ML17300A627

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Forwards Response to List of Future Discussion Items Generated During 861028 Meeting in Phoenix,Az.Schedule for Completion Will Be Provided by 870101 for Responses Not Listed.Related Documentation Encl
ML17300A627
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde Arizona Public Service icon.png
Issue date: 11/06/1986
From: Haynes J
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To: Knighton G
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
ANPP-38962-JGH, TAC-64317, NUDOCS 8611140268
Download: ML17300A627 (36)


Text

REQULAT INFORNATION DISTRIBUTION STEN'RIDB)

ACCESSION NBR'- 8611 140268 DQC. DATE: 86/11/06 NOTARIZED:

NQ DOCKET FACIL':8'fN-50-530 Palo Verde Nuclear Station>

Unit 3> Arizona Pub 1 i 05000530 AUTH. NANE AUTHOR AFFILIATION HAYNES> J. G.

Arizona Nuclear Pouer ProJect

{formerly Ari zona Public Serv RECIP. NANE RECIPIENT AFFILIATION KNIQHTON> Q. W.

~ PWR Prospect Directorate 7

SUBJECT:

Forwards, response tD 11st of t u'ture d1scuss1Dn 1tems generated during 861028 meeting in Phoenix> AZ. Schedule for completiDn l0111 be proYided bg 870101 for those responses not listed. Related documentation encl.

DISTRIDUTION CODE:

900ID COPIES RECEIVED: LTR.Q ENCL g

SIZE:

TITLE: Licensing Submittal:

PSAR/FSAR Amdts 5 Related Correspondence NOTES: Standardized plant. N. Davis> NRR: fCg.

05000530 RECIPlENT ID CODE/NAI'lE PWR-8 EB PWR-8 FQB PWR-8 PD7 PD PWR-8 PEICBB INTERNAL: ACRB 41 ELD/HDS3 IE/DEPER/EPB 36 NRR BWR ADTS NR QE. I'l. L G FIL 04 I/NIB EXTERNAL: BNL{ANDTB ONLY)

LPDR 03 NBIC 05 NOTES:

COP IEB LTTR ENCL 1

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1 6

6 0

1 1

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1 RECIP IENT ID CODE/NANE PWR-8 PEICSB PWR-8 PD7 L*

LICITRA>E 01 PWR-8 RBB ADN/LFNB IE FILE IE/DGAVT/GAB 21 NRR PWR-8

  • DTS NRR/DHFT/NTB RGN5 DNB/DSS

{ANDTB)

NRC PDR 02 PNL GRUEL> R COP IEB

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LTTR ENCL 2

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1 2

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Arizona Nuclear Power Project P.O. BOX 52034

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PHOENIX. ARIZONA85072-2034 November 6, 1986 ANPP-38962-JGH/RAB/98.05 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:

Mr. George W. Knighton, Project Director PWR Project'irectorate P7 Division of Pressurized Water Reactor Licensing B

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555

Subject:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)

Unit 3 Docket No.

STN 50-530 ANPP/NRC Management Meeting File: 86-A-056-026

Dear Mr. Knighton:

On October 28,

1986, an ANPP/NRC management meeting discuss the operating performance of PVNGS Units 1

and operating license for Unit 3.

You provided'n agenda this

meeting, see attachment 1.

ANPP discussed these and'lides which comprise attachment 2.

was held in Phoenix to 2 prior to granting the to be discussed during items using the agenda During the meeting a list of future discussion items was generated by mutual agreement of both parties, see attachment 3.

In a subsequent conversation between you and Dick Bernier of my staff, it,was agreed.that ANPP would provide responses to those items by January 1,

1987.

In the event that a

response to an item is not available, it was agreed that a

schedule for completion will be provided by the January date.

Very truly yours, J.

G Haynes Vice President Nuclear Production JGH/RAB/rw cc:

0.

M.

De Michele E. E.

Van Brunt, Jr.

A. C. Gehr R.

P.

Zimmerman Sb111402b8 Sb110b PDR'DOCK '05000530 PDR'~0>

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ATTACHMENT l Palo Verde Management Meeting cto er c

l.

Introductions

(NRC and ANPP)

I 2.

NRC Concerns, Based Upon Gperating Performance of Palo Verde, Units l and 2

3.

large number of personnel errors by plant staff technical specification surveillance violations large number of plant trips effectiveness of engineering evaluations and root cause assessments thoroughness of preoperational and power ascension testing for verifying technical specification set points single failure vulnerabilities in plant desian ISC problems effectiveness of information dissemination to plant staff regarding problems and corrective actions interfacing with other nuclear plants adequacy and timeliness of applications for technical specification changes three unit operation may require additional experienced resources at corporate level and plant level increased management attention appears prudent until all three units achieve full power operation ANPP Assessment of Palo Verde Plant Performance 4.

ANPF Programs for Assessing and Improving Project Performance (a)

Existing programs description problems identified corrective actions taken or planned (b)

Planned programs description scheduled implementation date 5.

Conclusions and Closing Remarks

0 ATTACHMENT 2 PALO VERDE MANAGEMENT MEETING October 28,. 1986 AGENDA I.

Introduction, A.

NRC B.

ANPP E. E.

Van Brunt II.

ANPP Presentation A.

Overall Plant Performance B.

Assessing/Improving Plant Performance C.

Management Resources D.

Conclusion J.

R.

Bynum

0. J. Zeringue/R.

M. Butler J.

G. Haynes J.

G. Haynes III. Closing Remarks NRC

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LER,'S ISSUED PER UNIT PER QUARTER 25 20 15 0

1O z

20 (TS 3)

(ST=3) 21 (TS $1 2)

(ST$7) 25 (Ts =1 e)

(ST46) 25 (TS $11)

(ST02) 22 (TS $14)

(ST$ 6) 18 (TS$ 1 1)

(ST*6) 12 12 (TS,e)

(TS 4)

(ST$ 3)

(ST<2) 16 (TS$e)

(ST$ 4) 9 (TS$ 1)

(ST$ 0) 4 (TS =1)

(ST%0) 4th 1988 1st qtr qtr 1985 1st 2nd 3rd qtr qtr qtr (ST) SURVEILLANCETEST DEFICIENCIES (TS) TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION VIOLATIONS UNIT 1 UNIT 2 2nd qtr 3rd qtr

0

LER'S ISSUED PER UNIT PER QUARTER FIRST NINE MONTHS AFTER OPERATING LICENSING 25 (TS 41 8)

(ST*5) 20.'

15 j

Ul U.0 10 m

DX

,5.

20 (TS53)

(ST*3)

'f2 (TS*8)

(ST43) 21 (TSAR)

(ST%7)

~1e (TS:8)

(ST=~)

12 (TS='4)

(ST52) 6 MONTHS SINCE OPERATING LICENSE (ST) SURVEILLANCE TEST DEFICIENCIES (TS) TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION VIOLATIONS UNIT 1 (1985)

UNIT 2 (i988)

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1

220 Cumulative Total of Afi Event Reports IoS ~Ilc I 200."

+cchlnfton Ituclcaf I 160 I cIO

~It~flat I Col lavaf I

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Palo Vordo 1

l20

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100 CC c c4 gable I ICfo aC LQCI cl aca Diablo Can]on NcCulcc I 60 40 bcna Spot o 2

- VoL~o Suaguchanna St. lucia I 20 Dla 0- ~ Hill~ tone )

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10 12 ll '6 10 20 22 2CI 26 20 30 32 HONT)IS SINCE OPERATING LICENSE ISSUED

20 19 18

l7 18 15 14 z

13 o

10 0

9 8

K 7

UJ 6

5 z

4 3

12

,1 11(2) 20(12) 19(3)

OCCURRENCES INVOLVINGPERSONNEL 19(8) 14 (10) 12(6) 7(5)

//j/

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~ 9(5)

. 2 (2)

'85 1st qtr 2nCI qtr 3I Cf qtr 4th

'86 1st qtr qtr 2 llcI qtr 3I cI qtr QUARTERS SINCE ISSUANCE OF THE OPERATING LICENSE

=UNIT 1

.-&NIT2

( ) NUMBER OF PROCEDURE VIOLATIONS

0

OCCURRENCES INVOLVINGPERSONNEL 20 19

.18 17

'f6 15 14 f3 f2 11 IO 9

8 7

6 5

4 3

2

'I 11(2) 9(5) 2O (12) 7 (5) 19 (3) 9 (5)

UNIT I MONTHS OF OPERATION

-- UNIT 2

'( )

NUMBER OF-,PROCEDURE VIOLATIONS

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Samp1e Unit Comparative Trend Based On SCSS Data 200 100 160 Voohlngton 54clcor 5

140 C)

Vt 120 C9

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100

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45 ~lI~ 1 letCo lt c 5

. 80 60 C7 40 20 Ctc

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10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 20 30 32 Ii0IITIIS SIIICE 0PCWT1nG L1CCIISC 1SSuCO.

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UNIT 2 asm aa asa aug'

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REACTOR THlPS U)

CL KI-K0 O

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0'NIT UNIT 2 MONTHS OF OPERATION

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69 Cumulative Total of RPS Event Reports Masblngton ttuclrac 1

50 45 ttcCutra 1

40 35 I-

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Palo Vordo 1

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10 12 14 16 10 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 CIOCITIIS 5 ICICE OPECIATICIG LICECISE ISSUEO

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CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF ENGINEERING EVALUATIONS AND ROOT CAUSE 1.

CONTACTED OTHER 'PLANT TO EVALUATE EXISTING PROCESS.

2.

IDENTIFIED AREAS OF IMPROVEMENT 3.

DEFINED FORMAL ROOT CAUSE/ENGR.

EVAL. PROCESS.

4.

QUARANTINE COMPONENTS UNTIL'OOT/CAUSE/EVALUATIONCOMPLETE 5.

PLANT TRANSIENT RESPONSE/OPERATOR

RESPONSE

EVALUATION 6.

DEFINED RESTART CRITERIA 7.

UNIT UNIQUE EVALUATIONS WITH SHARED RESULT 8.

ABOVE APPLIED TO OTHER SYSTEM.

COMPONENT.

K PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS

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PIIESIDEtlT July 1986

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EXECIJTIVE V.P.

August 1986 V.p.

HUCI.EAR PAQOUC I IOH Jtlne 1985 Harch 1985 ASST.

V.P. IIIJCI EAR PROOIJCT IOtl pvtlris PLAtlT LIAIIAGER hlriA.

tllJCI.EAlt SAFETY ISEG/HSG OIR.

TfCHIIICAL SERVICES OIR.

CORPOltATE QA

LIGR, ELIERGBICY PLAtl LIGR.

OPEAATIOtlS IIGA.

TRAWSITIOII J.IGA.

IIUCLEAR FtlGItlEEAltlG

'SST.

LIGA.

COAPOAATE OA LIGR.

AOJJIJIISTRATIVE SERVICES IJCiA.

LIAIIITEIIAIICE J.IGA.

HIJCLEAR COWSTAIJCTIOW J.IGA.

OIJALITY SYSTEh(S/

EJIGIWEL'AHlG LIGR.

TRAIWIHG LIGR.

QUTAriE Harch 1985 LIAIIAGELIEIIT hlrA.

HUCLEAII FUELS IIGA.

PAOCIJAEJIEtlT OIJALITY ltAF SUPERIHTBIOEtlT hlGA.

PLAHT SERVICES LIGR. RECOAOS J,IGA.

+

QUALITY AlJQITS/

LIQIIITOIIIHG hlGR.

TECHHICAL SUPPORT LIGR, LICEtlSIHG hlGR.

QUALITY COtlTAOL i LOCATEO OIJSITE LIAttAGER coHPLIAHcE Harch 1986 OFFSITE ORGANIZATION 10/28/86

4 0

DISCUSSION LIST FROM ANPP/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING ON 10/28/86 ATTACHMENT 3 11/04/86 The CPC DNBR program needs to be modified to eliminate the flow projected DNBR trip.

When a fast bus transfer occurs, a

7 RPM dip in RCP speed is sufficient to cause a flow projected DNBR trip to occur.

This appears to, be a problem of insufficient margin.

2 ~

The Steam Bypass Control System (SBCS) responds as expected when actuated from power levels above 70X.

However, when power level is below 70X, the system has a tendency to over respond.

This appears to be a fine tuning

problem, and Combustion Engineering is involved in providing a solution.

3.

Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) coastdown is quicker than indicated in the safety analysis.

A re-analysis was completed indicating that the existing flow conditions are within the bounds of the current safety analysis.

4 ~

During a partial loss of non-class lE power, the motor operated isolation valve in the main steam supply to the moisture separator reheater remained

open, due to the loss of power.

Simultaneously, tlie high level dump valve on the reheater drain tank opened to the condenser, creating a

,path for steam flow from the main steam system to the condenser.

This in turn caused the pressure in the steam generator to decrease sufficiently to actuate the Main Steam Isolation Valves.

Design changes will be implemented to correct the problem.

5 ~

The BOP ESFAS/RMS equipment have caused numerous actuations of the ESF systems.

The problems have been varied and have included inadequate ventilation in cabinets, bad connections, and inadequate grounding.

6.

Several problems have occurred with the charging pumps.

Gas binding has occurred due to low VCT level and a ruptured diaphragm in a pulsation dampener.

Additionally, a

crack was discovered in a

charging pump block.

The changing pumps impact the operability of the auxiliary pressurizer spray.

7 ~

The issue of the masonry walls at elevation 76's being addressed in separate correspondence with the NRC.

8.

9.

During the event on 7-12-86, the control room supervisor first diagnosed the event as a small break LOCA when in reality it was an excessive steam demand event.

During the event there was:

also a

partial loss of non-class lE power which energizes certain main control board indicators needed to complete the diagnosis.

The NRC has transmitted their concerns in a letter, and ANPP is evaluating them and the emergency procedure.

\\

The NRC noted that the low pressurizer pressure trip and the safety injection actuation setpoints were the same.

- The question was raised as to whether it was desirable or not to have them the same.

10.

ANPP has taken exception to. provisions in R.G. 1.68.2 which would require a test to prove remote shutdown capability in each unit.

The NRC has determined that the test should be done in each unit.

ANPP will respond to the NRC by 11-10-86.

1074K/0037K

0

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11.

Problems were experienced with unwanted actuation of breakers in the switchyard.

The breaker operations which caused actuations of

'the Reactor Protection System were caused by malfunctions in the plant multiplexer system (PMUX).

Switchyard breaker control circuits have been hardwired, bypassing the PMUX for this function.

12.

Numerous computer failures in the 'security system have been a problem.

13.

PVNGS has demonstrated vulnerabilities to single failures as demonstrated by charging pump pulsation dampener

failures, actuation of SBCS by a

computer card, startup transformer current transformer connections, and a

loose wire on MOV-536.

s 14.

Numerous annunciators remain lighted on the main control boards.

15.

ANPP should develop more formal and regular communication with other plants, particularly the other CPC plants.

16.

The NRC expressed concern about whether or not formal procedures existed to insure the transfer of information and data from one unit to another.

17.

Concern was expressed by the NRC concerning load shedding causing valve inoperability.

They wanted to know if we were looking at the problem.

18.

The NRC noted that we must insure that all information for the Sholly process is included in licensing submittals.

In addition, consideration must be given to changes which could be affected by the Diablo Canyon decision in the Ninth Circuit Court which opened hearings for certain kinds of changes.

Change requests should look at more than gust the small scope of the change, and the time when the changes are needed must be considered.

19.

Does the Post Trip Review Procedure adequately cover what must be done and what must be monitored when the plant is restarted when the cause of the trip has not been fully determinedP 20.

Does the SPDS computer have sufficient capacity to perform in a timely manner if the third unit is added to the systemP 21.

There have been control problems at low power levels in the, feedwater control system.

22.

PVNGS has had several condenser tube problems.

PVNGS has titanium tubes and relatively little debris to enter the water boxes.

Condenser tube performance should be better.

a 23.

PVNGS has had personnel errors/Tech.

Spec.

violations.

Describe actions taken by management to reduce these occurrences.

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4 4