ML18005B031

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Insp Rept 50-400/89-15 on 890621-0720.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification,Surveillance Observations,Maint Observations & Onsite Follow Up of Events
ML18005B031
Person / Time
Site: Harris 
Issue date: 08/07/1989
From: Bradford W, Dance H, Shannon M
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML18005B029 List:
References
50-400-89-15, NUDOCS 8909080199
Download: ML18005B031 (7)


See also: IR 05000400/1989015

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UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.

ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323

Report No.:

50-400/89-15

Licensee:

Carolina

Power and Light Company

P. 0.

Box 1551

Raleigh,

NC 27602

Docket No.:

50-400

Facility Name:

Harris

License No.:

NPF-63

Inspection

Conducted:

June

21 - July 20,

1989

Inspectors:

. H. Bradfo d

Da e

igned

M. C.

Shann

n

Accompanying Insp

tor:

W

. Ruland (July 5-7,

1989)

Approved by:

. C. Dance,

Section Chief

Division of Reactor Projects

Da e

igned

Da e S'gne

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine safety inspection

was conducted

in the areas of operational

safety

verification, surveillance

observations,

maintenance

observations,

and onsite

follow-up of events.

Results:

In the areas

inspected,

two violations were identified:

failure to maintain

an

active

SRO license,

paragraph

5.b,

and improper installation of a flow orifice,

paragraph

2.

Wake County plans to construct

an airport approximately four miles east of the

plant, paragraptI 5.c.

During this report period,

the licensee

exceeded its previous

continuous

run

time of 124 days,

paragraph

5.a.

qy()90q01$ 9 890821

PDR

ADOCK 05000400

Q

PDC

REPORT DETAILS

Persons

Contacted

D. Braund, Supervisor,

Security

  • J. Collins, Manager,

Operations

  • G. Forehand, Director, QA/gC
  • C. Gibson, Director, Programs

and Procedures

  • C. Hinnant, Plant General

Manager

L. Lentz, Operations

Support Supervisor

T. Morton, Manager,

Maintenance

C. Olexik, Supervisor, Shift Operations

R. Richey, Manager, Harris Nuclear Project Department

J. Sipp, Manager,

Environmental

and Radiation Monitoring

H. Smith, Supervisor,

Radwaste

Operation

  • D. Tibbits, Director, Regulatory Compliance

B. Van Metre, Manager, Technical

Support

E. Willett, Manager,

Outages

and Modifications

Other

licensee

employees

contacted

during this

inspection

included

technicians,

operators,

mechanics,

security force

members,

engineering

personnel

and office personnel.

"Attended exit interview.

Acronyms

and initialisms used

throughout this report are listed in the

last paragraph.

Operational

Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors

conducted routine plant tours during this inspection period

to verify that the licensee's

requirements

and

commitments

were

being

implemented.

These

tours

were performed to verify that:

system valves

and

breakers

required for safe

plant operations

were in their correct

position; fire protection

equipment,

spare

equipment,

and materials

were

being maintained

and stored properly; plant operators

were

aware of the

current plant status;

plant operations

personnel

were

documenting

the

status

of out-of-service

equipment;

security

and health

physics controls

were

being

implemented

as

required

by procedures;

there

were

no

undocumented

cases

of unusual

fluid leaks,

piping vibration,

abnormal

hanger or seismic restraint

movements; all reviewed

equipment requiring

calibration

was current;

and

general

housekeeping

and control of fire

hazards

were satisfactory.

Tours of the plant included

review of site

documentation

and

interviews

with plant

personnel.

The

inspectors

reviewed

the control

room operators's

logs,

tagout logs,

chemistry

and

health

physics

logs,

and control

boards

and panels.

During these

tours

the inspectors

noted that the operators

appeared

to

be alert,

aware of

changing plant conditions

and manipulated

plant controls properly.

The

inspectors

evaluated

operations

shift turnover s

and

attended

shift

briefings.

They

observed

that

the briefings

and

turnovers

provided

sufficient detail for the next shift crew and verified that the staffing

met TS requirements.

During the inspection

period,

the

Backup Senior Resident- Inspector

from

the Brunswick Plant noted that

a flow orifice,

FE 7152, containment

spray

NAOH tank outlet,

appear ed to be installed improperly.

A review of work

requests

and technical

data verified that the flow orifice was installed

backwards.

The review also noted

a hold point signoff for proper orienta-

tion

and

the

hold point

was initialed

as

being correct.

The flow

instrument is used for flow indication during accident conditions

by the

Control

Room Operators.

The failure of this component

does not render the

system inoperable

because

of safety-related

tank level instrumentation.

The inspectors

inspected

several

other flow orifices in other

systems

to

insure proper installation.

No additional

problems

were identified during

the orifice review.

The improper installation of the

NAOH tank outlet flow orifice and the

failure to identify the deficiency at the

gC hold point are collectively

identified as

violation 89-15-01,

improper flow orifice installation.

One violation and no deviations

were identified.

3.

Monthly Surveillance Observation

(71709)

The inspectors

reviewed

surveillance

test activities

on safety-related

systems

and components

to verify that the licensee

performed the activities

in accordance

with applicable requirements.

The review included witnessing

selected

portions

of each

surveillance,

review of the

surveillance

procedure

to ensure that administrative controls

were in force, insuring

that approval

was obtained prior to conducting the surveillance test,

and

verifying that

the individuals conducting

the test

were qualified in

accordance

with plant approved

procedures.

Other observations

included

verification that test instrumentation

was calibrated,

data collected

was

within the specified

requirements

of TS, identified discrepancies

were

properly noted,

and

the

systems

were correctly returned

to service.

Portions of the following test activities were observed

or reviewed

by the

inspectors:

OST-1013

MST-I0495

OST-1004

IASA Emergency Diesel

Generator

Operability

Diesel

Generator

IASA Engine Vibration Trip Switch

Test

Power

Range

Heat Balance

OST-1026

OST-1215

MST-10100

RCS Leakrate

Emergency Service Mater (Train "B") quarterly

Accumulator Tank

C Pressure

Loop Calibration

Spent fuel pool water chemistry sampling

No violations or deviations

were identified.

4.

Monthly Maintenance

Observations

(62703)

Station

maintenance

activities of safety-related

systems

and

components

were observed/reviewed

to ascertain

that they were conducted

in accordance

with approved

procedures,

regulatory guides,

industry codes

and standards

and were in conformance

with TS.

Items

considered

during the review

included verification that

LCOs were met while components

or systems

were

removed

from service;

approvals

were obtained prior to initiating the

work; approved

procedures

were used;

completed

work was performed prior to

returning

components

or systems

to service; quality control records

were

maintained; activites

were accomplished

by qualified personnel;

parts

and

materials

were properly certified;

and radiological

and fire prevention

controls

were

implemented.

Work requests

were also reviewed to determine

the status

of outstanding

jobs to assure

that priority was assigned

to

safety-related

equipment maintenance

which could affect system performance.

Portions of the following activities were observed

or reviewed:

"A", Diesel

Generator Oil Temperature

Switch

"C" Accumulator Pressure

Insrument Repair

Spent

Fuel

Pool

and Transfer

Canal

Weld Repairs

Brown Boveri

LK16 Breaker Inspection Following Failure to open.

During this reporting period the plant experienced

an additional

Brown

Boveri

LK16 breaker failure.

The "A" pressurizer

heater

supply breaker

failed to open

and resulted in burning up the trip coil.

Approximately 20

breakers

in non-safety

related

applications

have failed to open

since

initial operation.

No violations or deviations

were identified.

5.

Onsite Followup of Events

(92702)

The following events/concerns

were reviewed

by the Inspectors

during this

inspection period:

a.

Record

Run

During this

inspection

period

the unit exceeded

its first cycle

record

run of 124 days

and

had reached

a

127 continuous

day run at

the end of the report period.

Inactive Licensed Senior Control Operator

On Duty:

On July 5, 1989, the licensee

informed the resident

inspectors

that

an active

licensed

Senior

Reactor

Operator

had not completed

the

required five 12-hour shifts to remain qualified for his position

as

Senior Control Operator for the quarter ending June

30,

1989.

E

The

SRO subsequently

performed three

12-hour shifts

on July 1, 2,

and

3

as

the

SCO without meeting the re-activation

requirements

of

10CFR 55.53.f.

Technical Specification 6.2.2.b requires at least

one

qualified

SRO to be in the main control

room when the reactor is in

modes

1, 2,

3

and 4.

The plant

was in mode

1.

When the Shift

Foreman

performed his plant tours or left the main control room, the

minimum shift compliment

was

not maintained

on the

6:00

a.m.

to

6:00 p.m. shifts

on July 1, 2, and'.

The

SRO worked 12-hour shifts

as the

SCO

on May 9,

May 28,

May 29 and June

9,

1989.

He worked 4

hours

on May 10 until approximately 9:30

PM when

he was notified of a

family emergency.

He was relieved

by a qualified

SRO

and promptly

left the plant.

This

SRO worked ten 12-hour shifts

as .the Shift Foreman

Designee

on

April 4, 5, 6, 11, 12,

13,

14, 28, 29,

and 30, 1989.

This position

requires

a thorough

knowledge of the plant at all times.

He works in

close co-ordination with the shift foreman

and operating

crew.

He is

stationed

in the Operations

Clearance

Center,

which is adjacent

to

the control

room,

and is

charged with issuing

work clearances

on

equipment

requiring maintenance.

He designates

post-maintenance

testing

and

determines

acceptance

criteria

on equipment

released

after maintenance.

He relieves

the shift foreman in the control

room

when required.

The licensee

does

not count this time

as Shift

Foreman

Designee

as fulfillingthe requirements

to remain qualified

as

SCO.

The licensee's

method for tracking the active license required hours

consists

of data retrieval

approximately

bi-weekly

by the shift

clerk.

Sixty days into the quarter,

a computer printout is generated

which designates

the hours

worked

and flags those operators

who need

more hours.

This report is provided to the Operations

Supervisor

and to each on-shift foreman.

The Shift Foreman

ensures

that all

personnel

are appropriately

scheduled

to accomplish

the five full

shifts

by the

end of the quarter.

On the last day of the quarter,

the final computer printout is generated

which shows the total hours

worked

and flags those

who do not have the required

60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br />.

The

60 day printout identified this

SRO

as not having enough time.

When

he

counted

his hours,

he

had forgotten

the partial shift he

had

worked

on

May 10.

The

12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> shift he worked on June

9 still made

him approximately

8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> short.

The

end of the quarter

computer

printout

on Friday,

June

30 identified this

SRO to be short of the

required

hours.

This printout was generated

on Friday evening

and

the person responsible

to read the printout was off on July 1, 2, and

3 and

came

back to work on July 4.

He then

read the printout and

identified to the Shift Foreman that his

SRO did not have the time

required to be

an active

SRO.

By this time the

SRO had worked three

12-hour shifts

on July 1, 2, and 3.

The licensee

immediately placed

the

SRO under

40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> of instruction

by a qualified

SRO as required

by 10

CFR 55.53(f)(2).

Failure to maintain

a

SRO license active

due to not fulfilling the

requirements

of working five 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> shifts during the second quarter

of 1989;

and

subsequently

performing

license

duties

for three

consecutive

days

in the third quarter of 1989 without completing

certification

is identified

as

violation 89-15-02,

failure to

maintain

an active

SRO license.

c ~

Proposed

Make County Airport

The licensee

informed the inspectors

that

Wake County was proposing

to construct

a

new airport which will be called

Wake South Regional

Airport.

The airport is to

be located

about four miles =from the

Harris Nuclear Plant

on the east, side.

The airport will initially

have

one

5000-foot

runway oriented

northeast

to southwest.

The

airport is

supposed

to relieve airport congestion

at Raleigh/Durham

International

Airport.

The

runway is lined

up approximately

10

degrees

to the southwest of the Harris Nuclear Plant.

The airport is intended

almost exclusively for general

aviation.

This

means

a

good portion of flights will be

by small aircraft.

Multiple engine aircraft (Learjet

and Gulfstream)

with weights in

excess

of 12,500

pounds

are

projected

to

use this airport.

The

annual

number of flight operations

is projected to be

as follows:

5 Year

10 Year

20 Year

Peak

Hour

Traffic

40

55

85

Annual

Operations

64,400

88,500

128,000

Annual

Instrument

Approaches

950

1,800

3,500

The

inspectors

questioned

the potential

impact of the

proposed

airport

upon

the plant.

The

licensee

met with the

inspectors

subsequent

to the inspection

period

on July 24

and explained

much

of the

above

information.

The licensee

stated

that the airport

criteria was within the plant siting guidelines of the NRC's Standard

Review Plan,

NUREG 0800.

The licensee

indicated that

a presentation

would be made to

NRR in the near future.

One violation and no deviations

were identified.

Exit Interview .

The

inspection

scope

and findings

were

summarized

during

management

interviews

throughout

the reporting

period

and

on July 19,

1989, with

those

persons

indicated

in paragraph

1.

The licensee

acknowledged

the

inspection

findings

and did not identify as proprietary

any material

reviewed

by the inspector during the inspection.

Item Number

~0

89-15-01

89-15-02

VIO - Failure to maintain

an active

SRO license,

paragraph

5.b.

VIO - Improper flow orifice installation,

paragraph

2.

Acronyms and Initialisms

ALARA

ESW

EPZ

FE

FSAR

IFI

LCO

LER

LIV

LOCA

MST

NAOH

NRC

OP

OST

PCR

PMTR

QA

QC

RCS/RC

RWP

SCO

SRO

STA

TS

VIO

WR/JO

As Low as Reasonably

Achievable

Emergency Service Water

Emergency Planning

2one

Flow Element

Final Safety Analysis Report

Inspector Follow-up Item

Limiting Condition for Operation

Licensee

Event Report

Licensee Identified Violation

Loss of Coolant Accident

Maintenance

Surveillance

Test

Sodium Hydroxide

Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

Operating

Procedure

Operations

Surveillance Test

Plant Change

Request

Post Maintenance

Test Requirements

Quality Assurance

Quality Control

Reactor Coolant System

Radiation

Work Permit

Senior Control Operator

Senior Reactor

Operator

Shift Technical Advisor

Technical Specification

Violation

Work Request/Job

Order