ML18011A813
| ML18011A813 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 03/03/1995 |
| From: | CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18011A812 | List: |
| References | |
| HNP-95-013, HNP-95-13, NUDOCS 9503090110 | |
| Download: ML18011A813 (9) | |
Text
ENCLOSURE TO SERIAL:
HNP-95-013 ENCLOSURE 5
SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT NRC DOCKET NO. 50-400/LICENSE NO. NPF-63 REQUEST FOR LICENSE AMENDMENT ELIMINATIONOF RESPONSE TIME TESTING FOR SELECTED PRESSURE AND DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE SENSORS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES 9503090110 950303 PDR ADOCK 05000400 P
3/4. 3 IHSTRUMENTATIOH 3/4.3.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.1 As a minimum, the Reactor Trip System instrumenration channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.
I APPLICABILITY:
As shown in Table 3. 3-1.
ACTION:
As shown in Table 3.3-1.
SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMEHTS 4.3.1.1 Each Reactor Trip System instrumentation channels and interlock and the automatic trip logic shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Surveillance Requirement.s specified in Table 4.3"l.
'ff'ir(. noh 4.3.1 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each Reactor trip function s all be to be within its limit, specified in the Technical Specification Equipment List Program, plant procedure PLP-106, at least once per 15 mont s.
Each shall include at least one train such that both trains are at least once per 36 months and one channel.
per function suc t at all channels are at least once every N times 18 months where H is the total number of redun'dant channels in a specific Reactor trip function as shown in the "Total No. of Channels" column of Table 3.3-1.
SHEAROH HARRIS - UNIT 1
3/4 3-1 Amendment Ho.~
INSTRUMENTATION ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATIOH SYSTEM INSTRUMEHTATIOH SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMEHTS 4.3.2. 1 Each ESFAS.instrumentation channel and interlock and the automatic actuation logic and relays shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the ESFAS Instrumentation S
e Requirements specified in Table 4.3-2.
ver iFieah'on 4.3.
The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES
RESPONSE
TIME of each ESFAS function shall be t
be within its limit specified in the Technical Specification Equipment List Program, plant procedure PLP-106, at least once er 18 months.
Each +eve-shall include at least one train such that both trains are at least once per 36 months and one channel per function such that all channels are at least once per N times 18 months where N
is the total number of redundant channels in a specific ESFAS function as shown in the "Total No. of Channels" column of Table 3.3-3.
SHEARON HARRIS - UN1T 1
3/4 3-17 Amendment Ho.~
IHSTRUMEHTATIOH BASES REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM IHSTRUMEHTATIOH AHO EHGIHEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATIOH SYS EM LHSTRUMEHTATIOH Cantiaued deviation of the sensar fram its calibration paint or the value specified in Table 3.3-4, in percent span, fram the analysis assumptions.
Use of Kquatfan 3.3-1 allaws for a sensor draft factor, an increased rack drift factor, and provides a threshold value for determination of OPERABILITY.
The methadolagy to derive the 7rfp Setpoints is based upon combining all af the uncertainties in the channels.
Inherent ta the determination of the Trip Set-points are the magnitudes of these channel uncertainties.
Sensor and rack fnstrumentatian utilized in these channels are expected ta he capable of oper ating within the allowances of these uncertainty magnitudes.
Rack drift fn excess of the Allowable Value exhibits the behavior that the rack has not met its allowance.
Being that there fs a sma11 statfstfcal chance that this will
- happen, an infrequent excessive drift fs expected.
Rack or sensor drift, in excess of the allowance,that fs mare than occasional, may he indicative af more serious problems aad should warrant further invegtigatfan.
PLAcE oui
/c'c /Vcr e2 The measureme of respa e time at th pecified frequen es pravides assur ance that reactor ip and the E
ineered Safety F
res actuation ass ciated w'ach Q nel fs compl d within the tim imft assumed in safe analyses Ha credit wa ken in the anal es for those charm s with nse times indicated as t applicab1e.
Re onse time may be oastratect fany se ei af sequenti; overlapping, or tal channel
- test, asurements provid at such tes demonstrate the +
1 channel respond e time as def Senso response tim erfffcatioa may.b ~cfenanstrated by e er.
(1) in
- ace, on, or offsi test measurements r (2) utilizing replaceaent s
ors with rtfffed re se time~
The Engineered Safety Features Actuat'fan System senses selected plant param-eters and determines whether ar not predetermined limits are being exceeded.
If they're, the signals are combined inta logic matrices sensit'ive ta cambfna-tfans indicative of various accidents
- events, and transfents.
Once the required logic combination fs completed, the system sends actuation signals to those Engineered Safety Features campanents whose aggregate functfaa best serves the requirements af the condition.
As an example, the following actions may be
'initiated hy the Engineered Safety Features'ctuatfan System ta mitigate the consequences of a steea line break or lossmf-coolant accident:
(1) charging/
safety infection pumps start and automatic valves position, (2) reactor trip, (3) feedwater fsalatfan, (4) startup of the emergency diesel generators, (5) caatainment spray pumps start and autamatic valves position (6) containment isolation, (7) steam line isolation, (8) turbine trfp, (9) auxiliary feedwater pumps start and automatic valves position, (10) containment fan coolers start aad autamatic valves position, (11) emergency service water pumps start aad automatfc valves position, and (12) cantral room isolation and emergency fil-tratfan start.
SHEARON HARRIS UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-2
lNSERT A The verification of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the reactor trip and the engineered safety features actuation associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the safety analyses.
No credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable.
Response
time may be verified by actual tests in any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel measurements, or by suomation of allocated sensor response times with actual tests on the remainder of the channel in any series of sequential or overlapping measurements.
Allocations for sensor response times may be obtained from: (1) historical records based on acceptable response time tests (hydraulic, noise, or power interrupt tests),
(2) inplace, onsite, or offsite (e.g.
vendor) test measurements, or (3) uti,lizing vendor engineering specifications.
MCAP-13632 Revision 1, "Elimination of Pressure Sensor
Response
Time Testing Requirements" provides the basis and methodology for using allocated sensor response times in the overall verification of the Technical Specifications channel response time.
The allocations for sensor response times must be verified prior to placing the sensor in operational service and re-verified following maintenance that may adversely affect response time.
In general, electrical repair work does not impact response time provided the parts used for repair are of the same type and value.
One example where time response could be affected is replacing the sensing assembly of a transmitter.
3/4.3 INSTRUME ION 3/4.3.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.1 As a minimum, the Reactor Trip System instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
As shown in Table 3.3-1.
ACTION:
As shown in Table 3.3-1.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.1.1 Each Reactor Trip System instrumentation channels and interlock and the automatic trip logic shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements specified in Table 4.3-1.
4.3.1.2 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each Reactor trip function shall be verified to be within its limit, specified in the Technical I
Specification Equipment List Program, plant procedure PLP-106, at least once
~
~
er 18 months.
Each verification shall include at least one train such that oth trains are verified at least once per 36 months and one channel per function such that all channels are verified at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific Reactor trip function as shown in the "Total No. of Channels" column of Table 3'-1.
SHEARON HARRIS
- UNIT 1 3/4 3-1 Amendment No.
INSTRUMENTATION ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.2.1 Each ESFAS instrumentation channel and interlock and the automatic actuation logic and relays shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the ESFAS Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements specified in Table 4.3-2.
4.3.2.2 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES
RESPONSE
TIME of each ESFAS function shall be verified to be within its limit specified in the Technical I
Specification Equipment List Program, plant procedure PLP-106, at least once
~
~
er 18 months.
Each verification shall include at least one train such that oth trains are verified at least once per 36 months and one channel per function such that all channels are verified at least once per N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific ESFAS function as shown in the "Total No. of Channels" column of Table 3.3-3.
SHEARON HARRIS
- UNIT 1 3/4 3-17 Amendment No.
INSTRUMENTATION BASES REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION Continued deviation of the sensor from its calibration point or the value specified in Table 3.3-4, in percent
- span, from the analysis assumptions.
Use of Equation 3.3-1 allows for a sensor draft factor, an increased rack drift factor, and provides a threshold value for determination of OPERABILITY.
The methodology to derive the Trip Setpoints is based upon combining all of the uncertainties in the channels.
Inherent to the determination of the Trip Setpoints are the magnitudes of these channel uncertainties.
Sensor and rack instrumentation utilized in these channels are expected to be capable of operating within the allowances of these uncertainty magnitudes.
Rack drift in excess of the Allowable Value exhibits the behavior that the rack has not met its allowance.
Being that there is a small statistical chance that this will happen, an infrequent excessive drift is expected.
Rack or sensor drift, in excess of the allowance that is more than occasional, may be indicative of more ser ious problems and should warrant fur ther investigation.
The verification of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the reactor trip and the engineered safety features actuation associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the safety analyses.
No credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable.
Response
time may be verified by actual tests in any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel measurements, or by summation of allocated sensor response times with actual tests on the remainder of the channel in any series of sequential or overlapping measurements.
Allocations for sensor response times may be obtained from:
(1) historical records based on acceptable response time tests (hydraulic, noise, or power interrupt tests),
(2) inplace, onsite, or offsite (e.g.
vendor) test measurements, or (3) utilizing vendor engineering specifications.
WCAP-13632 Revision 1, "Elimination of Pressure Sensor
Response
Time Testing Requirements" provides the basis and methodology for using allocated sensor response times in the overall verification of the Technical Specifications channel response time.
The allocations for sensor response times must be verified prior to placing the sensor in operational service and re-verified following maintenance that may adversely affect response time.
In general.
electrical repair work does not impact response time provided the parts used for repair are of the same type and value.
One example where time response could be affected is replacing the sensing assembly of a transmitter.
The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System senses selected plant param-eterss and determines whether or not predetermined limits are being exceeded.
If they are, the signals are combined into logic matrices sensitive to combinations indicative of various accidents
- events, and transients.
Once the required logic combination is completed, the system sends actuation signals to those Engineered Safety Features components whose aggregate function best serves the requirements of the condition.
As an example, the following actions may be initiated by the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System to SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 8 3/4 3-2 Amendment No.
INSTRUMENTATION BASES p
REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION Continued mitigate the consequences of a steam line break or loss-of-coolant accident:
(1) charging/safety injection pumps start and automatic valves
- position, (2) reactor trip, (3) feedwater isolation, (4) startup of the emergency diesel generators, (5) containment spray pumps start and automatic valves position (6) containment isolation.
(7) steam line isolation, (8) turbine trip, (9) auxiliary feedwater pumps start and automatic valves
- position, (10) containment fan coolers start and automatic valves position, (11) emergency service water pumps start and automatic valves position, and (12) control room isolation and emergency filtration start.
SHEARON HARRIS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-2a Amendment No.