelope.
Cable will not cause spurious opening of the valve 2RC-V284SA 3.
The remaining RC vent cables in the area are power cables and will not cause spurious action.
Valve 2RC-V284SA will fail close.
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HIGH-LOW INTERFACE REGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER LETDOWN ISOLATION SYSTEM
SUMMARY
OF ANALYSIS FIRE AREA 2CS-V511SA (SSD-1) 2CS-V512SA (SSD-1) 2CS-V513SA (SSD-1)
VS 1CS-L500 SN (SSD-2)
FAASGA Valve 1CS-L500 SN will fail close on loss of power to Aux.
Transfer (1-A-SWGRA)'anel B, which is located in Cable Spreading Room B.
C.
FAASGB Valves 2CS-V511SA, 2CS-V512SA, 2CS-V513SA are available.
Cables for these (1-A-SWGRB) valves are not routed through this fire area (separated by 3 HR fire barriers).
FAACSA Valve 1CS-L500SN will fail close on loss of power to Aux. Transfer Panel B which is located (1-A-CSRA) in Cable Spreading Room B.
Cable 10251H to ACP is located in this area but will not cause spurious opening of the valve as the circuit is disconnected at the Aux Transfer Panel "B".
FAACSB (1-A-CSRB)
Valves 2CS-V511SA, 2CS-V512SA, 2CS-V513SA are available.
Cables for these valves are not routed through this fire area (separated by 3 HR fire barriers).
FAABC5 Cables for valves 2CS-511SA, 2CS-V512SA, 2CS-V513SA are not routed through this (1-A-BAL-C) fire area (separated by 3 HR fire barrier).
IBMD-WKCB01-OS4
Page 2
HIGH-LOW INTERFACE REGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER LETDOWN ISOLATION SYSTEM
SUMMARY
OF ANALYSIS FIRE AREA 2CS-V511SA (SSD-1) 2CS-V512SA (SSD-1)
Vs 1CS-L500SN (SSD-2) 2CS-V513SA (SSD-1)
FACRCB (1-C)
On loss of power valve 1CS-L500SN will fail close.
Cable will not cause spurious action as it is routed in a dedicated conduit.
Controls to the valves will be available from the ACP after the
'transfer'rom the Main Control Room.
FCACR1 (12-A-CRC1)
FCACRM (12-A-CRC1)
The design of the CVCS system includes pressure reducing orifices and relief valves downstream of the Regenerative Heat Exchanger.
These devices prevent overpressurization of the low pressure portions of this system should the isolation valves experience spurious actuation prior to transfer.
Furthermore the letdown portion of this system is not required for Safe Shutdown at Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant.
FAAEPA (1-A-EPA)
Valve 1CS-L500SN will fail close on loss of power cables to the chargers.
Cables will not cause spurious actions (power cables)
FAAEPB (1-A-EPB)
Cables for valves 2CS-V511SA, 2CS-V512SA, 2CS-V513SA are not in this fire area (separated by 3 HR fire barriers).
FAAACP (1-A-ACP)
'Cables to ACP are not required to control the valves from the Main Control Room.
All the valves will be available and the cables in this'rea will not cause spurious action as they are disconnected at the Transfer Panels.
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HIGH-LOW INTERFACE REGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER LETDOWN ISOLATION SYSTEM
SUMMARY
OF ANALYSIS FIRE AREA 2CS-V511SA (SSD-1) 2CS-V512SA (SSD-1)
Vs 1CS-L500 SN (SSD-2) 2CS-V513SA (SSD-1)
FAABB4 FAABB5 (1-A-BAL-B)
NORTHSIDE Valve 1CS-L500SN will be available to isolate as the power cables to the valve are on the south side of El. 261'-0 RAB SOUTHSIDE Valve 1CS-L500SN will fail close on loss of the power cables to the chargers.
Cables will not cause spurious actions (power cables).
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Page 1
HIGH-LOW INTERFACE RHR SUCTION ISOLATION VALVES
SUMMARY
OF ANALYSIS FIRE AREA 1RH-V500SB (SSD-2)
Vs 1RH-V501SA (SSD-2) 1RH-V502SB (SSD-1)
Vs 1RH-V503SA (SSD-1)
FAASGA (1-A-SWGRA)
Isolation valve 1RH-V500SB will be available as none of the cables for this valve are routed through this area.
(separated by 3 HR fire barriers).
Isolation valve 1RH-V502SB will be available as none of the primary power source or control cables to the valve are routed through this area (separated by 3 HR fire barriers).
FAASGB (1-A-SWGRB)
Isolation valve 1RH-V561SA will be available as none of the primary power source cables or any control cables to the valve are routed through this area (separated by 3 HR fire barriers).
Isolation valve 1 RH-V503 SA will be available as none.of the primary power source or control cables are routed through this area (separated by 3 HR fire barriers).
FAAEPA (1-A-EPA)
Isolation valve 1RH-V500SB will be available as none of the cables are routed through this area (separated by 3 HR fire barriers).
Isolation valve 1RH-V502 SB will be available as none of the primary power source or control cables are routed through this area (separated 3HR fire barriers).
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Page 2
HIGH-LOW INTERFACE RHR SUCTION ISOLATION VALVES
SUMMARY
OF ANALYSIS FIRE AREA 1RH-V500SB (SSD-2)
Vs 1RH-V501SA (SSD-2) 1RH-V502SB (SSD-1)
Vs 1RH-V503SA (SSD-1)
FAAEPB (1-A-EPB)
Isolation valve 1RH-V501 will be available as none of the primary power source or control cables are routed through this area (separated by 3HR fire barriers).
Isolation valve 1RH-V503SA will be available as none of the cables are routed through this area (separated by 3 HR fire barriers).
FACRCB (1-C) 2.
Power
& control cables to isolation valve 1RH-V501SA are routed in dedicated conduits.
Valve will be used.
On loss of 3-phase power
- cable, the valve will remain closed.
The control cable will not cause any spurious operations.
2.
Power
& control cables to isolation valve 1RH-502SB are routed in dedicated conduits.
Valve will be used.
On loss of 3-phase power cable, the valve will remain closed.
The control cable will not cause any spurious operations.
FAACSB (1-A-CSRB)
Isolation valve 1RH-V501SA will be available as none of the primary power source or control cables are routed through this area (separated by 3 HR fire barriers).
Isolation valve 1RH-V503SA will be available as none of the primary power source or control cables are routed through this area (separated by 3 HR fire barriers).
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Page 3
HIGH-LOW INTERFACE RHR SUCTION ISOLATION VALVES
SUMMARY
OF ANALYSIS FIRE AREA 1RH-V500SB (SSD-2)
Vs 1RH-V501SA (SSD-2) 1RH-V502SB (SSD-1)
Vs 1RH-V503SA (SSD-1)
FAACSA (1-A-CSRA)
Isolation valve 1RH-V500SB will be available as none of the.primary power source or'ontrol cables are routed through this area (separated by 3 HR fire barriers).
Isolation valve 1RH-V502SB will be available as none of the primary power source or control cables are routed through this area (separated by 3 HR fire barriers).
FAABA1 FAABA2 FAABA3 (1-A-BAL-A) 2.
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Both isolation valves will be available to isolate.
Cables in this area are not protected.
They perform an interlock function only and will not cause spurious opening of the valves.
No other isolation valve cables are in this area (separated by 3 HR fire barriers).
2.
3.
Both isolation valves will be available to isolate.
Cables in this area are not protected.
They perform an interlock function only and will not cause spurious opening of the valves.
No other isolation valve cables are in this area (separated by 3 HR fire barriers).
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Page 4
HIGH-LOW INTERFACE RHR SUCTION ISOLATION VALVES
SUMMARY
OF ANALYSIS FIRE AREA 1RH-V500SB (SSD-2)
Vs 1RH-V501SA (SSD-2) 1RH-V502SB (SSD-1)
Vs 1RH-V503SA (SSD-1)
FAABB4 FAABB5 (lA-BAL-B)
Isolation valve 1RH-VSOOSB will be available as the primary power source cables and the control cables are protected with 1 HR protective envelopes and suppression system.
Isolation valve 1RH-V502SB will be available as the primary power source cables and the control cables are protected with 1 HR protective envelopes and and suppression system.
FAABC5 (1-A-BAL-C)
Isolation valve 1RH-V501SA will be available as none of the primary source cables or control cables to the valve are routed through this area (separated by 3 HR fire barriers).
Isolation valve 1RH-V503SA will be available as none of the primary power source or control cables to the valve are routed through this area (separated by 3 HR fire barriers).
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Page 5
HIGH-LOW INTERFACE RHR SUCTION ISOLATION VALVES
SUMMARY
OF ANALYSIS FIRE AREA 1RH-V500SB (SSD-2)
Vs 1RH-V501SA (SSD-2) 1RH-V502SB (SSD-1)
Vs 1RH-V503SA (SSD-1)
FCACRM (12-A-CR)
FCACRC (12-A-CRC1)
Both isolation valves will be available and controlled from the ACP after the
'transfer'rom the main control room.
Both isolation valves will be available and controlled from the ACP after the 'transfer'rom the main control room.
Spurious operation of these valves is prevented prior to transfer by the location of a pressure interlock (< 430 psig) in the Solid State Protection Cabinets.
This interlock and it's related cabling is located in a separate fire area bounded by a 3-hour fire barrier from the control switches in the Control Room Fire Area.
FAAACP (1A-ACP)
Both isolation valves will be available to isolate from the main control room.
Both isolation valves will be available to isolate from the main control room.
2.
Cables to ACP in this area 2.
are not required to control the valves and will not cause spurious action as they are normally disconnected at the transfer panel.
Cables to ACP in this area are not required to control the valves and will not cause suprious action as they are normally disconnected at the transfer panel.
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