05000250/LER-1981-005-01, /01T-0:on 810310,drain Header to Floor of Component Cooling Water Pump & Heat Exchanger Room Backed Up.Caused by Overflow of Laundry Water from Monitor Tank. Laundry Water Transfer Terminated

/01T-0:on 810310,drain Header to Floor of Component Cooling Water Pump & Heat Exchanger Room Backed Up.Caused by Overflow of Laundry Water from Monitor Tank. Laundry Water Transfer Terminated

ML17340A970
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	03/24/1981
From:	Simmons K FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML17340A969	List: 05000250/LER-1981-005, Forwards LER 81-005/01T-0 05000250/LER-1981-005-01, /01T-0:on 810310,drain Header to Floor of Component Cooling Water Pump & Heat Exchanger Room Backed Up.Caused by Overflow of Laundry Water from Monitor Tank. Laundry Water Transfer Terminated
References
LER-81-005-01T, LER-81-5-1T, NUDOCS 8104130394
Download: ML17340A970 (4)

LER-1981-005, /01T-0:on 810310,drain Header to Floor of Component Cooling Water Pump & Heat Exchanger Room Backed Up.Caused by Overflow of Laundry Water from Monitor Tank. Laundry Water Transfer Terminated

Event date:
Report date:
2501981005R01 - NRC Website

text

tlRC FOAM See)

(7 771 LICEINSFE FVQNT R-I ORT V.*tlUCLKARRKGVLATORVCOMMIS"ION

• '"""'"*':LJ I

I I

I I

!Qi IPLKASZ PRltlT OR TYI'KALLRKOVIRKO ItIPORI4PITIOPII 3

C C."I'

~01 t

9 I 'CZNSZZ CQCZ Q.

I lcaieSZ NUMSZA

""'*"'0 sn Sl QQCJ4PT PIUMSZA '539 KVKNTOKSCRIPTIOPI 'tlO PROOAISLK CO'4SKCVKNCKS Qlo During refueling shutdown while ).n the

.,Q.,

0LJ L C>>'ISP. VP>>

)0 5 ~ *~

53 I~0 0

zveNT QATZ 14 15 ilSPQAT OATS 30 process of transferring laundry water to a monitor tank, the monitor tank overflowed.

Some of the overflow

~03 watex backed up the drain header to the floor of the component 'cooling water pump and heat exchanger room.

Some of this water potentially could s

have entered the storm drain system from other normal drains in this room.

This is reportabl e pux'suant to TS 6. 9. 2. a. 9 7

3 9

SYSTZU CAUSZe CAV53 COMP.

V*LV5 CQOZ CQQZ SU5CCOZ CCIPPQNSNT CQOZ sueccos sUecocs

~0! 9 LJO L'JS~S LJS LJS I

3 In II 17 I) 1$

IS SZCUZNTIAI.

QCCURRZtlc>>

ASPOAT AZVISION'ZRPRQ ZVZtlZV AA

AZPOATNQ, CQOZ TYPS

~

tlO.

Qie eeit e ~ol

~

Loo 01 55 11~~

~01

~T'

~0

)I 24 ee) tt 5

)0 I

ACTICN Pl ' UA>>

ZPP ZC ~

SItU TQCWN

• I ~ *CleMZNT,NP AQM PA I M9 COMp, COMP 0NZII 1'AI4Z I

ACTIC ~,

CN PLAN'r

'ZTIeoo AQUAS Q22 SVaMITTZQ PQAM>Ua.

SUPPI ISA ht*NVPA TUA 4 L'JSLuS L'JS L'JS ~e'JO LJO M>S LJ "' '>S

))

5

)5

)I 40 41 42 4) 44 47 CAUSK OKSCRIPTION ANO CORRKC. IVKACTIO.lS Q7

~10 E'he transfer of laundr water was immediately terminated.

The monitor tank eas removed from sex'vice for a lovel instrumentation charnel check.

aluation results indicated no significant water if any ente ed the normal drain system.

However, the potential for this unintended flow path

~I oes exist and alterations are being evaluated.

3 9

7 ACILI r ~

STAtU'S; PQYIZA 0'eel ZB STA. Us 5

H 2a 0

OIO 29'/A 00 LJO ~~,0~

Activlrt cclNOTSNr ASLZASZQ CP ASL ASI'MQVNTOPACTIVITYQ 5

~L Q33

~bl Q

- 1 IP-5 curies 'otal 7

3

'3 10 44 PSASQNNZL ZAPQSVAZS

~ol o o ILQ> LT,IQLI v4 t

51ZTNQO OP olscoveAY olsccv>>AY QSSCRIPTIQN 32

~AQQI Operator Observation 4S 10 ATIQ'ZQP ASLTAsz Area surrounding

( P'II pumo~

7 5

I 3

9 2

e) 3 I I I>>

P>>SASQNNZL INIUAI>>$

NUSISZA OZ)C11PZIQ'IQ L00 0 Iloo l1 5

11 I>>

$$ QP'el 0*MACK 0 P4 ILI ~ P M eeVP ~

0550;IIPTIQet LJLSI PVaLIC:~

15$ VZO ZSCA:Pt:CN GS LN IQ44 IIA NA

')

,I Mlo PRF *R K.l 1 ~

S imlIIOns 30 tIRC VS Op;LY I 'I I

,'I I

I I I!

.. (305) 552-3815 4>30.Ã'/

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 250-81-5 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT PAGE T'",0 Additional Event Description and Probable Consequences:

During refueling shutdown, an evolution was in progress to transfer laundry water to the A Monitor Tank.

The monitor tank overflowed to the waste holdup tank drain syst: em, but the pipe size to the waste holdup tank was not sufficient to handle the amount of overflow.

As a result, some of the overflow backed up into the component cooling water pump and heat exchanger area and may have overflowed into the storm drain system which discharges to the intake canal.

kfowever, no contamination was detectable via smear samples on the storm drain lip.

The volume which overflowed could not be determined, however, it is bounded by the volume o>> the laundry tank.- 600 gallons.

The concentration of radionuclides in the water wh'ch overflowed was 2.8 E-6 }iCi/ml for Co-58, 5.8 E-6 pCi/ml for Co-60, and 8.0 E-7'Ci/ml for Cs-137, which was well below the limits sPecif'ed in 10 CFR 20 Appendix B Table IX, Column 2.

This is considered reportable pursuant to TS 6.9.2.a.9.

Additionally, notification pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 was not made.

This action was based on the interpretation that the low activity which potentially could have been released was not significant and therefore not report-able.

Additional Cause Descri ption..nd Corrective Actions:

Upon discovery of the ove flow, the transfer of laundry water was immediately terminated.

Nater spilled as a result of the overflow was confined to the area adjacent to the safety injection pumps and the Unit N3 component cooling wate

pumps, and potentially a storm drain system.

The maximum activity of the spill

.ias 21 p curies.

This activity is based on A ltonitor Tank sample data.

Control and cleanup of the contaminated area was promptly initiated.

The.A tIonitor Tank was removed from service for a channel check of the level instrumentation.

Results of the channel check indicate that instrument error was not the cause of the overflow.

The oot cause of the overflow appears to be a combination of an inadequate written instruction for the evolution and personnel error in that the written instruction was not followed.

The management actions that have been planned/instituted are:

1.

Revise the writt n instruction to provide proper guidance in making transfers between the laundry tank and monitor tanks.

2.

Reinstruct personnel in strict compliance to procedures.

3.

Revise procedure to require that any accidental, unplanned, or uncontrolled radioactive release or potential release resulting from spills, etc.,

(except normal or expected releases from maintenance or other operational activities) be reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72.

4.

Evaluation of the interface between radioactive and non-radioactive drain systems and of the overflow/siphon break protection for. the montitor tanks.

Until the evaluation can be completed, the radioactive drains in the Unit 53 component cooling water pump area will be sealed.

e'f