ML17297A747
| ML17297A747 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 08/26/1981 |
| From: | Van Brunt E ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| To: | Tedesco R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| ANPP-18750-JMA, NUDOCS 8109010373 | |
| Download: ML17297A747 (10) | |
Text
REGULA Y INFORMATION DISTRIBUTI SYSTEM (RIDS)
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ACCESSION-NBR;8109010373, 'OC ~ DATE,; 81/08/26 NOTARIZED; YES FACILi;STN-50-528 Palo Verde Nuclear StationP Unit ii Arizona Publi STN 50-529 Palo Verde Nuclear StationP Unit 2i Ar izona Publi STN-50-530 Palo Verde Nuclear StationP Unit 3i Arizona Publi AUTH', N AME,,
AUUTHOR AFFILIATION VAN BRUNT<ED,E',
Ar izona Public Service Co.
REC IP ~ SAMEl RECIPIENT AFFILIATION TEDESCOPR
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Assistant Director for Licensing
SUBJECT:
Forwards responses to Core Performance Branch Questions 490,2 " 490 ~ 4iwhich will be incorporated into futurei FSAR amend.ResponseI to Question 090 F 1 will be submitted by 810904
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p KIIXEIICI MWVÃIOllaKOHMEf P.o. BOX 21666 PHOENIX, ARIZONA85036 August 26, 1981 ANPP-18750 - JMA/TFQ Mr. R. L. Tedesco Assistant Director for Licensing Division o'f Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
Subject:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Units 1, 2 and 3
Docket Nos.
STN-50/528/529/530 File:
81-056-026; G.l.10
Reference:
Letter from R. L. Tedesco, NRC, to E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
dated July 14, 1981, subject:
Request for Information PVNGS (Core Performance Branch)
Dear Mr. Tedesco:
Attached are our responses to NRC Questions 490.2fthrough 490.4 for your use.
These responses will be incorporated into the FSAR in a future amendment.
Our response to 490.1 will be submitted by September 4, 1981.
Please contact me if you have any further questions on these matters.
Very truly your E.
E. Van Brunt, Jr.
APS Vice President, Nuclear Projects ANPP Project Director EEVBJr/TFQ/av Attachment cc:
A. C. Gehr (w/a)
, J. Kerrigan (w/a)
P. Hourihan (w/a)
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STATE OF ARIZONA
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I; Edwin E. Van Brunt, Jr., represent'-that I am Vice President Nuclear Projects of Arizona Public Service Company, that the foregoing document has been signed by me on behalf of Arizona Public Service Company with full authority so to do, that I have read such document and know its contents, and that to the best of my knowledge and belief, the statements made therein are true.
Edwin E.. Van Brunt, Jr&
C'0 Sworn to before me this~)
day of 5/(> gg /
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,,1981.
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Notary Public Hy Commission expires:
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PVNGS RESPONSES TO QUESTION FROM CORE PERFORMANCE BRANCH NUCLEAR FUELS SECTION NRC UESTION 490.1 We note that the PVNGS FSAR references Section 4.2.3.1.2 of the CESSAR FSAR which, in turn, references the use of the analytical methodology from the CE topical report CENPD-178.
This report has not.been approved for licensing applications and is currently undergoing revision.
By letter dated March 23, 1981, CE has projected the submittal of the revised report to be in the second quarter of 1981.
We anticipate that the revised report will present methods that conform to the requirements of NUREG-0609.
However, plant-specific results using these methods will be needed for PVNGS.
The PVNGS FSAR should thus provide the results of an analysis that demonstrates the ability of the System 80 fuel design to withstand combined seismic-and-LOCA loadings at the PVNGS site in accordance with the require-ments of NUREG-0609.
RESPONSE
NRC UESTION 490.2 What means will be used to provide continuing assurance that the reactivity invested in the water-soluble B4C-filled control element assemblies is main-tained?
For other applications (e.g.,
ANO-2 and SONGS 2 and 3), the CEA symmetry test that is described in Section 14.2J.2.4 of the CESSAR FSAR was found to be an acceptable method of providing this assurance, on the basis that the test is conducted routinely and not just during the initial low-power physics testing.
RESPONSE
PVNGS will conduct the CEA symmetry test described in CESSAR Section 14.2.12.4 during the low-power physics testing conducted during initial startup and following each subsequent core reload.
Page 2
NRC UESTION 490.3 Please describe the details of the visual surveillance which will be con-ducted on PVNGS discharged fuel assemblies.
This surveillance program should be adequate to identify gross problems of structural integrity, fuel rod failure, rod bowing, spacer grid strap
- damage, insufficient fuel rod shoulder gap spacing, or crud deposition on a limited number of fuel assemblies that are discharged at each refueling. If abnormalities are found during the examination, the license s should agree to write an LER; otherwise, no reporting or licensing action is necessary.
RESPONSE
PVNGS shall visually inspect a limited number of randomly selected (about 10 to 15) discharged fuel assemblies during or following each refueling.
The visual inspection shall be conducted with underwater viewing equipment (will include inspection of the four sides of each inspected fuel assembly) and is intended to detect gross problems of structural integrity, gross fuel rod failure, gross bowing, spacer grid strap damage, insufficient fuel rod shoulder gap spacing, or crud deposition.
Underwater viewing equipment is separately provided on the refueling machine and in the spent fuel pool.
Reporting of abnormalities will be in accordance with Sections 16.6.9.1.8 or 16.6.9.1.9.
NRC UESTION 490.4 A.
The process radiation monitor (PRM) is said to be a "trending device to warn the operator of possible fuel failure."
Regardless of whether the amount of failed fuel is greater or less than one percent, is the PRM capable of providing an indication of the number of failed rods (e.g.,
1 or 2 rods vs.
10 or 50 rods)?
Is the reading continuous and direct so that the operator can readily note any potential rapid escalation of failing fuel?
B.
The alarm set points are adjustable.
To what equivalent percent failed fuel or number of failed rods are the set points intended to correspond?
What action is triggered by the alarms?
C. If the, PRM readings indicate the presence of leaking fuel rods during a given cycle, what surveillance will be performed during the next refueling outage to identify the leakers and nature of the damage?
Page 3
RESPONSE'.
The process radiation monitor (PRM) is designed to provide information on both the long term trends and rapid changes in,the level of radio-activity in the reactor coolant.
The monitoring is continuous and direct with the PRM located in the reactor coolant purification letdown line.
Rapid escalations in reactor coolant activity may result from phenomena which is not related to the integrity of'the fuel.
Therefore, the PRM is not designed to provide an indication of the number of failed fuel rods.
The PRM monitors the count rate of gross gamma and rubidium 58 activity in the reactor coolant.
Determination of the percent of reactor power generated in fuel rods containing cladding defects or their vicinity in the core requires the analysis of the isotopic ratio of specific'nuclides in the coolant.
This is done to distinguish between fuel failures and other phenomena which ma'y escalate activity levels such as iodine spiking or corrosion product releases.
The determination of the actual number of fuel rods containing cladding defects requires the process of fuel assembly sipping.
B.
The PRM is not designed to provide quantitative indication of. fuel failure.
The PRM alarm set point is adjusted to an activity value which is just above that normally measured in the coolant.
Annuncia-tion of the alarm would then indicate escalation in the reactor coolant activity level.
The action upon receipt of the alarm is operator investi-gation of the cause and initiation of corrective action if required.
The PRM does not provide any automatic control functions.
C.
The PRM is used to monitor. trends in reactor coolant activity.
Plant procedures will require investigation of the cause of significant esca-lation, whether or not an alarm set point is reached.
CESSAR Section 16.3/4.4.8 describes limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements concerning reactor coolant system specific activity, and requires chemical analysis of reactor coolant for gross activity and iodine activity.
The required periodic measurements of Do'se Equivalent I-131 will be used to monitor cladding integrity during operation.
Should these trends indicate cladding failure, the reports described in Sections 16.6.9.1.8 or 16.6.9.1.9 and CESSAR Section 16.3.'4.8 will be made to the NRC.
A program of fuel assembly sipping will be conducted at the nextrefueling to determine the location and number of failed fuel rods, if a significant number is indicated.