ML18018B425
| ML18018B425 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 10/27/1983 |
| From: | Mcduffie M CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| REF-SSINS-6835 IEIN-79-22, LAP-83-506, NUDOCS 8311020011 | |
| Download: ML18018B425 (30) | |
Text
REGULATORY I RMATION DISTRIBUTION SYS (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR ~ 831 102001 1
DOC ~ DATE 83/10/27 NOTARIZED NO DOCKET FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plantg Unit 1< Carolina 05000400 50-401 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant< Unit 2~ Carolina 05000401 AUTH,NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION MCDUFFIE<M,-A, Carolina Power L Light Co, AECIP ~ NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DENTONgHeR ~
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulationi Director
SUBJECT:
Forwards response to draft SER Open Item 99 re effects of high energy line breaks on control sys,Response consis of results of study performed per IE Info Notice 79 22, DI'STRIBUTION CODE:
B001S.
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TITLE! Licensing Submittal:
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Carolina Power 8 Light Co mpany SERIAL:
LAP-83-506 OCT 27 1983 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NOS.
1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS.
50-400 AND 50-401 DRAFT SER OPEN ITEM 99
RESPONSE
Dear Mr. Denton:
Carolina Power
& Light Company hereby transmits one original and forty copies-of our response to Draft Safety Evaluation Report Open Item 99.
This Open Item deals with the effects of high energy line breaks on control systems and is being reviewed by the Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch.
Yours very truly, M. A. McDuffie Senior Vice President Nuclear Generation FXT/pgp (8327FXT)
Mr. B. C. Buckley (NRC)
Mr.
G. F. Maxwell (NRC-SHNPP)
Mr. J.
P. O'Reilly (NRC-RII)
Mr. Travis Payne (KUDZU)
Mr. Daniel F.
Read (CHANGE/ELP)
Mr. R.
P.
Gruber (NCUC)
Chapel Hill Public Library Wake County Public Library Mr. Wells Eddleman Dr. Phyllis Lotchin Mr. John D. Runkle Dr. Richard D. Wilson Mr. G. 0. Bright (ASLB)
Dr. J.
H. Carpenter (ASLB)
Mr. J. L. Kelley (ASLB) 83ii0200ii 83i027 PDR ADOCK 05000400 E
PDR 411 Fayettevilte Street o P. O. Box 1551 o Raleigh, N. C. 27602
)~"
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch Draft SER Open Item No.
99 Operating reactor licensees were informed by IE Information Notice 79-22, issued Spetember 19,
- 1979, that if certain nonsafety-grade control equi,pment were subjected to the adverse environment of a high energy line break, it could impact the safety analyses and the adequacy of the protection functions performed by the safety-grade equipment.
The staff has requested a review by the applicant to determine whether the harsh environment associated with high-energy line breaks might cause control system malfunctions and result in a consequence more severe than those of t'e FSAR Chapter 15 analyses or beyond the capability of operators or safety systems.
Response
The results of a study performed to assess the effects of high energy line breaks on control systems are attached.
REPORT FOR EFFECTS OF HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS OVi CONTROL SYSTEifS (IE INFOK'fATION NOTICE 79-22)
TABLE OF CONTENTS 0.
S17i'MARY l.
INTRODUCTION 2.
BACKGROUND 3.
OVERALL APPROACH 4.
'iiETHODOLOGY 5.
RESULTS TABLES TABLE 1 ItPACTED COMPONENTS SUBJECTED TO JET FORCES/PIPE VHIP/
FLOODING TABLE 2 COMPONENTS SUBJECTED TO HELB ENVIROViKNTS (INSIDE CONTAIVs1ENT)
TABLE 3 -. COMPONENTS SUBJECTED TO HELB EiiVIRO'iiMENTS (OUTSIDE CONTAVPiKNT)
0.
SUi&fARY An analysis of the effects of control system malfunctions caused by post-ulated high energy line breaks (HELBs) was performed in response to NRC acceptance review question 420,7 (open item 99).
The purpose of this analysis is to assure that any HELB induced failures of non-qualified control systems do not result in effects not considered in the FSAR Chapter 15 analysis of these events.
The analysis has identified that the power and signal cables from excore neutron detector NE-44 of the Rod Control System could be severed by HELBs. This can result in an inadvertent rod withdrawal in conjunction with the initiating HELB until reactor trip which is not clearly bounded by the existing FSAR Chapter 15 analyses.
This will be eliminated by rerouting the cables from NE-44 to an area unaffected by HELB or install-ing the barriers to protect the cables.
The analysis also showed that no other such instances exist in the SHNPP design.
This is primarily due to the following reasons:
1 Host instruments used for control are used for plant protection as well.
As such, they are safety related and are required to be pro-tected from HELBs by the project pipe break criteria regardless of this question.
2 Environmental qualification of the Westinghouse supplied instruments was recently upgraded, including qualification of. some non-safety control instruments.
3 All cabling used in the plant for non-safety systems is qualified for-the HELB harsh environment.
4 Concrete embedded conduit is extensively used in the containment for instrument cable routing where most of the postulated HELBs are.
l.
INTRODUCTION This report was developed in response to NRC acceptance review question 420.7 (open item 99).
This question asked if the 'effects asso-ciated with HELBs might cause control system malfunctions and result in a consequence more severe than those of the FSAR Chapter 15 analyses or beyond the capability of operators or safety systems.
2.
BACKGROUND On September 14, 1979, the NRC issued I&E Information Notice 79-22'his re-sulted from a report regarding Public Service Electric
& Gas Company's Salem plant based on a Westinghouse review of the environmental qualification of equipment.
It was realized that certain non-safety grade equipment, if subjected to an adverse environment, from a postulated high energy line break, could impact the safety analyses and the protective functions performed by safety grade equipment.
This concern also led the NRC to issue a standard question to plants under OL review.
This question requires an analysis to assure that high energy line breaks will not cause control system failures to complicate the event beyond the FSAR Chapter 15 analyses.
3.
OVERALL APPROACH This effort may extend into as many as three major phases.
Th's is shown schematically on Figure 1 and described below.
PHASE I Plant models are developed and analyzed to determine if there are any control system components affected by the effects of high energy line breaks that can result in control system malfunctions.
The effects of HELBs include jet im-pingement, pipe whip, flooding or harsh environment.
If none are found, the study is complete and the design is acceptable.
If any are found, they will be compared to the Chapter 15 analyses to determine if they cause any effects not considered in these analyses.
If any are found, the study will proceed to Phase II.
PHASE II Chapter 15 type analyses that include the HELB induced control system failures will be performed for the items that escape Phase I. If these new analyses show that the ensuing transients do not exceed the Chapter 15 analyses, the study is complete and the design is acceptable.
If any of the control system malfunctions exceed the Chapter 15 acceptance criteria, the study will proceed to Phase III.
PHASE III Any control system malfunctions that escape Phase II are unacceptable and must be eliminated by relocation of the affected component, physical pro-tection (shields or barriers),
or qualification of the affected component for the expected HELB environment.
These modifications will be subjected to a re-evaluation (as in Phase I) to verify that no unacceptable design features have been added by the changes.
4.
METHODOLOGY (PHASE I)
The objective of Phase I is to determine if there are any control system component failures induced by HELBs that can cause adverse effects that were not included in the Chapter 15 analysis of the HELB.
A broad functional based method was chosen to assure that all potential scenarios were identi-fied and evaluated.
This was accomplished in discrete steps as described in the following.
Identify the Control System Com onents of Interest The control systems of interest are those identified in the response to NRC acceptance review question 420.8 (open item 98), except the safety grade systems.
HELB induced failures of safety grade components were explicitly excluded from this analysis because the ongoing work on pipe rupture pro-tection and equipment qualification will assure that these do not occur.
Identif the Control System Com onent Failures Caused b
the HELB Effects The standard HELB effects of jet impingement, pipe whip, harsh environment and flooding were considered in this analysis.
The HELBs postulated are the ones specified in FSAR Section 3.6.1.
For pipe whip and jet impingement, the HELB jet cone drawings were superim-posed on the associated instrument location, conduit, trays and grounding drawings which identify the sensor, impulse line, connecting cables and con-trolled component locations.
The components of interest were located and a list was maintained that identified the components that are struck by each j et.
Components struck by pipe whip are enveloped by the resultant
- jets, so no separate consideration needed to be given to pipe whip.
Jets impacting instrument lines and connecting cables were assumed to sever them.
Jets impacting sensors and controlled components were assumed to fail these devices in the worst case
- mode, as determined from the experience of question 420.8 (open item 98).
The resultant tabulations are given on Table 1.
For flooding, the containment post-recirculation flood level was conserva-tively assumed.
A search was conducted to identify all sensors connecting cables and controlled components that are located at or below this level.
None were found.
Instrument lines are not senstitive to flooding, so these were not searched for.
The harsh environment conditions given in FSAR Section 3.11 were used for the analysis.
The environmental qualification envelopes given in the manu-facturer qualification reports for each sensor and controlled component were compared to these conditions to determine whether they were qualified for the harsh environment caused by the HELB.
The results of this detailed evaluation are presented in Tables 2 and 3.
As seen in Table 2, the only instruments that are subject to the HELB effects but are not qualified for the harsh environment are pressurizer pres-sure transmitters PT-444 and PT-445.
These transmitters provide inpu" to the PORV control and would provide a false PORV open signal if the HELB environ-ment caused them to fail such that a false high output was generated.
- However, PORV opening in this case would be blocked by an interlock based on signals from qualified pressurizer pressure transmitters.
As such, there are no,harsh environment induced control failures that need be con-sidered in conjunction with the jet impingement effects of the HELB.
Also, as seen in Table 2, the letdown isolation valves (1-LCV-459
& 460) are not specifically qualified for the harsh environment.
As such, they cannot be guaranteed to assume their safe failure position. (closed) following a HELB.
However, there are qualified valves (letdown orifice isolation valves 1-8149A, 1-8149B and 1-8149C) in series with the letdown isolation valves that close on low pressurizer level or Phase A Containment Isolation Signal.
These valves will maintain the function of letdown isolation following the HELB, so any failure of the letdown isolation valves are inconsequential.
As seen in Table 3, the only instrument that is subject to HELB effects not qualified for the harsh environment is flow transmitter FT-122.
This trans-mitter provides the input to the charging flow control valve.
The worst case failure of this transmitter will result in increased charging flow and pres-surizer level until high pressurizer level reactor trip.
This event is considered not significant for Chapter 15 analyses.
Anal ze the Collective Effects of Each HELB The collective effects of all malfunctions induced by each HELB as listed on Table 1 were considered to determine the overall effects, if any, on the Chapter 15 analyses.
This was originally to be done by including the breaks on the block diagrams from the response to question 420.8 (open item 98) and using the block diagrams to propogate the failure effects.
- However, the resultant failure comoinations were few and simple enough to be analyzed by inspection and compared to the Chapter 15 analyses.
The results for each are given on Table l.
5.
RESULTS As. shown on Table 1, there is only one HELB induced failure of control systems that affect FSAR Chapter 15 analyses.
This failure consists of the severence of the electrical conduit serving excore neutron detector NE-44, which would result in an inadvertent withdrawal of the control rod banks until reactor trip.
Only a few other control system failures are induced by HELBs, but these failure modes did not affect the FSAR Chapter 15 analyses.
Such favorable findings resulted due mostly to four reasons:
1 Most instruments used for control are used for plant protection as well.
As such, they are safety related.and are required to be protected from HELBs by the project pipe break criteria regardless of this question.
2 Environmental qualification of the Westinghouse supplied instruments was recently upgraded, including qualification of some non-safety control instruments.
3 -Most cabling used in the plant for non-safety systems is qualified for HELB harsh environment.
4 Concrete embedded conduit is extensively used in the containment fo" instrument cable routing where most of the postulated HELBs occur.
CONTROL SYSTE~if i~fALFUNCTION CAUSED BY HELB PHASES I.
ANY CONTROL SYSTEif MALFUNCTIONS WHICH COULD BE CAUSED BY THE EFFECTS OF A POSTULATED HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK?
NO END YES PERFO1Qf SCREENING REVIEW II.
PERFORIf FSAR CHAPTER 15 TYPE ANALYSES OF THE CONTROL SYSTEM FAILURES ARE THE CHAPTER 15 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 2'?
YES ND NO III.
RECOtEEND DESIGN CHANGES TO ELI'fINATE ANY UNACCEPTABLE CONTROL SYSTHf HAH!UNCTIONS.
RE-EVALUATE AS IN I. ABOVE.
FIGURE 1
Sheet 1 of 8 TABLE 1 - IMPACTED COMPONENTS SUBJECTED TO JET FORCES PIPE NlIP/I1A)ODING (INSIDE CONTAItUKNT)
INITIATING EVENT CVCS Letdown Line Break Pressurizer Surge Line Break JET CONE NUMBER RJ-CS-90-1A(R-138)
RJ-CS-91-18(R-138)
PU-CS-92-18(R-138)
RJ-CS-138-18(R-138)
RJ-CS-139 1A(R-138)
RJ-CS-140-1A(R-138)
RJ-RC-35-1A(R-163)
RJ-RC-35-SA(R-163)
AFFECTED COMPONENT/FAILURE MODE Imp use L nes; Cl-R6-1-T23/None Sec Note Cl-R6-2-T23/Hone - See Note Instrument Air Supply Lines Ruptured Results in PORV's 1-PCV-4448/Fail Closed 1-PCV-445A/Fail Closed 1-PCV-4458/Fail Closed Pressurizer Spray Valves 1-PCV-444C/Fail Closed I-PCV-444D/Fail Closed Impluse Lines; Cl-R6-1-723/None - Sce Note Cl-R6-2-723/None Sec Note Cl-R9-3-T32/Hone - See Note Cl-R9-4-732/Hone - See Note Cl-R8-)-T28/Hone - See Note
> RB-<- 28/Hone - Sce Hptc Instrument Air Supply Lines Ruptured Results in PORV's 1-PCV-4448/Fail Closed 1-PCV-445A/Fail Closed 1-PCV-4458/Fail Closed Pressurizer Spray Valves 1-PCV-444C/Fail Closed 1-PCV-444D/Fail Closed Impulse Lines:
Cl-R4-2-T13/Hone - Sce Note Cl-R4-3-T13/Hone - See Note Cl-R3-1-710/Hone - See Note Cl-R3-2-T10/Hone See Note CI-R2-1.-77/Hone See Note CI-R2-2-77/Hone - See Note FLOODINC YES NO F.FFECT PORVs opening and pressurizer spray are not required for this event, so there is no effect on the Chapter 15 analyses.
PORVs opening and pressurizer spray are not required for this event, so there is no effect on the Chapter 15 analyses.
NONE
Sheet of 8 TABLE 1 - INPACTED COMPONENTS SUBJECTED TO JET FORCES PIPE WHIP FLOODIHG (INSIDE CONTAINNEHT)
INITIATINGEVENT JET CONE NIBIBER RJ-RC-35-5B(R-163)
AFFECTED COHPONENT/FAILURE NODE Impulse Lines Cl-R10-1-T35/Hone - See Note Cl-R10-2-T35/None See Note Cl-R9-5-T33/None - See Note Cl-P9-6-T33/None - See Note Cl-RB-5-T29/None - See Hote Cl-RB-6-T29/None - Scc Note PLODDING TES NO NONE EFFECT Safety Injection RJ-RC-66-1(R-154)
Line Brcak RJ-RC"66-2(R-154)
Electrical Conduit:
17020 N-S4-3/ Severed Cables A. Safety Injection Line Break.
B, Inadvertent Rod ulthdraual.
CVCS Charging Line Break RJ-CS-95-1A(R-137)
RJ-CS-114-3A(R-137)
RJ-CS-83-28(R-138)
RJ-CS-83-4A(R-138)
RJ-CS-83-4B(R-138)
RJ-CS-84-IA(R-138)
RJ-CS-85-48(R-137)
Impulse Lines:
Cl-R9-3-T32/Hone - See Note Cl-R9-4-T32/Hone - See Note Cl-RB-3-T28/None " Sce Note Cl-RB-4-T28/Hone - Sce Note Electrical Conduitss:
17005J-SR3/None See Note 17002H-2/Severed Cables Instrument Air Supply Lines Ruptured Results in PORVs 1-PCV-4448/Fail Closed 1-PCV-445A/Fail Closed I-PCV-445l3/Fail Closed PORVs opening and pressurizer spray are not required for this event, so there is no effect on the Chapter 15 analyses.
Pressurizer Spray Valves I-PCV-444C/Fail Closed I-PCV-444D/Fall Closed
Sheet 3 of 8 TABLE 1 - IMPACTED COHPONEHTS SUBJFCTED TO JET FORCES PIPE NIIP/FLOODING (INSIDE CONTAINHEHT)
INITIATING EVENT JET CONE NUHBER CVCS Charging RJ-CS-83-38(R-138)
Line Break RJ-CS-84-1B(R-138)
AFFECTED COMPONENT/FAILURE NODE Instrument Rack Cl-RB-RPS/None-See Note Electrical conduit:
17005J-SR3/None - See Note Instrument Air Supply Lines Ruptured Results in PORVs 1-PCV-4448/Fail Closed I-PCV-445A/Fail Closed 1-PCV-4458/Fail Closed FLOODING YES 0
EFFECT PORVs opening and pressurizer spray are not.
required for this event, so there is no effect on the Chapter 15 analyses.
Pressurizer Spray Valves I-PCV-444C/Fail Closed 1-PCV-444D/Fail Closed CVCS Charging Line Break CVCS Charging Line Break RJ-CS-83-2A(R-138)
RJ-CS-83-58(R-137)
Electrical Conduit:
17002M-2/Severed Cables Impulse Lines:
Cl-R9-3-T32/None - See Note Cl-R9-4-T32/Hone See Note
" Cl-R10-1-T35/Hone - Sce Note Cl-RIO-2-T35/Hone - See Note Cl-R9-5-T33/None - See Note CI-R9-6-T33/Hone - See Note Electrical Conduit:
17024K-3/Severed Cables 170028-SR2/Hone See Note Instrument Air Supply Lines Ruptured Results in PORVs 1-PCV-4448/Fail Closed I-I'CV-445A/Fail Closed 1-PCV-4458/Fail Closed Pressurizer Spray Valves 1-PCV-444C/Fail Closed 1-PVC-4440/Fail Closed PORVs opening and pressurizer spray are not required for this event, so there is no effect on the Chapter 15 analyses.
PORVs opening and pressurizer spray are not required for this event, so there is no effect on the Chapter 15 analyses.
Sheet 4 of 8 TABLF. 1 - INPACTED COHPONFJlTS SUBJECTED TO JFT FORCES PIPE Nllp/FLOODIHC (INSIDE COHTAIHHEHT)
INITIATIHCEVENT CVCS Letdown I.Inc Brcak JET CONE NNIBER RJ-CS-87-28(R 137)
RJ-CS-87-3B(R-137)
AFFECTED COHPOHEHT/FAI I.URE NODE Impulse Lines:
Cl-R4-2-T13/Hone - See Hote Cl-R4-3-T13/Hone - See Note FLOODIHG YES NO NONE Auxiliary Pe@Q-uater Linc Break RJ-AF-60-5B(R-074)
Impulse I.ines:
CI-RI3-3.-T47/None - See Note Cl-R13-2-T47/None See Hotc HONE Small Brcak LOCA Unrestrained Pipe Hhip
& Jet Impinge-ment Area (SC-IB Area)
Impulse l.ines:
Cl-RB-3-T28/None - Sce Note Cl-R8-4-T28/None - Scc Note Cl-RG-2-T23/Hone Scc Note Cl-RG-I-T23/None - Scc Note PORVs opening and pressurizer spray are not required for this event, so there is no effect on the Chapter 15 analyses.
Instrument Air Supply Lines Rup-tured Results in PORVs 1-PCV-444iB/Fail Closed 1-PCV-445A/Pail Closed 1-PCV-4458/Fail Closed Small Brook 1.0CA Unrestrained Pipe Hhip anil.Iet Im-pingement Area (SG-IC Area)
Pressurizer Spray Valves I-PCV-444C/Fail Closed l-l'CV-444D/Fall Closed Impulse I.ines:
Cl-R13-1-T47 CI-R13-2-T47 A. Small Break LOCA B. Steam generator 1C llain feedwater control valve opens too far, overfeeding the steam generator until main feedwatcr isolation occurs on a Safety Injection Signal or HI-Hl Level in the steam generator.
This does not complicate the small LOCA cvcnt.
Sheet g of 8 TABLE 1 - IHPACTED COHPONEHTS SUBJECTED TO JET FORCES PIPE MIIP FLOODIHG (INSIDE COHTAINNENT)
INITIATINGEVENT JET CONE NUHBER AFFECTED COHPONENT/FAILURE NODE YES FLOODIHG NO EFFECT Small Brcak LOCA Unrestrained Pipe Whip and Jet Im-pingement Area (SG-1A Area)
Impulse Lines:
Cl>>R4-2-T13/None - See Note Cl-R4-3-T13/Hone - Sec Note Cl-R3-I-T10/Hone >> See Note CI.-R3-2-T10/None - Sec Note Cl-R2-1-T7/None Sce Note Cl-R2-2-T7/None See Note Instrument Air Supply Lines Rup-tured Results in Letdown Isolation Valves 1-LCV-459/Fails Closed 1-LCV-460/Fails Closed Letdown is not requited for this evenr.
so there ls no effect on the Chapter 15 analyses.
Small Break LOCA Small Break I.OCA Unrestrained Pipe Whip and Jet Im-pingement Area (SG-1B Area)
Unrestrained Pipe Mhip and Jet Im-pingement Area (SG-1C Area)
Impulse Lines:
Cl-R10-1-T35/Hone - See Note Cl-RIO-2-T35/None - See Note Cl-R9-5-T33/None - Sce Note Cl-R9-6-T33/None See Note Cl-R8-5-T29/None See Note Cl-R8-6-T29/None Sce Note Impulse I,ines:
Cl-R15-1-T53/None See Note Cl-R15-2-T53/None Sec Note Cl-R14-1-T51/None - Sec Note Cl-R14-2-T51/lh>ne - See Note CI-RI3-I-T47/H>>nc - Sce Note Cl-R13-2-T47/Hone - See Note NONE A, Small Break LOCA B. Inadvertent Rod withdrawal Electrical Conduit:
17020 H-84-3/Severed Cables
Sheet 6 oE 8 TABLE 1 - IMPACTED COMPONENTS SUBJECTED TO JET FORCES PIPE NIIP FLOODIHG (INSIDE CONTAINMENT)
IHITIATIHCEVENT Main Feedwater Line Brcak JET CONE NNIBER RJ"FW-67-IB(R-071)
AFFECTED COMPONENT/FAILURE MODE Impulse Lines:
Cl-R4-2-T13/None - See Note Cl-R4-3-T13/Hone - See Note Cl-R3-1-TIO/None - See Note Cl-R3-2-T10/Hone See Note Cl-R2-1-T7/Hone - See Note Cl-R2-2-T7/Hone See Note YES FLOO DING NO NONE EFFECT Main Fecdwater Line Brcak Main Feedwater Line Break RJ-FW-68-IB(R-071)
RJ-FW-69-4A(R-071)
Impulse Lfnes:
Cl-R10-1-T35/None - Sce Note Cl-RIO-2-T35/None - See Note Cl-R9-5-T33/None - See Note Cl-R9-6-T33/None - See Note Cl-RB-5-T29/None Sec Note Cl-RB-6-T29/Hone - Sec Note Electrical Conduit:
17020M-S4-3/Severed Cables NONE A. Main Feedwater Break.
B, Inadvertent Rod withdrawal.
Main Feedwater Linc Break RJ-FH-69-IB(R-071)
Impulse I.fnes:
Cl-R15-1-T53/None - See Note Cl-R15-2-T53/Hone See Note Cl-R14-1-T51/None - See Note Cl-R14-2-T51/Hone - See Note Cl-R13-1-T47/None - See Note Cl-R13-2-T47/Hone - See Note NONE Mafn Steam Linc Brcak RJ-MS-1-1C(R-067)
RJ-MS-I-3C(R-067)
Impulse Lines:
Cl-R4-2-T13/Hone Sce Note Cl-R3-I-T10/Hone - Sec Note Cl-R2-I-T7/None - Sce Note Cl-R2-6-T8/None - See Note.
Cl-R7-3-T26/Hone - See Note NONE
Sheet 7 of 8 TABLE 1 IMPACTED COMPOHENTS SUBJECTED TO JET FORCES PIPE WHIP/FLOODING (INSIDE CONTAINMEHT)
IHITIATIHGEVENT Main Steam Line Break JET CONE NUMBFR RJ-MS-2-IC (R-067)
AFFECTED CIRPONENT/FAILURE MODE Impulse Lines:
Cl-RIO-1-T35/Hone - See Note Cl-R9-5-T33/None - See Note Cl-RB-5-T29/None See Note Cl-RB-8-T30/Hone See Note FT-IMS-0485-IV-W-l!P-T65/None - See Note FLOODING YES NO NONE EFFECT Main Steam Line RJ-MS-3-IC(R-067)
Break RJ-MS-3-3C(R-067)
Impulse Lines:
Cl-R15-1-T53/Hone - See Note Cl-R14-1-T51/Hone - See Note Cl-R13-1-T47/None - Sce Note Cl-R13-7-T49/Hone See Note FT-IMS-0495-IV-W-IIP-66/None See Note NONE Main Steam Line RJ-MS-1-2C(R-067)
Break Impulse Lines:
Cl-R2-3-TB/None - Sce Note Cl-R7-2-T26/None See Note NONE Main Steam Line Break Main Stcam Linc Brcak Stcam Generator 1 Iot>> l~,~ Linc Brcak RJ-MS-3-2C(R"067)
RJ-MS-2-2C AJ"BD-7-lA(R-177)
AJ uD 14 lo(o177)
Impulse Lines:
Cl-R13-5-T49/Hone See Note FT-IMS-0495-IV-W-LP-T66/None - Sce Note impulse Lines',
CI.-R8-7 T30/None
~ See Note FT-IMS-0485-IV-LP-T65/None See Note Instrument Rack Al-R7 Impacted Rc suits in FT-1"2/Fail Lou NONE NONE A. Steam Generator Bloudqun Line Brcak B. Increase Charging Flou Until Reactor trip.
C. Event Not Considered Significant for Chapter 15 Analysis,
Sheet 8 uf g TABLE I - IMPACTED COMPONENTS SUBJECTED TO JET FORCES PIPE MIIP/FLOODINO (INSIDE COHTAINHENT)
INITIATINCEVENT JET CONE NUMBER AFFECTED COMPONENT/FAILURE MODE Safety In]ection AJ-SI-50-1(R-152)
Instrument Rack Al-R7 Impacted Re-Line Break suits in FT-122/Fail Low FLOODINC EFFECT A, Safety In)ection Line Break.
8, Loss of Charging Flow.
C, Event Not Considered Significant for Chapter 15 Analysis.
Main Steam Line Break AJ-MS-8-2A (R-068)
AJ-MS-8-2B (R-068)
AJ-MS-9-2A (R-068)
AJ-MS-9-28 (R-068)
Electrical Cable Trays; C1701/Severed Cables C1705/Severed Cables C1206/Severed Cables All steam dump valves opening are not required for this event so there is no effect on the FSAR Chapter 15 Analysis.
NOTE:
This is a safety grade impulse line that will be protected against the effects of the NELB.
Sheet 1 of 6 TABLE 2 - COIU'ONENTS SUB.IFCI'ED TO IIELB ENVIROIIIIENTS (INSIDE CONTAIHIIENI')
S YSTI Steam Generator Water Level Control System AFFECTED COIII'ONEHT LT-474 LT-475 LT-476 FUtlCTIOtl Steam Generator lA Narrow Range Level Stcam Cenerator 1A Narrow Range Level Steam Generator lA Narrow Range Level NODFI. HUtUIFR ITT Barton 764 (2)
ITT Barton 764 (2)
ITf Barton 764 (2)
SAI Eff RELATF.D VFS HO X
IIEI 8 (1)
FtlVIRONIIFtll'(UALlftCAfION
'I".S NO X
LT-484 LT-485 LT-486 Stcam Generator 1B Narrow Range Level Stcam Generator 1B Narrow Range Level Steam Generator 1B Harrow Range Level ITT Barton 764 (2)
ITT Barton 764 (2)
ITT Barton 764 (2)
LT-494 Steam Generator IC tlarrow Range I.evel ITT Barton 764 (2)
LT-495 Steam Generator 1C Narrow Range Level ITT Barton 764 (2)
LT-496 S earn Generator 1C Harrow Range Level ITT Barton 764 (2)
FI'-474 FT-475 FT-484
}7-485 FT-494 Stcam Generator IA Stcam Flow Steam Ccncrator 1B Stcam Flow Stcam Cencrator 1B Steam Flow ITT Barton 764 (2)
ITT Barton 764 (2)
ITT Barton 764 (2)
Steam Generator 1C Stcam Flow ITf Barton 764 (2)
Steam Generator lA Steam Flow ITT Barton 764 (2)
Slieet 2 oE 6
TAlH.E 2 - ColrPOHElrrs SOBAECTED TO llEI.B PNVlHONHi:.ltts (IHSlllF. Cnl'IAllllll:.Irr)
'I7 Vl I. ~l I
Pressurizer Lovel Control AFFI'.CTl'.D
('A)ill'OH!'.NT FT-495 Hll-44 I.T-459 LT-460 LT-461 I.SF.-1CS-0459 I.SE-1CS-04i60 HUHCT I OH Stcam Generator 1C Stcam Flow Power Pan@a Neutron Flux Detector Pressurizer Level Pressurizer I.eve i Pressurizer Lcvcl Letdown I.ine Isolation.Valve 1-LCV-459 Solenoid Letdown Linc Isolation Valve 1-LCV-460 Solenoid ISH)I.L NllllBI;II ITT Barton 764 (2)
W - 1CTD (2)(4)
UI. - 24154 WL - 24)56 ITT Barton 764 (2)
ITT Barton 764 (2)
ITT Barton 764 (2)
ASCO FT-831654 (6)
ASCO Ff-831654 (6)
SAFl 1"( Hl'.IATI'.D HO YI:8 HELD I'.HVI HOHIII'.tel'iHAl.I I'ICA I'lOll l Il "ll X
X Pressurizer Pressure Control PT-44i4 Pressurizer Pressure Control Transmitter ITT Barton 753 (2)
P r-445 Pressurizer Pressure Control Transraitter ITT Barton 753 (2)
LT-459 I.T-4i60 LT-461 PT-455 P r-456 I"l'-457 Pressurizer I.cvcl Pressurizer I.cvc1 Pressurizer Level Pressurizer Prcssure Pressurizer Pressure Pressurizer Pressure ITT Barton 764 (2)
ITT Barton 764 (2)
ITT Barton 764 (2)
ITT Barton 763 (2)
IIT Barton 763 (2) 1TT Barton 763 (2)
Sheet 3 nf 6 TAIII.F. 2 - COIU'ONEN'IS SUB.IECTFD TO IIEI.B FNVIRONHENTS (ItISIDF. CONTAINNFQT)
SYS3 Fdl AFFF.CTF.D COIIPONENT PSE-1RC-044481 RINCTION Pressurizer Power Relief Valve 1-PCV-4448 Control Solenoid IIODEI. NUIIBI'.R ASCO FT-831654 (3)
SAFETY RFLATFD NO YI'.S III'.I.II (1)
ENVIRONllEtg QUALIFICiYfION Yl S NO X
PSE-1RC-044482 PSE-1RC-0445A1 PSE-1RC-0445A2 PSE-1RC-044581 PSE-1RC-044582 Pressurizer Power Relief Valve 1-PCV-4448 Control Solenoid Pressurizer Power Relief Valve 1-PCV-445A Control Solenoid Pressurizer Power Relief Valve 1-PCV-445A Control Solenoid Pressurizer Power Relief Valve 1-PCV-4458 Control Solenoid Pressurizer Power Relief Valve 1-PCV-4458 Control Solenoid ASCO FT-831654 (3)
ASCO FT-831654 (3)
ASCO FT>>831654 (3)
ASCO FT-831654 (3)
ASCO Ff-831654 (3)
I/P-1RC-0444C I/P-1RC-0444D Pressurizer Spray Valve 1-PCV-444C Pneumatic Converter Pressurizer Spray Valve 1-PCV-444D Pneumatic Converter Fisher 546 (3)
Fisher 546 (3)
T-AVC Control TE-04118 TE-0411C TE-04218 TE-0421C TF.-04318 TE-0431C DT-TAVC Control (RTD) llot Leg RDF 21204 (2) (5)
DT-TAVG Control (RTD) Cold Leg RDF 21204 (2) (5)
DT-TAVC Control (RTD) Hot Leg RDF 21204 (2) (5)
DT-TAVC Control (RTD) Cold Leg RDF 21204 (2) (5)
DT-TAVO Control (RTD) Ilot Leg RDF 21204 (2) (5)
DT-TAVG Control (RTD) Cold IA.g RDF 21204 (2) (5)
Sheet 4 of 6 TABLE 2 - CONPOHFNTS SUKIECTED TO IIEI.B ENVIRONNEHTS ItlSIDE CONTAINIIENT)
SYSTF'I Rod Control AFFECTED COtIPOHFNT Ntl-44 FUtICTION Power Range Neutron Flux Detector ttODFJ, NUIHIFR M - IGTD (2)(4)
ItL - 24154 NL 24156 Yltg NO X
SAFETY RELATFD IIEI.B (1)
EIIPIIIOIIIIENTtjUALIFICATION IHI
'YI'.8 X
Engineered Safety Features Actuation PT-445 PT-456 PT-457 LT-474 LT-475 LT-476 LT-484 LT-485 LT-486 LT-494 LT-495 LT-496 Pressurizer Pressure Prewsurizer Pressure Pressurizer Pressure Steam Generator 1A Narrow Range Level Steam Generator 1A Harro~
Range Level Steam Generator IA Narrow Range Level Steam Generator IB Narrow Range Level Steam Generator IB Narrow Range Level Steam Generator IB Narrow Range Level Steam Generator IC Narrow Range level Steam Generator 1C Narrow Range Level Steam Generator IC Narrow Range Level ITI'arton 763 (2)
ITI'arton 763 (2)
ITT Barton 763 (2)
ITT Barton 764 (2)
ITT Barton 764 (2)
ITT Barton 764 (2)
ITT Barton 764 (2)
ITT Barton 764 (2)
ITT Barton 764 (2)
ITT Barton 764 (2)
ITT Barton 764 (2)
ITT Barton 764 (2)
Sheet 5 of 6 TABI.E 2 - COIIPONEtCCS SUB.IECCED TO IIFLB ENVIROtlHEtlTS (1NSIDF. CONTAINHI!NT)
SYSTFZI AFFFCCF.D CO!II'ON!'.NT TE-412B TE-412D TE-422B TE-422D FUNCTION RCS Loop I DT/T AVG Protection (RTD) Protection Set I RCS Loop 1 DT/T AVG Protection (RTD) Protection Set I RCS Loop 2 DT/T AVG Protection (RTD) Protection Set II RCS Loop 2 DT/T AVG Protection (RTD) Protection Set II tlODFI. NUIIBFR RDF 21204 (2)
RDF 21204 (2)
(51 RDF 21204 (2) (5)
RDF 21204 (2)
(5)
SAFETY RELATFD Yl'8 IIEI.B (I)
F'lK I RONtlFN I'
[UALI F ICATIOtt Nl!
l't:.S TE-4328 TE-432D RCS Loop 3 DT/T AVG Protection (RTD) Protection Set III RCS Loop 3 DT/T AVG Protection (RTD) Protection Set IV RDF 21204 (2) (5)
RDF 21204 (2) (5)
PT-951 PT-952 PT-953 Containment Pressure Containment Pressure Containment Pressure ITT Barton 351 (2)
ITT Barton 351 (2)
ITT Barton 351 (2)
Sheet 6 of 6 NOTI'. 1:
Shearon Ilarris Plant Specific Equipmcnt I)>>allfication Fnvclope (Inside Containmcnt)
Tcmpcraturc
" Prcssure Relative Ilumidity Radiation Chemistry 376 F
52psi lOOX 1.2 x 10 R )
Boric Acid Spray 8.5-11 Pll NOTE 2:
I)ualificd per NCAP 8587.
This qualification reference indicates the individual qualification dotal)s for each particular type of equipmcnt, meeting IFEF. 323-1974, si>ppllcd by thc NSSS Vendor, Mcstinghousc.
'I'his WCAP is a generic reference document for all NSSS supplied IE cquipmcnt meeting IEFE 323-1974.
NOTE 3:
The solenoid operators associated with thc PORVs and thc pneumatic convcrters for the Pressurizer Spray Valves arc not quell.fied for the harsh environment nnd their instru-ment air siq>ply lines could be impinged upon by thc )et caused by IIEI.B.
The failure of the solenoid operators will result in their associated valves going to their failed closed nosition which will not complicate any event beyond the FSAR Chapter 15 analyses.
NOTE 4:
Excorc Power Range Neutron Flux Detectors are not qualified for IIEI.B relative humidity of )OOX.
IIowcver, these Excore Power Range Neutron Flux Detectors have been q>>all(lcd to a relative Iu>mldity of 95Z.
Due to the fact that the excorc detectors nre required to function properly for a very limited nmount of time after the IIEI.B (until reactor trip), these components have been determined to bc func-tionally qualified.
NOTE 5:
Due to the fact that these RCS temperature narrow range RTD's are only required to function less tlw>n five mire>tes after thc IIEI.B, thcsc components have bccn dctcrmined to be functionally qualified.
NOTE 6:
The letdown orifice isolation valves (in series with the unqualified valves) are qualified and villperform the function of letdown isolation following tire IIEI.B.
Sheet 1
oC l.
TABI.E 3 - COHPONENCS SUILII'A'TED TO IIFI.B FPIVIRONNEHTS (OUTSIDE CONTAINIIEHT)
SYSTFZI AFFECCED COIIPONEHT FUNCTI ON N)DF.I. NIUIBFR SAFFTY REINED YES IIEI.B ENVIRONIIFNT l)UALIfICATIOH YL'S NO Pressurizer Level Control FI'-122 Charging lleader Flow ITT Barton 752