ML18005A238
| ML18005A238 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 12/11/1987 |
| From: | Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Utley E CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8712220159 | |
| Download: ML18005A238 (22) | |
Text
Docket No. 50-400 License No.
NPF-63 Carolina Power and Light Company ATTN:
Mr.
E.
E. Utley Senior Executive Vice President Power Supply and Engineering and Construction P. 0.
Box 1551
- Raleigh, NC 27602 Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE
SUMMARY
This letter refers to the Enforcement Conference held at our request on November 20, 1987.
This meeting concerned activities authorized for your Shearon Harris facility.
The issues discussed at this conference related to operations personnel action during the conduct of a
Technical Specification surveillance test for the Reactor Coolant System vent valves and also to the operating history of these valves at Shearon Harris.
A summary, a list of attendees and a copy of your handout are enclosed.
It is our opinion that this meeting was beneficial and has provided a better understanding of the inspection
- findings, the enforcer ent
- issues, and the status of your corrective actions.
We are continuing our review of these issues to determine the appropriate enforcement action.
In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice,"
Part 2,
Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a
copy of this letter and its enclosures wi 11 be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.
Sincerely,
Enclosures:
l.
Enforcement Conference Summary 2.
List of Attendees 3.
Handout J.
Nelson Grace Regional Administrator cc w/encls:
(See page 2)
B712220i 59 87121 i F'DR ADOCy, 05000400 PDR
Carolina Power and Light Company cc w/encls R. A. Watson, Vice President Harris Nuclear Project D. L. Tibbitts, Director of Regulatory Compliance J.
L. Willis, Plant General Manager bcc w/encls:
C. Barth, OGC NRC Resident Inspector A. Upchurch, Chairman, Triangle J Council of Governments DRS Technical Assistant Document Control Desk State of North Carolina RII i s:er 12$ /87 RI RII j 7yl P
edickson DVerrelli 12/~ /87 12/ 3 /87 C~
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ENCLOSURE 1
ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE
SUMMARY
The Deputy Regional Administrator opened the meeting by stating that Region II was very interested in the decision process whereby manipulation of valves continued, resulting in the discharge of reactor coolant to the containment atmosphere and pressurizer relief tank, and also was interested in any previous knowledge that Carolina Power and Light (CP8L) had regarding operating problems and configuration problems with these specific valves.
CP&L then initiated their presentation with the shift foreman on duty at the time of the event presenting the details of the valve testing that occurred on October 9, 1987.
The NRC found this presentation to be very informative due to the first hand justification supporting the actions of the shift foreman, but did express concern that the foreman had not considered all the negative possibilities of continued testing.
At this point CP8L gave a description of the mechanical and electrical operation of the valve followed by a detailed breakdown of the corrective action being taken for the incident involving the Reactor Coolant System vent valves.
The actions taken are documented in the enclosed handout.
- Next, a description of the historical chronology of the Reactor Coolant System vent valve problem was discussed.
CPSL stated that the early historical data
Enclosure I in reference to the Target Rock valves was not previously known to the Shearon Harris plant, prior to the power range test
- program, which commenced in January 1987.
It was noted, though, that the vent valve back leakage problem was first observed in June 1985.
In summary, CPLL stated that these valves have a long standing history of this event type problem but the problem was previously unknown to Shearon Harris and
'that it is apparent that Shearon Harris is the only plant that tests the valves at power.
CPSL reiterated that while the operator actions were not prudent, they did not result in an unsafe condition of the plant during operations.
CPEL also stated that their corrective actions were timely and comprehensive F
after the event and that further actions were being addressed to revise the Technical Specifications and ISI program.
The meeting was concluded by the Deputy Regional Administrator.
ENCLOSURE 2
LIST OF ATTENDEES CP8(L M. A. McDuffie, Senior Vice President - Nuclear Generation R. A. Watson, Vice President - Harris Nuclear Power Plant J.
L. Wi 1 1 i s, Harri s Pl ant General Manager S.
R.
Zimmerman, Manager Nuclear Licensing J.
M. Collins, Manager Operations C.
P. Matthews, Shift Foreman NRC Re ion II M.
L. Ernst, Deputy Regional Administrator L. A. Reyes, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
C.
W. Hehl, Deputy Director, DRP G.
R. Jenkins,
- Director, Enforcement and Investigative Coordination Staff (EICS)
B. Uryc, Enforcement Coordinator, EICS P.
E. Fredrickson, Section Chief, DRP G.
F. Maxwell, Harris Senior Resident Inspector, DRP S. J. Vias, Project Engineer, DRP W.
M. Dean, Lead Examiner, Operations
- Branch, Division of Reactor Safety 1
NRC Head uarters B. Mozafari, Project Engineer, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, PD II-I
l.
A.
A TEST WAS BEING CONDUCTED DUE TO THE DETERIORATION OF THE STROKE TIMES AS REQUIRED BY ISI e Bs TEST ASS I GNED TO EXTRA SRO 2s YALVE TEST STARTEDs 5s-RC-904 WAS OPENEDs THEN SHUT AND TIMED WITH NO PROBLEMSs A.
RC-900 WAS OPENED AND RC-904 INDICATION ALSO INDICATED OPENs Be RC-900 WAS IMMEDIATELY SHUT AND RC-904 RETURNED TO SHUT INDICATIONe NO CHANGE'OBSERVED TO PRESSURIZE LEVELs 5.
A, THESE VALVES ARE FAST ACTING (<
1 SECe)e's SINCE RC-900 AND 904 HAD BOTH CLOSED AND ACTION HAD BEEN SO QUICKs SRO DECIDED TO CONFIRM OBSERVATIONS TO IDENTIFY EXACTLY WHAT HAD BEEN OBSERVEDs Ce RC-900 WAS REOPENED AND RC-904 AND RC-905 INDICATED OPEN ALSOs Ds RC-900 DID NOT OPERATE IMMEDIATELY ON ATTEMPT TO SHUTs Ee AT THIS TIMEs I
ENTERED THE CONTROL ROOMs I
HAD THE RO ENERGI2E THE BACKUP HEATERS WHICH WERE NOT ON AT THIS TIMEe DISCUSSED SHUTTING THE ORIFICE ISOLATIONS IF NEEDED (2 WERE OPEN) e Fe A
SECOND EXTRA SRO ENTERED THE CONTROL ROOMs HE HAD ADDITIONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONTROL CIRCUITRY AND OPERATION OF THE SWITCHES FOR THESE VALVESe Gs HE SUCCESSFULLY SHUT RC-900, RC-904, AND RC-905 SHUT.
LONGER THAN NORMAL STROKE TIME WAS OBSERVEDs
6e STABILIZED THE PLANTs PRESSURE DROPPED TO 2210 PSIG i AND LEVEL DECREASE HAD BEEN 2
TO 3 PERCENTe Te 8ELD DISCUSSION ON TESTe's THE SRO WHO SHUT RC-900 SAID HE FELT PROBLEM WAS THE SWITCH WAS NOT HELD LONG ENOUGH TO CLEAR OPEN LIMIT SWITCH SEAL IN -CIRCUITe B ~
THIS OPERATOR IS A
RELIABLE INDIVIDUALS WHO DOES NOT PASS INCORRECT INFORMATION JUST TO ANSWER A QUESTIONs C,
THE NUMBER OF VALVES THAT WOULD EFFECT RC-900 AND RC-900 WAS UNDETERMINEDe D
THE TEST WAS BEING RUN TO THE INCREASE STROKE TIME ON THE VALVES e THE EXTENT OF THIS PROBLEM WAS ALSO UNKNOWNe E
INDICATIONS WERE THAT THESE STROKE TIMES HAD DETERIORATED EVEN FURTHERs Fe PRESSURE NEVER DROPPED BELOW THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMIT OF 2205 FOR DNB CONSIDERATIONSs G s INVENTORY LOSS WAS WITHIN CAPABILITY OF NORMAL MAKEUP SYSTEM ~
He I
WAS NOT MADE AWARE OF THE FIRST CYCLING OF RC-900e
Ss I
MADE THE DECISION TO RUN THE TEST TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM WITH THE VALVESs Ae THE PLANT WAS BEING SHUT DOWN THAT NIGHT ~
Bs, IF A
TICKET WERE CUT AND INVESTIGATION DELAYED UNTIL AFTER CONDITIONS
- CHANGED, THE PROBLEMS COULD HAVE BEEN MASKEDs THIS COULD HAVE PREVENTED NEEDED REPAIRS TO THE SYSTEMs 9s THE TEST WAS COMPLETED WITH RC-904 AND RC-905 OPENING ON THE OPERATION OF EACH UPSTREAM VALVE TESTED STROKE TIMES HAD INCREASED. SIGNIFICANTLY ON TWO OF THE THREE VALVES TESTEDs
REACTOR VESSEL HEAD L.O.
FLO~W RESTRICTOR RC-901 RC-900 RC-905 PRESSURIZER RFLIEF TANK RC-90 RC-902 RC-904 PRESSURIZER CNI'IT ATI'IOSPHERE L
EQUIPI IEHT DRAIN REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTING ARRANGEMENT
NOAnnl. vnt.vE OPEAATIONi vn I ~
The control smitch ls placed In the "OPEN" position 2.
This en> rgltes the solenoid which lifts up on the pilot disc,
~Sich I Ifts up on the main dier via the disc connecting pin.
3.
The I lou of fluid past the seat aids ln the opening of the valve If do~-stream pressure Is lover than that up stream of the
- valve, then the pilot operation assists the opening of the valve to reduce the stoke time as follousf ai Mhen the pilot disc moves up the pilot orifice ls opened allotting pressures Pl 0 P2 to bleed off rapidly.
bi With the pressure above the valve disc C P-Inlet ~ the valve opens faster'.
Once the 33/ao open contact ls made~
the control svllch can be releasedi The sultch mill spring return to normal" I the 33/ao contact mill maintain the relay energlaed.
l.
The control sui tch Is placed In ~ I ther "shut" or "pull to lock".
2 The relay deenergixes and spring pressure shuts the valve.
S.With the solenoid deenergltedy the pilot orl fice Is shu't This al ion s the pressure above the main disc IPI L P21 to increase to upstream pressure aiding In maintaining the valve closed.
AAPIO PAESSUTIE SUAOES UPSTAEAN OF TIIIS TYPE OF VALVET Inlet P1 I
If P-Inlet increases rapidly idue to uater Insurge)
~ the supply orl Tice ulll al lou Pl to Increase.
If the increase Is very rapid, then Pl
~ III Increase faster than P2 ~ collapsing the void above \\he pilot disc ~
and lift the pilot dlsC mh>Ch mill lift the main dlsC and allou the valve to pass fiou and provide a force to act against the spring pressur e.
This force eben combined ulth Iow pressure at P2 ~ill malntaine ihe valve open Outlet 2.
I I the sul tch Is In "normal" and the valve travel goes to ful I open, then the solenoid bill energlte and the valve ~i I I remain open.
lf the control sultrh is in "pull to lock" or held In the "closed"
- position, then the valve should go shut shen one Of the COndltions listed belou occurs ai. Flou Is stopped such that the force acting to hold the valve open ulli no longer be present and the spring tension alii be SufflCIent tO reahut the Valve bi sufficient time passes to a!lou Pl L P2 to equallae.
Then spring tension can shut the valve I
Pi NACHT 0
I n ~ater seal ls malntalned up stream of the valve.
This mi I I keep the vOI d abeve the dl SCS full Of uater.
When a preSSure Surge OCCurS the vnld mii I not be coll apsed and no rapid dl sc movement
~ 111 orcur Floe which mould force the valve open,
~ I I I not be Initlated.
2.
Ihe pressure surge Is sloe enough to allov Pl to ~cluallae
~ Ith P2 by bleedang between the ps lot disc and the main disc
TYPfCAt-TAR'GET ROCK.VAt VE norma c ose pilot operated solenoid type)
Ill'afve internals:
12 10
.QN
. r~
I' vrP 5e-Enet=teeC Close c 12 5
lo lttlet Oetlet 2,
13
.ner e~
Open I
~cutlet Kev 1)
Coil
- 2) Core
- 3) Plunger 4)
Stem')
Spring
- 6) Pilot Disc
~
- 7) Pilot O~ce
- 8) Main Disc
- 9) Main Seat
- 10) Main Disc Seal Ring 11)
Su pply OriQce
- 12) Disc ConnecMg PLn
- 13) ilec&cal Connections Controf Cicuit:
POSIT IO<
COI4TACT5 Ial~ ~IAC A IE I O-I I-OIE2l b Pu TO LOCK 5HLIT I;ORNA OF EH 120 vAC Control Swl'l'ch ContactS 5PRIM& RETURI4.0 I4ORMAL X
COI4TACT CLO5EO 5HUT OPEH PuLL TO LOCK 111$
)A2 33/ao "DPEN VPI LJ mlt sw>toll EhlER TO OPEN IIlhLVE TARGET RocK vALYB VALVELII4IT SWfTCli OEYELOM4EItT
~LV OPEHlMG
~ C eoio bo
CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN OR IN PROGRESS FOR INCIDENT INVOLVING REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENT VALVES le INVOLVED SHIFT FOREMAN WAS RECALLED TO THE PLANT IN ORDER TO FURTHER INVESTIGATE DETAILS OF THE INCIDENT~
OPERATIONS HANAGER AND OPERATING SUPERVISOR WERE RECALLED FROM TRAINING TO CONTINUE INVESTIGATION AND TO DEVELOP A
PLAN OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONe 2e A THOROUGH INVESTIGATION OF THE INCIDENT WAS CONDUCTEDe 3e EACH SHIFT WAS BRIEFED BEFORE THEIR NEXT ON SHIFT PERIOD OF THE SERIOUSNESS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EVENT e THE PLANT GENERAL HANAGER PERSONALLY BR I EFED ALL SHIFTS ON HOW MANAGEMENT VIEWS THE INCIDENTe THE OPERATIONS HANAGER AND OPERATING SUPERVISOR ALSO DISCUSSED THE INCIDENT WITH EACH SHI FTe 4e THE SHIFT FOREMAN INVOLVED IN THE INCIDENT WAS COUNSELED ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE INCIDENT BY THE OPERATIONS HANAGERi OPERATING SUPERVISOR AND SEPARATELY BY THE PLANT GENERAL HANAGERe ADDITIONALLY. THE SHIFT FOREMAN WAS REQUIRED TO ASSIST IN THE INCIDENT INVESTIGATION AND PARTICIPATE IN THE FOLLOW-UP ON BRIEFINGS FOR SHIFT PERSONNELe
CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN OR IN PROGRESS FOR INCIDENT INVOLVING REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENT VALVES (CONTINUED) 5e DETAILED TRAINING ON THE CHARACTERISTICS OF TARGET ROCK SOLENOID OPERATED VALVES p INCLUDING CONTROL C IRCUITRY >
HAS BEEN CONDUCTED FOR ALL OPERATORSe 6 ~
. SURVEILLANCE TEST PROCEDURES OST-1005 AND OST-1822 WERE REVISED TO ENSURE'.
Ae TEST SEQUENCE OF VALVES CHANGED TO REQUIRE TESTING VENT VALVES (UPSTREAM VALVES)
BEFORE THE BLOCK VALVES (DOWNSTREAM VALVES)
TO KEEP BLOCK VALVES UPSTREAM PIPING FILLED WITH WATER WHILE CYCLING VENT VALVESe Be lT IS CLEAR THAT ANY TiNE SHUT IS USED'T MEANS "SHuT.
PULL TO LOCK POSI TIONe Ce
. IT IS CLEAR. THATe IF BLOCK VALVES POP OPEN DURING TESTING.
THE, TEST IS TO BE STOPPED AND NOT PROCEED FURTHER UNTIL FURTHER GUIDANCE IS PROVIDED BY 8ANAGEMENTe
CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN OR IN PROGRESS FOR INCIDENT INVOLVING REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENT VALVES (CONTINUED)
VHE VENDOR TARGET ROCK
'CORPORATION WAS CONTACTED TO DISCUSS THE INDICATIONS SEEN AND'O DEVISE CORRECTIVE ACTION e VENDOR ADVISED THAT THE VALVES WOULD EXHIBIT THE CHARACTERISTICS SEEN DURING THE INCIDENT> NAMELY THE OPENING OF THE DOWNSTREAM VALVES WHEN AN UPSTREAM VALVE IS OPENED AND THE DISC CAVITY OF THE DOWNSTREAM VALVE IS NOT FILLED WITH WATERe VENDOR PROVIDED COPIES OF CORRESPONDENCE ON THIS PHENOMENA DATED 1980 AND j.984 o
AN INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED TO DETERMINE IF SHNPP HAD EVER RECEIVED THAT INFORMATION g AND IT WAS DETERMINED THAT WE HAD NOT RECEIVED ITs (NATERIAL WAS NEVER SENT TO UTILITIES BY THE VENDOR)
Se A
TASK FORCE WAS FORMED TO INVESTIGATE THE CAUSE OF THE INCREASED STROKE TINES OF THE VENT VALVES AND TO RECOMMEND CORRECTIVE ACTION FOR THESE VALVES AND THE BLOCK VALVES WHICH HAD POPPED OPENS 9s THE PLANT 6ENERAL NANAGER CONDUCTED "SENSITIVITY" COUNSELING FOR THE OPERATIONS NANAGER AND THE OPERATING SUPERVISORo 10'CTIONS WERE STARTED TO REVISE THE ISI PROGRAM TO ELIMINATE CYCLING OF THESE VALVES DURING POWER OPERATION AND TO REQUIRE CYCLING ONLY ON A REFUELING OUTAGE FREQUENCYe
CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN OR IN PROGRESS FOR INCIDENT INVOLVING REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENT VALVES (CONTINUED) 1 1 e
ACTIONS WERE STARTED TO REVISE THE TECHNICAL SPEC IF I CAT I ONS TO ELIMINATE. CYCLING OF THESE VALVES DURING POWER OPERATION AND TO REQUIRE CYCLING ONLY ON A REFUELING OUTAGE FREQUENCY'2
. OTHER UT ILITIES WERE QUERIED VIA NUCLEAR NETWORK AND NOHIS FOR SIMILAR PROBLEMS a
13s A
NUCLEAR NETWORK ENTRY IS BEING PREPARED TO ADVISE OTHER UT I LITI ES OF TH I S PROBLEMs
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEN VENT VALVES
- HISTORICAL CHRONOLOGY DEC. 1980-
"TARGET ROCK REPORT ¹ 2866 DESCRIBES PHENOMENA OF SPURIOUS OPENING OF TARGET ROCK SOLENOID OPERATED VALVES DUE TO INLET PRESSURE TRANS I ENTI APRIL 1981-
"ASHE PAPER ON SPURIOUS OPENING OF HYDRAULIC ASSISTEDi PILOT"OPERATED VALVES>
LATE 1981-e'EARLY 1982-H s B ~
ROB INSON PLANT EXP ERI ENCES PROBLEMS WITH SPURIOUS OPENING OF TARGET ROCK RCS VENT VALVES'ENDOR ADVISED HBR TO ROTATE VALVESi MHICH HAS ACCOMPLISHED ~
OCTOBER 1984-TARG ET ROCK INTERNAL MEMORANDUM SUMMARI Z ES PHENOMENA DISCUSSED IN DECEMBER 1980 TARGET ROCK RE> ORT ¹ 2866 AND APRIL 1981 ASME PAr ER AND RECOMMENDS:
DEVELOPED INFORMATION NOT PREVIOUSLY KNOMN TO SHEARON HARRIS'
HISTORICAL CHRONOLOGY (CONTINUED) 1 s FOR VALVES D I SCHARG ING LIQUID TO AMBIENT (AS IS THE CASE FOR THE LAST VALVE IN THE CHAIN OF REACTOR HEAD VENT VALVES)i MOUNT THE VALVE WITH THE BONNET TUBE BELOW THE HORIZONTALs 2s HHERE POSSIBLES MAINTAIN A
POSITIVE PRESSURE AT THE VALVE DISCHARGE PART ~
3s LOCATE VAI VES DISCHARGING TO AMB I ENT.
WHERE SPURIOUS OPENING W ILL NOT COMPROMISE PERSONNEL OR PLANT SAFETYs JUNE 1985-
.SHNPP RCS VENT VALVES OPERATED FOR RCS FILL AND VENTs NO PROBLEMS REPORTED IN OPERATIONs IT WAS NOTED THAT VALVES LEAKED IN REVERSE DIRECTION WHEN PRESSURE IN PRTs JANUARY 1986 RELIEF REQUEST R"15 SUBMITTED TO NRC REQUESTING RELIEF FROM ISI REQUIREMENT TO CYCLE VALVES QUARTERLY TO CYCLE ONLY DURING REFUELINGs REASON!
YALVES INTENDED TO PROV IDE VENTING CAPABILITY, ONLY DURING NATURAL C IRCULATI ON COOLDOWN s TEST I NG OF VALVES AT POWER COULD RESULT IN AN UNCONTROLLED BLOWDOWN SHOULD THE DOWNSTREAM BLOCK VALVES INADVERTENTLY OPEN OR EXPERIENCE EXCESSIVE LEAKAGEs
~,
HI STOR I CAL CHRONOLOGY (CONTINUED)
AUGUST 1986-NEETING WITH NRC IN WASHINGTON'
~ C ~
CONCERNING VARIOUS ISI QUESTIONS AND RELIEF REQUEST INCLUDING R-15i REVI EWER NOT CONVINCED OF JUSTIFICATION FOR CHANGE BECAUSE OF STATEMENT IN FSAR CHAPTER 5
THAT VALVES ARE TESTABLE AT POWERS JANUARY 1987-COMMENCED POWER RANGE TEST PROGRAMe FEBRUARY 1987-VALVES TESTED FOR FIRST TIME AT PRESSURE AND POWER WITH FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS!
WHEN RC-904 OPENED - RC-905 ALSO OPENED'HEN RC-900 OPENED - RC-905 ALSO OPENED.
WHEN RC-901 OPENED RC-903, 904 AND 905 ALSO OPENEDI CWORK REQUEST WRITTEN TO CHECK VALVE POSITION INDICATION AND CONTROL CIRCUITS'
HISTORICAL CHRONOLOGY (CONTINUED)
APRIL 1987-WORK REQUEST WAS WORKEDe NO PROBLEM FOUND Wl TH INDICATION OR CONTROL C I RCU I T I NA I NTENANCE PLANNER WRITES SUPPLEMENTAL TICKET FOR MECHANICAL ASSISTANCE IN REWORKING VALVEs SUSPECT CAUSE IS BACK PRESSURE OF SYSTEMe HAY 1987-VALVES TESTED
~
NO PROBLEMS REPORTED i JUNE 1987-HAINTENANCE FEEDBACK REPORT WRITTEN TO OBTAIN MAINTENANCE ENG I NEER ASSISTANCE IN DETERMINING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AUGUST 1987-VALVES TESTEDI NO PROBLEMS REPORTEDa OCTOBER 9i 1987 -
VALVES TESTED AND FAILED'CTOBER 10.
1987
COMMENCED OUTAGE'
HISTORICAL CHRONOLOGY (CONTINUED)
OCTOBER "
VALVES 904 AND 905 INVERTED TO ALLOW DISC NOVEMBER'987 CAVITY TO REMAIN FULL OF WATERe VALVES 900,
- 901, 902, AND 904 DISASSEMBLED AND INSPECTED FOR DAMAGEs INTERNAL PARTS REPLACED IN VALVES 900'01 p
AND 904'HECK VALVE INSTALLED BETWEEN PRT AND VALVE 905
stjMt1ARY VALVES HAVE LONG STANDING HISTORY OF THIS TYPE PROBLEM BUT UNKNOHN TO SHEARON HARRIS AND TO NRCe SHNPP IS APPARENTLY ONLY PLANT THAT TESTS VALVES AT POMERe OPERATOR ACTIONS WHILE IMPRUDENT DID NOT RESULT IN AN UNSAFE CONDITIONS CORRECT I VE ACT I ONS HERE T IHELY AND COMPREHENSIVE'URTHER ACTIONS REQUIRED TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND ISl PROGRAHa