ML18004B940
| ML18004B940 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 09/18/1987 |
| From: | Richey R CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, NLS-87-200, NUDOCS 8709240292 | |
| Download: ML18004B940 (5) | |
Text
REGULATO INFORMATION DISTRIBUTIONSTEM
<RIBS>
I ACCESSION NBR: 8709240292 DOC. DATE: 87/09/18 NOTARIZED:
NO FACIL: 50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Planti Unit ii Carolina
- UTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION RICHEYI R. B.
Car olina Poujer 5 Light Co.
RECIP. NAME, RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
SUBJECT:
Forujards addi info re responses to IE Bulletin 85-003. Valve Nos 8130A 8c B 5 8131A 5 B not required to close during any analyzed accident.
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
IE11D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR ENCL SIZE:
TITLE: Bulletin Response (50 DKT)
NOTES: Application For permit reneuJal filed.
DOCKET 05000400 05000400 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-1.LA BUCKLEYIB INTERNAL: AEOD/DOA AEOD/DSP/TPAB NRR/DEST/*DS NRR/DOE*/EAB
+RES NLk 02 RGN2 FILE 01 EXTERNAL:
LPDR NSIC COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
0 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
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REC IP IENT ID CODE/N*ME PD2-1 PD
- EOD/DSP NRR/DEST/ADE NRR/DEST/MEB NRR/DOEA/QCB NRR/PMAS/ ILRB RES/DE/EIB NRC PDR COPIES
~ LTTR ENCL 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 "1
1 1
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1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:
LTTR 19 ENCL 18
C~L Carolina Power 8 Light Company SEP f 8887 SERIAL: NLS-87-200 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTENTION: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-000/LICENSE NO. NPF-63 REQUEST FOR ADDITIONALINFORMATIONCONCERNING THE SHNPP RESPONSES TO IEB 85-03 Gentlemen:
Attached is the additional information requested by your letter dated August 18, 1987.
The attachment provides that information necessary for the staff to resolve its comments and questions regarding previous SHNPP responses to IE Bulletin No. 85-03 Action (e).
Should you have any questions concerning this issue, please contact Mr. A. W. Schmich at (919) 836-8759.
Yours very truly,
~/D.-BYE'e/
R. B. Richey j Manager Licensing and Nuclear Fuel AWS/lah (5286A WS)
Attachment cc:
Mr. B. C. Buckley Dr. j. Nelson Grace Mr. G. F. Maxwell 8709240292 870918 PDR ADOCK 05000400 P
PDR 411 Fayettevitte street
~ p. o. Box 1551
~ Raleigh. N. c. 27602
~E II tlt
CAROLINAPOWER R LIGHTCOMPANY SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT l
Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Concerning Harris Responses to IE Bulletin 85-03 The following provides specific information for each of the information request items regarding IEB 85-03 Action (e).
Item 1:
The following MOVs of the HPSI system are not included in Table 1 of the response of 05-13-86.
However, similarly located MOVs of another Westinghouse three-loop plant are listed for inspection in accordance with bulletin requirements.
Please revise Table 1 to include these MOVs, or justify their exclusion.
As required by Action Item A of the bulletin, consider the effect of inadvertent equipment operations.
a.
Unlisted MOVs 8130A, 8130B, 8131A, and 8131B are shown normally open in series in a crossover line providing suction for the charging pumps, in Zone 3-11 of Drawing CAR-2165-G-0805, Revision IO.
b.
Unlisted MOVs 8132A, 8132B, 8133A, and 8133B are shown normally open in series in a crossover line on the discharge side of the charging pumps, in Zone I-7 of the drawing identified above.
CPRL Res onse:
la.
Valve Nos. 8130A and B and 8131A and B are not required to close during any analyzed accident.
lb. The valves addressed for Action (a) of IEB 85-03 were selected using the methodology of the "Westinghouse Owners'roup Safety-Related MOV Program Final Report" dated April 7, 1986.
The applicable excerpts of the report are quoted below.
Under Part III. METHODOLOGY, high pressure coolant injection is defined as:
1.
Those portions of the Safety Injection System down to/and not including the Accumulator Injection System.
In general, this includes portions of the CVCS and/or HHSI (RHR is NOT included and accumulator injection is not included).
2.
Those portions of the above-defined HPI Systems necessary to establish a flowpath(s) from the RWST and the RCS.
3.
Only those portions of the HPI (as defined above) required during the safety injection phase, up to/NOT INCLUDINGthe manual or partial auto transfer to recirculation from the containment sump after the RWST empties.
Therefore, recirculation modes of operation (2084NEL/ppo)
(long-term cold-leg recirculation and hot-leg recirculation) are not included in the definition of HPI since these modes of operation require the functioning of the RHR System, which has been excluded from the HPI definition (above).
Valve Nos. 8132A and B and 8133A and B are used to separate safety trains A and B during the low-head safety injection/recirculation phase of accident recovery.
The valves are closed after the refueling water storage tank is emptied and cooling water is obtained from the containment sump via the residual heat removal system.
These valves are not positioned by the engineering safety features actuation system (SI Signal) and are not required to operate during the high-head safety injection phase.
Has water hammer due to valve closure been considered in the determination of pressure differentials? If not, please explain.
CPRL Res onse:
Water hammer is a short-lived pressure spike whose duration is a small percentage of total stroke time. Additionally, the valve is a water hammer initiating device which reflects the pulse upstream of the valve where the spike acts on other components.
Deceleration of the fluid mass is at a relatively slow rate due to valve stroke time thereby minimizing any resulting pressure transients.
Please expand the proposed program for Action Items B, C, and D to include the following details as a minimum:
a.
commitment to a training program for setting switches, maintaining valve operators, using test equipment and interpreting test results, and b.
description of a method possibly needed to extrapolate valve stem thrust measured at less than maximum differential pressure.
CPRL Res onse:
IRC technicians are initiallytrained to set limitand torque switches by Craft and Technical Development training (CRTD). CRTD training is both formal and documented.
In addition, the technicians receive on-the-job training on installed equipment in the plant. Technicians set the switches in accordance with a detailed, approved maintenance procedure.
For these reasons, we believe that the commitment to a training program is met and no further action is required.
Corrective maintenance (CM) and maintenance periodic test (MPT) procedures for valve operators are in place at this time. These procedures set the switches and inspect the condition of the operator.
A maintenance management manual (MMM)procedure is in the process of being developed at this time that willcoordinate maintenance activities on operators.
The commitment to maintaining valve operators is therefore met.
(2084NE L/ppo)
Valve operators are currently tested periodically under the ISI program.
Personnel have been trained in the use of diagnostic techniques for evaluating MOV performance and subsequent evaluation of the results.
MOV valve operators are also covered by the Post-Maintenance Testing procedure which specifies test activities. It is therefore felt that the requirement for using test equipment and interpreting the test results has been met.
The current technology does not provide an accurate, readily available means for measuring valve thrust in the field on installed MOVs in both opening and closing strokes.
Additionally, the valve manufacturers, valve operator manufacturer, and valve testing companies have not established a standard formula describing required valve thrust versus differential pressure due to the innumerable variations in packing, surface finishes, seating areas/finishes, and physical layout of the valve. The degree to which the valve is maintained also needs to be factored into the thrust/hP equation for the permanently installed MOV.
One possible method of extrapolating thrust to design maximum hP, accurate to the tolerance of the test e ui ment thrust measurin device, would be to measure thrust at zero hP and again at some reasonably attainable hP.
These two points would then be plotted on a graph and a straight line drawn through the two points and extended to design maximum hP.
The thrust at maximum hP is then read off its plotted axis.
The extrapolated thrust at design maximum hP may then be compared to the valve manufacturer's stated value to determine if the installation is in accordance with the design basis for the operator/valve assembly.
According to Section A of Attachment 1 of the response of 03-00-87, "The 0 percent positions are determined by the total number of handwheel turns for the valve (listed on the data sheet)".
This method is not recommended, because one of the problems at Davis-Besse 1 reported in IEB 85-03 resulted from counting handwheel turns.
Please provide a description of how that problem at Davis-Besse 1 willbe compensated for at your facility.
CPRL Res onse:
Gate valve position for the purpose of setting closed-to-open torque switch bypass limitswitches willbe performed by one of the following methods:
1.
By the use of diagnostic techniques, or 2.
Switches willbe set at a minimum of 15% which willaccount for any lost motion due to operator backlash.
For No. 2 above, maintenance procedures willbe revised to provide for the 15 percent setting.
Based on the fact that testing has already been satisfactorily performed, field implementation willoccur by the end of the 1988 refueling outage.
(20S4NEL/ppo)