ML18012A378
| ML18012A378 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 08/31/1996 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18012A376 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-96-07, 50-400-96-7, NUDOCS 9610030017 | |
| Download: ML18012A378 (31) | |
See also: IR 05000400/1996007
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket No:
License
No:
50-400
Report
No:
Licensee:
50-400/96-07
Carolina
Power 5 Light (CPSL)
Facility:
Shear on Harris Nuclear
Power Plant, Unit 1
Location:
5413 Shearon Harris Road
New Hill, NC 27562
Dates
July 21
- August 31,
1996
Inspectors:
Approved by:
J. Brady, Senior Resident
Inspector
D. Roberts,
Resident
Inspector
M. Miller, Reactor Inspector
(M3.1, M3.2, M8.2)
R. Chou,
Reactor Inspector
(E1.2)
P. Fillion, Reactor Inspector
(E2.1)
G. Wiseman,
Project Engineer (Fl, F2)
M. Shymlock, Chief, Projects
Branch 4
Division of Reactor
Projects
9hi00300i7 960927
ADQCK 05000400
8
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Shearon Harris Nuclear
Power Plant, Unit 1
NRC Inspection Report 50-400/96-07
This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations,
engineering,
maintenance,
and plant support.
The report covers
a six-week
period of resident
inspection;
in addition, it includes the results of
announced
inspections
by three regional reactor inspectors
and two regional
project engineers.
Operations
~
The conduct of operations
during the period was adequate
(Section 01.1).
However,
a negative trend in personnel
performance
was noted during this
e
eriod (Section 04.1).
Two examples
were found where Shift Supervisor
ogbooks
were incomplete with respect to status of instrument
channel
oper abilities (Section 02. 1).
~
Self assessment
activities were good (Section 07.1).
Maintenance
Those maintenance activities observed
were conducted well (Section
Ml.1).
An Unresolved
Item was identified in relation to maintenance
rule classification for components listed in the Equipment Data Base
System being inaccurate
(Section M3.2).
Overall, plant equipment
appeared to be in good material condition.
However,
two deficiency tags
were found still hanging for work completed several
years
ago (Section
M2.3).
A failure to follow procedure violation with two examples
was identified
for the performance of surveillance activities:
(1) during service
water valve testing,
and (2) during engineered
safety feature slave
relay testing (Section
M2).
Surveillance
procedures
were appropriately
receiving engineering
reviews (Section
M3. 1).
En ineerin
The licensee's
Generic Letter 96-01 reviews for the containment
spray
actuation circuitry and associated
Technical Specification surveillance
testing
was good (Section E2.1).
Spent fuel cask receiving and unloading procedures
were adequate.
The
crane capacity
had been adequately tested to handle the cask weight.
Measures to prevent the casks
and crane accidentally moving outside the
lift path were in place (Section E1.2)
Engineering support for the SIII instrument
bus inverter repair was good
(Section El. 1) .
~P1
tP
t.
~
Although control
room personnel
were well equipped to perform an offsite
dose
assessment
prior to manning of the emergency
response facilities,
the procedure did contain
some
ambiguous information which demonstrated
that attention to detail
was lacking during the procedure's
development
and validation process
(Section P3).
The general
approach to the control of contamination
and dose for the
site was good (Section R1.1).
The security and safeguards
activities were performed well.
A recent
licensee
audit identified problems pertaining to access
control
(Sections Sl. 1) .
Fire protection activities were acceptable.
Good compliance with plant
fire prevention procedures
has resulted in a low incident of fire within
the plant protected
area
(Section F1.1).
When fire protection systems
are found degraded
or inoperable
a high priority is assigned to promptly
return these
systems to service
(Section F2.1).
The licensee's
program
to maintain the fire protection water supply was completed in accordance
with the licensee's
procedures
and
NRC requirements
(Section F2.2).
Re't Details
Summar
of Plant Status
Unit 1 maintained approximately
100 percent
power for the entire inspection
period.
I. 0
rations
01
01.1
02
02.1
Conduct of Operations
Gener al
Comments
71707
Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors
conducted
frequent
reviews of ongoing plant operations.
In general,
the conduct of
operations
was professional
and safety-conscious.
Specific events
and
noteworthy observations
are detailed in the sections
below.
Operational
Status of Facilities and Equipment
Review of Shift Lo s
a.
b.
Ins ection Sco
e
71707
The inspectors
reviewed operator logs to verify that activities
including operational
Technical Specification Limiting
Condition For Operations
(TS
LCO) entries,
and equipment
downtimes were
appropriately documented.
Observations
and Findin s
Control
room shift log entries
between July 23 and 26,
1996 associated
with inoperable safety related instrument channels
were incomplete.
This observation
was specific to the Shift Superintendent
of
Operations'SSO)
logs.
The inspectors
noted that one of the four Refueling Water
Storage
Tank
(RWST) level channels
was documented in the logs as being
out of service
on July 23.
On July 24, the log referenced
that another
channel
was taken out of service
when its power supply was deenergized.
There were
no
SSO log entries reflecting the first channel
being
returned to service prior to the second
channel
being deener gized,
indicating that
a potential
TS
LCO 3.0.3 entry had occurred.
The
inspector s later verified via the reactor
operator 's
(RO) logs that the
first channel
had been restored
nearly four hours before the second
channel
was deenergized.
This noted problem incident occurred prior to
the actual
TS
LCO 3.0.3 entry discussed
in report Section 08.1
A second
example of a log entry problem involved a reference to two
steam pressure
channels
which prevented
operators
from
calibrating nuclear instrumentation
on July 26.
All of the
SSO log
entries
up to that point had only mentioned
one specific steam pressure
channel
having failed.
The inspector's
concern
was that the two
channels
may have involved a TS violation.
This concern
was
alleviated during further investigation by the inspectors
which
alleviated during further investigation by the inspectors
which
determined that the two channels
were associated
with different steam
generators.
This key information had not been included in the
SSO log
entr y.
Conclusions
,040
P4.1
a.
The inspector
concluded that although the
SSO logbook was incomplete
with respect to status of certain instrument
channel
oper abilities, the
information was either available in the
RO logbook or could be explained
by the operators.
The
SSO log omissions indicated that more attention
to detail
was warranted in logkeeping.
Operator
Knowledge and Performance
Ne ative Trend In Personnel
Performance
Ins ection Sco
e
71707
b.
The inspectors
reviewed condition reports to identify potential
adverse
trends
and the effectiveness
of the licensee's
control in identifying,
resolving,
and preventing problems.
Observations
and Findin s
The inspectors
noted several
examples of personnel
error s in the
oper ations
area during this period.
Sever al of those
were associated
with valves being found out of position.
Others
had to do with improper
control switch manipulations during routine operations
or surveillance
activities.
Another
example involved
a recent revision to an operations
procedure
that resulted in one train of the fuel handling building
ventilation system being inoperable for a short period of time.
Two of the examples,
an
NRC identified failure to follow a surveillance
procedure
and
an inadvertent
Engineered
Safety Features
(ESF) actuation,
are discussed
in report section
H2 as Violation 50-400/96-07-01.
The
other
examples,
all licensee identified, provided further indication
that improvement
was needed.
Personnel
errors
had trended
up during the
second half of 1995,
and error reduction efforts had been
implemented to
help reduce the error rate.
However, the latest trend indicated that
either the techniques
were not being implemented properly or were
currently not effective.
The latest err or s individually had minimum
safety consequences
or effect on the plant, but taken collectively could
be seen
as precursors to a more serious
concern if not corrected.
Licensee
management
was aware of the declining trend and,
by the end
of'he
inspection period,
had initiated a root cause investigation
and
requested
a special
Nuclear Assessment
Section surveillance
assessment
of Operations.
All of the errors noted by the inspector
had been
documented in Condition Reports.
Conclusions
07
07.1
A negative trend in personnel
performance
was noted during this period.
Licensee
management
planned efforts to identify causal
factors
and
corrective actions for this trend.
These efforts were being initiated
near the end of the inspection period.
Ouality Assurance in Operations
Licensee
Self-Assessment
Activities
Ins ection Sco
e
40500
b.
During the inspection period, the inspectors
reviewed multiple licensee
self'-assessment
activities, including:
~
the Plant Nuclear Safety Committee
(PNSC) meeting
on July 25 and
August 2,
1996;
~
Nuclear
Assessment
Section.(NAS) Audit of Engineering
(HNAS96-174)
~
Event Review for Condition Report
(CR) 96-01868,
Resin Spill.
Observations
and Findin s
C.
The inspector
found that the
PNSC discussions
were good and that members
had the proper safety perspective.
However, the inspector
found that
the members
were not well versed
on the
NRC position on TS
the use of enforcement discretion,
and TS re'Iief.
The inspector
referred the licensee to current
NRC guidance
on these subjects.
The inspector
found that one of the strengths
in the
NAS audit related
to the plant's surveillance
procedure
review program was not supported
by any technical
review.
NAS acknowledged this problem and later
conducted
a review which verified. that the surveillance
procedure
review
program implementation
was
a strength.
The Event Review identified
a number of personnel
errors
and
communications errors in the waste processing
operations
areas.
The
Event Review was thorough
and corrective actions identified were
appropriate.
Operations
management
was integrating these errors with
others
discussed
in section 04.1 to determine if further,
more generic
corrective actions
were needed.
Conclusions
The
PNSC exhibited the proper safety perspective.
A NAS audit strength
was identified without any supporting review.
The Event Review
performed for CR 96-0186
was good.
Hiscellaneous
Operations
Issues
(92700,
92901)
Closed
LER 50-400/96-012-00:
Technical Specification 3.0.3 entry when
transferring the SIII Instrument
Bus back to the inverter with RWST
Level Transmitter
LT-993 out of service.
This
LER reported the TS
LCO 3.0.3 entry that occurred
on July 25,
1996.
The SIII inverter (Uninterruptible Power Supply for the SIII instrument
bus)
was taken out of service for repair on July 24,
1996 at 9:58 p.m.
Initial problems with the inverter had started
on July 19,
1996 when the
inverter
went into saturation/overload
after the backup
power supply for
rocess
instrumentation
cabinet
(PIC)
9 was returned to service.
The
icensee
performed troubleshooting of the problem over the next four
days
and had discussions
with the vendor before concluding that the
problem was the inverter.
The inspectors
observed the response
to the
initial problem and
a portion of the troubleshooting.
Prior to beginning the work on July 24,
1996 the SIII bus
was
transferred to the alternate
AC power
supply per procedure
Electrical Distribution, Revision 10.
TS
LCO 3.8.3.1 action c was
entered
which allowed continued
oper ation in that configuration for 24
hours while the transformer,
choke,
and rectifiers were being replaced.
The inspector
observed
a portion of the repair (see Section Hl.1).
The
inverter
was repaired,
tested,
and was ready to be placed into service
around
noon on July 25,
1996.
RWST level channel
IV had been declared
inoperable at 12:09 a.m.
on
July 25,
1996 due to spiking observed
by control
room personnel.
The
licensee
was replacing the transmitter
and several
instrumentation
cards
in an effort to make the
RWST level channel
IV operable.
To return the
SIII inverter to service
and exit TS
the SIII instrument
bus must be deenergized
from the alternate
power
source
and then
reenergized
from the SIII inverter.
Because
RWST level channel III was
powered
from the SIII instrument bus,
which would be deenergized
while
performing
OP 156.02 to place the bus
on the SIII inverter, the plant
would have two of four
(channel III and IV) RWST level channels
at the
same time resulting in TS
LCO 3.0.3 being applicable.
The licensee
convened the
PNSC to discuss this issue
(Section 07.1).
The decision for the entry was based
on the following facts:
(1) the TS
allows
a second
RWST level transmitter
to be out of service for two
hours'or
surveillance testing;
(2) transfer ring the SIII bus to the
SIII inver ter places the bus on the more reliable power supply;
and (3)
the evolution did not present
an adverse
impact to plant safety.
After
the
PNSC meeting,
the inspectors
observed the licensee
deenergize
the
SIII instrument
bus and reenergize
the bus from the inverter per
TS
was entered for approximately
12 minutes.
The
inspectors
concluded that the licensee decision to place the plant in
the safest configuration was appropriate.
Hl
Conduct of Haintenance
H1.1
Gener al
Comments.
II. Haintenance
a
~
Ins ection Sco
e
62703
The inspector s observed
work performed
on the SIII inverter:
~
WR/JO 96-AEDE1, Replacement of transformer,
choke,
and rectifier
on SIII uninterruptible
power supply.
The inspectors
also observed
various activities associated
with a failed
emergency service water
pump suction valve
(1SW-3) at the Hain Reservoir
intake structure:
~
WR/JO 96-AFLT1, Troubleshoot
(valve) operator to determine
possible
cause of valve not opening;
~
WR/JO 96-AFLT2, Inspect valve to determine
cause of trouble,
includes diver inspection;
and
~
WR/JO 96-AFLT8, (Valve) Stops
found damaged.
Repair/replace
as
needed.
b.
Observations
and Findin s
The inspectors
found the work performed under these activities to be
professional
and thorough.
All work observed
was performed with the
work package
present
and in active use.
Technicians
were experienced
and knowledgeable of their
assigned
tasks.
The inspectors
frequently
observed
supervisors
and system engineers
monitoring job progress,
and
quality control personnel
were present
whenever
required by procedure.
Heasurement
and test equipment
used were within their calibration
frequency.
The
1SW-3 valve disk is attached to
a shaft which is between
60 and 70
feet long and is submerged
under
roughly 40 feet of water.
Working on
the valve required efficient planning,
an adequate
clearance
boundary,
and good workmanship by the many parties involved.
The inspectors
verified that clearances
were in place, that good safety practices
were
used
by the divers and other workers,
and that TS
LCO requirements
were
met.
All work was properly documented.
c.
Conclusions
The maintenance activities observed
by the inspectors
were conducted
well.
H2
H2.1
Haintenance
and Haterial Condition of Facilities and Equipment
Surveillance Observation
Ins ection
Sco
e
61726
The inspectors
observed all or portions of the following surveillance
tests:
~
HST-I0145,
A Narrow Range
Level
Loop (L-0476)
Operational
Test,
Revision 4
~
HST-E0010,
1E Battery Weekly Test,
Revision
6
~
OST-1214,
Emergency Service Water System Operability Train A,
Revision
7
~
HST-I0148,
B Narrow Range
(L-0486), Revision 4
~
HST- I0148,
A Narrow Range
(L-0476), Revision 4
Observations
and Findin s
Licensee
personnel
performed portions of procedure
OST-1214 to satisfy
post-maintenance
testing requirements for work conducted
on the "A"
scr eenwash
pump and on valve
1SW-3 (report Section Hl.1).
Section 7.7
of the procedure directed personnel
to install
a differential pressure
(d/p) gauge indicating from 0-100 inches water column
(INWC) on the
suction line of the screenwash
pump.
Operators
would use this gauge
while setting
up flow for the pump.
Other gauges
(indicating from 0-200
pounds
per square
inch gauge (psig) were intended to determine
pump
differential pressure
and were installed
on the
pump suction
and
discharge lines.
The inspector verified that the gauges
were installed
properly and were within calibration
frequencies.
Step 7.7. 17 of the procedure directed the operator to obtain
a pump
flowrate between
31-33
INWC (150-155 gallons per minute (gpm)) on the
installed d/p gauge
by throttling pump discharge isolation valve 1SC-23.
Because
the operator
was stationed at the valve and the instrument
were several
feet
away and out of immediate view,
a maintenance
technician assisted
in providing gauge readings.
The operator
erroneously directed the technician to monitor the 0-200 psig discharge
pressure
gauge instead of the 0-100
INWC d/p gauge while setting
up
flow.
The operator throttled discharge
valve 1SC-23 almost completely
shut while attempting to obtain
a reading of between
150 and
155 psig on
the discharge
pressure
which was initially reading
130 psig.
The
inspector questioned
the operator's
actions
as it appeared
that the
pump
was operating with very little flow.
The operator
and another
technician placed their
hands
on the discharge
pipe and indicated that
flow was still available.
They continued throttling the valve until the
discharge
pressure
gauge indicated
150 psig.
Moments later, the inspector
observed that the d/p gauge installed
on
the suction line was reading
0
INWC (0 GPM).
The inspector
indicated to
the test personnel
that the d/p gauge
on the suction line was the gauge
they were supposed to be monitoring.
Realizing this, the operator
opened the discharge
valve to restore flow indication.
The pump later
failed the surveillance test after only delivering 29-30
GPM.
The
inspector
had noted that the d/p gauge
was indicating approximately
35
gpm before the error occur red.
It was determined that an impeller
clearance
adjustment
was necessary
for the
pump to meet the flow
requirements.
After the adjustment
was completed,
the
pump was retested
and satisfied the flow acceptance criteria.
Technical Specification 6.8. l.a requires that written procedures
shall
be established,
implemented,
and maintained covering the activities
referenced
in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, which includes
surveillance tests for service water systems.
Using the incorrect
while setting
up flow requirements
on the "A" emergency service water
(ESW) screenwash
pump constituted
a failure to follow procedure
OST-1214
and is
a violation of TS 6,8.l.a (50-400/96-07-01).
This violation is of regulatory concern
because it resulted in operating
the safety related
screenwash
pump under
conditions
(minimum to no flow)
for which it was not'intended.
The error
created
delays
and extended
out-of-service time for the
ESW system.
Additionally, this was one of
several
operator
errors during the inspection period, indicating
a need
for increased
management
attention in this area.
The licensee initiated
Condition Report 96-02155 to document this item.
Conclusions
The inspector identified
a violation of'S 6.8. 1.a during the
performance of OST-1214.
This example,
along with several
others during
the inspection period, indicated
a need for increased
management
attention in the area of human performance.
Inadvertent
ESF Actuation Durin
Slave Rela
Testin
Ins ection Sco
e
61726
The inspectors
reviewed the circumstances
surrounding
an inadvertent
engineered
safety features
actuation during slave relay testing.
In
addition to gaining an understanding of the incident, the inspectors
verified that the event
was properly reported to the
NRC and that the
licensee
performed
a root cause determination.
Observations
and Findin s
On August 12,
1996,
NRC-licensed operators
were performing OST-1045,
ESFAS Train B Slave Relay Test, quarterly Interval, Revision 9.
Section
7.20 tested the go-circuit relay for containment ventilation isolation.
Step 7.20.5 directed the operator to turn test switch S938 clockwise and
momentarily depress it.
The switch is located in protection system
safeguards
test train
B cabinet
number
2.
Depressing
the switch was
expected to cause certain
and
a fan in the containment
ventilation system to isolate and/or
shut off.
During the test,
the
operator accidentally turned
and depressed
switch S931 instead,
which
was associated
with the main steam line isolation signal.
As
a result,
three main steam line drain-before-seat
isolation valves shut.
No other
main steam line valves were affected.
The incident was determined to
constitute
an inadvertent
ESF actuation
and was properly reported to the
NRC in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii).
According to statements
in the Condition Report
and discussions
with
licensee
personnel,
the operator initially identified the correct switch
to be manipulated,
momentarily removed his hand from that switch, then
accidentally placed his hand on the S931 switch, located directly above
the S938 test switch, without properly self-checking it.
Licensee
management
has recently conducted training on human error reduction
techniques
following a series of errors that occurred during the fall of
1995.
However, this er ror indicated that those techniques
were not
adequately
employed during this surveillance activity.
The error had no adverse
impact on plant operations
as it only affected
the three drain-before-seat
valves.
However, given different operating
circumstances
and the'otential
impact of other equipment operated
by
switches in these test cabinets, this type of error during slave relay
testing could easily have caused
a more complicated plant transient.
TS 6.8. l.a and Regulatory Guide 1.33 collectively require that written
procedures
for surveillance tests
be established,
implemented,
and
maintained.
Hanipulating the wrong switch during the August 6 test
constituted
a failure to follow procedure
OST-1045
and is the second
example of Violation 50-400/96-07-01
discussed
in section
H2. 1 above.
Conclusions
The inadvertent
ESF actuation,
along with .other
personnel
errors
.
discussed
in report section 04.1 above, all demonstrated
a need for more
management
attention in the area of human performance
during routine
tasks.
Haterial Condition of Facilities
and
E ui ment
Ins ection Sco
e
61726
The inspector s performed walkdowns to ver ify that equipment
was in good
mater ial condition and that deficiencies
were identified and
appropriately corrected.
Observations
and Findin s
The inspector
observed
some nearly four -year-old deficiency tags
on two
valves.
These were associated
with an incorrectly installed leakoff
valve for the "A" charging/safety injection pump (CSIP) suction valve,
and
a leaking containment isolation valve in the demineralized
water
system.
The inspector
asked licensee
personnel
to check the status of
the associated
work tickets.
Both of the deficiencies
had been
corrected
two or
more year s earlier, yet the tags were still hanging
on
the components.
This indicated that personnel
closing the maintenance
work orders
were not necessarily
removing deficiency tags
upon
completion of work.
This also indicated that people
who routinely tour
plant areas
were not always attentive to old deficiency tags.
To assist
maintenance
personnel
in this area,
Operations
issued
a Night Order to
operators
reminding them to be more attentive to old tags during plant
walkdowns.
Conclusions
H3
H3.1
Overall, plant equipment
appeared
to be in good material condition.
However, the above two examples
indicated that more attention
was
warranted in the area of removing deficiency tags
from components
upon
successful
completion of work.
Haintenance
Procedures
and Documentation
Surveillance
Procedures
Ins ection Sco
e
61726
The inspectors
reviewed samples of documentation,
including the
"Procedure
Review Forms"
and "Procedure
Change
Forms" to determine if
engineering
personnel
were performing reviews of surveillance
procedures
and revisions to procedures
in accordance
with administrative site
requirements.
In addition, the inspectors
reviewed Plant Operating
Hanual, Administrative Procedures;
AP-100, Revision 5, Procedure
Use and
Adherence;
AP-005, Revision 10, Procedure Writing Guide;
and Plant
Programs
Procedure,
PLP-100,
Revision 7, Conduct of Infrequently
Performed Tests or Evolutions to identify the site requirements.
Observations
and Findin s
The inspectors verified that the electrical
engineering section
satisfactorily reviewed procedures
1) HST-E-0012,
Revision 5,
1E Battery
18 Honth Test;
2) HST-E-0027,
Revision 5,
1E Battery Service Test;
and
3) PH-E-0014,
Revision 5,
Non Class
lE Battery Connections
and
Haintenance
Resistance
Checks.
The inspector
verified that the instrumentation
and control section
appropriately reviewed procedures
1) HST-I-0001, Revision 8, Train A
Solid State Protection
System Actuation Logic and Haster Relay Test;
2)
OST-1845T,
Revision 0, Safety Injection Actuation Switch test;
3)
OST-
9016T,
Temporary Procedure
For Containment
Spray System
Hanual Actuation
Switch Operability Verification; 4) OST-9018T,
Temporary Procedure to
Test A Train Sequencing
Blocking Functions;
and OST-1094,
Revision 0,
Sequence
Block Circuit and Containment
Cooler Testing Train A.
10
c.
Conclusions
The Engineering
Department
was performing adequate
reviews of
surveillance
procedures
and revisions to procedures.
H3.2
Condition Re orts
62700
a.
Ins ection Sco
e
The inspectors
examined
two condition reports
(CR) concerning
maintenance
items to determine if requirements
in the Plant Operating
Hanual Administrative Procedure,
AP-615, Revision 18, Condition
Reporting
and ADH-NGGC-0101, Revision 3, Haintenance
Rule Program
were
being addressed.
b.
Observations
and Findin s
1)
CR No. 96-02021
- "Haintenance
Plan for
On July 28,
1996, Boric Acid Filter Inlet Valve 1CS-559 failed to
stroke closed during the per formance of surveillance test
OST-
1093,
CVCS/SI System
Oper ability Train
B Quarterly Interval,
Rev.
3.
The concerns listed in the
CR were:
(1) there
was
no clear
written trouble shooting plan;
(2) the practice of stroking the
valve prior to timing appeared to violate guidelines for
"preconditioning" valves prior to stroke timing; and (3) the
problem was repetitive.
The inspector investigated
the repetitive portion in relation to
the maintenance
rule,
Procedure
ADH-NGGC-0101,
Haintenance
Rule Program,
Revision 3, provides maintenance
rule
implementation instructions.
It also contains
a listing of the
systems that are scoped within the maintenance
rule in Attachment
1.
When the inspectors
requested
the maintenance
rule
classification for the valve, it was listed in the Equipment
Data
Base
System
(EDBS) as Haintenance
Rule
-
No (N).
The valve is
part of the emergency boration flow path in the chemical
and
volume control system.
Because
1CS-559 could affect reactivity
control, the inspectors
concluded that the
EDBS was inaccurate
for
its maintenance
rule classification.
The licensee
showed the
inspectors
where this inaccuracy
was already
known; however,
a
condition report was not written and the problem was not corrected
when the inspectors
found it.
The
EDBS has
been
used by the licensee
as
a centralized
means of
identifying and storing plant component information so that it is
easily and conveniently retrievable.
The licensee informally
decided to use this existing data
base to implement the expert
panel
maintenance
rule scoping determinations.
The expert panel
scoping determination
was accurate in identifying the bor ation
flowpath (which includes
as
a maintenance
rule function.
However, the valve had been identified in the wrong system (filter
backwash)
when the
EDBS was originally created.
The filter
backwash
system
had been determined
by the expert panel
not to
have
a maintenance
rule function and all of its components
were
classified in the
EDBS as Maintenance
Rule
- .N.
The erroneous
classification of 1CS-559 in the
EDBS,
and other errors discovered
later
by the licensee,
indicated that the licensee
had not done
an
adequate quality check of the
EDBS prior to implementation of the
maintenance
rule.
When the inspectors
expressed
concerns
about the accuracy of the
EDBS,'icensee
personnel
wrote Condition Report 96-2175 for valve
and initiated
a further review.
This review found
numerous other examples of components with maintenance
rule
functions that were listed in non-maintenance
rule systems
in the
EDBS ~
A discrepancy with a nitrogen system valve, identified by the
licensee in early July 1996,
had prompted
a similar review which
provided ample opportunity to identify the larger problem.
This
review performed in July 1996,
found none of the examples that
were found during the later
review prompted by the inspectors.
The inspector s concluded that the licensee's
handling of the
previously identified discrepancies
in maintenance
rule
implementation
was poor.
Procedure
AOM-NGGC-0101, Maintenance
Rule Program,
Revision 3,
implements
and provides maintenance
rule
implementation instructions.
Section 9.3.1,
under
scoping,
directed personnel
to obtain systems lists from the
EDBS and
supply to the Expert Panel for evaluation.
The inspector
found
that the
EOBS was being used to implement the expert panel
system
determinations
on a component level
and was being used
as the
primary tool to implement the maintenance
rule on
a daily basis.
Maintenance rule decisions
were being
made
on the assumption that
the
EDBS was accurate.
As a result of the
EDBS inaccuracies,
the
inspectors
were concerned that maintenance
rule decisions
could be
adversely
impacted.
The licensee
was in the process of correcting
the
EDBS problems
and assessing
the impact of these errors
on
previous maintenance
rule implementation decisions at the end of
the inspection.
Procedure
AP-615, Condition Reporting,
Revision
19 defines
adverse
conditions
as nonconformances
in items or activity which has
affected or could affect nuclear safety
or quality, or compliance
with other regulations
not included in nuclear safety or quality
above.
These conditions are to be reported
on
a condition report.
The licensee
had not initiated
a condition report for the
EDBS
maintenance
rule problems until their significance
was identified
by the inspectors.
12
This issue is identified as Unresolved
Item (URI) 50-400/96-07-02,
Corrective Actions for Maintenance
Rule Implementation
Problems,
pending
NRC review of the licensee
impact assessment.
2)
CR No. 96-01811
- "E-17 Failed to Start"
On July 7,
1996, after the completion of OST-1032
RAB Emergency
Exhaust
System Train A Operability Honthly Interval,
Rev.
6, test
personnel
attempted to restart
fan E-17.
It did not start.
The
breaker
was racked out, cycled in the "test" position,
and racked
back in.
The breaker
closed
and the fan started.
The inspectors
were concerned that the practice of racking the
breaker out and cycling it in test after it failed to operate
would not be tracked
as
a component failure in the Maintenance
Rule Program.
During this event,
the Maintenance
Rule was not in
effect and E-17 was not Class
1E.
However,
E-17 is classified
as
a Maintenance
Rule Component.
The inspectors
discussed this
concern with licensee
personnel
who issued
an Operations
Night
Order reminding operators of the need to implement formal
troubleshooting
procedures
following such failures.
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors identified that the
EDBS needs to be updated
for the
Haintenance
Rule Classification.
In addition,
when components fail to
operate,
the problem needs to be addressed
for root cause prior to
cycling in test or returning it to service.
H8
Miscellaneous
Maintenance
Issues
(92700,
92902)
M8. 1
0 en
LER 50-400/94-001-00:
Technical Specification surveil'lance
violation due to inadequate
procedure.
This event report
was issued to
report that the slave relay test for relay K623 did not verify actuation
of the reactor coolant drain tank pump discharge
valve (lED-121).
The
event
was caused
by a deficiency in procedure
OST-1044,
ESFAS Train A
Slave Relay Test.
The inspector verified that the procedure
had been
changed to include this valve on Hay 26,
1994 for Revision 4,
Change
5.
The inspector
confirmed that the current revision (7) also contained
this item.
The inspector
was also
aware that
LER 95-07 contained
corrective action that included
a comprehensive
surveillance
program
review which was still ongoing and addressed
Testing of Safety-Related
Logic Circuits.
Th'ose reviews
have generated
33 reportable
items.
This item will be reviewed collectively with the
associated
LERs for overall program adequacy.
M8.2
0 en
LER 50-400/96-008:
Reactor trip due to failure of an output
breaker disconnect
device.
The licensee's
April 25,
1996,
planned
corrective action for maintenance/engineering
items was examined to
determine its adequacy for the event.
Some of the corrective action
items were as follows:
13
1)
Investigation
and testing of the under -voltage relay momentary
contact closure
and false under-voltage signal.
Action Item 96H0228 was completed
June 27,
1996.
The testing
identified the problem as premature contact
bounce
from the one-
second timer.
The timer was mounted
on the front panel of the
cubicle and was subject to vibrations from 6.9kV breakers
operating.
The licensee
was investigating
means to suppress
the
vibrations.
Installation was planned for the next refueling
outage.
2)
Additional testing to duplicate the
86DG lockout relay trip in the
A EDG control circuity is planned.
Action Item 96H0198 was completed
June
14,
1996.
The testing of
an identical
spare relay did not provide conclusive evidence
on
the exact cause or that the
86DG relay tripped due to a spurious
voltage transient.
However, there is no safety concern since the
86DG relay will not inhibit a valid EDG start.
3)
The plant system engineer will become
more intrusive in
coordinating switchyar d activities including predictive
and
preventive maintenance.
Scope of switchyar d work will be
established
and integrated into refueling outage schedule.
This item was not completed.
However, the system engineer
,
provided test results
from the June ll, 1996,
thermography testing
(infrared heat) of the disconnect
switches.
The temperature for
the disconnect
switches
was within tolerance.
The licensee
was implementing appropriate corrective action in a timely
manner
.
The
LER wi')1 remain open pending completion of all corrective
actions.
III. En ineerin
E1
Conduct of Engineering
El. 1
SI II Invertor
a.
Ins ection Sco
e
37551
The inspectors
observed the engineering
support for the SIII invertor
events
b.
Observations
and Findin s
Engineering
personnel
were heavily involved with the SIII inverter
problem discussed
in 08.1
and H1.1.
The SIII invertor was noisy prior
to this event
and was being trended
by engineer ing personnel.
The
licensee
was planning on refurbishing the inverter at the next outage.
Parts
were available if the need to refurbish earlier was necessary.
14
Engineering discussed
the inverter saturation
problem with the vendor
and concluded the problem was the inverter, not the instrumentation
power supplies
which passed
The problem parts were
narrowed to the transformer,
choke,
and rectifiers (parts
on site).
The
repair resulted in the inverter noise level being significantly reduced
and invertor performance
being returned to normal.
c.
Conclusions
The inspector
concluded that engineering
support for this issue
was
good.
E1.2
Review of S ent Fuel
Cask Receivin
a.
Ins ection Sco
e
37700
The inspectors
reviewed the adequacy of the spent fuel cask receiving
and crane operation procedures;
verified through record review that the
crane received
proper testing during the original construction
and was
qualified to liftthe cask;
and walked down the spent fuel pool area to
examine the cask receiving area
and the crane to be used to liftthe
casks.
The inspectors
reviewed the codes
and standards
that were
referenced
in the licensee's
crane
oper ation procedures.
The procedures
reviewed are listed below:
Procedure
No.
Rev.
No.
Procedure Title
HMM-020
PH-H0074
HST-M0040
15
10
Spent
Fuel
Cask Handling
(IF-300 Cask)
Oper ation, Testing,
Maintenance,
and Inspection of
Cranes
and Special Lifting
Equipment
Equipment
Lube Oil Sampling
Cask Handling Crane Interlocks
and Physical
stops Weekly
Interval During Crane
Operations
The spent fuel pool facility contains
a 150-ton crane which handles
receiving
and unloading of casks transported
by rail cars
from the other
CPEL sites.
The crane
vendor test procedure
and manual
were reviewed
and listed below:
15
Document
No.
Rev.
No.
Title
b.
Proc.
1-8200-P-01
Hanual
LXZ
Observations
and Findin s
Spent
Fuel
Cask Handling Crane
Preoperational
Test
Operating
and Haintenance
Hanual for Fuel Handling
Building Cask Crane
150 Tons
Capacity
C.
The inspectors
reviewed the procedures
for receiving and unloading of
the spent fuel casks.
Procedure
HHH-020 contains the crane safe load
paths,
heavy load item listing for each crane,
and inspection
check
lists for all the cranes in the plant.
Procedure
CH-H0300 contains the
detailed operation for receiving
and unloading the cask including the
removal of the assemblies
from the received
cask.
Procedure
HST-H0040
contains
measures
to prevent the cask handling crane
from moving heavy
loads over the spent fuel pool.
The cask is lifted from the rail car to
a decontamination pit, then lifted over
a cask closure
head storage pit
to the unloading pool.
The 150-ton crane is restricted in its load path
by Procedure
HST-H0040 to prevent the crane
from moving over spent fuel
pool
D, which is in the vicinity of the unloading pool.
The inspector s toured the spent fuel pool area
and reviewed the
potential operational
risks associated
with lifting of casks
from rail
car s to the unloading pool.
A steel barrier is installed to prevent the
cask, if dropped,
from rolling or falling into spent fuel pool
D.
The inspectors
reviewed the crane test records which showed the cask
crane hoist load block was tested to 186.5 tons,
which is 125 percent of
the 150 ton lifting capacity per the requirements of ANSI B30.2 Code.
The test
manual
allowed
a +5/-5 ton margin from 187.5 tons.
Conclusions
E2
E2.1
The licensee
procedures
and test data for the spent fuel cask crane were
adequate
and could be safely used for moving the casks.
Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment
Testin of'afet -Related
Lo ic Circuits
a.
Ins ection Sco
e
37550
Pursuant to Generic Letter 96-01, Testing of Safety-Related
Logic
Circuits, the licensee
has
been in the process of reviewing logic
circuits
and associated
TS test procedures.
The purpose of the review
was to determine
whether there were functions or features of the logic
circuits that had not been tested
by periodic sur veillances.
The
licensee's
status report for this project indicated that the project was
16
C.
95 percent
complete.
During the course of the project, the licensee
had
identified functions and featur es of the safety related logic circuits
that had not been tested.
When this occurred,
the procedure
was
revised,
and the circuit was tested
using the
new procedure within the
required time frame.
These
problems
and corrective actions were
described in LER 96-02 which has multiple supplements.
The inspectors
performed
a detailed review of the circuitry for
containment
spray actuation
and the associated
Technical Specification
surveillance
procedures.
The inspectors
also reviewed the licensee's
documentation
which had been generated
by their Generic Letter 96-01
program for this circuit.
Observations
and Findin s
The inspectors
noted that the licensee's
review of the containment
spray
actuation circuit y identified several
cases
where features
or functions
had not been tested
by the TS surveillance
program.
For each of the
problems,
a Condition Report was generated
to develop the appropriate
corrective action
and track its implementation.
The inspector
did not
identify any problems with the test procedures
for the containment
spray
actuation circuitry above
and beyond those already identified by the
licensee.
Based
on his independent
review and review of the Condition
Reports,
the inspector
concluded that the licensee's
methodology
and
level of detail for the review was good.
The inspector
also noted that
the documentation of the review process
and results
was good.
The
documentation
included
a tabulation of each circuit function and feature
together with an assessment
of whether they had been tested
as well as
any problems identified.
Conclusions
The inspector
concluded that the licensee's
methodology,
level of detail
for the review,
and documentation of the review process
and results
were
good.
E7
Quality Assur ance in Engineering Activities
E7.1
S ecial
FSAR Review
37551
A recent discovery of a licensee operating their facility in a manner
contrary to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
(UFSAR) description
highlighted the need for
a special
focused
review that compares
plant
practices,
procedures
and/or parameters
to the
FSAR descriptions.
While
performing the inspections
discussed
in this report, the inspectors
reviewed the applicable portions of the
FSAR that related to the areas
inspected.
The inspector s verified that the
FSAR wording was consistent
with the observed plant practices,
procedures
and/or parameters.
17
IV. Plant
Su
rt
R1.1
Radiological Protection
and Chemistry
(RP8C) Controls
General
Comments
71750
P3
The inspector
observed radiological controls during the conduct of tours
and observation of maintenance activities and found them to be
acceptable.
The general
approach to the control of contamination
and
dose for the site was good.
EP Procedures
and Documentation
a.
Ins ection Sco
e
71750
b.
The inspector
conducted
a brief review of control
room procedures
and
interviewed shift operators
to assess
the control
room staff's readiness
to perform offsite dose calculations during potential
events
when the
Technical
Support Center
(TSC)
and Emergency Operations
Facility (EOF)
had not yet been
manned.
Observations
and Findin s
The inspectors
found that
a procedure
was in place,
PEP-340,
Revision 2,
Radiological
Assessment.
This procedure
was located at the Emergency
Communicators
desk in the main control
room.
It referenced all of the
important radiological effluent monitors necessary
to make offsite dose
calculations.
The inspector later interviewed operators
(on two shifts)
who were able to quickly reference the procedure
and direct the
inspector to the computer where the dose calculations
would be
performed.
Procedure
PEP-340 contained
a table in Step 2.0.1 listing those
radiation monitors whose alarming status
would be an initiating
condition for performing an offsite dose
assessment.
The table listed
the accuracy
ranges
for each of the monitors
as
a reminder for operators
to disregard
readings outside of the ranges.
For three of the vent
stack effluent monitors, the accuracy
ranges
were listed in units of
concentration
(microcuries per milliliter).
To verify oper ability, the
inspector
asked operators
to access
the specific effluent monitors on
the control
room radiation monitor panel.
The effluent monitors
indicated in flowrate units of micro-curies per second,
The inspector
asked operators
about this discrepancy
and whether
a calculation
was
necessary
to convert to the concentration units listed in the procedure
table.
Operators
were not sure of the answer
and contacted
the
emergency
preparedness
staff who had originally developed the procedure.
Emergency
preparedness
personnel
later explained to the residents that
vent stack
gas detection
channel
outputs (in units of concentration)
are
usually coupled with flowrates established
by isokinetic sampling skids
in determining overall radioactive effluent flowrates,
as indicated by
the effluent monitor s.
The vent stack effluent monitors
and their
18
S1
S1.1
corres'ponding
gas detection
channels
have similar
noun names.
Since the
table listed the effluent monitors which indicate in units of flowrate,
specifying their ranges
in units of concentration
added
a confusion
factor in the procedure.
The similarity in noun
names
between the
effluent and gas monitors contributed to this procedural
oversight.
Based
on their discussions
with operators,
emergency
preparedness
personnel
were convinced that the ambiguity would not impede the offsite
dose calculation process,
but acknowledged that the procedure
should be
revised.
Subsequent
to the inspection period, Revision
3 was issued
which deleted the reference to accuracy
ranges in the table of Step
2.0. 1 and relocated this information (in microcuries
per
second) to that
point in the procedure
where operators
would be performing the
calculations.
Conclusions
Control
room personnel
were well equipped to perform an offsite dose
assessment
in the event the TSC and
EOF were not yet manned during
a
potential
event.
However,
ambiguous
information in a table in the
offsite dose calculation procedure
demonstrated
that attention to detail
was lacking during the procedure's
development
and validation process.
Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities
Gener al
Comments
71750
S7
S7.1
The inspector
observed
security and safeguards
activities during the
conduct of tours, observation of maintenance activities,
and the
emergency
preparedness drill, and found them to be good.
Compensatory
measures
were posted
when necessary
and proper ly conducted.
Quality Assurance in Security and Safeguards Activities
Licensee
Self-Assessment
Activities
General
Comments
40500
During the inspection period, the inspectors
reviewed Performance
Evaluation Section Audit PES96-033,
Access Authorization and Fitness
for Duty Programs
Assessment.
This corporate audit identified problems
pertaining to access
control which is the subject of NRC Inspection
Procedure
F1
Control of Fire Protection Activities
Fl. 1
Gener al
Comments
64704
71750
During maintenance activities the inspector
observed that fire
protection equipment
was readily accessible.
Recently,
the licensee
formed
a new Fire Protection
Issues
Review Team
to review the plant fire protection program implementation.
The
19
F1.2
inspectors
received
a good briefing on the teams task and the action
items they were reviewing.
Fire Re orts
Ins ection
Sco
e
64704
The inspector
reviewed the plant fire incident reports for 1995 and
1996, to assess
maintenance
related
or material condition problems with
fire protection systems
and equipment.
The inspector verified that
plant fire protection requirements
were met in accordance
with procedure
Fire Protection,
Revision 16,
when the equipment
was declared
out of service.
Observations
and Findin s
Three fires had occur red during the last two year period,
two in 1996
and one in 1995.
However, these
were not significant fires.
Only one
of these fires had occurred within the plant protected
area.
This fire
was caused
by a minor organic chemical spill in a laboratory. It was
immediately extinguished
by plant personnel.
Conclusions
F2
F2.1
Good compliance with plant fire prevention procedures
has resulted in a
low incident of fire within the plant protected
area.
Status of Fire Protection Facilities and Equipment
Fire Protection
Records of Haintenance
a.
Ins ection Sco
e
64704
The inspectors
reviewed fire protection out-of-service logs from Harch
1996 to the present to assess
maintenance-related
or material condition
problems with fire protection systems
and equipment.
The inspector
verified that plant fire protection requirements
were met in accordance
with procedure
Fire Protection,
Revision 16,
when the equipment
was declared
out of service.
b.
Observations
and Findin s
The fire protection out-of-service logs indicated that
a small
number
(49) of impairments for repairs
were recorded f'r the six month period.
With the exception of the diesel-driven fire pump, these repair
impairments
had been restored to service within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
A small
backlog of work orders
remained for scheduled
completion.
Host of these
repair
impairments involved fire doors:
20
Conclusions
When fire protection systems
are found degraded
or inoperable
a high
priority is assigned to promptly return these
systems to ser vice.
A
small
number of impairments for repairs
were recorded
for the most
recent six month period.
With the exception of the diesel-driven fire
pump, these
repair
impairments
had been restored to service in a timely
manner.
Review of Ino erable Diesel-driven Fire
Pum
Ins ection Sco
e
64704
The inspectors
reviewed the adequacy of the fire protection water supply
Design Basis
Document
(DBD), System Description
(SD),
and Fire
Protection
Procedures
(FPP); verified through record review that the
diesel-driven fire pump received proper testing following maintenance
activities;
and walked down the fire pump areas to examine the pumps
and
testing connection
ar rangement.
The inspectors
reviewed the
FSAR and
National Fire Protection Association
(NFPA) code/standards
that were
referenced
in the licensee's
protection program procedures.
The
documents
reviewed are listed below:
Document
No.
Rev.
No.
Title
FSAR Section 9.5.1
Amendments
27,
46 Fire Protection
Revision
16
Fire Protection
DBD No. 306
SD-149
Revision
2
Revision
5
Fire Protection
and
Detection System
Fire Protection /
Detection System
The plant diesel-driven fire pump was declared out of service
on July 8,
1996, after failing to meet the test acceptance criteria found in FPT-
3004, Fire Pump Operability Test.
The acceptance
criteria require the
pump to produce
a water flow rate of
2500
gpm at 125 psig.
The diesel-driven fire pump was only capable of
116 psig at the required water. flow.
The pump was replaced with a
rebuilt pump which also failed the test acceptance criteria.
With the
assistance
of a representative
from the
pump manufacturer,
this pump was
inspected.
A hole caused
by erosion
was found in the discharge
casing.
The pump casing
was replaced,
the
pump rebuilt,
and tested.
This pump
passed
the criteria of FPT-3004
and was returned to service
on July 25,
1996.
During the inspectors
review, minor inconsistencies
in references
to
design fire pump capacity information, technical
manuals,
and
21
C.
engineering calculations in the fire protection
DBD and
SD were noted.
These
items were discussed
with the plant fire protection
program
engineer
and manager
.
There minor inconsistencies
did not affect design
inputs or
cause discrepancies
in the
FSAR.
The marginal fire pump capacity
was being evaluated
by the Harris
engineering organization.
The inspectors
noted that the status of this
condition was also addressed
in daily plant management
meetings.
During
the period the
pump was inoperable,
an alternate fire protection water
supply was provided as discussed
in NRC in report 50-400/96-06.
Conclusions
Overall, the inspectors
concluded that the licensee's
program to
maintain the fire protection water supply was completed in accordance
with the licensee's
procedures
and
NRC requirements.
The recorded test
data
was complete,
accurate,
met fire protection acceptance
criteria,
test discrepancies
were properly documented
and rectified,
and the
system
was properly returned to service.
However,
some examples
were
identified where there were minor inconsistencies
in references
to
design fire pump capacity information and engineering calculations in
the fire protection
DBD and
SD.
There minor inconsistencies
did not
affect design inputs or cause discrepancies
in the
FSAR.
V. Hang ement Heetin s
X1
Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors
presented
the inspection results to members of licensee
management
at the conclusion of the inspection
on September
3,
1996.
The licensee
acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspector s asked the licensee
whether
any material
examined during
the inspection
should be considered proprietary.
No proprietary
information was identified.
X2
Pre-Decisional
Enforcement Conference
Summary
On August 22,
1996,
a pre-decisional
enforcement
conference
was held at
the
NRC Region II office to discuss potential
enforcement
issues
identified in Inspection Report 50-400/96-06.
The issues
related to
missing interlocks on the spare charging/safety injection pump and spare
component cooling water
pump intended to prevent overload of the
emergency diesel
generator.
In addition,
key interlocks for the
same
pumps that were intended to protect train separation
and redundancy
were
removed without appropriate
design control measures'
22
Licensee
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS
CONTACTED
D. Alexander,
Supervisor,
Licensing and Regulatory
Programs
D. Batton, Superintendent,
On-Line Scheduling
D.
Br aund,
Superintendent,
Security
B. Clark, General
Manager,
Harris Plant
A. Cockerill, Superintendent,
I&C Electrical
Systems
J. Collins, Manager, Training
J.
Dobbs,
Manager,
Outage
and Scheduling
J.
Donahue,
Director Site Operations,
Harris Plant
R. Duncan,
Superintendent.
Mechanical
Systems
W. Gautier,
Manager,
Maintenance
W. Gurganious,
Superintendent,
Chemistry
M. Hamby, Supervisor,
Regulatory Compliance
M. Hill, Manager,
Nuclear Assessment
D. McCarthy, Superintendent,
Outage
Management
K. Neuschaefer,
Acting Manager,
Environmental
and Radiation Control
W. Peavyhouse,
Superintendent,
Design Control
W. Robinson,
Vice President,
Harris Plant
G. Rolfson,
Manager, Harris Engineering Support Services
S. Sewell,
Manager,
Operations
T. Walt, Manager,
Performance
Evaluation
and Regulatory Affairs
NRC
T. Le, Harris Project Manager,
M. Shymlock, Chief, Reactor Projects
Branch
4
IP 37550:
IP 37551:
IP 37700:
IP 40500:
IP 61726:
IP 62700:
IP 62703:
IP 71707
IP 90712:
IP 92700:
IP 92901:
IP 92902:
23
INSPECTION
PROCEDURES
USED
Engineering
Onsite Engineering
Design Changes
Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving,
and
Preventing
Problems
Surveillance Observations
Maintenance
Implementation
Maintenance
Observation
Fire Protection
Plant Operations
Plant Support Activities
In-Office of Written Reports of Non-Routine Events at Power
Reactor Facilities
Onsite Followup of Events
Followup
- Plant Operations
Followup
- Haintenance
~0ened
ITEMS OPENED,
CLOSED,
AND DISCUSSED
50-400/96-07-01
Failure To Follow Procedure
During Performance
Of
Surveillance Testing
(2 examples),
Paragraph
H2.
50-400/96-07-02
Corrective Actions For Maintenance
Rule Implementation
Problems,
Paragraph
H3.2.
50-400/94-001-00
LER
Technical Specification Surveillance Violation Due To
Inadequate
Procedure,
Paragraph
M8. 1.
Closed
50-400/96-012-00
LER
Discussed
Technical Specification 3.0.3 Entry For SIII Inverter,
Par agr aph 08.1
50-400/96-008-00
LER
April 25,
1996 Reactor Trip, Paragraph
H8.2.