ML18018A673

"Draft Supplement" is not in the list (Request, Draft Request, Supplement, Acceptance Review, Meeting, Withholding Request, Withholding Request Acceptance, RAI, Draft RAI, Draft Response to RAI, ...) of allowed values for the "Project stage" property.

Forwards Response to Draft SER & Acceptance Review Question 280.30 Re RHR Sys & Supplementary Info to Responses Re Acceptance Review Questions 280.31 & 280.9 Re Safe Shutdown Capability & Fire Dampers,Respectively

ML18018A673
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	08/12/1983
From:	Mcduffie M CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LAP-83-326, NUDOCS 8308190008
Download: ML18018A673 (13)

Text

I REGULATOR'lNFORNATION DISTRIBUTION S'EN (RIDE)

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ACCESSION NBR: 8308190008 DOC DATE: 83/08/1'2 NOTARIZED:

NO DOCKET FACIL:50-000 Sliearon Har ris Nuclear Power,plantF Uni,t ii Car ol ina 05000400 50-401 Shear on Har ris Nuclear Power Plant< Unit 2< Carolina 05000401 AUTH~ NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION MCOUFFIE~M ~ AD ICarolina f'ower 8 Light Co ~

AEiC IP",'NAME RECIf'Ih,NT AFF ILIATION DENTONgH ~ RE Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulationi Director

SUBJECT:

Forwards response to draft SER a Acceptance Review Question 280,30 rIe RHR sys L supplementary info to rIesponses re Acceptance Review Questions 280 '1 8

280 '

re.safe. shutdown capabili,ty 8, fir'e dampe'rTsirespectively

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Carolina Power & Light Company SERIAL:

LAP-83-326 AUG la ~883 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NOS.

1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-400 AND 50-401 DRAFT SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT AND ACCEPTANCE REVIEW QUESTION RESPONSES

Dear Mr. Denton:

Carolina Power

& Light Company (CPAL) hereby transmits one original and forty copies of the response to Acceptance Review Question 280.30.

In

addition, we are providing some supplementary information on the responses to Acceptance Review Questions 280.9 and 280.31 which were previously transmitted to you.

Yours very truly, FXT/cfr (7678FXT)

~

~

M. A. McDuffie Senior Vice President Engineering 4 Construction Cct Mr. E. A. Licitra (NRC)

Mr. G. F. Maxwell (NRC-SHNPP)

Mr. J. P. O'Reilly (NRC-RII)

Mr. Travis Payne (KUDZU)

Mr. Daniel F.

Read (CHANGE/ELP)

Chapel Hill Public Library Wake County Public Library Mr. Wells Eddleman Dr. Phyllis Lotchin Mr. John D. Runkle Dr. Richard D. Wilson Mr. G. 0. Bright (ASLB)

Dr. J.

H. Carpenter (ASLB)

Mr. J. L. Kelley (ASLB) 8308190008 830812 PDR ADOCK 05000400 E

PDR 411 Fayetteville Street o P. O. Box 1551 o Raleigh, N. C. 27602

l

'h

'V Ni II h

Tne residual heat ramoval system is genera ly i. 'lo~

prea>>ure system tbat interfaces ~4th the high pressure primary coolant'ystem.

To preclude a LOCA through this interface, wa require compliance ~4th the recommendationa of Branch Technical Positl.on RsS 5-X.

Thus, th$.s interfaca most likely consists of two redundant and independent motor operated valves with diuarae interlocks in accordance with Bremch Technical Position XCSB 3.

These tMo motor operated values and their associated cable may be>>ub)ect to e single Are heard.

Xt i>>

our concern that this sinsle Hre could cause the two valves to open resulting 9n a fire-initiated LOCA through the sub)ect high-low pressure system interface.

To assure that thee interface and other Mph-low pressure interfaces are adequately protected from the effecta of a single fire, wa require the following information.

a.

Identify each high-low pressure interface that uses red'.dant electrically controlled devices (such as two sc.ries motor operated valves) to 'solate or preclude rupture of any pr1mary coolant boundary.

b.

Xdentkfy each deWce's esseatie1 cabling (powar and control) and describe the cable routing (by fire area) frcra source to termination.

c.

ldenti y each location a%ere the identified cables are separted by less than a ~~il having a three-hour fire rat"ng from cable>> for the redundant device.

a)

The fo1lo ~g Reactor Coolant System high-low pressure interfaces Nly on redundant electrically controlled devices to rainta5n primary system integrity.

EGIR Suction lsbiation Valves (FSAR."igu're 5.4.7-1)

, 1RH-'V500 SB

~

1RH-V501 SA 1PH-V502 SB 1PB-V503 SA 2.

Power Operated Relief System (CESAR Figure 5.4.7-1) 1RC-P527 SH 1RC-P528 SH 1RC-P529 SH 1RC-V526 SH 1RC-V527 S~3 1RC"V528 SH

~Res onse (Cont'd)

. 280 30 a)

(Coat'd) 3.

Letdown Xsolatioa System (PSALM Figure 9.3.4-1) 2CS-V512 Sh 2CS-V511 SA 2CS V513 SA 1CS L500 SH 1CS-L501 SN 4.

'Primary Sampliag System (FSM Figure 9.3.2-1) 2SP-V21-SNl 2SP-V22-SN1 2SP-Vill-SB-1 2SP-V23-SA-l 2SP-V12-SA-1 2SP-V2-SA-1 2SP-V116-SA-1

. 4SP-V381-1 4SP-V382-l 2SP-V 1 1-SB 2SP-Vl-SB-1 2SP-V113-SB"1 2SP-Y114-SB-1 2SP-V115"SB-1 5.

Reactor Coolant Vent System (PSAR Figures 5.1.2-1 aad 5e1.2-2 to be revised to include this system~.'ee response.- to Open Item Ho, 47 2RC-V280 SB

?RC-V281 SA 2PC-V282 SB 2F'C-V283 SA 2RC-V284 SA 2RC-V285 SB.

~Ras anse 280. 30 (Cont'd) bhc) 1.

~,

RKR Suction Tsolation Valves The essential cabling by fire area to each valve has been identified in TaMe 9.59-4c (page 110) of the Safe Shutdova Analysis in Case of Pire.

The cable routing by.-,

ARea has been identified in Table 9.53-4a (pages 17,18,19,20,21,22 and 23) of, the Safe Shutdovn AnaIyeis in Case of Pire.

2, Po~er Operated. Relief System Device l.-RC-P527'-RC-F527 1-RC-P527 1-RC-P527 Cable 10157A 10157B l0157P 10157Q PAA~A, PUBL4 PACRCB PAABL4 P+QQ SA PAACSA Area 1-RC-P527 1-RC+527 1<<RC-F527 1-RC-F528 1-RC-P528 1-RC-P528 1-FC>>F528 1-RC-F528 1-RC-P528 1-RC-PS28 1-RC-P529 1-RC-F529 10157H 10157J 10157K 10158A 10158B 10158F 101580 101582 10158$

10158V.

10156A 101563 I"(G)

PAA2IA, FAACSA, FAACSB P~OL4 FAABL4, PAACSA FAAiPA, FAABL4 FACRCB PP~~L4,

PAACSk, FAACSA.

FAABL4, FAACSA, FAACSB PAABL4 PA.ML4, PAACSA P~8 PN cGB FAAACP PAABL5 FACR~B 1-RC-F529 PAASgB, F~ >>P, P~L5,

PAACSB, FCACRC 1-RC-F529 10.560

~

(D)

FAACSW, :"AACSB 1-RC-P 52.9 10156H +

(D)

PAAS ~~B s

FAACSA, FAA'CSB

~Res esse

'80. 30 (Cont')

b a,~)

(Cont~d) 2.

(Cont')

1-RC-P529 1-RC-P529 1 RC-7526

)-RC-V526 a-RC-V526 1-RC-V526 1-RC-V526 1-FZ-V526 1-RC-V526

>'-RC-V526 1-RC-V527 1-RC<<V527 1-.RC-V527

)-RC-V527

)-RC-V527

),-RC-V527 F-RC-V527 1-RC-V528 1-RC-U528 Cable 3,0156J 10156K 10160A 10160B 10160C 10160D 10160K 10160F 10160G 10)60J 10)61A 1016}B 10161C 10161D l0161:"

1016)P 10)6)C 10162A 10162B+

(C}

PAASGB, PAPACP PAASGB, '.PAAAGE>>

RAASL5, PAACSB>> PC&RC FAAZPA, RAABL5 FACRCB>>

PAASL5 P~A PACRCB PAA~~X, PAABL4 PAA31A, RAACSA, PAACSB PAACSA PACRCB K~A, FAABL5

PACRCB, RAABL5 PAA~~(L

."ACRCB

PPKEPA,

.AABL4 PAACSA,,

PAACSH PAACSA PAAZPB FACRCB 1-RC-V528 i-.RC-V528 1-RC-V528 1-RC-V528 10162C 10162D * (C) 10162K 10162F

< (D)

PACRCB PAPZP c, "AASGB>> PAP>CP, FAABL5

PAMGB,

."-AACSA, RAACSB 1-RC"V528 lO)620 ~ (D)

"A%CA FAACSB 1-RC"V528

'0162J (C)

.""ACRCB

~ses ense 280e30 (Cont'6) b

& c) (Cont.')

3.

Ietiam'ao1ation System Device lMS-L501 1 CS.-L501 1WS-L501 1~ S-'L502 1-CS-L501 1-CS-L501 1W5-L500 1-CS'-L500 1-CS-L500

~ 1WS-L500 1~S-L500 1-'S-L500 2-CS-V511 2-Cs-V511 2<<CS>>7511 2-CS-V511 2&S-V511 I

2-CS-V511 2"CS-V511 2-CS-V5 2WS-7511 2WS-V512 2-CS"V512 2-CS-7512 2"CS-V512 2-CS-V512 2-CS-V512 2-CS-7512 2-CS-V512 2-CS-V5'2 Cable 10250B 10250F 10250G 102508 10250C 10250A 10251F 102510 10251K 10251A 1025 1C 102513 10284A 10284D 10284E 10284P

" 10284G 10284J

}0284',

10284 H 3.0284M

}0285A 1028SD

10285K, 10285P 10285G 10285J 10285K 10285H 1.0285H

. Area PAAKPA, FAABL4

PAACSA, FAACSB PAAR 4, PAACSA)

FAACSB PAABL4 PACRCB FAABL4

PAACSA, PAACBB PAABL4, RAACSA) FAACSB FAQH 4 PAULO PACRCB PAA""~A) PAABL4 FACP.CB r ACRCB

."A&~A)

PI~A)

DEBT 4)

K4A,CSX FMBL4:

FAABL4, P~4CSA FAABL4 FAAEPA) PAABL4, FAACSA FACRCB ZACRCB PA~A) PAABL4, FAACSA PA4~A) FAABL4

~= A, P"A" L4,

PISA, ZAASGB )

AP ~no 7;"~~L4) PAACSA FAABL4) FAACSA FA.mL4 PP ~A) F'UJL4 F4 ~SA PAA "A, FNBL4, PMCSA

PAASGB, FAAACP, PAAEL4, FAACSA

280. 30 (Cont'd)

~-

b 6 c) (Cont'd) 3.

(Cont')

Device 2-CS-7513 2-CS-'V513 2<<CB V513 2-CS-V513 2-CS-V513 2WS-7513 2-CS-V513 2-CS-V513 2-CS-v513 10286A 102860 10286E 10286K'02860 1.0286 J 10286K 10286M 10286H Cable FACRCB RACRCB

PAARPA, RA~Ap

7AAWA, RAASOB,

RAASL4, MASL4 PAAR~A, Area FA.&L4, RAACM, RZAAACP, MASL4s PAACSA PAACSA PJVZK,4,

.AAC~M 4.

Pr~r7 Sampling SYstem

~ The Pri;~r7 Sampling Systems consists of 3/8" tubing piping.

he loss of fluid 9n tM.s system due to any melfmction caused by a fire. ould. oot causa a LOCA condition since; the discharge fro-... the charging pmaps W13.

adequately make-up f.or may'oss in the system.

Therefore, a testing of cabling is deemed not neceasary.

5.

Reactor Coolant Vent System he cable~

g for the solenoid operated valves has not been routed at this tim.e.

The routing Mll be designed such tbat adequate separation oi cables

<<11 be provided so that fire initiated LOCA w 11 b

precluded and Apped& R separation criteria M11 be met.

0

• NOTE'OR b&c) Z.

The pressurizer is provided with three redundant power opezated relief

valves,

. The solenoid operated vaIves are designed to fail close on loss of power to prevent uncontrolled steam

dump, Por additional pro

tection, each relief valve has a motor operated isolation valve located upstr'earn.

For diversity the relief valves are dc powered while the isolation va1ves are ac powered, (valves P529

& V528)

Xn addition, the cables of one relief valve and its associated upstream isolation valve are routed as "3" train, while the other two relief valve's and their associated upstream valves are routed as "A" train <<'ith two areas of. exception.

'Zheae two areas are.'.

The containment area at the pressurizer (EL 286'}

F.A;'hCBCR where. all the valves are located

.within less than twenty feet.

'2.

'The RAE (EL 286'},fire area FAACSB, where some o

the train A

& 3 cables axe in the same fire area, "be fo3.lowing modifications <ill oe made, in order to assure continued

.operation of the relief system ia case of a fixe:

A.

The "BoL" vires in.each of the cables carrying power to "be solenoid valves, and control power to the isolat ion valves,. wi11 be routed with separate cables.

These cables will be routed along the cables which origina11y contained the hot wires.

As for that portion of 'the circuit, between the'aia Control Board

{HCB}

and the NTC th).ch is ade up with specia].ly manufactured

.cables, these same cables will-bc protected

~

Th'e terminations and wiring of the "Hot" wires at the panels T.E. ', etc

~ vill be trace'd and aepara ed {i.e. separate termina3. block sets and separate bundle of wires).

A and B above wil1 ensure that no credible spurious operation of any valve wi11 occur,

< ~

At the. contianment area the conduits to the valves will be individually wrapped were necessary by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated wraps or the area sprinkled.

D.

At the RP3 common fire area P~CSB, the cables or valves P529 and V52S wi3.1 be routed thru - separate

<<ire area via dedicated condui ts, C and 9 above vill prevent t,he "impairment of to a

common fire.

bo th trains of va'. ve s due

Question 280.31 One control room is provided for both units.

In the event of a fire in the control'room, equipment for both units could be damaged and both units would have to be shutdown from outside the control'room.

Verify that both units can be safely shutdown in the event of such a fire in the contol room.

Show that there is the necessary manpower available to perform all necessary actions.

~Res onse:

This question is no longer applicable to the ghearon Harris design.

A three hour fire rated'barrier has been placed between the two control room complexes, providing complete separation.

280. 9 On page 9.5.1-9 of your FSAR you state that "fire dampers are not provided in sa'fety-related'ductwork."

It is our position

'hat fire dampers be provided for all ventilation duct penetra-tions of fire barriers in conformance with BTP OMEB, 9.5-1 Section 0.5.a.

Verify that all fire barrier ductwork penetrations will be sealed by fire dampers having a fire resistance rating at least equal to that of the barrier.

Verify that such dampers have.been tested and approved by a nationally recognized laboratory.

~Ree ouee:

Ductwork which peoetiate fdre barrdere we'll be provdded with fire dampers (tested'and approved by a nationally recognized

'aboratory) having a fire resistant rating at least equal to that of'he fire barrier with the following exceptions:

i)

Exhaust and intakes at exterior walls, stacks and "roofs.

Because these walls are not contiguous with fire areas it was not necessary to provide fire dampers.

ii)

Transfer'air from RAB, HVAC equipment room to the tank area'Elevation 286 because the tank area has negligible combustibles iii)

Local cooler ductwork penetrating floors in RAB which are designated fire zone boundaries within fire areas 1-A-BAL and 12'-A-BAL and were upgraded to the equivalent of minimum 3-hour fire resistance rating.

Section.9.5.1 will be modified in a future amendment to incorporate this response.