ML17354A689
| ML17354A689 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 10/20/1997 |
| From: | Croteau R NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | Plunkett T FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17354A691 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-M85616, TAC-M85617, NUDOCS 9711040262 | |
| Download: ML17354A689 (18) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 2055&4001 October 20, 1997 Mr. T. F. Plunkett President
- Nuclear Division Florida Power and Light Company P.O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, Florida 33408-0420
SUBJECT:
USE OF SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS RATHER THAN CHARGING PUMPS FOR 10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS - TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 (TAC NOS. M85616 AND M85617)'ear Mr. Plunkett:
Pl During a public meeting with your staff on January 7, 1997, we were informed that you intended to use the safety injection (Sl) pumps for post fire safe shutdown (in lieu of the charging pumps) in the event of a fire in the charging pump area.
Previously, you had protected one train of the charging pumps with Thermo-Lag, however, failure of the product to meet the fire barrier requirements resulted in the need for upgrades or, as your staff indicated, use of other equipment.
In the January meeting, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff stated that use of the Sl pumps constituted an "alternative post-fire safe shutdown" method and your staff should confirm compliance with Sections III.G.3 and III.Lof 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R (Appendix R). Your staff considered the SI pumps redundant to the charging pumps.
During a site visit to Turkey Point in May 1997, your staff provided the NRC with a memorandum to Florida Power 5 Light from the law firm Shaw, Pittman, Potts &
. Trowbridge entitled "Safety Injection Pumps For Use As Shutdown Equipment Under Appendix R" dated March 14, 1997.
A copy of the memorandum is enclosed.
This memorandum provided a legal discussion on the use of the Sl pumps as redundant to the normal charging pumps for a safe shutdown.
We have reviewed the Turkey Point design as documented in the FSAR and the March 14, 1997 memorandum and concluded that the Turkey Point Sl pumps are not functionally redundant to the charging pumps.
Our evaluation is enclosed.
The FSAR indicates that the Sl pumps have a shutoff head of 3,300 feet (approximately 1430 psi), significantly lower than plant operating pressure and pressure immediately after a shutdown.
Therefore, the Sl pumps are not redundant to the charging pumps and should be considered "alternative post-fire safe shutdown" equipment.
We have concluded that it is necessary to evaluate the adequacy of fire protection features provided in 'the charging pump room and determine if any modifications to these features are needed to meet Section III.G.3 of Appendix R.
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~4 In addition, it would be necessary to verify that the Sl pump alternative shutdown method satisfies the reactor performance goals specified by Section III.Lof Appendix R, if the Sl pumps are used in lieu of the charging pumps.
It is our understanding that you have not yet implemented this change from use of the charging pumps to use of the SI pumps and compensatory measures are still in place due to the deficient fire barriers installed in the charging pump areas.
Sincerely,
. /s/
Richard P. Croteau, Project Manager Project Directorate II-3 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251
Enclosures:
As Stated cc w/
Enclosures:
See next page Distribution Docket File BBoger PUBLIC TP Reading OGC ACRS Document Name: G:TURKEYiThermo.lag PMadden LTran J Johnson, Rll THarris(E-mail SE)
OFFICE PM:PDII-3 NAME RCroteau DATE 0/
/97 COPY Y
/No D:PDII-3 LA:PDII-3 FHebdon BClayto 18
/97 0/RQ'97 Yeas No Yes/
o FFICIAL REC COPY SPLB TMarsh IO/ I/97 Yes/No
Mr. T.
F. Plunkett Florida Power and Light Company TURKEY POINT PLANT CC:
M. S.
- Ross, Attorney Florida Power
& Light Company P.O.
Box 14000 Juno
- Beach, FL 33408-0420 John T. Butler, Esquire
- Steel, Hector and Davis 4000 Southeast Financial Center Miami, Florida 33131-2398 Mr. Robert J.
Hovey, Site Vice President Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Florida Power and Light Company 9760 SW. 344th Street Florida City, FL 33035 Armando Vidal County Manager Metropolitan Dade County 111 NW 1 Street, 29th Floor Miami, Florida 33128 Senior Resident Inspector Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O.
Box 1448 Homestead, Florida 33090 Hr. Bill Passetti Office of Radiation Control Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Blvd.
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Hr. Joe Hyers, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Regional Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 61 Forsyth Street, SW., Suite 23T85
- Atlanta, GA 30303-3415 Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Plant Manager Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Florida Power and Light Company 9760 SW. 344th Street Florida City, FL 33035 Mr. H.N. Paduano, Manager Licensing
& Special Programs Florida Power and Light Company P.O.
Box 14000 Juno
- Beach, Florida 33408-0420 Hr. Gary E. Hollinger Licensing Manager Turkey Point Nuclear Plant 9760 SW. 344th Street Florida City, FL 33035 Hr. Kerry Landis U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 61 Forsyth Street, SW., Suite 23T85
- Atlanta, GA 30303-3415
Mr. T.F. Plunkett In addition, it would be necessary to verify that the Sl pump alternative shutdown method satisfies the reactor performance goals specified by Section III.Lof Appendix R, if the Sl pumps are used in lieu of the charging pumps.
~
It is our understanding that you have not yet implemented this change from use of the charging pumps to use of the Sl pumps and compensatory measures are still in place due to the deficient fire barriers installed in the charging pump areas.
Sincerely Richard P. Croteau, Project Manager Project Directorate II-3 Division of Reactor Projects - I/ll Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251
Enclosures:
As Stated cc w/
Enclosures:
See next page
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S~w, Prrn @et, PoTTs R TaowsRrmE MEMORANDUM TO:
Horida Power R Light David R. Lewis Pau1 A. Gaukler March 14, 1997 RE:
Safety Injection Pumps Far Use As Safe Shutdown Ecpxipment Under Appendix R L XN'TRODUCTIONAl'M Florida Power 85 Light PFPRL") is about to undertake changes to the Fire Pro-tection Program at its Turkey Paint Nuclear Power Plant in order ta resolve outstand-ing Gre protection issues concerning the use af Thermolag. As part af those charqps, HM.is proposing to ident'nd use one ofthe high head safety injection pumps as safe shutdown equipment in accordance withthe xecpzirements of TO CPS $ 50, Ap.
pendix R to safely shut down the plant inthe event af a Gze. Under this proposal, the equipment far the safe shutdown of.the plant would include one divisian ofthe charg-ing pump system and on. hvision ofthe safety injection sysu~n. They would be used ta mauu~ reactor coolant makeup and reactivity control, whidiare twa functions necessary to accomplish safe shutdovm of he plant. The ¹clear Reyilatory Com-mission ('NRC') has, hmnnrer, questioned FPBtL's proposed use ofone af the safety injection pumps ia lieu ofom ofth. chair g pumps as safe shutdawn equipment un-der Appendix R. According to the NRC's 'iew, the safety injection pumps should be considered 'alternative dnudawn capability'ubject to the require-m~a ofSeaion III.G3ofAppendiz R.
Enc1osure 1
V'e have reviewed this issue and have concluded that the safety injection pumps can be identi6ed and used as safe shutdown equipment under Appendix R.Section III.G3 ofAppendix R reflects tha't alternative shutdown capability involves some physical modification to the plant to enable nksung systems to provide safe shutdown capability not otherwise provided for by the plant s design. Here, the safety injection pumps are designed to perform the reactor coolant makeup and reactivity control I
,:functions necessary forthe safe shutdown of the plant and they can accomplish those functions without physical modifications. Moreover, PPM. has established proce-dures under which the plant operators have been trained to shut da'wn the plant using the safety injection pumps to accomplish these functions.
Furrier, Generic Letter 81 which sets Earth the Staff's posiYion on safe shutdown capabiTity identi6es safety injection pumps along withthe charging pumps as equipment geaerally access;~ for safe shutdown ofpressurized water reactors. The generic letter reflects that reactor coolant makeup and reactivity control can be accom-plished Eor Appendix R ptxzpases by either the charging pumps or the safety'njectian pumps. That the safety injection pumps can be used ia conjunctian withthe charging pumps to provide forthe safe shutdown ofthe plant in accordance with Appendix R is Abye NRC' i~ ~~J ~
h P Island Nuclear (%aerating Plant. There, the NRC accepted one division af the charg-um em and one the saf in as part ofthe zzg.~
dundant trains of saEe shutdown epipment requued under Appendix R.
Genetic Letter 86-10 also addiesses safe shutdown epipmeat and alternative shutdown capability but poses a different criterion fordetermixung what constitutes alternative shutdown capability. The test under ~eric Letter 86-10 is whether the system or componeat is being used to provide ia intended design ~ion, aot whether tnodiEcations are necesmy to provide the alternative shutdown capabtTitp.
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According to Generic Letter 86-1O, ifthe system or component is not being used as provided for by its design, it should be
. oasid"red as p:u-.;~ altermtiv" shutdo~
capability subject to the requiremeats of Section IILG3ofAppendix R.
We believe that FPM.'s proposed use ofthe safety injection pumps for safe shutdown satisfies the criterion set forth in Generic Letter 86-Io (even assunmg dm criterion's validitygivea its divergence from Appeadiz R). The safety injection pumps are designed to provide reactor coolant makeup and other safe shutdown Euactioas for desiyx basis events. Aay doubt about the aauptabiHty ofusing the safety injenion pumps as safe shutdown equipment under Appendix R is laid to rest by their identifi-cation as safe shutdown equipment in Generic Letter 81-12 and the NRC's acceptance oftheir use as safe shutdown equipment at the Prairie Island plant.
H. LEGALDISCUSSION A
A dix R Re ents For Safe Shutdown OfThe Phnt Appendix R retires that at least "to~ traia ofsystems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown willremain available during and after any pemQated fire in the plant.
10 CZ2t. $ 50, App. R, $ HLG.1~ see also 45 Fath Reg. 76,602, 76,606 (Nov. 19, 1980). To achieve this objecnve, Section HLG2 ofAppendiz R presctibes three different means forprotecting redundaat trains ofsystems repi~~ for safe shut-down ofthe plant located within 9w same fire area.
These are (a) scpazaion "by a fire bonier having a 3-hour rating" (b) septet on by a horizontal distance ofmore than 20 feet (withautomatic Eire suppression); and (c) enclosure of oae redundant train in a Gre barrier having a 1-haur rating (withautomatic Gre suppression).
Section IILG3pro-vides that "[a]ltettunive or dedicated shutdown cagtTtt7" ntust be provided in the enmt ix is not feeble to protect systems required forhot shako,wn by one ofthe three means prescribed in Section IILG2ofAppendix R.
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The components or equipment ofthe two redundant trains of systems required
-.o achieve safe compression shutdown in m" event of a Ere are referred to as "safe shutdown equipment."
~Scc ~c, 45 Fcd. Reg. at 76,608. However, neither, Appendix R nor the statement of considerations elaborate on the attributes of safe shutdown equipment (beyond setting forth in Sccuon IILLthe funciions to bc accomplished by safe shutdown ofthe plant);" Footnote 2 to Appendix R docs, however, give further dcfinition to alternative and dedicated shutdown capability as follows:
Alternativeshutdownca bilitvis rovidcdb rerou
'eloca or modifica ion of 'ms; dedicated shutdown capability is provided by installing new struc-tures and systems <or the fur.ztion ofpost-Gre shutdown.
10 CZW $ 50, App. R, $ IILG3,note 2 (emphasis added). The statement ofconsid-erations to Appendix R further elaborates on Alternative and Dedicated Shutdo am Capability" as follows:
In some locations (such as the cable spreading roo'm) within operating nuclear power plants, it is not always possible or practicable to protect redundant safe shutdown systems against adverse dfects offire or fire supprmion activities only through the use ofGre protection features because the rekmdant safe shutdown systems in a yven Gre area are too clo.::v each other. Altenmtive shutdown capability has usu:aQy been required to be independent ofthe control room, cable spreading room, switchgcar rooms and cable riser areas because rcdunctant systems in these areas are not adepmeely separated.
When lant modiBcations to ovuh alternative shutdo nx are ext a dedicated sys-tem that is essentially a mixumum capabiTity safe shutdown
-". IEInformaaon Notice No. @49 provides that t'tPe systems and equipmcnt neede4 for posr-Gre safe shutdawa are those systems necessary to perform the shutdcwn hnHnn de6ned in Seaion HLL ofAppendix R-'E Information¹uce ¹. 8449 ("Lelons Lcaraei &emNRC Inspections ofFire Proteaion Safe Shurdown Sysrcms (10 CFR SQ, Appendix 1g"), Attachment 1 at 4.
train aad is independent ofthose already existing may be provided.
45 Fed. Reg. at 76,607 l'emphasis added).
Thus, the language and regulatory history ofAppendix R shows that the NRC contemplated that "alternative shutdown capability" would involve some physical change to the plant aot part ofthe plant's design or conGguration in order to ea-able existing plant systems or components to provide safe shutdowri capabiTity. At Turkey Point, the safety injection system as oriymdlydeemed'perfc~
certain func-tions necessary for the safe shutdown ofthe plant aad no modifications are necessary for the system to provide these safe shutdown functiona Thus, both the language and.
regulatory history oEAppendix R reQect that the safety injection pumps should be-considered as equipmeat designed forthe safe shutdown ofthe plant, and not epup-ment that has been modiGed to provide alternative shutdown capability."
B.
Genenc Letter 81-12 Fire Protection Rule... November 19 1980 Generic Letter 81-12, (issued February 20, 1981 shortly after Appendix R-had been promulgatedj conGrms the above conclusion based on thc plain Imqpuge of Appendix R. Enclosure 1 to the Geaeric Letter, entitled "Sta8 Position Safe Shut-down Capability, sets forth guidelines concenuag the procedures aad criteria by which liccasees are to demonstrate "Ls+c shutdown capability" in accordance withthe rapurements ofSection IKG2ofAppeadiz R, or alternatively, provide "alternate shutdown capabilityte ia accordance withSection IILG3ofAppendix R. Generic Let-ter 81-12, Endosure 1 at 1.
These guidelines identify the "[p~ormance +osis'r refuiretnents for safe shutdown ofthe plane.SI Id. at 2-3. The guidelines also identify the specifipclant These indude verbaum the 'performance goab'or the shmdcrglyn 6maion set hmh in Section HLL2ofAppendix R.
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equipment "tj}enerally[n]ecessary" for hot and cold shutdown af bath pressurized and boiling water reactors. Id. at 3-5. With respect ta the "je]quipment [generally tn]eces-sary for th]ot I's]tandby" of pressurized water reactors, the guidelines provide as follows:
(I)
~R Reactor trip capability (scram). Horatian capabiTity e..
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f Ib rated water supplies, and let down system ifrequired.
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Reactor Coolant Makeu Reactor coalant makeup capability', e.
ar the 'essure in ection.
um Power operated reliefvalves may be required ta reduce pres-sure to aHow use ofthe high pressure injection pumps.'6)
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tion ofthe above described shutdown agcomponent cooling water service water, etc. anId onsite power sources (AC, DC) withtheir associated electrical distribution system.
Id. at 3 (emphasis added). Thus, Generic Letter 81-12 expressly idenci6es the safety injection pumps as "[safe] shutdovm equipment" Eor premuized water reactors, such as Turkey Point. Moreover, itreflects that either the charging pumps or the safety injection pumps can be used under Appendix R ta aomplish the reactar coolant makeup and reactivity control functions necessary fur safe shutdow" n accordance withthe provisions af hppeadix R, Qeaeric Lene Si-Q abo reQects that atter-Pootnote continued oa next page
That safety injection pumps can be used as safe shutdown equipment in accor-dance with the requirements ofSection 2I.G2 ofA.ppenui-R is further confirmed by the NRC's acceptance of the fire protec-.ion program Eor the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant which included one ofthe safety injection pumps as safe shutdown equipment for the plant. The Updated Safety Ana1ysis Report ("USAR") Eor the Prai-ric Island plant provides as follows:
The minimum safe shutdown ems consist of one divi-sion ofthe e
one division ofthe saf in ec-d Ch'l ~mf d
system (&W)(one motor and one turbine driven}, the power operated reliefvalves (PORV) and steam safety valves. (SSV), the component coo1ixg water system (CCV),
the cooling water system (CW), the residual heat remova1 system gUM), and emergency diese1 generators (EDQ)....
The mixnmum systems provide for a means to maintain the required maryn ofshutdo am reactivity or saf
~in'ection, melee-up coolant inventory or aaf
~in eciaa, removing reactor decay iteat (AfW),control of the cool down rate (PORV or SSV), long term cooling pe), cooling for the safety injection pump, reactor cool-ant pump thermal barriers and residual heat remova1 system (CCW), equipment cooling (CW), and supply power (EDG).
Footnote continued &omprevious page n<<ze'r
<<1teraative shuxdmra c<<p<<biTity iavohres modiGcaion ofpl<<nt sysrems to provide for shutdown capabiTity not included as part ofthe pl<<nt's origin<<1 deign. For erample, among the in-formation requited for Staff review i3:
(<<) Description ofthe systans or portions thereof used to provi*the shutdown c<<pabBity and modi6c<<tions 'o achieve the +
ternate Shutdown iTi if uireL Generic Lena 81-12, Encioture 1 at 5 (eetp irma adCe@; tee abo Generic Lener 81-72 at 1.
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Prairie Island USAR $ 103.1.5 ("Safe Shutdown Systems Analysis") at 103-11 (Rev.
- 13) (empbasis added).'- Thus, at Prairie Isl~rd, one ofthe safety injection pumps is re-lied on to perform the same safe shutdown functions under Appendix R as proposed by FPBzL for Turkey Point.
In short, two pertinent conclusions can be drawn from Generic Letter 81-12 and the Prairie Island USAR concerning the identity of safe shutdown equipment under Appendix R First, thc two redundant trains of equipment required for safe shutdo~
under Appendix R can bc comprised ofportions or divisions ofvarious plant systems.
It is not necessary under Appendix R to protect the redundant %visions ofthe same sgn:em, such as the charging system, in accordance saith gecuon IILG2ofAppendix R as long as the safe shutdown funct:on of the chaqjng system can bc accomplished by another existing piant system, such as the safety infection system. ~Secon one divi-sion ofthe safety injection system and one division'ofthc chaqjng pump system can be used to provide thc reactivity control and reactor coolant makeup safe shutdown functions ofthe two redundant trains ofshutdo wn ecgupment under Appendix R. Of course, in this instance, the division ofthe chaqjng system relied upon for safe shut-down must be separated in accordance withSection IILG2from the division ofthe safety injection system relied upon forperforming those same safe shutdown functions.
Further Table 1~ ofthe Prairie Mand UShR ideati6es the two divisions or trains-
"Trainh" and 'Train B' ofminimum safe shutdown equipment necessary to achieve safe shut-dogvn in the event ofa Gre. Prairie Island USAR at 103-9 (Re@. 13). This table, entitled "Safe Shut-dawn Equipment, includes one diviYionofthe chaqjng system and the related chatting pump as part of"Trainh and one division ofthe safety iareaioa ~em and the related safety in)ectioa pump as part of'Train B.'rairie bland USHER, Table 10~ at 9 Pev. 3).
Similarly, for boiTia'g water reaaoa Generic Letter 81-Q reQeas that certain safe shutdown func-tions caa be accognpljshed by a combination ofthe reactor core isolation cooling system aad the high pressure coolant injection system.
Generic Letter 81-12, Enclosure 1 at 4 O'U f'6 SO'tyd 488BC9958'5'ag SLXOd NVHLZ.Id AVHSsH05d CSs6g d.6-trg-'hIEfH
C.
Generic Letter 86-10 "Im lemeatatioa Of Fire Protection Re 'eats Generic Letter 86-10, issued April24, 1986, also address..'. alteInative shutdown capability but suggests a diferent criterion than that set forth ia Appendix R for deter-mining what constitutes alternative shutdown capability. The guidance ia Generic Letter 86-10 most relevaat here is found in question aad aamgyer 3.89, "Redundant Trail+/Alternate Shutdown" set forth in Eaclosure 2. This question aad answer pro-vides as follows:
Confusion exists as to what willbe ctassi6ed as an alternate shutdown system and thus what systems might be required to be protected by suppression aad detection uader Section IILG.3.b. For example, while we are relying upon the turbine. building condensate syncom for a reaotor building fire and the RHR system for a turbine buildingfit,would oae system be considered the alternative to the other. Ifso, would suppression aad detection be required foreither or both systems under XKG.3.bP An explanation ofalternative shutdown needs to be acbrance3 foz'lllicenses.
RESPONSE
Ifthe is used to rovide its functio it
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. Ild used in lieu ofthe referred because the redundant corn nents ofthe referred em does aot meet the ration criteria ofSection IILG the is considered an alternative shutdown ca bili.. Thus, forthe example above, it appears that the condensate system is providing at-teraauve shutdown capabiTity in lieu ofseparating redun-dant components ofthe RHR Syste~ Fire detection and a Bred Gre suppression system auld be recgIired ized the area where separation ofredundant components ofthe &K, system is aot provided. However, ia the event ofa turbine building Gre, the RHR system would be used for safe aeuMrrt s
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shutdown and is aot considered an alternative capability.
However, one train ofthe RHR system must bc separated fxom the turbine building.
Generic Letter 86-10, Enclosure 2 at 17 (emphasis added).
The above guidance suggests that the dcGxxing characteristic of alternative shut-down capability is not whether mc4fications are necessary to adapt the system for safe shutdown, as set forth in Appendix R, but whether thc system is providing its design function. Ifthe system or component is beiag used to provide its design function, than it constitutes safe shutdown equipmeat under Appendix R. Otherwise, according to Generic Letter 86-10, the system or component should be considered as providing alternative shutdown capability subject to thc rccpxiremcats ofSection IILG3ofAp-pendix R. Thus, the guidance in Generic Lener 86.10 in effect goes beyond Appendiz R to include withinthe definition ofaltcrnativc shutdown capability not only those systems that require modiGcauon in order to provide safe shutdo'wn capabxTity but also those that are utiTimd in a manner diferent from their intended design functxon.
Thc divergence ofthis guidance from the dear Ianyuge ofAppendix R could provide a basis on which to argue that itis arbitrary and capricious depeadiag oa how the NRC applied the guidance. However, we believe, that properIy applied, the safety injection pumps wouldbc considered safe shutdenm equipment under the above guidance sct forth in Generic Letter 86-10.'-'he safety injection pumps at Turkey
~~ Bobbies v. Seminole 65 S.Ct. 12i5, 1211 (15>$5) (an agency's interpretation of its own regulationis of'controllingwcigixtunless it is plainly erroneous or inconsisuuxt~ the regula-tion'). Sce site cases cited in note 12 infra.
Generi Leaer 86-10 states that it aCkcs precedence over prior guidance 't.'t]o the eeent (the] guid-ance" in Generic Lencr 86-10 "may bc inconsistent~ prIrguidance.'eneri LctterM10 at 1..
V'e do nor, however, sec any inconsistency beaten Gcnerxc Letters 86.10 and 81-72 as discussed in dec zezt above. Generic Letter 81-12 ideni8es the safety injection puxnps as xjart Bthe plant~
nxent designed to accomplish safe shuuiown, which undcr zhc yudancc set forth in Generic Lener 86-10, leads to thc saxnc conclusion that they constitute safe shutdown epxipmcnt and not alternative shutdown capabiTity.
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Point are designed to perform the reactivity control and reactor coolant makeup safe shutdown functions attributed to them w Generic Lmer P1-12. Using tb>> words of Generic Letter 86-10,'the safety injection system in performiag reactivity control ar:a reactor coolant makeup "is being used to provide its design function." Moreover, plant procedures have been developed at Turkey Point forusing the safety injection t
pumps to perform these functions ~hollyapart &om Appendix R safe shutdown con-siderations.
As such, even under Generic Letter 86-10, the safety injection pumps should be considered as performing safe shutdown functions as contemplated and pro-vided for by their design as opposed to alternative shutdown capabiTity not contem-.
plated by their design.
V'e understand, however, that the h~C h - suggested, ia appareat reliance on Generic Letter 86-10, that the safety injection pumps are intended to provide safe shut-down capability only in accident situatioas and that the preferred components forpia-vidiag this capability are the chaqjng pumps which are nonxully used forplant shutdowa. Oa this basis, the NRC has suggested that the safety injection pumps at Turkey Point should be cLLezi6ed as altauative shutdawa capability. Ve believe that this preliminary position staked out by the NRC is wrong, even amuming that the NRC could ignore the clear language ofAppendix R that ahernatme shutdown capa-bilityiavolves a madi6cation ofexisting plant systems.
Genetic Letter 86.10 does n~t suggest that piant ngiheredsafety features, such as the safety injectioa pumps, designed to provide for safe shutdown ofthe plant in ac-cident condiYions cannot be included as part ofthe safe shutdawn ecyupment relied upon uader Appendix R. Indeed, the residual heat removal system referred to in ques-tion and answer 3.g3 ofGeneric Letter 66.10, quotli above, is such an engineered safety feature (albeit it provides the same design &mxioaforordinary shutdown as welg. Further, Generic Letter g 1-12 crpressly refiects that engineered sakty features, SZ J'8 I 35Vd d,SSBC995SK'QI SLLOd NtsfggXX Id AWS s MOgfd S9 s 6I d,B Is I -hi'tfM
such as the safety injection pumps, can bc used in lieu of other plant compoacats in or-der to accomplish safe shutdown under Appendix R where they provide the same de-sign function.
Moreover, Appendix R itself draws no distinction bctw~ engineered safety features designed to provide for safe shutdown ia accident conditions and other plant features designed to provide for safe shutdown during normal operation. 3oth can be safe shutdown equipment under Appendix R. Section IofAppendix R establishes
"[t]hree levels of fire damage limits for structures, systems, aad components accordiag to the their safety function based on the proposition that "the loss offunction of sys-tems used to miYigate the consequences of design basis accidents under postEre condi-tions" is of lesser importance taan "limitingGre dam;ige to systems required to achieve aad maintain safe shutdown conditions.
i0 CPS $ 50, App.R. $ L The three categories ofstructures, systems, aad components forwhich dBercat levels of Gre damage arc established are (1) those used forhot shut~xra, (2) those used forcold shutdown and P) those used to mitigate design basis accidents.
LcL Section IofAppen-dix R expressly recognizes that systems may fallinto more thais oae of these catcgo-ries:
The most ent Gre e limitshall a forthose that fallinto more than one ca
. Redundant used to mitigate the consequences of other design basis accidents but not n for safe shutdown may be last to a single exposure Gre.
Id. (emphasis adde@.
Thus, Appendix R expressly recognize that engineered safety features (generally described as features "to mitigate the consequences ofdesiga basis or 1ossof~oolsnt accidents"-") can be used as safe sbutmown espdptnent under Appendix M!ERG0800, Suadard Revi~ Plaa, 5 6.1.1, Revision 2, July 1981:
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R. Indeed, a coatrary conclusion auld rua counter to the fundamental purpose of Appendix R of achieving and maintaining safe shutdown;"
That engiaeered safety features, such as the safety injection pumps, can be desig-nated as safe shutdown equipment forAppendix R purposes is coaclu'sively conErmed by Generic Letter 81-12 discu.'med above. Generic Letter 81-12 was issued February 20, 1981, shortly after Appendix R was.promulgated aad became effective." As such, it is a coatemporaneous iaterpretatioa by the NRC ofthe safe shutdo'am provisions ofAp-pendix K. It is a well established rule ofstatutory interpretation that the contempora-neous interpretation of a statute or regulation by those danged'with its implementation is entitled to great weight." Bythe same token, subsequent changes in interpretation, such as that p
'cbranced here bythe Staff are disfavored, particularly where, as here, no rational explanation is advanced forthe change m inter-pretation.~
Section IofAppeadiz R contains the broad overview statem<<nt that:
%hen coasi*riag the effects ofGr. those syN<<ms associated with achieviag aad maiataiaittg safe shutdown coadYiioas assume major importance to safety because damage to them caa lead to core damage resultiag &om loss ofcoolant through boiloK 10 CZE. $ 50, App.R. $ L Obviously, the safety injection pumps are equally as imporuat as the citargiag pumps inavoi~~ damage resultiag trom loss ofcoolaat thiough boiloK I
t-Appendix R was published in the Federal Regisr<<r November 19, 1980 aad became efec&e Feb-ruary V, 1981. See Generic Letter 81-12.
~ ~ eg Waxt v.
101 S. Ct. 1673, 1681(1981) ('t]he Departmeax's coatemporaaeous coa-snoctioo carries persuasive ~eight'. Accord Udal! v. T SS S. Cc 792, 801 (1965).
~ ~~<<.
INS v. Cardoza-Fo 10l S. Cr. 120l, 1221gt30 (19$) ("I'a]a agency interpretation that coaaicts with the ageacy's earlier interpretation is eatitled to coasid<<rably less deference'han a
consist<<atly held agency view+ Esuze ofS
- v. Commissioner ofInternal 43 F. 3d 226, 234 (6th Cir. 1995) ("[m]oreimportantly, the Gct that the 55 has done an about face since 1986 tastes us even more reluctant ro adopt their iat<<tpretaxioa ofthis statute without an urtdersraadable arxicuiatioa ofa tax policy supporting it ).
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fn shutt entpneetetf safety featutes, such as the safety injection pumps, can be used as safe shutdown equipment under Appendix R to accomplish saf>> shutdown functions which they are designed to perform. The Staff's suggestion'to the contrary is simply wrong. Any doubt about the acceptability ofusing the safety injection pumps as safe shutdown equipment under Appendix R is laid to rest by their identifi-cation as safe shutdown equipment in Generic Letter 81-12 and the NRC's acceptance ofthe Prairie Island Ere protection program, which, as discussed, utiTized one division ofthe charging pump system and one division ofthe safety injection system for safe shutdown under Appendix R.
IIL CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, we conc1ude that the safety injection pumps can be designated as safe shutdown equipment under Appendix R~ accordance with. Ge-neric Letter S1-12 and the accepted Gre protection program at the Prairie Island Nu-c1ear Generating Plant.
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