ML17310B372
| ML17310B372 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 05/27/1994 |
| From: | Bernier R ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| To: | Mathews R NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17310B373 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9406220234 | |
| Download: ML17310B372 (7) | |
Text
A ',CELERATED DISTRIBUTION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM t
t REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRXBUTXON SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSXON NBR:9406220234 DOC.DATE: 94/05/27 NOTARIZED:
NO DOCKET. 0 FACIL:STN-50-528 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Arizona Publi 05000528 STN-50-529 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Arizona Publi 05000529 STN-50-530 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 3, Arizona Publi 05000530 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION BERNIER,R.A.
Arizona Public Service Co.
(formerly Arizona Nuclear Power RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION NATHEWS,R.J.
NRC No Detailed AffiliationGiven +
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SUBJECT:
Forwards corrected pages to Rev 6 to "PVNGS Update FSAR,"
D incorrectly printed 6 required editorial correction.
S DIsTRIBUTIQN coDE:
A053D coPIEs REcEIUED:LTR J ENcLj sIzE:
1f TITLE: OR Submittal:
Updated FSAR (50.71) and Amendments
/
NOTES:STANDARDIZED PLANT Standardized plant.
Standardized plant.
05000528 A
05000529 05000530 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PDIV-3 PD TRAN,L COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
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1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME HOLIAN, B COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
1 D
S INTERNAL: ACRS NRR/PDLR RGN4 2
2 1
0 1
1
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RB 1
1 EG FILE 01 1
1 EXTERNAL: XHS NSIC 1
1 1
1 NRC PDR SAXC ATEFI,B.
1 1
1 1
D NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM P 1-37 (EXT. 20079) JO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!
TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:
LTTR 13 ENCL 11
/7
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APS Arizona Public Service Company Company Correspondence ID ¹:
Date:
102-02973-RAB/GAM May 27, 1994 To:
Sta.¹:
Ext.¹:
R. J. Mathews 7718 6809 From:
Sta.¹:
Ext.¹:
R. A. Bernier 7636 5882 File:
94-005-419.05
Subject:
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report - Corrected Pages We recently distributed Revision 6 to the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). It was subsequently discovered that two pages of the update were incorrectly printed and required editorial correction.
The two pages have been corrected and are attached.
Please distribute the attached corrected UFSAR pages 9.2-9/9.2-10 and 9B.3-7/9B.3-8 to all UFSAR holders except the NRC.
The corresponding superseded pages currently in the UFSAR should be discarded.
The NRC is being provided the corrected pages by a separate letter.
Should you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Richard A. Bernier at (602) 393-5882.
RAB/GAM/dd
Attachment:
PVNGS UFSAR Corrected Pages cc: A. K. Krainik 9406220224 940527 PDR ADOCK 05000528 K
PVNGS UPDATED FSAR WATER SYSTEMS 9.2.1.5.5 Instrumentation and Controls Refer to paragraph 7.4.1.1.4 for the ESPS pump control logic.
(Refer to paragraph 9.2.1.9 for instrumentation and control applications to the ESPS.)
9.2.1.6 S stem 0 eration During emergency operations, the ESPS provides cooling water directly to the cooling systems of the diesel generators and to the ECWS indirectly through the ECWS heat exchangers.
Cooling water for the ESPS is supplied from the ultimate heat sink as described in subsection 9.2.5.
Return flow from components serviced by the ESPS is returned to the ESPS spray cooling subsystem and to the ultimate heat sink for reuse.
The ESPS will operate for 27 days following a postulated LOCA without requiring any makeup water to the ultimate heat sink and without requiring any blowdown from the spray ponds for salinity control.
Provisions for makeup water and spray pond blowdown for the time period following 27 days are dis'cussed in subsection 9.2.5.
The combined water inventory of both essential spray ponds is needed for a 27-day operation without makeup.
The ESPS has two redundant and separate trains.
Each train alone, in conjunction with the ultimate heat sink, has a full 1004 heat dissipation capacity for a safe shutdown.
Although an emergency reactor shutdown is accomplished by initial operation of both ESPS trains, shutdown and cooldown over an extended period of time is possible with the use of a single train.
The ESPS operational logic and the associated initiation and actuation controls and instrumentation are summarized in the following paragraphs.
March 1994 9.2-9 Revision 6
PVNGS UPDATED FSAR WATER SYSTEMS operationally actuated by any single or any combination of the following signals or operations:
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Safety injection actuation signal (SZAS)
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Containment spray actuation signal (CSAS)
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Control room ventilation and isolation actuation signal (CRVIAS)
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Control room essential filtration actuation signal (CREFAS)
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Auxiliary feedwater actuation signal (AFAS-1 or AFAS-2)
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Diesel generator start signal (DGSS)
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Loss of offsite power signal (LOP)
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Manual start by control room operator Manual start and stop actuation from the control room over-rides the automatic mode.
Manual start and stop controls are also provided for each of the two ESPS trains and two ECWS trains.
This individual control feature permits the removal of a train from operation after the automatic operation actuation if it is not required.
The only components that are actuated in any of the trains, either automatically or by manual control room operator initiation in lieu of automatic actuation, are the ESPS pumps.
Essential spray pond system and ECWS valves are manually and locally operated, except for spray header isolation valves SPA-HV49A and SPB-HV50A, and spray header bypass valves SPA-HV49B and SPB-HV50B, which are manually operated only from the control room.
Valves in the supply lines from the pumps and in the return lines to the essential spray ponds or to the ECWS and diesel generator heat exchangers are locked open.
March 1994 9.2-10 Revision 6
Table 9B.3-1 COMPARISON OF PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION TO APPENDIX A OF NRC BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION APCSB 9.5-1 (Sheet 7 of 68)
B.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES CONTROLS AND FIRE BRIGADE W
4)
I (D
(Or-0 APPLICATIDM DOCKETED SUT CONSTRUCTION PERHIT NOT RECEIVED AS OF 7/I/76 8.
u I
~ R a or Sl On au(tlpte-reactor sites uhere there sre operating reactors snd construction of rene(ning mits ls being ccapteted, the fire protection progrse should provide contlnulng evaluat'lon and Include additional fIre barriers, fire protection capability, snd sdalnlstratlve controls necessary to protect the operating mits froa construction fire hazards.
Ihe superintendent of the operating plant should have the lead responsibI(lty for site fire protection.
Slau(tsnecus fires ln cere than one reactor need not be postulated, Hhere separation requlreeents are aet.
A fire involving Nore than one reactor unit need no't be pos'tulated excep't for facilities shared betueen mits.
PLANIS UhDER CONSTRUCTION AND OPERAT INC PLAN'TS 8.
u I le Reactor Si PVNQS POSITION AND BASIS fOR NONCCHPLIANCE ITEHS
- 8. Hulti le-Resc of Sites Construction of Units I, 2, snd 3 ls coap(ete.
the PVNSS fire protection prograa provides continuing evaluation of the fire protection/prevention ceasures to protect the operating mlt(s) fros construction fire hatards.
Fire barriers betueen operating plants are not deemed necessary.
Each mlt ccaplex Ia separated fros any other mlt ccaplex by a distance of approx(seta(y 500 feet.
Responsibilities for the fire protectlcn prograu are discussed in section A.I of this table.
9.
S ru taneous Fires PVNGS does not postulate slcu(tsneous fires In sere than one reactor since no facilities, except for the fire Hater lxrps, the eater city tanks, and the underground fire Hater cain loop, sre ccaren.
A separation distance of spproxlaetely 500 feet exists betueen mits.
The failure of the shared facilities ui(I not affect the safe shutdovn capability of the mits.
The tuo diesel-driven fire Hater Txxaps (5(M( capacity each) are protected by s Net pipe sprinkler systos.
(See sectlcn E.2.c of this table for cere details).
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Table 9B.3-1 COMPARISON OF PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION TO APPENDIX A OF NRC BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION APCSB 9.5-1 (Sheet 6 of 68)
OVERALI. REOUIRENEN S OF NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAN (CONTINUED)
APPLICATION DOCKETED BUT CONSTROCTION PERHIT NOT RECT.IVEO AS OF 7/1/76
- l. Adslnlstrative procedures consistent uith the need for ctafntaining the periornance of the fire protection systcn and personnel In nuclear paver plants should be pravlded.
Guidance ls contained in the foliauitVI publlcationst NFPA 4 Organization for fire Services NfPA 4A
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Organization for Fire Ocpartaent NIPA 6 industrial fire Loss Prevention NfPA 7
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Hanagcscnt of Fire Efscrgcncles NFPA 8
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Hanagcoen! Responsibility for Effects af fire on Operation NFPA 27 -
Private fire Brigades 2.
Effective sdsinistratfve neasures should be lspieacnted to prohibit bulk storage of ccebustibie natcrfats Inside or adjacent to safety.related buildings or systess during operatian or naintenance periods.
Regulatory Guide 1.39, Housekeeping Rcquirescnts for Rater Cooled Nuclear Pouer
- Plants, provides guidance on housekccping, Including the disposal of coebustlblc naterlsts.
PLANTS ORDER CONSTROCTION AND OPERAT ING PLANTS 2.
Sass PVNGS POSITION AND BASIS fOR NONCOHPLIANCE IIEHS
- 1. Adslnlstrative procedures consistent uith the need for naintaining the perfornance of the fire protection system snd personnel in nuclear paver plants sre provided.
2.
PVNGS cccplies by providing adslnistratlvc "Contral of Corbustiblcs" procedure.
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