ML18018A673

Forwards Response to Draft SER & Acceptance Review Question 280.30 Re RHR Sys & Supplementary Info to Responses Re Acceptance Review Questions 280.31 & 280.9 Re Safe Shutdown Capability & Fire Dampers,Respectively

ML18018A673
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	08/12/1983
From:	Mcduffie M CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LAP-83-326, NUDOCS 8308190008
Download: ML18018A673 (13)

Text

I REGULATOR'lNFORNATION DISTRIBUTION S'EN (RIDE) O'"

ACCESSION NBR: 8308190008 DATE: 83/08/1'2 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-000 Sliearon Har ris DOC Nuclear Power,plantF Uni,t ii Car ol ina 05000400 50-401 Shear on Har ris Nuclear Power Plant< Unit 2< Carolina 05000401 AUTH ~ NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION MCOUFFIE~M ~ AD ICarolina f'ower 8 Light Co ~

AEiC IP",'NAME RECIf'Ih,NT AFF ILIATION DENTONgH ~ RE Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulationi Director

SUBJECT:

Forwards response to draft SER a Acceptance Review Question 280,30 rIe RHR sys L supplementary info to rIesponses re Acceptance Review Questions 280 '1 8 280 ' re .safe. shutdown capabili,ty 8, fir'e dampe'rTsirespectively ~

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SERIAL: LAP-83-326 Carolina Power & Light Company AUG la ~883 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-400 AND 50-401 DRAFT SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT AND ACCEPTANCE REVIEW QUESTION RESPONSES

Dear Mr. Denton:

Carolina Power & Light Company (CPAL) hereby transmits one original and forty copies of the response to Acceptance Review Question 280.30. In addition, we are providing some supplementary information on the responses to Acceptance Review Questions 280.9 and 280.31 which were previously transmitted to you.

Yours very truly, M. A. McDuffie

~ ~

Senior Vice President Engineering 4 Construction FXT/cfr (7678FXT)

Cct Mr. E. A. Licitra (NRC) Mr. Wells Eddleman Mr. G. F. Maxwell (NRC-SHNPP) Dr. Phyllis Lotchin Mr. J. P. O'Reilly (NRC-RII) Mr. John D. Runkle Mr. Travis Payne (KUDZU) Dr. Richard D. Wilson Mr. Daniel F. Read (CHANGE/ELP) Mr. G. 0. Bright (ASLB)

Chapel Hill Public Library Dr. J. H. Carpenter (ASLB)

Wake County Public Library Mr. J. L. Kelley (ASLB) 8308190008 830812 PDR ADOCK 05000400 E PDR 411 Fayetteville Street o P. O. Box 1551 o Raleigh, N. C. 27602

l

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'V Ni II h

Tne residual heat ramoval system is genera ly i. 'lo~

prea>>ure system tbat interfaces ~4th the high pressure primary coolant'ystem. To preclude a LOCA through this interface, wa require compliance ~4th the recommendationa of Branch Technical Positl.on RsS 5-X. Thus, th$.s interfaca most likely consists of two redundant and independent motor operated valves with diuarae interlocks in accordance with Bremch Technical Position XCSB 3.

These tMo motor operated values and their associated cable may be>>ub)ect to e single Are heard. Xt i>>

our concern that this sinsle Hre could cause the two valves to open resulting 9n a fire-initiated LOCA through the sub)ect high-low pressure system interface.

To assure that thee interface and other Mph-low pressure interfaces are adequately protected from the effecta of a single fire, wa require the following information.

a. Identify each high-low pressure interface that uses red'.dant electrically controlled devices (such as two sc.ries motor operated valves) to 'solate or preclude rupture of any pr1mary coolant boundary.

b. Xdentkfy each deWce's esseatie1 cabling (powar and control) and describe the cable routing (by fire area) frcra source to termination.

c. ldenti y each location a%ere the identified cables are separted by less than a ~~il having a three-hour fire rat"ng from cable>> for the redundant device.

a) The fo1lo ~g Reactor Coolant System high-low pressure interfaces Nly on redundant electrically controlled devices to rainta5n primary system integrity.

EGIR Suction lsbiation Valves (FSAR ."igu're 5.4.7-1)

, 1RH-'V500 SB

~ 1RH-V501 SA 1PH-V502 SB 1PB-V503 SA

2. Power Operated Relief System (CESAR Figure 5.4.7-1) 1RC-P527 SH 1RC-P528 SH 1RC-P529 SH 1RC-V526 SH 1RC-V527 S~3 1RC"V528 SH

~Res onse (Cont'd)

. 280 30 a) (Coat'd)

3. Letdown Xsolatioa System (PSALM Figure 9.3.4-1) 2CS-V512 Sh 2CS-V511 SA 2CS V513 SA 1CS L500 SH 1CS-L501 SN

4. 'Primary Sampliag System (FSM Figure 9.3.2-1) 2SP-V21-SNl 2SP-V22-SN1 2SP-Vill-SB-1 2SP-V23-SA-l 2SP-V12-SA-1 2SP-V2-SA-1 2SP-V116-SA-1 4SP-V381-1 4SP-V382-l 2SP-V 1 1-SB 2SP-Vl-SB-1 2SP-V113-SB"1 2SP-Y114-SB-1 2SP-V115"SB-1

5. Reactor Coolant Vent System (PSAR Figures 5.1.2-1 aad 5e1.2-2 to be revised to include this system~.'ee response.- to Open Item Ho, 47 2RC-V280 SB

?RC-V281 SA 2PC-V282 SB 2F'C-V283 SA 2RC-V284 SA 2RC-V285 SB.

~,

~Ras anse 280. 30 (Cont'd) bhc)

1. RKR Suction Tsolation Valves The essential cabling by fire area to each valve has been identified in TaMe 9.59-4c (page 110) of the Safe Shutdova Analysis in Case of Pire.

The cable routing by .-, ARea has been identified in Table 9.53-4a (pages 17,18,19,20,21,22 and 23) of, the Safe Shutdovn AnaIyeis in Case of Pire.

2, Po~er Operated. Relief System Device Cable Ar ea 10157A PAA~A, PUBL4 l.-RC-P527'-RC-F527 10157B PACRCB 1-RC-P527 l0157P PAABL4 P+QQ SA 1-RC-P527 10157Q PAACSA 1-RC-P527 10157H PAA2IA, FAACSA, FAACSB 1-RC+527 10157J P~OL4 1<<RC-F527 10157K FAABL4, PAACSA 1-RC-F528 10158A FAAiPA, FAABL4 1-RC-P528 10158B FACRCB 1-RC-P528 10158F PP~~L4, PAACSk, 1-FC>>F528 101580 FAACSA.

1-RC-F528 101582 FAABL4, FAACSA, FAACSB 1-RC-P528 10158$ PAABL4 1-RC-PS28 10158V. PA.ML4, PAACSA 1-RC-P529 10156A P~8 PN cGB FAAACP PAABL5 1-RC-F529 101563 I"(G) FACR~B 1-RC-F529 PAASgB, F~ >>P, P~L5, PAACSB, FCACRC 1-RC-F529 10.560 ~ (D) FAACSW, :"AACSB 1-RC-P 52.9 10156H + (D) PAAS ~~B s FAACSA, FAA'CSB

~Res esse

'80. 30 (Cont')

b a,~) (Cont~d)

2. (Cont ')

Cable 1-RC-P529 3,0156J PAASGB, PAPACP 1-RC-P529 10156K PAASGB, '.PAAAGE>> RAASL5, PAACSB>> PC&RC 1 RC-7526 10160A FAAZPA, RAABL5

)-RC-V526 10160B FACRCB>> PAASL5 a-RC-V526 10160C P~A 1-RC-V526 10160D PACRCB 1-RC-V526 10160K PAA~~X, PAABL4 1-FZ-V526 10160F PAA31A, RAACSA, PAACSB 1-RC-V526 10160G PAACSA

>'-RC-V526 10)60J PACRCB 1-RC-V527 10)61A K~A, FAABL5 1-RC<<V527 1016}B PACRCB, RAABL5 1-.RC-V527 10161C PAA~~(L

)-RC-V527 10161D ."ACRCB

)-RC-V527 l0161:" PPKEPA, .AABL4

),-RC-V527 1016)P PAACSA,, PAACSH F-RC-V527 10)6)C PAACSA 1-RC-V528 10162A PAAZPB 1-RC-U528 10162B+ (C} FACRCB 1-RC-V528 10162C i-.RC-V528 10162D * (C) PACRCB 1-RC-V528 10162K PAPZP c, "AASGB>> PAP>CP, FAABL5 1-RC-V528 10162F < (D) PAMGB, ."-AACSA, RAACSB 1-RC"V528 lO)620 ~ (D) "A%CA FAACSB 1-RC"V528 '0162J < (C) .""ACRCB

~ses ense 280e30 (Cont'6) b & c) (Cont.')

3. I etiam'ao1ation System Device Cable . Area lMS-L501 10250B PAAKPA, FAABL4 1 CS.-L501 10250F PAACSA, FAACSB 1WS-L501 10250G PAAR 4, PAACSA) FAACSB 1~ S-'L502 102508 PAABL4 1-CS-L501 10250C PACRCB 1-CS-L501 10250A FAABL4 1W5-L500 10251F PAACSA, PAACBB 1-CS'-L500 102510 PAABL4, RAACSA) FAACSB 1-CS-L500 10251K FAQH 4

~

1WS-L500 10251A PAULO 1~S-L500 1025 1C PACRCB 1-'S-L500 102513 PAA""~A) PAABL4 2-CS-V511 10284A FACP.CB 2-Cs-V511 10284D r ACRCB 2<<CS>>7511 10284E ."A&~A) DEBT 4) K4A,CSX 2-CS-V511 10284P PI~A) FMBL4:

2&S-V511 PAA "A, FNBL4, PMCSA 10284G I

2-CS-V511 10284J PAASGB, FAAACP, PAAEL4, FAACSA 2"CS-V511 }0284', FAABL4, P~4CSA 2-CS-V5 10284 H FAABL4 2WS-7511 3.0284M FAAEPA) PAABL4, FAACSA 2WS-V512 }0285A FACRCB 2-CS"V512 1028SD ZACRCB 2-CS-7512 10285K, PA~A) PAABL4, FAACSA 2" CS-V512 10285P PA4~A) FAABL4 2-CS-V512 10285G ~= A, P"A" L4, PISA, 2-CS-V512 10285J ZAASGB ) AP ~no 7;"~~L4) PAACSA 2-CS-7512 10285K FAABL4) FAACSA 2-CS-V512 10285H FA.mL4 2-CS-V5'2 1.0285H PP ~A) F'UJL4 F4 ~SA

280. 30 (Cont'd)

~-

b 6 c) (Cont'd)

3. (Cont ')

Device Cable Area 2-CS-7513 10286A FACRCB 2-CS-'V513 102860 RACRCB 2<<CB V513 10286E PAARPA, 2-CS-V513 RA~Ap 10286K'02860 2-CS-V513 7AAWA, FA.&L4, RAACM, 2WS-7513 1.0286 J RAASOB, RZAAACP, MASL4s PAACSA 2-CS-V513 10286K RAASL4, PAAC SA 2-CS-V513 10286M MASL4 2-CS-v513 10286H PAAR~A, PJVZK,4, .AAC~M

4. Pr~r7 Sampling SYstem

~

The Pri;~r7 Sampling Systems consists of 3/8" tubing piping. he loss of fluid 9n tM.s system due to any melfmction caused by a fire . ould. oot causa a LOCA condition since; the discharge fro-... the charging pmaps W13.

adequately make-up f.or may'oss in the system. Therefore, a testing of cabling is deemed not neceasary.

5. Reactor Coolant Vent System he cable~ g for the solenoid operated valves has not been routed at this tim.e.

The routing Mll be designed such tbat adequate separation oi cables <<11 be provided so that fire initiated LOCA w 11 b precluded and Apped& R separation criteria M11 be met.

0

• NOTE'OR b&c) Z.

The pressurizer is provided with three redundant power opezated relief valves, The solenoid operated vaIves are designed to fail close on loss of power to prevent uncontrolled steam dump, Por additional pro tection, each relief valve has a motor operated isolation valve located upstr'earn. For diversity the relief valves are dc powered while the isolation va1ves are ac powered, (valves P529 & V528)

Xn addition, the cables of one relief valve and its associated upstream isolation valve are routed as "3" train, while the other two relief valve's and their associated upstream valves are routed as "A" train <<'ith two areas of. exception. 'Zheae two areas are.'.

The containment area at the pressurizer (EL 286'}

F.A;'hCBCR where. all the valves are located

.within less than twenty feet.

'2. 'The RAE (EL 286'},fire area FAACSB, where some o the train A & 3 cables axe in the same fire area, "be fo3.lowing modifications <ill oe made, in order to assure continued

.operation of the relief system ia case of a fixe:

A. The "BoL" vires in .each of the cables carrying power to "be solenoid valves, and control power to the isolat ion valves,. wi11 be routed with separate cables.

These cables will be routed along the cables which origina11y contained the hot wires. As for that portion of 'the circuit, between the'aia Control Board {HCB}

and the NTC th).ch is ade up with specia].ly manufactured

.cables, these same cables will- bc protected ~

Th'e terminations the panels T.E.

aepara ed {i.e.

', and wiring of the "Hot" wires at etc ~ vill be trace'd and separate termina3. block sets and separate bundle of wires).

A and B above wil1 ensure that no credible spurious operation of any valve wi11 occur,

< ~ At the. contianment area the conduits to the valves will be individually wrapped were necessary by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated wraps or the area sprinkled.

D. At the RP3 common f ire area P~CSB, the cables or valves P529 and V52S wi3.1 be routed thru - separate

<<ire area via dedicated condui ts, C

to and 9 above a common vill prevent fire.

t,he "impairment of bo th trains of va'. ve s due

Question 280.31 One control room is provided for both units. In the event of a fire in the control'room, equipment for both units could be damaged and both units would have to be shutdown from outside the control'room. Verify that both units can be safely shutdown in the event of such a fire in the contol room. Show that there is the necessary manpower available to perform all necessary actions.

~Res onse: This question is no longer applicable to the ghearon Harris design. A three hour fire rated'barrier has been placed between the two control room complexes, providing complete separation.

280. 9 On page 9.5.1-9 of your FSAR you state that "fire dampers are not provided in sa'fety-related'ductwork." It is our position fire dampers be provided for all ventilation duct penetra- 'hat tions of fire barriers in conformance with BTP OMEB, 9.5-1 Section 0.5.a. Verify that all fire barrier ductwork penetrations will be sealed by fire dampers having a fire resistance rating at least equal to that of the barrier. Verify that such dampers have .been tested and approved by a nationally recognized laboratory.

~Ree ouee: Ductwork which peoetiate fdre barrdere we'll be provdded with fire dampers (tested'and approved by a nationally recognized

'aboratory) having a fire resistant rating at least equal to that of'he fire barrier with the following exceptions:

i) Exhaust and intakes at exterior walls, stacks and "roofs. Because these walls are not contiguous with fire areas it was not necessary to provide fire dampers.

ii) Transfer'air from RAB, HVAC equipment room to the tank area'Elevation 286 because the tank area has negligible combustibles '.

iii) Local cooler ductwork penetrating floors in RAB which are designated fire zone boundaries within fire areas 1-A-BAL and 12'-A-BAL and were upgraded to the equivalent of minimum 3-hour fire resistance rating.

Section.9.5.1 will be modified in a future amendment to incorporate this response.