ML17303B028
| ML17303B028 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 03/30/1988 |
| From: | Martin J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | Van Brunt E ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17303B029 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8804190104 | |
| Download: ML17303B028 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000528/1988001
Text
" AC't.'EIZRATED
DISTRIBUTION
DEMONSTRATION
SYSTEM
SUBJECT:
Forwards Special
Team Insp rept 50-528/88-01
on 880104-0212
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IEOID
COPIES
RECEIVED:LTRj ENCL
SIZE: 6+~D
TITLE: General
(50 Dkt)-Insp Rept/Notice of Violation
esponse
D
05000528
S
NOTES:Standardized
plant.
REGULATORY'NFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
CESSION NBR:8804190104
DOC.DATE: 88/03/30
NOTARIZED: NO
DOCKET
g
ACIL:STN-50-528 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Arizona Publi
05000528
AUTH.NAME
AUTHOR AFFILIATION
MARTIN,J.B.
Region 5, Ofc of the Director
RECIP.NAME
RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
VAN BRUNT,E.E.
Arizona Nuclear Power Project (formerly Arizona Public Serv
RECIPIENT
ID CODE/NAME
PD5
DAVIS,M
INTERNAL: ACRS
DEDRO
NRR/DLPQ/PEB ll
NRR/DOEA DIR 11
NRR/DREP/RPB
10
NRR/PMAS/ILRB12
OGC 15-B-18
RES/DRPS
DIR
TERNAL: LPDR
NOTES:
COPIES
LTTR ENCL
1
1
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
RECIPIENT
ID CODE/NAME
LICITRA,E
NRR MORISSEAU,D
NRR/DLPQ/QAB 10
NRR/DREP/EPB
10
NRR/DRIS DIR 9A
OE LIEBERMAN,J
FILE
02
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NRC PDR
COPIES
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A
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8
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TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES
REQUIRED:
LTTR
27
ENCL
27
Docket No. 50-528
Arizona Nuclear
Power Project
P.
0.
Box 52034
Phoenix,
Arizona 85702-2034
Attention:
Nr.
E.
E.
Van Brunt, Jr.
Executive Vice President
SUBJECT:
NRC INSPECTION OF
PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
UNIT NO.
1
Gentlemen:
'I
This refers to the special
team inspection of January
4 through February 12,
1988,
conducted
by Nr.
M.
M. Mendonca
and other members of our staff, of
activities authorized
by NRC License
No.
NPF-41 and to the discussion
of our
findings held with you on February
12,
1988,
and other members of your staff
at the conclusi,on of the inspection.
Areas
examined during this inspection are described
in the enclosed
inspection
report.
Within these
areas,
the inspection consisted of selective
examinations
of procedures
and representative
records,
interviews with
personnel,
and observations
by the team.
Ins ection Overview
The inspection
conducted
by the team was
a safety
system functional
inspection
(SSFI).
The objective of an
SSFI is to assess
the operational
readiness
of selected
safety systems
to function under all operational
and analyzed
accident conditions.'he first step involves the selection
of a small
number of plant systems that have significant impact
on plant
safety
and which involve a broad cross section of site activities. 'or
this inspection,
the Essential
Chilled Water System
(EC), Essential
Cooling Water System
(EW), and Essential
Spray
Pond System
(SP) were
selected for review with .additional attention to interfaces with
supporting
and serviced
systems.
These
systems
were selected
because it
is considered
essential
that they function correctly following an event
such
as
a loss of offsite power or a major plant transient.
Additionally, probabilistic risk assessment
studies of pressurized
water
reactors
have indicated that the tailure of the selected
systems,
following a loss of offsite power or a major plant transient,
generally
contributes
highly to the probability of occur rence of a core melt event
or an event with significant offsite consequences.
~In assessing
these
systems,
the team focused primarily on the capability
of your engineering
organization to establish
and access
the design basis
of the systems;
and their capability to maintain the design basis
when
modifying the systems
and during system operation.
Additionally, the
8804i90104
880330
...PDR
ADOCK 05000528
9
SEOUL
MAP 3
0
198S
team considered
the actual
implementation of the design basis
through
maintenance,
surveillance,
testing,
and plant operational
aspects
associated
with the systems
selected.
Team Findin
s
The team identified a number of deficiencies
and raised
many significant
questions
with regard to =the selected
systems.
As highlighted below,
these
include missing or inadequate
design analysis,
inadequate
implementation or maintenance
of the design, basis,
and deficiencies
in
the System
Engineer
Program:
1.
Several
examples of significant errors in design basis
documents
were identified:
Significant calculations
were missing.
There were
no
calculations available for:
Sizing the essential
chilled water or the essential
cooling water surge tanks relief valves.
Supporting the design temperatures
and pressures
of the
three
systems.
gualification of electrical
cable supports
in electrical
cable trays for SSE conditions.
Examples of inadequate
design or modification calculations/
assumptions
wer e observed:
ANPP had
made
two calculation
changes
to diesel
generator
loading calculations
and
had not first corrected
or taken
into account inaccuracies
in the original/initial
calculations.
Battery sizing and diesel
generator
loading calculations
contained
non-conservatisms
and notable errors.
Sizing the essential
cooling water system
surge tank was
based
on one half the
Rancho
Seco design with no
calculations.
2.
Several
examples
were identified in which the design basis
was not
adequately
implemented or maintained.
Procedure
and training were inadequate
for the crosstie of
the essential
cooling water (safety)
and the nuclear service
water (non-safety)
systems.
Addition of a chemical additive tank over the
SP system,
without considering
seismic aspects
in the 10 CFR 50.59
review.
Air Handling Unit Access
Panel
missing,
poor condition of
emergency lighting batteries,
electrical cabinets with several
cover fasteners
missing.
These
are indicative of a less than
adequate
level of verification of proper maintenance activity
completion.
3.
System engineers
lacked specific
knowledge with regard to
design basis,
examples
are:
The failure of system engineers
to identify the problems
identifie'd by the inspection
team.
Lack of knowledge of various interface functions with other
systems,
e.g.,
essential
cooling water system
surge tank level
setpoints,
battery pilot cell selection.
Established training programs
were not specific nor did they
assure
acceptable
system engineer
knowledge or retention.
A summary of significant, inspection
team findings is set forth in
Appendix
B', herewith enclosed.
Conclusions
Based
on these finding and the findings of the special
inspection
(50-528/88-07) related to the inoperability of the Auxiliary Feedwater
Pumps,
the team found that:
Y
ANPP has defined
as
a goal the establishment
of a plant design
basis
document;
however,
ANPP has not been effective in
implementing
an engineering
program to assemble
a complete
and
accurate
design basis
document.
ANPP has not been effective in establishing
and implementing
a
System Engineering
Program that accomplishes
the goals laid out by
ANPP.
The team concluded that these
programs
have drifted away from the
original goals
due to management
inattention.
We find this particularly
vexing in light of our past discussions
with you concerning
these
programs.
The number
and types of problems
noted is indicative of the need for
additional
and better
focused
management
attention to design related
activities.
This conclusion is also reinforced
by the findings of a special
inspection related to the inoperability of the Auxiliary Feedwater
Pumps.
In
that inspection,
we found that the problem of changing limit switch
I'JAR 3 0
198S
setpoints
inconsistent with component
design function, could have
been
found
and corrected
by respon'sible
personnel
during any one of many opportunities.
Similarly, the SSFI found examples of inadequate
implementation of the design
basis
throughout the
ANPP organization.
In this regard,
the team
had several
discussions
with licensee
management
personnel.
These
management
personnel
shared this concern
and noted that efforts have already
been initiated to
enhance
performance
in this area.
As previously stated,
the team concluded that the design basis
program
and the
system engineer
program strayed substantially
from the objectives
stressed
to
us over the last several
years.
Further,
the team determined that the root
causes
of this divergence
were that (1) management
had not effectively
established
and communicated their expectations
related to the Technology
Transfer
and the System
Engineer
Programs,
and (2) management
had not assured
implementation of the design basis into plant activities, e.g.,
operations,
maintenance,
surveillance,
and training.
Specifically,
management
had not
provided
and assured
a clear understanding
of (1) what is an acceptable
design
basis
document,
(2) what is an acceptable
design basis technical
review,
and
(3) what are the
knowledge level
and responsibilities
for engineering
personnel
to establish
and maintain the -design basis.
Finally, the team
concluded that management
must assure that their expectations
are
implemented
through
management
overview, quality audits,
and other independent
assessments.
During the team exit meeting,
you acknowledged
the team's
conclusions relating
to design
and design control deficiencies
and described
several
planned
actions to correct
these deficiencies.
You further clarified your intentions
during an
ANPP/NRC Management
Meeting held on February 29,
1988.
The team
understands
that these
actions
are intended to:
(1) consider
design basis
information and calculations
associated
with plant systems
and provide
additional
assurance
that this information is accurate
and complete with
particular emphasis
on the Technology Transfer
Program;
(2) audit plant
activities
and confirm that these activities reflect accurate,
technically
sound design basis
information; (3) provide improved programs
and control over
all organizations
implementing design basis
requirements,
particularly with
regard to the System
Engineer
Programs,
and (4) provide additional
management
overview of the technical
aspects
of design
and modification activities
including independent
assessment
of those activities.
0
You are encouraged
to assign priority to efforts to improve your performance
in this area.
Additionally, we would request that you please
provide
a
detailed written description of your action plan to improve performance
in
~ this area.
Specifically,
we would suggest that you perform a thorough
reappraisal
of the design basis
program
as well as the system engineer
program.
This reappraisal
should include your evaluation of the root cause(s)
as to why the programs
have not completely
implemented
management's
objectives
and intentions,
and assure that there is a clear,
mutual understanding
of your
objectives
by all involved.
Me anticipate periodic meetings with you and,your
staff to discuss
the status of your actions to address
the basic
problems
.identified in this inspection.
~<8 ~ 0
1S88
Based
on the results of this inspection, it appears
that certain of your
activities were not conducted
in full compliance with NRC requirements,
as set
forth in the Notice of Violation, enclosed
herewith
as Appendix A.
Your
response
to this Notice is to be submitted in accordance
with the provisions
of 10 CFR 2.201.
In addition to your response
to the Notice of Violation,
please
provide your assessment
of the apparent deficiencies identified as
unresolved
items in the enclosed
report, including any corrective actions
taken or planned.
In accordance
with 10 CFR 2.790(a),
a copy of this letter and the enclosures
will be placed in the
NRC Public Document
Room.
The responses
directed
by this letter and the attached
Notice are not subject
to the clearance
procedures
of the Office of Management
and Budget
as required
by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980,
PL 96-511.
Should you have
any questions
concerning this inspection,
we will be glad to
discuss
them with you.
Sincerely,
Regional Administrator
Enclosures:
1.
Appendix A, Notice of Violation
2.
Appendix B,
Summary of Significant Findings
3.
Inspection
Report
No. 50-528/88-01
cc w/enclosures:
'.
G.
Haynes,
W.
F. Quinn,
R.
Papworth,
L. Souza,
T.
D. Shr-',ver,
W., E. Ide,
C.
N.
Russo,
J. Morrison,
PVIF
L. Bernabei,
GAP
T.
Hogan,
ACC
A.
C.
Gehr, Snell
8 Wilmer
JBurd
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CCal dwe1
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bcc w/enclosures:
RSB/Document Control
Desk (RIDS) (IE01)
D. Persinko,
Project Inspector
Resident
Inspector
G.
Cook
B. Faulkenberry
J. Martin
Docket File
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M. Smith
Region V/norma
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