ML18003B275

Submits Justification for Revising Tech Spec Surveillance Intervals for 13 Slave Relays from Quarterly to Every 18 Months & for Rev to Quarterly Surveillance Test Interval on Subj Relays

ML18003B275
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	05/19/1986
From:	Zimmerman S CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NLS-86-047, NLS-86-47, NUDOCS 8605230124
Download: ML18003B275 (14)

Text

REGULATORY INFORNATION DISTRIBUTION:"SYS~TeN (R IDS)

>>ACCESSION NBR: 860523012~

DOC. DATE: 86/05/19 NOT~ ZED:

NO I

DOCKET 0 FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant>

Un~ ii Carolina 05000400 AUTH. NAI>E AUTHOR AFFXLIATION ZXNNERNANiB. R.

Carolina Power Zc Light Co.

RECIP. NANE RECXPXENT AFFlLIATIQN DENTQNp H. R.

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulationi Direc tor (p ost 851125

SUBJECT:

Submits justification for revising Tech Spec surveillance intervals for 13 slave relays from quarterly to every 18 months Zc for rev to quarterly surveillance test interval on sub J relays.

DIBTRIBVTION CODE:

BOOID COPIEB RECEIVED: LTR g ENCL j SIZE:

TXTLE: Licensing Submittal:

PBAR/FBAR Amdt s Zc Related Correspondence NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed.

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CM0 Carolina Power & Light Company MAY >9 me Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NO.

1 - DOCKET NO.50-000 SLAVE RELAYS SERIAL: NLS-86-007

Dear Mr. Denton:

Carolina Power R Light Company (CPRL) submits justification for a deviation from the Standard Technical Specification (TS) surveillance intervals for 13 slave relays to support the safe and prudent operation of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (SHNPP).

This information has been requested by your staff for the development of SHNPP TS. These slave relays are part of the Engineered Safety Features Actuation Instrumentation listed in Table 0.3-2 of the CPRL proposed SHNPP TS (Attachment 1).

Specific reasons for the revision to the Standard TS surveillance interval for each relay are given in Attachment 2. In general, the operation of these slave relays would place the plant into an abnormal operating condition. Carolina Power R Light Company proposes to revise the surveillance interval from quarterly to every 18 months during refueling and during each cold shutdown greater than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> unless the relay has been tested within the previous 92 days.

Additional justification to support this interval is provided in Attachment 3.

If you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Gregg A. Sinders at (919) 836-8168.

Yours very truly, GAS/ccj (3308GAS)

Attachments S.

. Zi erman ager Nuclear Licensing Section CC>>

Mr. R. A. Benedict (NRC)

Mr. V. Benaroya (NRC)

Mr. B. C. Buckley (NRC)

Mr. J. Mauck (NRC)

Mr. G. F. Maxwell (NRC-SHNPP)

Dr. J. Nelson Grace (NRC-RII)

Mr. Travis Payne (KUDZU)

Wake County Public Library Mr. Daniel F. Read (CHANGE/ELP)

Mr. Wells Eddleman Mr. John D. Runkle Dr. Richard D. Wilson Mr. G. O. Bright (ASLB)

Dr. J. H. Carpenter (ASLB)

Mr. J. L. Kelley (ASLB)

Mr. H. A. Cole 411 Fayetteville Street o P. O. Box 1551 s Raleigh, N. C. 27602 I

ssossss>>+

ssos~

PDR ADOCK 05000 A

" 'DR

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL UNIT TABLE 4.3-2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 0

TRIP ANALOG ACTUATING MODES CHANNEL DEVICE

, MASTER SLAVE FOR N)ICH CHANNEL CHAHNEL OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL ACTUATIOH 'ELAY RELAY SURVEILLANCE CHECK CALIBRATION TEST TEST I

TET TET I

T

~IE M

I CO

1. Safety Injection (Reactor Trip, Feedwater Isolation, Control Room Isolation, Start Diesel'enerators, Containment Ventilation Isolation, Phase A Con-tainment Isolation, Start Auxiliary Feedwater System Motor-Driven Pumps, Start Containment Fan Coolers, Start Emergency

'ervice Water'Pumps, Start Emergency Service Mater Booster Pumps) a.

Manual Initiation H.A.

b. Automatic Actuation H.A.

Logic and Actuation Relays c.

Containment Pressure S High-1 H.A.

H.A.

N.A.

H.A.

H.A.

N.A.

N.A.

M(1)

N. A.

H.A.

N.A.

1, 2, 3, 4

M(1) 0 (3) 1, 2, 3

N.A.

N.A.

1, 2, 3

EE 4

E C

C

d. Pressurizer Pressure S

. Low e.

Steam Line Pressure Low N.A.

H.A.

N.A.

N.A.

H. A.

N.A.

N.A.

1, 23 N.A.

'1, 2,

3

~ SI CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL UNIT

2. Containment Spray TABLE 4.3-2 Continued)

ENGIHEEREO SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATIOH SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS TRIP ANALOG ACTUATING MODES CHANNEL DEVICE ltASTER SLAVE FOR 'NlICH CHANNEL CMAHHEL OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL ACTUATION'ELAY RELAY SURVEILLANCC CHECK CA LIB RATIOH TEST TEST LOGIC TEST TEST TEST IS ~RE VIREO a.

Manual Initiati on

b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays

'. Containment Pressure High 3. Containment Isolation I

a.

Phase "A" Isolation H.A.

H.A.

N.A.

H.A.

H.A.

H.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

M(1)

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

1, 2, 3, M(l)

Q 1,2,3,4 N. A.

N. A.

1, 2, 3

1) Manu'al Initiation

\\

2) Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays

3) Safety Injection b.

Phase "B" Isolation H.A.

H.A.

N.A.

H.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N. A.

N.A.

M(1)

N.A.

N.A 1, 2, 3, 4

M(1)

Q(8g 1, 2, 3, 4

See Item 1.

above for all Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements.

1) Manual Containment Spray Initiation

2) Automatic Actuation Logic Actuation Relays H.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N. A.

M(1}

M(1)

Q See Item 2.a.

above for Manual Containment Spray Surveillance Requirements.

1,:..',

3, 4

mg NIQ gg iaI

TABLE 4.3-2 Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM IHSTRUMENTATIQN SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS CHANNEL'..

FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHANNEL CHECK TRIP ANALOG ACTUATING MODES CHANNEL DEVICE

, MASTER SLAVE FOR WHICH CHANNEL OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL ACTUATIOH I RELAY RELAY SURVEILLANCE CALIBRATIOH TEST TEST LOGIC TEST TEST TEST IS REIIOIREO II

6. Auxiliary'Feedwater (Continued)

f. Trip of All.Main Feed-H.A.

water Pumps Start Motor-Driven Pumps g;-.Steam Line Differen-S tial Pressure High Coincident With Main See Item Steam Line Isolation Z.

Safety= Injection Switchover to Containment Sump H.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

H.A 1,

2 H.A.

N. A.

N.A.

H.A.

1, 2, 3

4.

above for all Main Steam Line Isolation Surveillance Requirements.

a. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays b.

RWST LevelLow-Low Coincident With Safety Injection

8. Containment Spray Switch-over to Containment Sump N.A.

N.A.

See Item 1.

above N.A.

N.A.

M(1) q(3) l.,2, 3,

~

cp (3)

M N.A..

N.A.

N.A.

~N.A 1, 2, 3, for all.Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements.

a. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

M(1)

M(1) q 1, 2, 3,

~@5

~

g TABL<< 3-2 (Continued)

TABLE HOTATIGH (1)

Each train shall be tested at least every 62 d-ys o

S"AQQ""ED T S

BASIS.

na 7-c~

t I

(2)

The Surveillance Reauirements of Specification 4.9.9 app/y durina CORE

&Lr

~

r T:-~i~OH or movement of irradiated fuel in conrtainmen etpoint verification not required.

Our-no CORE ALI-.'GH~

LI MI GH 0

mOVemenr.

Or 'Irradiaied ruel in C ntainment (33 EX~f Qv. ~lays k I or rrI o'LrL408> kloof r k'r IO> kbrh~

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Car b.<4l!7kD4rr!

r r ~~g 02.

! <<~5 u~Q.Srr ~

terr~ W~ 4s4g urWra ~ Irreuro re 9

c4qs.

SHEAROH HARRIS - UNIT 1 3/4 3"44

ATTACHMENT2 The attached table provides the following information for each relay for which CPRL requests a surveillance frequency change:

Relay Number Equipment/Valve Number The designation of equipment/valve of concern actuated by the relay.

Service Description Test Concerns A brief description of the function of each device.

Identifies the difficulties associated with actuating specific devices.

These undesirable consequences provide the basis for our request for a change in surveillance frequency.

(3348GAS/ccj

)

ATTACHMENT2 TABLE 1

~Re la No.

Equipment/Valve No.

Train A Train B Service Descri tion Test Concerns K601 DG DG IA-SA 1B-SB Diesel Generator Start The Diesel Generators used on SHNPP are manufactured by Trans-America DeLaval (TDI). Due to the number of starts on the diesel as a result of quarterly testing, the maximum number of starts as recommended by TDI and its owners'roup would be exceeded.

In the event the maximum number of starts is exceeded, the engine is required to be broken down and refurbished.

The Diesel Generators are presently being load tested on a monthly basis by manual initiation.

ISI-208 Accumulator IC Discharge Isolation Additionally, the isolation valve to RCS Accumulator 1C should not be closed for testing during power operation since it can place the plant in a potentially unsafe condition.

Based on the SHNPP accident analysis, two accumulators are required to mitigate the consequences of a double-ended break in the cold leg. It is assumed that only one accumulator volume is discharged through the break.

Therefore, closing an accumulator discharge isolation valve would isolate a second accumulator, violating the initial conditions of the SHNPP Accident Analyses.

K602 1CS-165 1CS-166 VCT to CSIP Suction Actuation of the relay cause addition of borated water to the RCS during power (3308G AS/pgp)

ATTACHMENT2 TABLE 1 (Continued)

Equipment/Valve No.

~Rela No.

Train A Train B K602 (cont'd) 1CS-291 1CS-292 Service Descri tion RWST to CSIP Suction Test Concerns operation.

This results in unnecessary rod movement and can result in a violation of Axial Flux Difference limits. There is also some small possibility of a reactor trip due to the hl penalty to the OThT trip setpoint.

Boration also increases the amount of liquid radwaste to be processed and could cause an unnecessary plant shutdown at the end of a core cycle. Switching of the CSIP's suction can result in thermal cycles to RCP seals and possible clogging of the seal injection filters.

K603 ICS-238 1CS-235 ISI-206 ISI-207 Charging Pump Discharge to RCS Isolation Accumulator IA and 1B Discharge Isolation Actuation of this relay causes isolation of the charging flow to the RCS and would decrease significantly the capability of the CVCS system to provide proper boration ratio. The isolation would only allow a flow path through the RC pump seal which would provide a insufficient boration path.

Additionally, this relay should not be tested at power for the same reason as the Relay K601. Refer to concerns for testing of Relay K601.

K608 1SW-270 1SW-271 Emergency Service Water Header A/B Return to Auxiliary Reservoir This relay should not be tested at power due to discharging chlorinated water from the normal service water/cooling tower system to the reservoirs.

This would (3303GAS/pgp)

ATTACHMENT2 TABLE I (Continued)

Equipment/Valve No.

~Rela No.

Train A Train B K608 (cont'd)

Service Descri tion Test Concerns potentially violate the EPA/State effluent discharge permit for chlorine limitations.

Additionally, in the event that either of the cooling tower make-up pumps are not operational, the opening of these valves could cause the lowering of the cooling tower basin level. This could potentially affect the.

normal service water pump capability and the plant would have to reduce load or shutdown.

K610 DG 1A-SA DG 1B-SB RAB HVAC RAB HVAC Isolation Isolation Diesel Generator Start (Secondary Input)

RAB Normal HVAC Branch Isolation Dampers This relay should not be tested at power for the same reasons as discussed for Relay K601.

Additionally, this relay should not be tested at power because it will isolate safety-related equipment areas that also have non-safety related equipment.

Although those areas do have back-up cooling, it is available only when the associated service water header is in operation.

Therefore, there could be adverse temperature excursions that could affect the safety-related equipment qualification and non-safety related equipment operation.

(3303GAS/ccj)

ATTACHMENT2 TABLE 1 (Continued)

~Re la No.

K-739 K-700 K-700 K-701 Equipment/Valve No.

Train A Train B 1CT-105 ICT-102 ICT-105 1CT-102 Service Descri tion Containment Spray Sump Recirculation Isolation Valves (Sump to Pump Suction)

Containment Spray Sump Recirculation Isolation Valves (Sump to Pump Suction)

Test Concerns The relays control the automatic switchover to the containment sump on lo-lo RWST level coincident with a Safety Injection signal. If tested at power, manual valves would have to be closed to prevent draining the RWST to the Containment Spray Sumps.

This would be in contradiction to the commitment made in Section 7.3.2.2.10.7 of the FSAR concerning safeguards testing.

Also, this testing will drain the Containment Spray Header into the Containment Sump.

This problem can be minimized if the testing is permitted during COLD SHUTDOWN.

These relays are tested in pairs as shown, with one test switch per train. Each pair of relays actuate all four valves shown.

(3308GAS/cc j)

ATTACHMENT3 The following information is supplied as further justification for requesting a revision to the quarterly surveillance test interval on the subject relays.

I.

Historical Data The slave relays employed at SHNPP are Potter-Brumfield Rotary relays.

These relays have been installed in several other operating plants.

The performance of the relays has been excellent and a recent survey of NPRDS data indicates that no failures have been reported.

Although CPRL is proposing not to test the output contacts of subject slave relays on quarterly intervals, the following test program elements increase the overall assurance of OPERABILITYof the component/system by testing upstream and downstream of the contacts.

ao Master Relay Testing Each of the master relays in the Solid State Protection System,.are actuated and continuity through its associated slave relay's coil verified on a monthly basis.

b.

Components actuated by the subject relays willbe tested per the ASME Section XI Pump and Valve Program and applicable TS surveillance requirements.

Co The Engineered Safety Feature Response Time testing required by TS 0.3.2.2 results in the actuation of the ESF components through their respective actuation devices.

d.

The subject slave relays shall be tested every l8 months during refueling and during each COLD SHUTDOWN period exceeding 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> unless they have been tested within the previous 92 days.

(3348GAS/ccj

)

4-4 ~

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