ML17309A253

Forwards Final Evaluation of SEP Topic VI-4, Containment Isolation Sys, & Revised Topic Difference Summary

ML17309A253
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	04/12/1982
From:	Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Maier J ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
References
TASK-06-04, TASK-6-4, TASK-RR LSO5-82-04-033, LSO5-82-4-33, NUDOCS 8204190280
Download: ML17309A253 (53)

Text

UNIYFDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, O. C. 20555 April 12, 1982 Docket No. 50-244 LS05 e4-033 Mr. John E. Maier Vice President Electric and Steam Production Rochester Gas 8 Electric Corporation 89 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649

SUBJECT:

FORWARDIIIG FINAL EVALUATION REPORT OF SEP TOPIC VI-4, CONTAII'IMEIVT ISOLATION SYSTEM FOR THE GINNA i'IUCLFAR POWER PLAI'IT Enclosed is a cooy of our final evaluation of SEP Topic VI-4, Containment Isolation System.

Inis assessment compares your facility, as described in Docket No. 50-244, with the criteria currently used by the regulatory staff, or licersing new facilities.

Please note that this revised evaluation has resulted in several chanoes to our Topic Dif,erence

Surnnary, dated March 17, 1982.

A revised Tooic Dif erence Summary s also enclosed for your information.

Mith respect to the potential modifications outlined in the conclusion in this report, a deter~ination of the need to actually imolement these changes

will be made during the same integrated assessment.

This topic assessment may be revised in the future if your facility design is changed or if NRC

c. iteria relating to thi s topic are modified before the integrated assess-ment is completed.

Sincerely,

Enclosure:

As stated Division o" L>censing ei

-"5 cc:

See next page

. Mr. John E. Maier CC Harry H. Yoigt, Esouire

LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby and MacRae 1333 Hew Ha..pshire

Avenue, N.

'A.

Suite 1100 Washing".on, D. C.

20036 Mr. Michael Slade 12 Trailwood Circle Roches er, New York 14618 Ezra Bialik Assistant At orney General Environmental Protection Bureau New York St te Depart,.ent of Law 2 World Trade Center Hew York, New York 10047 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Region Ii Office ATTN:

Regional Radiation Representative 26 Federal Plaza New York, Hew York 10007 Herber

Grossman, Esq.,

Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555 Ronald C. Haynes, Regional Adminis.rator Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region i 631 Park Avenue Iving of Prussia,

?ennsylvania" 19406 Resident inspector R.

E. Ginna ?lan.

c/o U. S.

HPC 1503 Lake Road

Ontario, Hew York 14519

Director, Bureau of Nuclear Opera ions State of Hew York Energy Office Agency Building 2 Empire State Plaza

Albany, New York 12223 Supervisor of the Town of Ontario 107 Ridge Road Wes,

Ontario, Hew York 14519 Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke Atomic Safe:y and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Cori,mission Wash ng:on, D. C.

20555 Or. Richard F. Cole Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.

S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555

TOPIC i90.

VI-4 TITLE Containment Isolation Systems 0 IFFEREHCE SUt~HARY (1)

The isolation valving arrangements do not meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50 (GDC 55 or 56),

as implemented by SRP 6.2.4 from.he standpoint of valve location for penetratiors

112, 120b, 12lc, 12ld,

123, 124b,

129, Z02, 203a, Z03b, 205,

Z06a, 207a,

210, 304,

305a, 305c, and 332a.

(2)

The isolation valving arranoements do not meet, the requirements of 10 CFR 50 (GDC 55 or 56),

as implemented by SRP 6.2.4 from the standpoint of valve number for penetrations 100, 102, 105,

106, 108,

109, 110a,

'llOb, 121, and 129.

For penetration 121a and 129 the nitrogen pressure recu'.ating valve is not an adequate isolation valve (3)

The isolation valving arrangements differ from the explicit require-ments of 10 CFR 50 (GDC 55, 56, and 57),

as implemented by SRP 5.2.4 from the standpoint of valve tyoe by usino a check valve outside containment for penetrations

105, 109,

129, 403, and 404.

(4)

The isolation orovided does not meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50 (GDC 55, 56, and 57),

as implemented by SRP 6.2.4 from the stand-point of valve actuation for penetrations

112, 120b,

121c, 12ld, 123,

201, 203a, 205, 206a,

207a, ZQ9, 305a, 308, 311, 312, 315, 316,

319, 320,

323, and 332a.

(5) 10 CFR 50 (GDC 57),

as imolemented by SRP 6.2.4 uas used to judge the acceptability of the isolation provisions for penetrations 301 and 303 (auxiliary steam heating to containment) and Z31 and 209 (Reactor Compartment Cooling) since a closed system was identified inside containment.

The licensee should verify that this portion of the system is of safety grade design to assure that the use of GDC 57 is appropriate.

(5)

The ESF reset oushbuttons are inadequately protected from accidental actuation.

Containment Systems Branch Evaluation.Report on SEP Topic Vl-',

Containment isolation System for the R.

E. Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1

Oocket No. 50-244 I

Introduction The R.

E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 began commercial operation in 1971.

Since then safety review criteria have changed.

As part of the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP),

the containment isolation sys-tem for the R. E. Ginna plant has been re-evaluated.

The purpose of this evaluation is to documen:

the deviations rom current safety cri --

teria as they relate to the containment isolation system.

The signifi-cance of the identified deviations, and recor.ended corrective measures to improve safety, will be the subjec of a subsequent, integrated assess-ment of he R. E. Ginna plant.

Review Criteria The safety criteria used in the current evaluation of the contairrent isolation system for the R.

E. Ginna plant are contained in the followinc references:

1) 10 CFR Par 50, Apoendi x A, General Oesicn Criteria 'or Nuclear Power Plants (GOC 5 '., 55, 56 and 57).

2),".UREG-75/087, Standara Rev! ew Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nucl ear

?ower Plants (SRP 6.2.-,

Con ainment I sol at Ion System).

3)

Rec" latory Guice 1.1l, !nstr ment Lines ?enetrating

?rimarv Reactor ron aihment.

=-NC~ OSURE

2-4)

Regulatory Guide 1.141, Containment Isolation Provisions for Fluid Systems.

III Related Safety Topics The review areas identified below are not covered in this report, but are related and essential to the completion of the re-evaluation of the con-tainment isolation svs em for the R.

E. Ginna plant.

These review areas are included in other SEP topics or ongoina Generic Reviews, as indicated below:

(1)

I I 1-1, (2)

I I I-4.C, (3).'11-6..",

(-) II1-6.8, (5)

I I I-6, (5)

! II-'12, (7) V!-6, (8)

'/ I I-2, (g) VIII-2, (10)

V I I I-a )

(11}

'UREG-Oi."O, (12)

';UREG-O66O, Classification of Structures, Components and Systems (Seismic and Ouality)

Internallv Genera ed missiles Effects of Pipe Break on Structures, Systems and Compo-nents Inside Containment Pipe Break OutsiCe Containment Seismic Oesign Considerations Environmental Quail ication of Safety-Relet o Equipment Containment Leak Testing Engineered Safety Feature System Control Logic and Oesign Onsite Ev,ergency Power Sys ems - Oiesel Generator Elec:rica.

Rene.rations of Reac or Containment Clarification of Tt~i;

~c ion Plan Requirements, I tern I I.E.-'.2, Containment I sol ation Oepe",dabi l i ty

.'!RC Action ?lan ~evo'oped as a Result of:he TNI-2 c'.ccicent, Item !!.E.-'.-', Con a'inment Purg'.,"g and Ventino Require."ents

IV Review Guidelines The containment isolation system of a nuclear power plant is an engi-neered safety feature that functions to allow the normal or emergency passage of fluids through the containrent boundary while preserving the ability of the boundary to prevent or limit the escape o

fission pro-ducts to the environs that may result from postulated accidents.

GDC 5a, 55, 56 and 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFp. part 50 pertain to the con-tainment isolation system of a nuclear po~er plant.

GDC 54 establishes design and test requirements or the leak detection provisions, he isolation function ard the containment capability of the isolation barriers in lines penetrating the primary reactor containment.

From the standpoint of containre. t isolation, leak detection provisions should be capaole of quickly detecting a'nd responding to a spectrum of postulated pipe break accident conditions.

To accomplish this, diverse parameters should be ronitored to initiate he containment isolation func.ion.

The parameters selected should assure a positive, rapid re-sponse to the developing accident condition.

Tnis aspect of the contain-ment isolation system review will be addressed during the review oi the post-THI requirements approved for implementa:ion, as stated in l)UREG-0737 at item 11.E,.'2.

Leak detection capabil ty should also oe provided at the svstem level to aiert the operator of the need to isolate a system train equipped with remote manual isolation valves.

SRP 6 ~2.'t 1tem II.I1, provides cuid-ance in this regard.

With respect to the design requirements for the isolation function, all non-essential systems should be automatically isolated (with manual valves sealed closed), and'alve closure times should be selected to as-sure rapid isolation of the containment in the event of an accident.

The review of the classification of systems as essential or non-essential, and the automatic isolation provisions for non-essential systems by appro-priatee signals, will be addressed in conjunction with the review of the post-TI41 requirements as stated in HUREG-0737 at Item II.E.4.2.

The clo-sure time of the containment ventilation system isolation valves will be evaluated in conjunction with the ongoing generic review of -purging prac-tices at operating plants (see

'lUR G-0660 at Item II.E.4.-').

he eiectricai power supply, instrumentation ana controls systems should be designed to engineered safety eatures criteria to assure accomplish-ment of the containment isolation function.

This aspect of the review is covered under SEP Topics VII-2 and VIII-2.

Also, rese'ting the isolation sicnai should not result in tne automatic re-opening o

containment iso-lation valves.

This will be addressed in con'unction with the revi ew of the post-T.'ll requirements approved for irplementation, as stated in NUREG-

0737, at Item I I.E.4.Z.

'I -h res" ect to the capao i 1 ities or con:ai nmment i sol a i on ba rriers in lines penetrating primar.

con ainment, the isolation barr'ers should be designed to encineered safety feature criteria, and protected acainst

missiles, pipe whip ano jet ii;:,".ange.-~ent.

Typical isolation barriers in-cluce valves, closed sys:e...s and blind flanges.

Fur hermore, provisiors should be made to permit periocic leak testing of the isolation barriers.

The adequacy of the missile, pipe whip and jet impingement protection will be covered under S."-P Topics I II-4.C, 111-5.A and 111-5.8.

The ac-

,ceptabili y of the design criteria originally used in tne design of the containment isolation system components will be covered in SEP Topics III-1, III-6 and III-12.

The adequacy of the leak testing procram will be covered under SEP Topic V I-6.

The acceptability of electrical penetrations will be covered in SKP Topic V I I I-4.

GOC 55, 56 and 57 establish explicit requirements for iso',ation valving-in lines penetratino the containment.

Speci ical ly, tney address the number and location o

isolation valves (e.g.,

redundant valving with one located inside contain ent and the other located outside containment),

val re actuation orovisions (e.c.,

automatic or remote manual isolation valves),

valve position (e.g.,

lock o closed, or the position of creater safety in the event of an accident or power failure),

ano valve type (e.g.,

5 imp le check val ve is no.

a per.kissable au'mat ic isola:ion va1 ve out-side containment).

Ficures 1

and 2 aepict the explicit valve arrangements speci>ied in GDC 55 and 56, and GDC 57, respectively.

GDC 55 and 56 also permit con=ai ment

~ sol>>'on provisions for 1 ines ene-tra ing the primary containment boundary that di f er fror. the explicit re-

.uire.,",ents, provideo he basis for acc ptabilit" is Cefinec.

This proviso is typically invoked when establisning t."e cortai.""ent iso',a-ion requ.re-men:s for essential (lies

, sa'ety related)

systems, or there is a clear improvement in safety.

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GENERAL DESIGN CRITERION 57 ISOLATION VALVE CRITERIA Lf)SSILE PROrEC I I'ON INSIDE OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT INSIDE OUTSIDE D

0 4

AUTOMATIC OR R"MOTE MANUAL CLOSEO SYSTEM

~ 0r'4b d.

0 AU TOMAT I C OR REMOTi MANUAL 0'e,ALED CLOSED CLOSED SYSTEM O.

h' 6

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~

b 'e.ALED CLOSED

Standard Review Plan (SRP) 6.2.4 at Item II.3 presents guidelines for acceptable alternate containment isolation provisions for certain clas-ses of lines.

Containment isolation provisions that are found acceptable on the "other defined basis" represent conformance with the GOC and do not constitute exceptions.

The followino evaluation addresses deviations in the containment isola-tion provisions from the explicit requirements of the General Design Criteri a.

Y Evaluation The con ainment isolation provisions or the lires penetr.irc the pri-marv reactor containment oi the R. E, Ginra,'suclear Power Plant, Unit 1

(Ginna) were evaluated based on Table 5.2.2-I and Figures 5.2.2-1 throuch S.2.2-!9 of he R.

S. Girna Final Sa-aty Analysis Rapor:

(FSAR) and other

~

aocumented informatior referenced in Section V II.

The orig'inal evalua-tion reoor-was transmitted to the licensee, and the license provided comments and addi:ional in ormation recarding by letter from RGEE (John

. s'saier) to tsRC (O

December 30, lg81.

Tnerefore, this report is evaluation report, and takes into account the for,".:at'.'on received

! ro.-.. the 1'ensee.

design changes in r sponse,,

sI

. H. Crutch, ield), da:ed a revision of the original co.

. ents and updated in-The containment isolation provisions fcr the Ginna plant are tabulated in Table l.

Tnis ',nfor.".,ation was obtained from ~ttacnment A to the Il December 30,

!981 letter and otl er docurents re erenced in Section YII.

9-The containment isolation provisions as tabluated in Table 1 were evaluated against the requirements of General Design Criteria (GDC) 54, 55, 56 and 57 (Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50) and the supplementary guidance of SRP 6.2.4 (Containment isolation Sys em),

wnere applicable.

Sec.ion 5.2.2 of the Ginna FSAR identifies five classes for categoriz-ing the lines penetratino the containment.

The following discussion ad-"'r dresses=each penetration class and identifies the containment penetra-tion number (provided by the licensee}

we have selected for inclusion in each class.

Class 1 - outgoing lines (reactor coolant system}

Yormally operating outgoing lines connected to the reactor coolant sys-tem are provided with at le st one automaticaliy operatea rip valve ana manual isolation valves in series locat d outside the containrent.

GDC 55 applies to Class 1 lines.

GDC 55 soecifies that one valve should be located inside containment and one valve should be located outside con airment, witn the valves being either locked -closed or autcratic isoiatior valves.

Furthermore, a simple check valve outside contain-ment may not be useo as an automa ic isolation valve, The following lines are incluoed in this class:

!08, liCb, 112, 1-'0, 20"-, 206a, and 20/a

10-The containment isolation provisions for line 140 (Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) letdown line) differ from the explici requirements of GDC 55 from the standpoint of valve location.

Two motor operated.

valves in series are provided inside containment; there is no contain-ment isolation valve in the line ou side containment.

However, the

closed, saiety-arade system outside containment (RHRS) is a suitable isolation barrier in lieu of a valve adjacent to the containment, and GDC 55 permits isola ion provisions that differ from the explicit re-quirements provided the basis for acceptability is defined.

There-fore, the isolation provisions for line 1~0 satisfy GOC 55.

The isolation provisions for lines "2, 205,

206a, and Z07a differ from the explicit requirements of GDC 55 from the standpoint of valve loca-tion and actuation.

Each of these lines is provided with an air-oper-ated valve and one or two manual valves in series

)ocated outside the containmen Loca ing both containment isolation valves outsioe con-tainment may be acceptable if the criteria used in the design of the piping between the containment and the,irst valve are sufficiently con-servative to provice adequate assurance of integrity.

This matter is discussed under SEP Topic lit-i.

For acceptability of the valve actua-t on provisions, these manual valves in lines '.'.2, 205, 20oa and 207a should be automatic isolation valves.

The contairrIent isolation provisions for lines CS and

'.:Db c fier irom the explicit-'equirements of GDC 55 iron the standpoirt o-the number of

'o I at ion va 1 ves, There i s no conta inrent isol ation va 1 ve in.hese

11 lines inside containment.

Therefore, an automatic isolation valve for line 108 and a locked-closed manual valve for line 110b are required inside containment.

2.

Class 2 -outgoing lines Normally operating outgoing lines not connected to the reactor coolant system and not protected against missiles throughout their lencth inside containment are provided with at least one automatically operated trip valve or one remotely operated stop valve located outside containment.

GDC 56 applies to Class 2 penetration lines.

GDC 56 specifies that one valve should be located inside containment nd one valve should be lo-cated outside containment with the valve beino either locked closed or automatic isolation valves.

Furthermore, a simple check valve outside containment ray not be used as an automatic isolation valve,

he fol-lowino lines. are included, in this class

107, 120b, 12lc, 12!d, !23,

!Zg, 1~3,

203a, 305a, and 332a.

The contairment isolation provisions ior lines

107, 12'!c, 1Z!c, 1-'3, Z03a and 332a dif er from the explicit requi.ements of GDC 56 from the standpoint of valve -location.

located outsice containment.

the discussion under Class 1.

I All of these lines have isolation valves l

l This may be acceptable,

however, basec on I

I I

I I t is not practical for lines

!07 (sum" di scnarge line) and

!-'3 ( R ~

C ~

drain tank discharge line) to have an isolation valve located irside containment because the val ve m:y be submerged as a result of

=-

LOCA.

The valving arrangement for these lines with both valves loCated outside containment is acceptable.

SRP 6.2.4, Item II.3, has provided guidance in this concern.

Consequently, GDC 56 is met on some other defined basis.

Lines

121c, 121d, 203a and 332a are small sensing lines for the contain-ment pressu're transmitters and are open to the containment atmosphere; tney were installed as a requirement of the THI Lessons Learned.

The pressure transmitters form a closed boundary outside containment.

A manual valve is also provided in each line for double barrier isolation capability.

However, to be an effective isolation valve, the manual valve should be a remote manual power operated valve.

With this change, and in light of the post-accident monitorino function of these lines, the

,'sola ion barriers satisfy GOC 56 on some other defined basis.

The containment isolation orovisions or lines

120b, 123, and 305a differ from the explicit reauirements of GOC 5o from the standpoint of valve location and actua ion.

Each of these lines is provided with an air-operated valve and a manual valve or chec'<

valve in series outside

'ontainment.

Locating both isolation valves outside containment may be acceptable based on the discussion under Class

However, a simple check valve outside containment is not an appropriate automatic isola-tion valve.

The juccment recarding its acceptaility will be made ir.

con~unction with the integrated assessment of the plant.

Furthermore,

.the local manual valve in hese lines shoul'e re"laced with an auto-matic isola ion valve.

13-Class 3 - Incomino lines Two sub-classes are identified for Class 3 penetration lines.

GOC 55 or 56 apply to Class 3 lines, depending on the line function Incoming lines connected to open systems outside containrent are provided with a check valve located inside containment, and a re-mote operated valve or check valve and remote operated valve lo-cated outside containment.

The following penetration lines are included in this sub-class:

120a, 121a,

121b, 129,

305b, 310a and 310b.

The containment isolation provisions for both lines 12la and 129 differ from the explicit requirements of GOC 56 from the stand-point of valve type.

A check valve and a oressure control valve (PCV) provide for containment isolation.

For the PCV to be an acceptable isolation valve, it must satisfy the requirements

,or an automatic isolation valve.

Tne licensee states that both PCV 44<

and PCV 1014 maintains the downs ream pressure at a constant 0.5 psig.

Of the downstream pressure is elevated above 0.5 psig; e.g.,

in the event of an accident both PCVs will automatically close.

However, of <<he down-stream pressure is less than 0.5 psig, both PCVs may ooen in an attempt to raise the cownstream oipinc pressure In lignt of this, the oerformance characteris ics of he valve cont. ols do not satisfy

.he reauirements

=or an automatic iso lat on valve.

Consequently lines 12la and 129 should be provided with an autor.atic isolation valve.

14 The containment isolation provisions for lines

120a, 12lb, 305b, 310a and 310b satisfy the explicit requirements of GOC 5o and are acceptable.

S.

Incoming lines, connected to closed systems outside containment are provided with at least one check valve or normally closed isolation valve located inside containment.

The following lines are included in this sub'-class:

100, 101,

102, 105,

106, 109, 110a, ill and 113.

The containment isolation provisions for line ill, tne residual heat removal (RHR) supply line, di fer from the xplicit requirements of I

I GOC 55

=rom the standpoint oi valve location and actuation.

The valving arranoement for this line is the same as for line 140, with two motor operated valves located inside containment that are remotely:,

controlled irom the control room.

There is no isola:ion valve out-side containmert.

Since tne system outside containment is a closed, safety-grade system, it constitut s

an appropriate isolation barrier I

in lieu oi a valve in the line outside containment.

Also, the line has a post-accident safety

-unction and automatic isolat'ion of he line is not appropriate.

Thereiore, the val re location and provi-sions or line 1

1 satisfy GFC 55 on sore other defired basis.

The containmcnt isolation provisions

=or lines

100, 102,

106, and

110a, the charging lines, dii;er =rom the explicit recuirements oi GOC 55 from the standpoint o= valve number.

A simple check valve in each line, inside containment, is identi=ied as the containment isolation valve; these lines are connected to

.he chemical and

15-volume control system outside containment.

The licensee states that the charging system does not have a required post-accident safety function.

Tnerefore, the containment isolation provisions for these lines should be uparaded to meet GOC 55 requirements; i.e.,

the lines should be automatically isolated.

The contai nment isolation provisions for lines 101 and 113, safety injection sy'tem, differ from the explicit requirements of GOC 55 from the standpoint of valve location and actuation.

="ach safety injec ion line is provided with two parallel motor operated valves inside containment that are re.:otely controlled

=rom the control room.

Since the safety injection system ou side con ainment is a

closed, safety-grade

system, double bar'rier isolation capability is provided.

Consequently, GGC 55 is met on some other defined basis.

The containment isolation provi s ions for lines 105 and

'.09, the con-tainment spray pump discharge

lines, di fer from the explicit require-ments of GOC 56 from the s andpoint of valve number and type.

A sim-pie check valve is provided in each line outside con ainment, which I

is not an acceptable automatic isolation valve.

Although these lines nave a pos -accident s-fety unction they are open to the con=ain-ment atmosphere and, therefore, the isolation provisions should satisfy GOC 56 (on some other defined basis).

Specifically, the check valves should be loca ed inside containnent and remote manual isola ion valves should be provided ou side containm nt.

Class 4 - Closed

system, missile protected.

>>ormally, operating incoming and outgoing lines, which are connected to a closed system inside containment and protected aaainst missiles through-out their lena h, are provided with at least one manual isolation valve out s i de containment.

GOC 57 applies to class 4 lines.

The following lines are included in this class:

124a, 125,

126, 12?,

128, 130, 131, 201,

206b, 20?b,

209, 301, 303,,

308, 3 11, 312, 3'.5, 3 16, 3 19, 320,

321, 322, 323, 401

~ 402, 403 and 404 ~

GOC 57 specifies the isolation provisions for closed systems inside con-tainment that are neither part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary nor connected directly to the containment atmosphere.

For theseclosed systems to qualify as bonafide containment isola ion barriers, they must be safety-grade design since the containment isolation system is an engi neered safety feature.

SRP 6.2.4 provides further guidance in this re-gard.

Closed systems

must, in part, be protected against missiles and pipe wrip, designated seismic Category I and classified Safety Class 2.

.=urthermo. e, GOC 5? specifies that a locked closed, re. ote manual or automatic isolation valve must be provided outside containment, and that a simple'heck valve may not be used as the automatic isolation valve.

The containment isolation provisions for lines

201, 209, 308, 311, 312,

315, 316,

319, 320 and 323 differ from the explicit requirements of GOC 57 from the standpoint of valve actuation.

All of these lines are equipped with local manual isolation valves outside containment.

These lines are served by the service water system.

For lines 308, 311, 312,

315, 316,

319, 320 and 323, which serve the containment fan cooler sys-tern (an engineered safety feature heat removal system),

the manual iso-lation valves should be upora-ed to power operated, remote manual valves.

I Furthermore, the licensee sho ld verify that the closed portions of the sys.em inside containment that are served by lines 201, 209, 301, and 303 are of safetv orade design to justify the applicability of GOC 57.

If GOC 57 cannot be applied, GOC 56 will oovern; i.e., automatic isolation valves should be orovided both inside and outside contain-ment.

In any erent, the manual valves in lines

201, 209,

301, and 303 should be automatic isolation valves since the lines are non-essentIal.

Penetration lines 401 and

~02 are the main steam lines.

Each line is provi ced wi h

a naiA s

earn stop valve hat is motor operated.

The

...a in steam blowaown branch lines are providea with motor operated stop check valves.

These valves are available to automat icallv or remote manually isolate the main steam lines.

Therefore, the iso atiof p ov)s ons satisfy GOC 57.

Penetration lines

-".03 and

'0-" are the feedwater lines.

Eacn line is isolated by a power operated vaIve and a check valve in series; the

18-power operated valve satisfies GDC 57 requirements.

Each feedwater line has two 3-inch auxiliary feedwater lines joining it downsteam of the power operated valve and is isolated with a manual valve and a check valve in series.

Under accident conditions, the auxiliary feedwater system is automatically initiated.

Since the check valve outside con-tainment is not an appropriate automatic isolation valve, the manual valve outside containment should be upgraded to a remote manual isola-tion valve.

Containment iso'lation provisions for penetration lines

124a, 125, 126

127, 128,

130, 131,

206b, and 207b satisfy the explicit requirements of GDC 57.

However, the aporooriateness of considerino lines

201, 209,

301, and 303, a close system will be made as a part of the integrated assessment.

3f these systems are not safety-grade

system, then GDC 56 applies, and addi tional automatic isolation valves must be provided inside containment.

Class 5 - Special service Lines wich penetrate the containm n-and which may be opened to the containment atmosphere, but which are normally closed during reactor operation, are provided with two isolation valves in series or one isolation vai'e a"d one blind lahge.

One of these devic s is located inside and the other is located outside

he containment.

GDC 56 applies to Class 5 penetration lines.

The followina lires are inciudea in this class:

29, lO:,

12-"b, l-'"-, 14!, l-'2, 202, 2:0, 300, 30

, 305c, 307, 30., 3.3, 3i7, 324 and 332b.

Z03b, 20-",

>9 The penetration lines listed below differ from the explicit require-I ments of GDC 56 from the standpoint of isolation barrier type:

Lines having a blind flang~ inside containment:

29, 309, 313 and 3l7.

i I

Lines having pipes or test connections capped inside containment:

~03 and 332b.

~ blind flange inside or outside containment is an acceptable isola-tion barrier in lieu of an isolation valve, if it is leak-testable.

Line 29, the fuel transfer tube, is isolated by a double-gasketed resi iert seal flange inside containment that is leak testable and a manual (locked closed) val re outside con-ai nment.

Lines 309 and 313, leak test depressurization, and 3I7, leak test supply, are equipped with leak-testable blind flanges inside containment and a rotor operated va'.ve outside containment.

Line 103, the construction fire service water line, is no lonoer in use, nas a pipe cap inside containment, a locked-closed valve outside containment, and a welded cao outside.

The isolation orovisions -or line 332b, leak test i ns trumen ation lines consist of a locked closed manual valve outside containment and a tubina cao inside containment which are both subject to loc 1

leakage testing.

There=ore, GOC 56 is met on some other def ned basis (SRP 6.2.-".,

Item II.6) -.or these lines

20-The containment isolation provisions for lines 141 and 142, containment sump recirculationsystem, differ from the explicit requirements of GOC 56 from the standpoint of valve actuation, due to their post-accident safety function.

Remote manual motor operated valves are used.

GOC 56 permits such deviations if the basis for acceptability is defined.

Therefore, the valve actuation provisions are acceptable and meet GOC 56 on some other defined basis (SRP 6.2.4, Item 11.3).

Contain ent isolation provisions for lines

124b, 202, 2030,

210, 304 and 305c differ from the explicit requirements of GOC 56 rom the stand-:

point oi valve location.

All of these lines have isolation valves lo-cated outside containment.

This mav be acceptable,

however, based on the discussion under Class 1.

Containment isolation provisions 'or lines 132, 204, 300,.

307, and 324 satisfy the explicit requirements of GDC 56 and are acceptable.

above, but are esalua.ed under containment isolation provisions.

penetrations are described in Section 5.1.2.7 nd shown in Figures These I

I l

/

These openings are pro-5.I.Z-ZS through 5.1.2-2g of the Ginna FSAR.

vided with recurdant closures and/or se )s, and are closed during normal operation.

They are also leak-testable.

Special Cases The containment penetrations No.

1000, personnel

hatch, and i'io

2000, equipment hate.'" are not covered "y the oenet'ration classes discussed YI.

CONCLUS ION The following summarizes the deviations from review guidelines that have been identi;ied and described in Section V of this report:

l.

The isolation valving arrangements of the following containment penetrations do not meet the requirements of GDC 55 and 56 from the standpoint of valve location:

Penetrations

112, 120b,

121c, 121d,

123, 124b, ZOZ, Z03a,

Z03b, 205,

206a, 207a,

210, 304,

305a, 305c, and 332a.

Tne isolation valves in these penetration lines are located outside containment.

The acceptabi lity of this is contingent on the acceptability of the piping design criteria (ScP Topic I'.I-:).

2.

Tne isolation valve arrangements oi the following penetration lines do not meet the requirements of GOC 55 or 56 from the standpoint o-valve nuFber:

Paragraphs

100, 102,

105, 106,

108, 109,

110a, 110b,

121a, and 129.

Tne isolation provis ions =or these

'lines should be upgraded.

Line 121a and 129 both identify a pressure control valve (PCY) ou:s'de conzainmen as a containment isolation valve.

Since the performance charact ristics of a PCY is such that tte valve may

reooen, therefore a

?CY is not considered an'utomatic isolation valve.

one isolation provisions for lines 121a and 129 should be upgraded to satisfy GDC 56.

3.

The isolation valves of the containment oenetration numbers listed oelow differ from the requirements of GOC 55, 56 and 57 from the standpoint of valve type by using a check valve outside contain-ment:

Lines 105,

109, 129, 403, and 404.

A simple check valve located outside containment is not an appropriate automatic isolation valve.

The judgement regarding its acceptability will be made in conjunction with the integrated assessment of the plant.

With regard to these lines, the isolation provisions should be uporaded because the lines are ooen to the containment atmosphere.

4.

The isolation provisions for the following penetraiions numbers. do not meet the requirements of GOC 55, 56 and 57 from the standooint of valve actuation:

Lines

112, 120b,

121c, 121d,

123, 201,

203a, 205,

206a, 207a,

209, 305a,

308, 311,

312, 315, 316, 319,

320, 323, and 332a.

Local manual valves are not aporopriate containment isolation valves unless they are administratIvely controlled closed; other-wise, automatic isolation valves should be provided.

GOC 57 was used to judge the acceptability o

the isolation provisions for Penetrations

201, 209, 301 and 303, since a closed system was identi fied outside containment.

It should be verified during inteorated assessment that the closed systems are of safety-grade design to assure that the use of GOC 57 is appropriate.

Also, as noted in item 4, automatic isolation valves should be provided, unless it can be satisfactorily argued that remote manual valves are acceptable.

If GOC 57 does not apoly, the isolation provisions must be uparaded to satis y GOC 56.

V I I REF" RENCES 1.

R.

"=. Ginna NPP, Unit 1,Final Safety Analysis Report, volume 2.

2.

R. i. Ginna NPP, Unit I, Systems design drawings:

33013-422, 3.

33013- '248, 33013-"25, 330'.3-4250, 33013--".27, 33013-42, 33013-433, 330 3-434, 33013-a35, 33013-436, 33013-519c, 33013-529, 33013-534, 33013-521, 33013-530.

PGE

( L. O. White, Jr. } letters to NRC (8. H. Gri er), dated 4/ 28, 6/22, 10/ 17, 1979, recardi ng responses to I.E. Bulletin 79-06A and 79-06A, Revision 1

( 50-2<<,

R.

E. Ginna, Urit 1).

RGE

( L. fl. Wnite, Jr.) letter to NRC (O. L. Ziemann),

dated 7/ 2/ 79, regarding Insef vlcc Inspection Program for the 1980- 1989 inta. Yal (50-244, R

~

"=. Ginna, Uni t I) ~

RGE (L. O. '>>hite, Jr.) let:er to NRC (fl. L. Zie...ann),

dated 3/ 17/80, recardi nc SEP Tooic V I-a, Contain;ert Isolation System (50-24',

R. E. Ginna, Uni 1).

6.

7.

9.

RGE (L. D. Mhite, Jr.) letter to NRC (D. H. Crutchfield) dated 6/18/80, regarding additional information provided or SEP topic XV-16 (50-Z44, R.

E. Ginna, Unit 1).

Counsel for RGE'LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby E HacRae) letter to NRC (H. R. Denton),

dated 11/13/80, regardino the Amendment and At-tachments A and 8 to amend the Technical Specifications in Ap-pendix A of operation license application to incorporate imple-mentation of THI Lessons Learned Category A items (50-244, R.

E, Ginna, Unit 1).

RGE (J.

. Haier) letter to NRC (D. H. Crutchfield),

da ed 3/2/81, regarding SEP Topic V!-4, Containment Isolation (Pur"e Valve Reset),

(50-24',

R.

E. Ginna, Unit 1).

RGE (J.

E. Haier) letter to NRC (D. H. Crutchfield), dated 3/27/81, reoardino corr,ents on SEP Topics V-IIA and VI-7.c.1, (50-2-"4, R.

=". Ginna, Unit 1).

RGE (L. 0. White, Jr.) letter o,"lRC (0. H. Crutchiield), dated

.'2/1/81, regarding SEP Topic VI--", Contain ent Isolation (Elec-trical), (50-244, R.

E. Ginna, Unit 1).

RGE (J.

E. Haier) letter to

<<RC (D. H. Crutchfield) dated 12/30/3',

provid ng cor,;->ents and in ormation in Attachment A

to the bette.

in response to SEP Topic VI--'Containment Isola-tion System (50-244, R. E. Girna, Unit 1).

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~O 4 p**4 Docket No. 50-244 LS05-81-05-001 UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM(SSlON WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 May 6, 1981 Cl~gP Vt -g

'Mr. John E. Maier Vice President Electric and Steam Production Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation 89 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649

SUBJECT:

COMPLETION OF APPENDIX J REVIEW On March 28, 1978, the NRC staff issued Amendment No.

17 to Provisional Operating License No. DPR-18 for the R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power. Plant.

This amendment modified the Ginna Technical Specifications regarding containment testing and granted certain exemptions from the requirements of Appendix J (Containment Leakage Testing) to 10 CFR Part 50.

However, the Safety Evaluation Supporting Amendment No.

17 also noted that more information was required in order to judge the acceptability of additional requested exemptions..

You provided the requested information in letters dated September 21, 1978 and November 3, 1978.

Your submittals have been reviewed by our consultant, the Franklin Research Center.

The results of this review are documented in the enclosed Technical Evaluation Report.

We have reviewed this report and concur in its bases and findings and have further concluded that:

Your proposal to modify certain piping penetrations to al.low draining of those affected lines prior.to a Type A test is acceptable and should be implemented in all future containment leakage tests.

2.

Your request to exclude residual heat removal system valves 700, 701, 720 and 721 from Type C testing is acceptable and no exemption from Appendix J requirements is necessary.

3.

Your request to test the containment spray system.isolation valves with water in lieu of air is acceptable and no exemption from Appendix J requirements is necessary,

Mr. John E. Maier

~

~

~

May 6, 1981 Also, your previous submittals of technical specifications to incorporate the requirements of Appendix J inadvertently omitted provisions for the testing of penetrations with expansion

bellows, as noted in Section 3.4 of the enclosed Technical Evaluation Report.

You submitted the necessary proposed modifications to the technical specifications by letter dated November 13, 1980.

This proposal is currently under review.

This letter completes the review of Appendix J for the Ginna Plant.

Sincerely,

Enclosure:

Technical Evaluation Report dated April 8, 1981 Dennis M. Crutchfield, C ref

'perating Reactors Branch 85 Division of Licensing

Mr. John E, Maier 3

May 6, 1981 cc w/enclosure:

Harry H. Voigt, Esquire

LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby and MacRae 1333 New Hampshire

Avenue, N.

W.

Suite 1100 Washington, D. C.

20036 Mr. Michael Slade 12 Trai lwood C i rc1 e Rochester, New York 14618 Ezra Bialik Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Bureau New York State Department of Law 2 World Trade Center New York, New York 10047 Jeffrey Cohen New York State Energy Office Swan Street Building Core 1,

Second Floor Empire State Plaza

Albany, New York 12223 Director, Technical Development Programs State of New York Energy Office Agency Building, 2 Empire State Plaza

Albany, New York 12223 Rochester Public Library 115 South Avenue Rochester, New York 14604 Supervisor of the Town of Ontari o 107 Ridge Road West

Ontario, New York 14519 Resident Inspector R. E. Ginna Plant c/o U. S.

NRC 1503 Lake Road

Ontario, New York 14519 Director, Criteria and Standards Division Office of Radiation Programs (ANR-460)

S. Environmental Protection Agency Washington, D. C.

20460 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Region II Office ATTN:

E IS COORDINATOR 26 Federal Plaza New York, New York 10007 Herbert Grossman, Esq.,

Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555 Dr. Richard F. Cole Atomic Saf ety and Licens i ng Boar d U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D. C.

20555 Dr.

Eraneth A. Luebke Atomic Saf ety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555 Mr. Thomas B. Cochran Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

1725 I Street, N.

W.

Suite 600 Washington, D. C.

20006