ML17347A637
| ML17347A637 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 12/01/1987 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17347A635 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8712040258 | |
| Download: ML17347A637 (26) | |
Text
Enclosure 2 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAP, REACTOR REGULATION PLANT SYSTEMS BRANCH - REGION II TECHNICAL INTERFACE AGREEMENT COMPONENT COOLING MATER HEAT EXCHANGER DEGRADED NOIR OPERATION (SRP SECTIONS 9.2e 1 AND 9.2.2)
TURKEY POINT, UNITS 3 AND 4 DOCKET NOS. 50-250/251
)
INTRODUCTION By letter dated June 29, 1987, Region II identified concerns related to the operation of the intake cooling water (ICW) system and the component cooling water (CCM) system at the Turkey Point, Units 3 and 4 nuclear plants.
These concerns were relative to the licensee's implementation of a Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) for out of service ICM/CCW heat exchangers, and relative to the adequacy and prudence of a licensee safety evaluation for the operation of the CCW heat exchangers with fouled heat transfer tubes.
Each unit at Turkey Point has three 50 percent design capacity CCW heat exchangers and three 100K design capacity CCM pumps.
The CCM heat exchangers are supplied cooling water from the ultimate heat sink by three 100K design capacity ICW pumps for each unit.
The present TS specify that one CCW heat exchanger may be inoperable for up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
After 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, the unit must be shutdown.
In the sumner of 1986, the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> action statement was repeatedly entered to allow cleaning of the three Unit 3 heat exchangers.
The data indicate that one heat exchanger or another was out of service for extended periods of time on a repetitive basis.
- However, no single heat exchanger remained out of service in excess of 24 continuous hours.
It is anticipated that the Unit 4 heat exchanoers will require cleaning at frequencies similar to those of Unit 4.
The licensee's evaluation for the operation of the CCW heat exchangers with fouled heat transfer tuhes was originally performed to address a
10 CFR Part 21 issue related to a single failure in the ICM system.
It was subsequently revised to address fouling and to allow Units 3 and 4 to remain at power provided a cumulative outage time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> was not exceeded during a 3-month period when two ICW pumps were required to provide flow to two CCM heat exchanaers in order to mitigate the consequences of the Maximum Hypothetical Accident (MHA) which is a worst case loss-of-coolant-accider t (LOCA).
The design basis as identified in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) specifies that one ICW pump with two CCW heat exchangers ts capab1e of mft$gating t)'e conseouences of the MHA.
The licensee therefore, allowed operation outside the plant's design basis since two ICM pumps were required to be operable at this time.
The licensee Justified continued operation by limiting the time period such that a small vulnerability exists from a probabilistic risk assessment standpoint.
- However, such Justification was not provided to the staff for approval.
The licensee believes that the time period (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> total in three months) is philosphically in keeping with the intent of other 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> LCOs (such as for an out of service ICM pump or CCM heat exchanger) which create single failure potentials.
It should be noted that the failure of the "B" emergency diesel generator removes emergency onsite power from two of the three ICM pumps.
87>2OOORM 87>boa P
The following specific questions were posed by Region II relative to the above issues.
I.
Is the ICW system technically inoperable when the heat exchangers are sufficiently fouled such that more than one ICW pump is required for the system to fulfillits design functions?
2.
What is the proper course of action for plant management when the ICW system is found degraded?
3.
4.
Should the licensee have performed a
10 CFR 50.59 evaluation for this condition since the situation potentially involved an "unreviewed safety question"?
Is 10 CFR 50. 59 applicable when the licensee has not made intentional changes to the system but the system fs being operated differently than that addressed in the FSAR?
5.
If a 10 CFR 50.59 is not applicable under these circumstances, then what type of evaluation, with associated NRC reporting, is appropriate?
6.
Is clearing the Unit 4 CCW heat exchangers at intervals similar in frequency and duration to those of Unit 3 acceptable?
EVALUATION On February 13, 1986, the licensee determined that the ICW syst: em contained two valves which were susceptible to single active failures.
The discrepancies were evaluated as not reportable under 10 CFR 21 in Substantial Safety Hazards'valuation JPE-L-85-38, Revision 0.
However, the licensee did determine that the inability to accommodate a single failure in these valves constituted an "unnecessary contribution" to overall risk and therefore implemented plans to evaluate and modify the ICW system to correct the condition.
Although Region II did not request clarification in this regard, the staff disagrees with the licer see's conclusion that the single failure vulnerability is not reportable under 10 CFR 21 as discussed below.
The ICW system provides for a single flow path and air operated valve downstream of the CCW heat exchanger and a single flow path and afr op+.ated valve downstream of the turbine plant cooling water (TPCW) system heat exchangers.
The single valve downstream of the TPCI! heat exchangers is identified in the FSAR as a fail closed valve that receives a close signal in the event of a safety injection signal (SIS) or a loss of voltage (i.e., loss of offsite power).
A solenoid valve senses the SIS or loss of voltage and is positioned to bleed air from one side of the diaphram causing the valve to close.
The single valve downstream of the CCW heat exchanger is designed to open or go further open as CCW temperature increases and it is not equipped with a solenoid valve to bleed air from either side of the air operator diaphram.
The licensee has identified certain single active failures that could result in the valves not failing fn the safe position.
However, the
licensee claims that since the ICW system as licensed pursuant to 1Q CFR 50 could not accommodate the single failure criteria, then this single 'failure vulnerability fs not reportable under Part 21.
The licensee cites 10 CFR 21,3(k) as defining a substantial safety hazard to mean a loss of safety function to the extent there is a ma,for reduction fn the degree of protection.
Th, t
h <<
t i'll lydg ddth reduction.
The staff disagrees with the licensee's evaluation and interpretation of Part 21 fn that if the staff was a~are of this specfffc single active failure problem, the ICW system would have been technically unacceptable.
It should also be noted that the FSAR shows the TPCW valve to be a fail closed valve which fnfers no single active failure will prevent ft from closing.
The valve at the CCW heat exchanger shows no failure position and a reviewer would likely assume that it,efther fails in its as fs position which fs normally open or fails open.
Therefore, a major reduction fn the degree of protection did occur from what was assumed or thought to have existed at the time of licensing and a Part 21 notification was appropriate.
That notwithstanding, the design deffcfency was definftely reportable under
- 50. 72 or 50. 73 since the plant was found to be in an unanalyzed condition that sfgnificantly compromised plant safety and the ICW system function.
Revfsfon 1 to JPE-L-85-38 was issued on February 16, 1986 to promulgate graphs depicting the relationship of post accident ICW flow through the CCW heat exchangers, ICW system (cooling canal ) temperatures, and CCW heat exchanger cleanliness.
Based on these parameters, the licensee was able to determine when personnel were to be stationed at the TPCW svstem manual isolatfon valve fn the ICW system to shut the valve in the event of a MHA.
For some optimum conditions, analyses showed that ff the TPCW valve dfd not automatically close following a MHA, the ICW safety function could still be performed.
A CCW heat exchanger performance monitoring program was also developed to ensure that the heat transfer capability of the heat exchangers remained sufffcfent to remove accident heat loads.
It was determfned that the effectiveness of the heat exchangers was heavily dependent on precipitation of calcfum carbonate from the canal water on the heat exchanger tubes.
The hfgh levels of calcium carbonate fn the canal system rapidly degraded the heat transfer capability of the heat exchangers.
Consequently, the licensee implemented a program to periodically clean them.
During the sumer months, cleaning was required approxfmately weekly based on the graphs contained in Revision 1 to the licensee's evaluation.
In June 1986, ft was postulated that, with one heat exchanger cut of service for cleaning, canal temperatures might rise to the point where the remaining two heat exchangers could not handle the MHA heat load even after posting an operator at the manual valve.
Revision 2 to JPE-L-85-38 was issued on August 5, 1986 to address this possibility.
4 Revision 2 states that should, during the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> LCO period for the cleaning of a CCW heat exchanger, the performance of the remaining two heat qxchangers degrade to the point where the flow ft om two ICW pumps is necessary 'to remove the accident heat load, the plant may continue operation for a total of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> during any three month period.
Revision 3 to the evaluation was issued November 7, 1986 and involved a
clarification to the use of the term "OPERABLE" and did not significantly change the evaluation.
The staff disagrees with the licensee's conclusion fn the analysis that the plant is permitted to take credit for the provisions of the evaluation for a cumulative time period of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in any three month period.
It is the staff's position that LCOs are meant to apply to single unplanned events and are not meant to be conveniende tools to keep the plant operating under adverse conditions.
When the performarce of the remaining two heat exchangers degrades to the point where two ICW pumps are required; the provisions of TS 3.0.3 should apply, requiring plant shutdown within one hour.
Continued operation would require a Justification for continued operation (JCO) approved by the staff since such operation is outside the scope of the TSs and the FSAR design basis.
The following responses are intended to address the Region II specific questions identified in the Introduction of this evaluation:
The CCM system should be declared inoperable when the heat exchangers are sufficiently fouled such that more than one ICh'ump is required for the system to perform its design safety function.
Anytime a CCk'eat exhanger is known to be fouled to the point where it cannot remove its design basip heat load, then it should be declared inoperable, and the appropriate CCM system action statement should be followed.
It. fs not appropriate as inferred by the licensee's analysis for the CCM system to be operable with no LCO when three CCW heat exchangers are required to be operable because of fouling.
For example, with the present TS, if two of the CCW heat exchangers are 100 percent efficient (totally unfouled) and the third heat exchanger is fouled to the point where it cannot remove its design basis accident heat load, then the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> action statement for the CCW system should be followed.
2.
The proper course of action for plant management when the ICW system (CCW heat exchangers}
is found degraded is to follow the appropriate TS. If an analysis exists to show that plant operation may continue at reduced power levels, then operation may continue provided the analysis shows that the design basis accident decay heat loads can be handled by the ICH system with one ICM pump.
This analysis should be used as a
JCO and provided to the NRC for approval of temporary waiver until a TS licensing amendment is issued.
The appropriate TSs should be revised (note that more than one TS section fs affected, such as power level trip setpoints) to account for reduced power levels under degraded conditions.
SP -.
V 'I
A 50.59 evaluation under these conditions is not appropriate because without a reduction in the flux level trip setpoints, the safety margins are reduced.
The staff takes the view that operability of a system is defined in terms of the maximum power level authorized by the license,
~ and any degradation of the system which would render it incapable of performing its function at the fu)ly licensed power level would cause the system to be inoperable.
10 CFR 50.59 can be applicable when the licensee has not made intentional changes to the system but the system is being operated differently than that addressed in the FSAR.
10 CFR 50.59 is not limited to design changes as it specifically points out that changes in the facility as described in the FSAR or changes in the procedures as described in the FSAR may require,a 50.59 analysis.
However, the specific problem at Turkey Point does not come under 50.59 because it violates the design bases of the TS and reduce>
the plant safety margins without a corresponding reduction in the trip setpoints identified in the TS.
The Turkey Point circumstances ate reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 because continued operation is outside the design bases idertified in the existing TS which specificaIIy address single ECV pump operation as being the minimum required, and because operation at a reduced power level is not allowed since it results in a reduced safety margin.
An analysis to justify continued operation should be performed and submitted to NRC if operation is desired beyond a
TS action statement.
Although it is not the intention of the TS to allow recurring entry into an action statement to compensate for such degraded conditions, the operation of Unit 4 for an interim period with the heat exchangers c
periodically unavailable due to cleaning in a manner similar to what was done for Unit 3 is acceptable because:
a.
A long term fix has been identified and has already been installed on Unit 3.
This consists of an Amertap system which provides for continuous on-line cleaning by passing specially designed cleaning balls through the tubes; b.
The same fix is scheduled to be installed fn Unit 4 during the scheduled March 1988 outage, and much of the time span before.
installation of the modification is during winter when the fouling is less severe; and C ~
Operation has been approved by NRC at other plants under similar conditions when such plants identified a Iong term fix as in a)
- above, and had a reasonable schedule for implementation as in b),
above.
CONCLUSIONS Based on its review of the fnformation and data provfded by Regfon II and the licensee's evaluation, JPE-L-85-38, Revision 3, the staff has reached the i'ollowfng conclusions:
The single active failure susceptibility of the ICW system fdentffied by the licensee should have been reported under IO CFR 21 regardless of the fact that ft existed in the original design.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
The CCW system should be declared fnoperable whenever ft fs known that the heat exchangers are sufficiently fouled such that more than one ICW pump fs reouired,using two CCW heat exchangers to remove desfgn basis accident heat loads assuming 'Initial power leve1s of 100 percent fn each unit.
A CCW heat excbanger should be declared inoperable and the appropriate action statement entered when ft becomes known that the CCW heat exchanger cannot remove its desion basis heat load.
The proper course of action to be taken when it becomes known that more than one ICW pump is required in confunction with two heat exchangers should be to follow the applicable TS which fn these circumstances fs Specfficatfon 3.0.3 (plant shutdown within one hour).
Otherwise, Justification for contfnued operation wfth NRC approval is requfred.
The CCW degradatfon problem fs reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.?3.
Justfffcatfon for continued operation must be supported by analysis to show safe operation can continue at reduced power levels and appropriate consideration must be given to mafntafnfng adequate safety marqfns.
A
~
license amendment would be required fncluding modii'fcatfons to the plant Technical Specfffcatfons to reduce the high flux trip setpofnt.
The licensee's evaluation to allow operation with more than one ICW pump befng requfred to meet the desfgn basfs accident fs inappropriate in that cumulative outage times are not considered acceptable and such operation/condftfons should be reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73.
Unit 4 can continue to operate wfth recurrfng entry fnto the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> LCO for cleanfng the CCW heat exchangers provfded conditions do not degrade to the pofnt where more than one ICW pump fs required.
If such conditions occur then the plant should reduce power as appropriate or should shutdo~n wfthfn one hour according to TS 3.0.3.
g,4,4, COMPONENT COOL?NG SYSTEM The reactor snal l nut be made crft>cal, except rur luw power physfcs tests unless the tollowfng condftfuns are met:
1.
THRKK canponent cooling pumps are operaole.
2.
.THRKE component coolfng heat exchangers are operaole.
3.
All ValVeS, inter lOCkS and piping aSSOCtated wi tn the above components are operable.
b.
Ouring power operation, the requf renents or 3.4.4.a may 5e modft'fed as stated aeluw.
lf'he system is nut restured to meet the cundf tfonS oi'.4.4.a wf thin tne ttme per>ud specfffed, the reactor shall be placed fn the hot shutoown cundftfun.
lf'he requf reaents of 3.4.4.a are nut sausf>ed wfthfn an addftfOnal 48 huurS, the reaCtur Shall bl plaCed fn the cold snutdown condf tfun.
bpecitlcatiun 3.Q.L applies to 3'.4obo l.
ONK pump may be out of'ervice for 7 days.
Z.
ONK addftfenal pump and ONK tteat eXChanger may Oe Out ut service for period of 24 huurs.
3.4.5 INTAKE COOLING WATER SYSTEM a.
The reactor snal I not be made crftical unless che rallawfng conditions are met:
THREE inCake Caaling waCar pumpS and T'AO neaaerS are oper ab le.
Z.
Al l valves, interlocks and pfpfng assocfacet with the operatfon af Chase
- pumps, and require ror post accident operation, are operable.
b.
Ourfng power aperacian, the requtrenentS af 3.4.5.a.,
- above, may be modf ried to allow any one of the rollowfng ceaponencs to be fnoperable provided the renainfng systems are in continuous operation; Ir tile system is nat reStared tO meet Che requirementS Or 3.4.5.a. with&
Che time period specified, the reactar slial l oe placef-in the hot shutdown candftfon.
If the requfreaents or 3.4.5.a are nOt SatfSrfef wiCnin an addft>anal 48 naurS, the reac or shall be placed in the cold shutduwn conditfan.
Specfrfcatfon 3.0.L applies to 3.4.5.b.
L.
One of the two headers may be aut af service rur a period of 24 huurs.
Z.
One intake cooling wacer pump may be out ot service for a period of ZC hours.
t ~ ~ ~
EASED 8 Z,4;a..
eae Coo~ Svstea.
~
. Doe yuap ask tao hNN,s exchangegg fsNe,t, ~
pSm s-3 of the 8 $,p, 5 Intake Coo Mater Srsem
~t l4.$
4.18, SAFaaY RELATED SYSTEMS FLOWPATrl Acoliccbilitv:
~ Applies to the cvailcb'ility of the required flawpaths for the s'ystems specified in Table 4.IS-I.
Ob iective:
Soecificatiorc To verify the availability of cn operable flawpath fcr the systems specified in Table 4. I S-I.
Monthly, perform a system wcIIcdown, a speciflecl in Table 4.IS-I, to demcnstrate the cvcilcbilitycf required flowpaths by:
I. Verifying that each accessible valve (mcnuaf, power cpercted, or cutapiatic) is in its correct position.
2 Verifying the availability af power to those components related to the operability of the cfesignated flowpaths TABLE 4.18 I
GEl Ig SYSTEM OGSCRIPTION (Note 1)
Hfgh Head Safety Ingectfon 2.
Lo~ Head Safety In)ectfon 3.
Auxflfary Feddwater 4.
Containment Spray Eme nc Ofesel Generators.
6.
omponent Co er 7.
Intake Coolin Mater FREQVBICY M,P M,P M;P M,P M,P.
M P o
c c
o~pa o
e Core M
9.
Post-accf dent Containment Yentf1atfon M,P 10.
In-plant AC Klectrfcal Ofstrfbutfon H,P ll.
Post-accf dent Hydrogen Monftorfng M
~
12.
Post-accf dent 'Sampl fng
~
13.
Fire Suppression'Mater.
System
.M Frequency:
M - Monthly P - Mfthfn one survefllance Interval.prfor to crftfcalfty.
APPLICABILITY MOOE 1.2 1,2 1,2(Note 2) 1.2 1.2 Note2) 1,2 1e
~
~ 4 1,2,(Note 2) le2 1,2,3,4 (Note 2) 1,,2,3,4 (Note 2) 1,2,3,4 (Note 2)
B4.I 8 BASES FOR SAFETY RELATED SYSTchl FLOWPATH VERIFICATION This surveillance is designed to verify that flowpaths exist in order for the specified safety related systems to perfarm as required by Section l4 of the FSAR.
~
~
~
~ ~
Verify that all reacllly accessible valves that are in the flowpath of the safety related systems Iistecf below cre in the. proper positions to fulfill the described'equirements of the systems.
Also verify that power is being fed through the in-plant AC electrical distribution system from 4I60-volt buses down to the 480-volt MCC's.
PLANT.SYSTEMS 3/4. 7. 3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.3 The CCW system sha11 be OPERABLE with:
a.
Two OPERABLE CCW pumps with independent power supplies, and b.
Two CCW heat exchangers in service that are capable of removing design basis heat loads*.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTION:
a.
With only one CCM pump OPERABLE or with two CCM pumps OPERABLE but not from independent power supplies, restore two pumps from independent power supplies to OPERABLE status in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLO SHUTDOMN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
b.
With one of the required CCM heat exchangers out of service, restore the out'f service heat exchanger to service in 1
hour or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLO SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
- Two heat exchangers, in conjunction with one ICW pump and one CCW pump, must be capable of removing design basis heat loads.
SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS pod acct.a18IA opcl di 4.7.3.1 a.
b.
Mc 544'IVI 1
11 I<<
11 E
E:
At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated, or: automatic) that is not locked, sealed,'r otherwise secure/
in position is in its correct position) and %et ~cr is <vailo4le +o Wse. ~pchchfs
>t~4, rcgu ~ p ~ $w t,D ~e 0 oper4m) ~
At least once per
, by verifying that:
rS)
Each automatic va actuates to its correct position on a sX tost signal, and 2)
Each Component Cooling Mater System pump starts automatically on a 5X test signal.
Zngerkkc roIIuE'red P sgsSEEEE
~rEElsi(Etg 6pQLASLE 4.7.3.2 Measure intake cooling water inlet temperature at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and verify that two CCW heat exchangers, in conjunction with one CCW pump and one ICW pump, are capable of removing design basis heat 1oads.
TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 AND 1st Bg'aft -
January 6g f98)
PLANT SYSTEMS
/~~pgg Cia aimg W+ 7 ETL.
~) 4~w" 3/4.7. 4 LIMITING CONOITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.4 The ICW system shall be OPERABLE with two OPERABLE ICW pumps with independent power supplies.
APPLICABILITY:
MOOES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTION:
With only one ICW pump OPERABLE or with two ICW pumps OPERABLE but not from in'dependent power supplies, restore two pumps from independent power supplies to OPERABLE status in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT STANOBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLO SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMEHTS ee rrired gr Ircrsk 4.7.4 t nfA.kt. COO~>
~1~ S$A~
shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
a.
b.
test signal.
At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated, or automatic) that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in its correct position) and 4~4 ~~
<'s atl~al44 4~ +~a ~~Me
~us~
PORC.V Qr p,g ~CONJ~ ca~~
At least once pe
, by verifying that:
refvJt 1)
Each automatic v
actuates tn its rect sitinn cn a.
s2 test signal, and ln kc ~'fg 2)
Each pump starts automatically on a
KK 3)
+rtsby lec.k t y'
g~
Wg
>Je I ~
bpcr~
<<'fKaSLt-
~
TVRKEY POZNT - VNXTS 8 AND 4 1st Dt Vt Januar y 6 ~
t9SP
PLANT SYSTEMS.
3/4. 7. 5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK [OPTIONAL]
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.5 T
ultim e heat s' shall h
OPERABLE w'C Am' m
at le datu fv n avera w
er te erature ess than or equal to y4 /
g /
Q fy 7 APPL ABILITY:
MODES 1,, 3, and 4.
TION:
With t requireme s of the a
ve specifi tion not sat fied, be in least HOT S NDBY withi 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> an in COLD SH DOWN ~ithin e following hours.
SURVEILLA RE UIREME S
4.7.
The ultima heat sink hall be dete ined OPERAB at least ce per-24 urs by veri ing the av age ~ater t perature an ater level o be wi in their 1
its.
t%TS.
ApP L4.A~
g,~g> ~ AASQCS gg~ ideoR,PA~'
-.Te~ sFec, TURKEY POINT - UNITS 5 AND 4 3/a 7 1%
I
3/4.7.3 CO4PONENT COOLING MATER SYSTB{
pmMt~
e u:p~
The OPERABILITY of the Coaponent Cooling Mater Systea ensures that suf-fcfent cool)ng capacity )s available for cont)nued operation of safety. related u) t during nodal and accident cond) lone.
The redundant cooling
, assming a single
- allure, ks. consistent Hth the assmpt1ons used
$ n the safety analyses.
ANALYSIS RESULTS HAVE SHOWN THAT ONE PUMP AND THE COMBINED PERFORMANCE OF TWO HEAT EXCHANGERS WILL MEET THE COOLING REQUIREMENTS ASSUMED IN THE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS.
A PROGRAM FOR MONITORING INTAKE COOLING WATER INLET TEMPERATURE AND CORRELATING IT WITH OTHER SYSTEM PARAMETERS PROVIDES ASSURANCE THAT THESE REQUIREMENTS ARE MET.
~pe@
Cree ~afb W~rftg.
Ill.'f.~~ 5YSI%I The OKRASMTYof the Syatm ensures that aufflc1ent cooling ~$ Q la evan)able for continued rat)on of safeiy.relate4 equ$ p-
~ent dur fnN ooraal uxor acc3dent conditfons..
'Tho loci@ ad oper tlirt of Ns spado~)
<iso I ~
~g f';lore ensures coo((<5 co.p ~'g l.A 4
4 rtefh
~f>>
~
'SIK fOPTINAL]
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$s cons the rec~nd-at)ons of Regula de Lt7, 'Ululate Heat $)nk for lants,'arch 197'.
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'F FIGURE 5:
EFFECT OF INCREASED TUBE PLUGGAGE ON LIMITING ICW INLET TEMPERATURE FOR VARIOUS ICW FLOW RATES TO TWO CCW HXS
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ENCLOSURE 2
Attendance List for March 15, 1988 Meeting with Florida Power
& Light concerning ICW/CCW Systems Name G.
E. Edison J.
S.
Wermiel J.
W. Craig A. Gi1 1 P.
Pace L. Pabst B.
P. Burdick T. Grozan C.
Moon R.
Y. Crlenjak D.
R. Brewer
,l. Arias, Jr.
T.
W. Fisher E.
M. Vaughn W. T. LaFave H.
A. Bailey V. Leung E. J.
Leeds P. Horian S.
Rubin Or anization NRC/Licensing PM NRC/NRR/DEST/SPLB NRC/NRR/DEST/SPLB NRC/NRR/DEST/SPLB FP&L - Nuclear Licensing FP&L - Power Plant Engineering FP&L - Power Plant Engineering FP&L - Nuclear Licensing NRC/NRR/DOEA/OTSB NRC/RII/Section Chief NRC/RII/Sr. Resident Insp. - Turkey Point FP&L -
PTN - Regulation and Compliance Supv.
FP&L -
PTN - Plant Support Engineer FP&L - Power Plant Engineerinq, Juno Beach NRR/DEST/SPLB AEOD/DOA/DFIIB RES/DRPS AEOD/DOA/DEIIB RES/DRPS/RPSIB AEOD/DOA/DEIIB
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