ML18005A630
| ML18005A630 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 09/26/1988 |
| From: | Bradford W, Fredrickson P, Shannon M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18005A628 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-88-25, NUDOCS 8810070159 | |
| Download: ML18005A630 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000400/1988025
Text
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UNITEO STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report No.:
50-400/88-25
Licensee:
Carolina
Power and Light Company
P. 0.
Box 1551
Raleigh,
NC
27602
Docket No.:
50-400
Facility Name:
Harris
1
License No.:
Inspection
Conducted:
July 20 - August 28,
1988
Inspectors:
. Bradford
M.
. Shanno
Approved by:~.
E
Fgedrickson,
C ief
Rea ofProjects
Section
1A
Division of Reactor Projects
ate Signed
84 8
.Oate-Si gned.
zS't
Si
ed
SUMNRY
Scope:
'his routine,
on-site
inspection
involved
a review of operational
safety
verification,
monthly surveillance
observation,
monthly
maintenance
observation,
radiological
protection
program,
physical
security program,
and refueling outage.
Results:
In the
areas
inspected,
two violations
were identified: failure to
establish
and
implement procedures,
two examples
- (paragraphs
3.a
and 4); and
a licensee
identified failure to maintain
RHR loop flow
greater
than or equal
to 2500
GPN - (paragraph 3,d).
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REPORT
DETAILS
1.
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
J.
H. Smith, Manager,
Operations
G. L. Forehand,
Director, gA/gC
C. S. Hinnant, Plant General
Manager
J.
R. Sipp, Manager,
Environmental
and Radiological Control
A. Howe, Regulatory Compliance
R. B. Yan Metre, Manager, Harris Plant Technical
Support
B. Batts, Manager,
Maintenance
C. Gibson, Director,,Programs
and Procedure
Other
'licensee
employees
contacted
i
ncluded
.t.echnicians, .operators,
mechanics,
security
force
members,
engtneering- personnel-
and office.
personnel.
Note:
A list of abbreviations
used
in this report is contained
in
paragraph
10.
2.
Follow-up on Items of Noncompliance
(92702)
This area
was not inspected
during this inspection period.
3.
Operational
Safety Yerification (71707)
The inspectors
observed
control
room operations,
reviewed applicable
logs
and conducted
discussions
with control
room operators
during the report
period.
Also, the operability of selected
emergency
systems
was verified,
tagout
records
were
reviewed
and
proper return to service of affected
components
was verified.
Tours of the plant were conducted
to observe
plant equipment conditions, including fluid leaks
and excessive
vibrations
and general
housekeeping
efforts.
The inspectors verified compliance with
selected
limiting conditions for operation
(LCO) and results of selected
surveillance
tests.
The verifications
were
accomplished
by direct
observation
of monitoring
instrumentation,
valve positions,
switch
positions,
accessible
pipe
and
review of completed
logs,
records,
and chemistry results.
The licensee's
compliance with LCO action
statements
was reviewed
as events
occurred.
The
inspectors
routinely
attended
meetings
with certain
licensee
management
and
observed
various shift turnovers.
These
meetings
and
discussions
provided
a daily status
of plant operations,
maintenance,
and
testing activities
in progress,
as
well
as
discussions
of significant
problems.
The inspectors
reviewed
the shift foreman's
log, control
room
operator's
log,
clearance
center
tag
out logs,
system
status
logs,
chemistry
and
health
physics
logs,
and
control
status
board.
The
B
inspectors
noted that
the operators
appeared
to
be alert
and
aware of
changing plant conditions.
OST 1826 - Train "B" SI
ESF Response
Time Test
The inspector witnessed
portions of OST 1826,
18 Month SI Actuation,
on 8/8/88
and 8/9/88.
Personnel
performing the test
appeared
to be
knowledgeable.
The various motors started
as required
and valves
moved
to their actuation
positions.
The test
was
considered
successful.
The surveillance test requires
that certain electrical
be lifted to ensure
that the
"B" train auxiliary feed water
pump would start
as
a result of a safety injection signal,
but not
due to the trip of the main feedwater
pumps,
which occurs
as
a result
of the safety injection signal.
Mhen the disconnected
electrical
were
placed
back
in the pretest
position,
the
"B" train
auxiliary
pump started
unexpectedly
because
both
main
pumps
were tripped.
The test
procedure
did not specify
that the "B" main feedwater-pump
control switch must
be
pl.,aced in the
"STOP" position prie~re
reconnecting the-lifted electrical-leads
This failure to establish
an adequate
procedure is identified as
one
example of a violation, VIO(400/88-25-01).
On 8/14/88,
a leak
was
reported
inside the containment building in
~the
area of the
"A" RCP.
Personnel
were
sent
in to locate
the
source.
Approximately 150 gallons of reactor coolant spilled out the
manifold vent
and
had to be cleaned
up.
The manifold drain valves
were
found to
be
clogged
and
work requests
were written.
An
investigation disclosed
that
a worker had stepped
on
a boundary valve
in the clearance
for the "A" loop
had
apparently
cracked
the valve
open
about
1/4 turn.
Personnel
were
further
cautioned
about
standing
and climbing
on equipment.
The
inspector
had
no further questions.
Ca
d.
Loss of Hain Control Board Annunicators
On 8/12/88, the site declared
an "Alert" because
a major portion of
the main control
board annunciators
were lost due to loss of normal
power supply.
The event lasted
nine minutes
before auxiliary power
was
restored.
The
normal
power
supply inverter,
BETA Control Inc.
400 Matt,
had
experienced
a
dual
output transistor failure.
The
maintenance
department
is still investigating,
and to date
has
not
been able to determine
the root cause of the failure.
The inspectors
will continue to follow this investigation.
RHR Loop Flow
During
a review of the shift foreman's
log sheet
for 8/13/88,
the
inspector
noted that
RHR loop flow was
being increased
to
2500
GPH
in order to comply with TS 4.9.8.2.
Further review by the inspector
revealed
that
RHR flow had
been
decreased
to 1900
GPN for draining
down of the
RCS in order to install the steam generator
nozzle
dams.
Four
hours
into the evolution
and after
the shift change,
the
following shift realized
that
the
RHR flow was
less
than
the
TS
value.
The licensee
promptly corrected this discrepancy
by refilling
the
RCS and increasing flow to greater
than
2500
GPM.
This
RHR flow violation of TS 4.9.8.2 is considered
to be licensee
identified
and
meets
the criteria of 10 CFR Part 2,
App.
C (V.G);
therefore,
a violation will not be issued,
LIV (400/88-25-02).
e.
PORV/RCS Vent
A power
operated relief valve,
RC-114,
was mechanically
gagged
open
to provide
an
adequate
RCS vent
as
required
by TS 3.4.9.4.b.
On
8/12/88,
the valve was
found in the intermediate position by control
room personnel.
The gag
had initially been correctly installed; but,
due tomechanical
compression of approximateIy ltd=inch of the
RC-114 ,
tt.te fiill o-p-eii indication: was-lost
.
Ritrogen pressure-
.
was restored to the valve operator
and the valve was reopened.
A new
gag
was installed
to ensure
that the correct valve
opening
was
maintained.
The inspector
had
no further questions.
f.
Bottom Head Orain
On= 8/7/88,
a licensee
technical
support
engineer
found boric acid
crystal
buildup on the pipe spools for "A" and "8" steam generator
bottom
head
drain lines.
The drain lines
are welded
by the
S/G
manufacturer
and
are
connected
to
the
side
of the
S/G.
Apparently,
the internal
have developed
cracks
and very small
leaks
have resulted.
On 8/10/88,
the
S/G manufacturer
and licensee
held
a meeting
to discuss
resolution of the leaking pipe.
It has
. been
decided
to cut off the drain pipe
and weld an extension
on the
bottom of the
S/G.
Repairs will be
made prior to the
end of this
refueling outage.
This incident is covered
in detail
in Report
No.
50-400/88-26.
g.
Station Air and- Instrument Air Systems
A water intrusion into the
SA system
occurred
on 7/18/88,
and
was
reported
in a previous
inspection report.
The inspector
performed
a
partial
system
walkdown of the
IA and
SA systems,
reviewed
the
operating
procedures,
and reviewed the system description.
The water
intrusion into the
SA system
did not appear
to affect
any safety
related
systems
or equipment.
The primary function of the
SA system
is
to
supply
hose
connections.
It was
noted
that five hose
connections
were
found at various
locations
on the
and
these
items were turned over to licensee
management
for resolution.
4.
Monthly Surveillance Observation
(61726,
71709)
The inspectors
witnessed
the licensee
conducting maintenance
surveillance
test activities
on safety-related
systems
and
components
to verify that
the
licensee
performed
the activities
in
accordance
with licensee
requirements.
These observations
included witnessing selected
portions of
each
surveillance,
review of the surveillance
procedure
to ensure
that
administrative
controls
were in force,
determining
that
approval
was
obtained prior to conducting the surveillance test,
and verifying that the
individuals conducting
the test
were qualified in accordance
with plant
approved
procedures.
Other observations
included ascertaining
that test
instrumentation
used
was
calibrated,
data
collected
was within the
specified
requirements
of TS,
any identified discrepancies
were properly
noted,
and the
systems
were correctly returned to service.
Por tions of
the following test activities were observed
or reviewed
by the inspectors:
MPT=061T- -. Simulated
Loss of Off.-Site&ower
.
OST-1823
lA':SA 'Emergency Diesel'enerator
18. Month Operability Test
Mode 5 and
6
OST-1824
1B-SB Emergency Diesel Generator
18 Month Operability Test
Mode
5 and
6
Containment
High Range Radiation Monitor
On
August 8,
1988,
the
inspector
witnessed
the
performance
of
Containment
Hi
Range
Accident
Radiation
Monitor
RM-01CR-3589-SA Calibration.
Section
7 of the procedure
requires
that the monitor cabinet
be placed
in the supervisory
mode.
This
action affects all eight monitors
in the cabinet,
and allows the
changes
to
be
made
to the
data
base
for the desired
radiation
monitor.
The
technician
continued
to follow the calibration
procedure
and
entered
new data into the data
base.
When bringing the monitor back
to service,
various
alarms
sounded
in the control
room.
Operations
personnel
had
some difficulty determining
the source of the alarms
and
found
that
the
Control
Room
Area
Radiation
Monitor
RC-21RR-3560-SA
was alarming.
The technician
had inadvertently entered
the data
base
changes
into
the wrong monitor.
The labels
above
each
monitor are
adequate
to
verify that the correct instrument is being tested.
The calibration
procedure
identifies the radiation monitor to
be calibrated
on the
procedure
cover
page,
as
well
as
Sections I, 3,
4
and
7.
The
procedure
was
not followed in that
the correct
instrument
to
be
calibrated
was not verified to be correct.
This failure to implement
a procedure
is identified
as
a
second
example of a violation, VIO
(400/88-25-01).
Monthly Maintenance
Observation
(62703)
Station
maintenance
activities of safety-related
systems
and
components
were observed/reviewed
to ascertain
that they were conducted
in accordance
with approved
procedures,
regulatory guides,
industry codes
and standards,
and
were in conformance
with TS.
Items
considered
during the review
included:
verification that limiting conditions for operations
were met
while components
or systems -were
removed
from service;
approvals
were
obtained prior to initiating the work; approved
procedures
were
used;
completed
work was
inspected
as applicable;
functional testing
and/or
calibrations
were performed prior to returning
components
or systems
to
service;
quality control
records
were
maintained;
activities
were
accomplished
by qualified personnel;
parts
and materials
were properly
certified; and radiological
and fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests
were also
reviewed to determine
the status
of outstanding
jobs to assure
that priority was
assigned
to safety-related
equipment
maintenance
which may affect system
perFormance.
The
inspectors
observed
various
pTant modifications
and
maintenance-
activities in progress.
One of these
involved the emergency
pump traveling
screen
which
had
experienced
mechanical
failure.
The
screen
bay was drained
and the maintenance
crew'discovered
that the lower
base plate bolts
had worked loose
and caused
the traveling screen
to bind
up.
The bolts
were repaired
and the traveling
screen
was returned
to
operation.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Radiological Protection
Program
(71709)
Selected activities of the licensee's
Radiological Protection
Program
were
reviewed
by the inspectors
to verify conformance with plant procedures
and
NRC regulatory requirements.
The areas
reviewed included:
organization
and management
of the plant's
health physics staff,
"ALARA" implementation
Radiation
work
Permits
(RWPs)
for compliance
to plant
procedures,
personnel
exposure
records,
observation of work and personnel
in radiation
areas
to verify compliance to radiation protection procedures,
and control
of radioactive materials.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Physical Security Program
(71881)
Licensee's
compliance
to the
approved
security
plan was reviewed
by the
inspectors.
The inspectors
verified by observation
and interviews with
security
force
members
that
measures
taken
to
assure
the
physical
protection of the facility met current
requirements.
Areas
inspected
included:
organization
of
the
security
force;
establishment
and
maintenance
of gates,
doors,
and isolation
zones;
access
control;
and
badging
procedures.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
8.
Refueling Outage
On July 30,
1988, at 3:35 a.m.,
the Unit was
shutdown to enter
a
56 day
refueling outage.
Just prior to taking the Unit off line, it was tripped
manually
by the operator at
10% power,
The trip was
due to an automatic trip of the
operating
main
feed
water
pump
on
low flow when its
recirculation valve failed to open.
The motor driven auxiliary feedwater
pumps
started
as
required.
Licensee
investigation of the
feed
pump
recirculation
valve failure indicated that the valve shaft
had
broken.
This is
under investigation
and repair.
Cooldown of the reactor
was
delayed
due
to both
source
range
monitors
becoming
The
failure of the
source
range
monitors
was
due to internal electrical
problems.
On August 15,
1988,
the
licensee
began
experiencing difficulties with
'inserting
and latching-the -reactor
vessel
head
guide
studs
The
manufacturer
technical
representatives
were
on site
and spec~quipment --
was
brought in to grind
and polish the guide
studs
in order to get
a
proper fit.
On 8/21/88,
the licensee with Mestinghouse
concurrence
made
the decision
to
remove
the reactor
vessel
head with only 2 of 3 guide
studs
installed.
The
head
was
subsequently
lifted
and
stored
satisfactorily.
It was
noted that the guide studs
had not been properly
fitted during initial fuel load.
The licensee
plans to repair the guide
studs during this refueling outage.
There are approximately
114 modifications planned during the outage.
This
does
not include the major work scheduled
on the main turbo-generator.
Najor modifications
include
a
teardown
inspection
on the diesel
gene-
rators,
NSIV Eg limit switch qualification, various
hanger modifications,
installation of reactor
vessel
level indication system isolation valves,
valve packing live loading,
Anchor Darling soft seat
replacement,
reactor
vessel
guide
stud
tolerance,
and
local
leak rate
testing of reactor
building containment
At the
close
of this inspection
period, the refueling outage
was approximately 8k days
behind schedule.
9.
Exit Interview
The inspection
scope
and findings were
summarized
throughout
the report
period
and
on August 29,
1988, with the plant general
manager
and other
members of his staff, listed in paragraph
1.
The inspectors
described
the
areas
inspected
and discussed
in detail
the inspection
findings listed
above.
Dissenting
comments
were
not
received
from the
licensee.
Proprietary
information is not contained
in this report.
The following
were identified:
VIO (400/88-25-01);
Failure to Establish
and
Implement Procedures-
(paragraphs
3.a
and 4).
LIV (400/88-25-02);
RHR.Loop Flow Less
Than 2500 GPM-
(paragraph 3.d).
10.
List of Abbreviations
ALARA-
18IC
LCO
OST
QA/QC-
S/G
TS
Auxiliary Feed Mater
As Low As Reasonably
Achievable
Environmental Qualification
Engineered
Safety Features
Instrument Air
Instrumentation
and Control
Limiting Conditions
For Operation
Maintenance Surveillance
Test
Operational
Surveillance Test
Power Operated Relief Valve
Quality Assurance/Quality
Control
Reactor-Coolant
Pump--
Reactor
Coo1aot-Syatear
Residual
Heat
Removal
Resistance
Temperature
Detector
Radiation
Work Permit
Station Air
Safety Injection
Technical Specification