ML17292B756
| ML17292B756 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 09/16/1999 |
| From: | Laura Smith NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Parrish J AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9909240092 | |
| Download: ML17292B756 (19) | |
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~O UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION REGION Iv 611 RYAN PLAZADRIVE, SUITE 400 ARLINGTON,TEXAS 76011%064 September 16, 1999 Mr. J. V. Parrish (Mail Drop 1023)
Chief Executive Officer Energy Northwest.
P.O. Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352-0968
SUBJECT:
MIDCYCLEPLANT PERFORMANCE REVIEW (PPR) - WNP-2
Dear Mr. Parrish:
On August 18, 1999, the NRC staff completed the midcycle Plant Performance Review (PPR) of WNP-2. The staff conducts these reviews for all operating nuclear power plants to integrate performance information and to plan for inspection activities. The focus of this performance review was to identify changes in performance over the past 6 months and to allocate inspection resources for the next 7 months.
We did not identify any areas in which your performance warranted additional inspection effort beyond the core inspection program.
Based on this review, we plan to conduct only core inspections at your facilityover the next 7 months.
Enclosure 1 contains a historical listing of plant issues, referred to as the Plant Issues Matrix (PIM), that were considered during this PPR process to arrive at our integrated review of licensee performance trends.
The PIM includes items summarized from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between the NRC and Energy Northwest from October 1, 1998, to July 16, 1999. As noted above, greater emphasis was placed on those issues identified in the past 6 months during this performance review. The NRC does not attempt to document all aspects of licensee programs and performance that may be functioning appropriately.
Rather, the NRC only documents issues that it believes warrant management attention or represent noteworthy aspects of performance.
This letter advises you of our plans for future inspection activities at your facilityso that you will have an opportunity to prepare for these inspections and to provide us with feedback on any planned inspections that may conflict with your plant activities. Enclosure 2 details our inspection plan through March 2000. This date was chosen to coincide with the scheduled implementation of the revised reactor oversight process in April 2000.
Routine resident inspections are not listed because of their ongoing and continuous nature.
9909240092 9909Kb PDR ADQCK 08000397 6
Energy Northwest If circumstances arise which cause us to change this inspection plan, we willcontact you to discuss the change as soon as possible.
Please contact Linda Smith at (817) 860-8137 with any questions you may have.
Sincerely, v -<Kl I
Linda J. smitl; cnief Project Branch E Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.:
50-397 License No.:
Enclosures:
- 1. Plant Issues Matrix
- 2. Inspection Plan CC:
Chairman Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council P.O. Box 43172 Olympia, Washington 98504-3172 Mr. Rodney L. Webring (Mail Drop PE08)
Vice President, Operations Support/PIO Energy Northwest P.O. Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352-0968 Mr. Greg O. Smith (Mail Drop 927M)
Vice President, Generation Energy Northwest P.O. Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352-0968 Mr. D. W. Coleman (Mail Drop PE20)
Manager, Regulatory Affairs Energy Northwest P.O. Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352-0968
Energy Northwest Mr. Albert E. Mouncer (Mail Drop 1396)
General Counsel Energy Northwest P.O. Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352-0968 Mr. Paul Inserra (Mail Drop PE20)
Manager, Licensing Energy Northwest P.O. Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352-0968 Perry D. Robinson, Esq.
Winston & Strawn 1400 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005-3502 Bob Nichols State Liaison Officer Executive Policy Division Office of the Governor P.O. Box 43113 Olympia, Washington 98504-3113 John L. Erickson, Director Division of Radiation Protection Department of Health Airdustrial Center Building ¹5 P.O. Box 47827 Olympia, Washington 98504-7827 Max E. Benitz, Jr., Chairman Board of Benton County Commissioners P.O. Box 190 Prosser, Washington 99350 Sue Miller, Chair Board of Franklin County Commissioners 1016 North 4th Street Pasco, Washington 99301
Energy Northwest sEp I 6 l959 bcc to DCD (IE40) bcc distrib. by RIV:
Regional Administrator DRP Director DRS Director Branch Chief (DRP/E)
Senior Project Inspector (DRP/E)
Chief, NRR/DISP/PIPB B. Henderson, PAO
- T. Boyce, NRR/DISP/PIPB C. Hackney, RSLO W. D. Travers, EDO (MS: 16E15)
Associate Dir. for Projects, NRR Associate Dir. for Insp., and Tech. Assmt, NRR PPR Program Manager, NRR/ILPB (2 copies)
Chief, Inspection Program Branch, NRR Chief, Regional Operations and Program Manag S. Richards, NRR Project Director (MS: 13D1)
J. Gushing, NRR Project Manager (MS: 13E16)
Chief, NRR/DIPM/IIPB Resident Inspector DRS Branch Chiefs (3 copies)
RITS Coordinator RIV File Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)
Chief, OEDO/ROPMS C. Gordon Records Center, INPO ement Section, OEDO DOCUMENT NAME: S:~PPR 99-QZXLetters/Vi'.4P To receive co of document. indicate in box: "C" ~ Co vnthout enclosures "E" = Co with enclosures "N" = No co RIV:SPE:DRP/E.
GAPick;Ijb
'9/<
/99 C:DRP/E LJSmith 09/, /99 D:DRP D:D KEBrockman 09
/99 ATHow 09 99 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY RECONCUR LJSmith 09/<t /99
Energy Northwest
.4-SEP j 6 l999 bcc to DCD (IE40) bcc distrib. by RIV:
Regional Administrator DRP Director DRS Director Branch Chief (DRP/E)
Senior Project Inspector (DRP/E)
Chief, NRR/DISP/PIPB B. Henderson, PAO T. Boyce, NRR/DISP/PIPB C. Hackney, RSLO W. D. Travers, EDO (MS: 16E15)
Associate Dir. for Projects, NRR Associate Dir. for Insp., and Tech. Assmt, NRR PPR Program Manager, NRR/ILPB (2 copies)
Chief, Inspection Program Branch, NRR Chief, Regional Operations and Program Manage S. Richards, NRR Project Director (MS: 13D1)
J. Gushing, NRR Project Manager (MS: 13E16)
Chief, NRR/DIPM/IIPB Resident Inspector DRS Branch Chiefs (3 copies)
RITS Coordinator RIV File Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)
Chief, OEDO/ROPMS
'C. Gordon Records Center, INPO ment Section, OEDO DOCUMENT NAME: S:iPPR 99-02XLettersiWNP To receive co of document, Indicate in box:
C" = Co without enclosures E" = Co with enclosures "N ~ No co RIV:SPE:DRP/
GAPick;Ijb 09/i/99 C:DRP/E LJSmith 09/
99 D:DRP KEBrockman 09 99 D:D ATHow 09 99 OFFICIALRECORD COPY RECONCUR LJSmith 09/I>I99
Page:
1 of 12 08/23/1 999 13:10:27 IR Report 3 ENCLOSURE 1
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX Region It/
WASH. NUCLEAR PROJECT By Primary Functional Area Functional Area Template item Title IO Type Codes Item Description Source Date 06/12/fggg 1999007 Pri: OPS NRC POS Prl: 1A Sec:
Sec: 1C Ter:
Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR 2 prompt, conservative operator response to establish containment prior to moving fuel Licensee requirements for establishment ol secondary containment prior to moving new fuel into the spent fuel pool ln Mode 4 were unclear. Operations responded promptly and conservatively.
The licensee conducted a thorough Ip CFR 50.59 safety evaluation. The resultant procedure change clarified conditions required for movement oi atl loads over the spent fuel pool.
p6/12/19gg 1ggg007 Prl: OPS NRC POS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR 2 Prh IA Sec: 1C Ter:
In<epth prompt Investigation of valve out of position The licensee's investigation of a valve out ol position was in depth and promptly performed.
The licensee identified several other problems and corrective actions In valve posit'on verlfiMbonprocesses Minor tagging aef clearance order process problems were also identified and corrective actions were initiated.
p6/12/1999 199g007 Prl: OPS Sec:
Oockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR 2 NRC POS Prl: IA Sec: 1C Ter: 5B Licensee application of shutdown TS focused on reactor safety Licensee actions with respect to interpretation and application ol shutdown Technical Specifications were focused on reactor and public safety concerns.
Conduct of management meetings fostered open and frank discussions that were focused on reactor safety and compliance with the intent of Technical Specification Bases.
06/11/1999 1999005 Pri: OPS Sec:
Oockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR2 NRC NEG Prl: 1A Sec:
Ter:
Negative performance Issues Indicated a need for continued training focus Some negative performance issues were identified indicating that personnel perlormance could be improved. The negative performance issues did not show overall inadequate crew performance but reinforced the need f con8nued training focus.
his assessment was corroborated by operators performance during recent plant events
.T'ne or 06/I I/1999 1999005 Prh OPS NRC POS Prl: 1A Good operator control board awareness Sec:
Operators monitored critical parameters well and demonstrated good control board awareness Ter:
Oockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR 2 06/11/1999 1999005 Prl: OPS Sec:
Oockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR 2 NRC POS Prl: 5A Sec: 5C Ter:
Effective self assessment process Identified findings The licensee's self-assessment process Identified worthwhile findings, and tracked and corrected them in a timely manner.
However. operation's perlormance indicators outside those monitored by the licensed requalification program were primarily quantitative and provided limited trending data item Type (Comptiance,Fottowup,Other),
From 10/01/1998 To 07/01/1999
page:
2 of 12 08/23/1999 13:10:27 IR Report 3 Region IV WASH. NUCLEAR PROJECT United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANTISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Date Source Functional Area Template ID Type Codes Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTON NUCLEAR 2 NCV Prl: 1A Sec: 3A Ter:
05/11/1999 1999007 01 Prl: OPS Sell Sec:
Item Title Item Description Violation of TS 5.4.1: failure to adequately monitor weir flow;failure to adequately monitor RX level The root cause for the inadvertent draindown of the spent fuel pool skimmer surge tank and the inadvertent dratndown of the reactor pressure vessel was poor control room operator board awareness and monitoring of key parameters in the plant. This is a Severity Level IVviolation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a. with two examples, which is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy, and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Problem Evaluation Requests 299-0882 and 299 1021.
05/01/1999 1999004 Pri: OpS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR 2 NRC POS Prl: 5C Sect Ter:
Operator responded promptly to resolve the color banding Issue The inspectors"questions about the adequacy of control room instrumentation color banding were prompoy addressed by the operators.
In addition, the operators demonstrated a good questioning attitude and a desire to resolve the issue O5/Ot/teee 1999004.01 Prl: OpS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR 2 05/01/1999 1999004.02 Prl: OpS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR 2 NRC URI NRC NCV Prl: 1B Sec: 4A Ter:
~ Prl: 5A Sec:
Ter:
Adequacy of the design basis of the RHR system The design basis of the residual heat removal system did not support the full range of applicability for Technical SpecTiication, umiting Condition ol Operation 3.4.9,:Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System-Hot Shutdown and the associated Technical Specilication Bases, The design basis was also inconsistently implemented in procedures and in instructions for the residual heat removal system in the shutdown cooling mode of operation.
Because the licensee is continuing to research the design basis for the system and because additional information is required on (1) related accident analysis assumptions. (2) genertc implications. (3) prior system evaluations. and (4) notification, the issue is being identified as an unresolved item Failure to complete corrective actions associated with color banding of Instrumentatlon, Correc6ve actions resulting from a 1996 problem evaluation request were never completed.
The problem evaluation request had been generated to address the failure to resolve control room design deficiencies associated with color banding of control roominstrumentation, as required by License Condition 16. The problem evaluation request was dosed and the work order to resolve the color banding issue was canceled during a backlog item review, without evaluating the work order cancellation for conflict wilh the license condition. This problem is a violation ol 10 CFR part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI;however, this Severity Level IVviolationis being treated as a noncited violation, and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Problem Evaluation Request 299-0745 04/17/1999 1999004
~
Prl: OPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTON NUCLEAR 2 NRC POS Prl: 1B Sec: 3A Ter:
Safe and deliberate licensee performance during reactor shutdown Key managers as well as quality assurance personnel were present in the control room to monitor the shutdown, which was conducted in a safe and deliberate manner.
Communications were good. Supervisory oversight and direction of the operating crew and operator performance during the shutdown were good 03/20/teee 1999002 Prl: OPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTON NUCLEAR2 NRC FOS Prl: 3A Sec: 3B Ter:
Thorough and rigorous Plant Operating Committee perfomance The Plant Operabng Committee (POC) meeting was thorough and rigorous. The diversity of committee members contributed positively to the depth and breadth ol questions, and the review packages were well prepared and presented.
Item Type (Compliance,Followup.Other), From 10/01/1998 To 07/01/Ieee
Page:
3 of 12 08/23/1999 13:10:27 IR Report 3 Region IV WASH. NUCLEAR PROJECT United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANTISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Date Source Functional Area Template ID Type Codes Item Title llem Description 03/20/I 9gg 1999002 Prl: OPS NRC POS Prl: 3B Sec:
Sec:
Ter:
Oockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR2 Operators Improved In self-fdentlfcatlon of poor work practices.
Operations department personnel identified multiple occurrences ol poor work planning, scheduling, and coordinating. This was recognized as an improvement in performance on the part of operators because of a conscious effort on the part of operations department management to raise the standards for performance and expectations inside the department and across the station as a whole, 03/2N1 ggg 1gg9002 01 Prl: OPS NRC Sec: MAINT Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR2 NCY Prl: 3A Sec:
Ter:
Violations of TS 5.4.1: LPRM found on prohibited SFP hanger; APRM Improperly returned to service; Improp Anoncited viofalon (NRC Enforcement Policy, Appendix C) ol Technical Specification 5.4.1 was identified with three examples: (1) The first example occurred when operators tailed to comply with a work instruction precaution and placed a local power range monitor on a damaged spent tuel pool rack. This violation is in the corrective action
~
program as PER 299-0470 (Section 04.1); (2) The second example occurred when the licensee failed to implement a Technical Speci5cation surveillance procedure, which resulted in data that determined the need for an instrument gain adjust not being documented and reviewed when required. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as PER 299.0377 (Section M1.3); and (3) The third example occurred when maintenance technicians inappropriately left two upright ladders and an unrestrained hydraulic control unit accumulator cart immediately adjacent to safety-related equipment, which was contrary to procedures.
Additionally, the technicians demonstrated poor housekeeping.
This viotation Is in the licensee's corrective action program as PER 299.0335 03/11/1999 1999301 Prl: OPS Sec:
Oockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR2 NRC NEG Prl: 3B Ter:
weak key parameter monitoring during dynamic scenarios Operators demonstrated weak key parameter monitoirng related to reactor building ditferential pressure during the dynamic scenarios.
Two fo the four crews examined failed to recognize that reactor building differential pressure went posi8ve and thus missed an Emergency Operating Procedures entry condition.
03/11/1999 1999301 Prl: OPS Sec:
Oockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR 2 NRC POS Prl: 3B Sec:
Ter:
licensing exam/test material, pass rate The 11 iniitiallicense applicants passed the examination.
Operators demonstrated good communications practices, peer checks, and crew briefings. The licensee developed good test material which was adequate for administration as submitted, with only one postexaminatnion change identified.
Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTON NUCLEAR2 02/06/1999 1998025 Prl: OPS NRC NEG Prl: 1A Sec:
Sec:
Tor:
Inattention to detail missed a procedure step.
The inspectors noted that operators did not initiallyrecognize a procedure step as being required Sperxficaliy.
operators had become accustomed to performing a relabvely simple repebtive procedure other than as written because of inattention to detail.
02/06/1999 1998025 Prl: OPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR2 NRC POS Prl: 1A Sec:
Ter:
Good operator performance during control rod exorcise test During the performance of a control rod exercise test, operators demonstrated good coordinadon communicagons and peer checks.
An operator, when presented with a procedural compliance problem, promptly notified the control room supe~sor. appropdatety requested aehonzabM to use a different pro edure ~ I igated steps to change the subject procedure.
Item TyPe (CornPliance,FollowuP,Other),
From 10/01/1998 To 07/01/19g9
page:
4 of 12 08/23/1999 13:10:27 IR Report 3 Region IV WASH. NUCLEAR PROJECT United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANTISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Date Source Funct!onal Template Item Title Area ID Type Codes Item Description 02/06/1999 1998025 Prl: OPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR2 NRC POS Prl: jB Sec:
Ter:
Good operator knowledge of possible system Interactions during work.
Operators demonstrated good system knowledge and an awareness ot ongoing work by recognizing that a reactor scram, potentially required because ol a stator cooling water high conductivity. could good the work area where personnel perlormed work on the circulating water system because ol swell followingpump shutdown. The Incident Review Board report for the deficiency idendfied underiying problems and was self critical.
I2/22/1998 1998023 Prl: OPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR2 NRC POS Prl: 1B Sec:
Ter:
Operators demonstrated proper safety focus for smoke Issuing from a power supply Operators demonstrated a proper safety focus when responding to smoke issuing from a constant voltage supply transformer ln the reactor building, in that appropriate attention and resources were given to address and conlro'I the event without losing sight of other operational responsibilities.
2/
%Ã r: OPS NRC NEG Prl: 1C Deficiency In requallflcatlon examlnagon development Sec:
A deficiency in the requalification examination development process was idenlified in that the process does not Ter:
address the verification of 10 CFR 55.43 sampling for the written requalificalion examination.
Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR2 12/10/1998 1998024 Prl: OPS Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTON NUCLFAR2 NRC WK Prl: 1A Sec: 1B Ter:
Generic operator weakness Identified related to control board awareness Ageneric operator performance weakness was identified in the area ol control board awareness, which involved repeated failures of operators to take appropriate responses to changing plant parameters or system rnisalignments.
Also, inconsistent communications were observed during crew briefings given during the dynamic simulator scenarios.
11/I I/1998 1998022 Prl: OPS Sec:
Doc'kets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR 2 NRC POS Prl: 1A Timely and appropriate operator response to a partial toss of annunclators.
Sec:
The control room operators demonstrated proper safety focus in responding to a partiat toss of annuncialors orl the Ter:
reactor control board. The creWs evaluation of the significance of the event and their implementagon oi compensatory measures were both timely and appropriate.
A methodical troubleshooting plan was effective in isolating the root cause and returning the annunciators to senrice Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR2 11/06/1998 199830t Prl: OPS NRC STR Prl: 1A Good operator communications during examinations Sec:
" ~munication pracbces were observed dunng the inithl op to I examination.
Ter:
Item Type (Compliance,FollowuP,Other), From 10/01/1998 To 07/01/1999
Page:
5of12 08/23/1999 13:10:27 IR Report 3 Region IV WASH. NUCLEAR PROJECT United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Date Source Funclional Asea Template ID Type Codes Item Title item Descclptlon I I/06/1998 1998301 Pri: OPS NRC WK Pcl: 1C Sec:
Sec:
Tec:
Oockets Discussed:
05M039/ WASHINGTONNUCLEAR2 Poor examination submittal The licensee initiallyfailed to submit an acceptable examination fos administration to operator license applicants for the operating test portion of the examinations.
The final as given examinalion met the requirements of NUREG.1021 and was considered good quatity.
11/05/1998 1998022-01 Prl: OPS Sec:
Oockots Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR 2 06/12/1999 1999007 Pri: MAINT Sec:
Dockols Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR2 NRC VIOIV Prl: IA Soc:
Ter:
NRC POS Prl:2B Soc: 3A Ter:
Failure to log and track the status of the standby liquid control systom During performance of a quarterly Technical Specification surveillance on the standby liquid control system neither the procedure nor control soom logs adequately tracked the equipment configuration to venfy adherence tp shpn term outage times allowedby Technical Speci5catipns.
As a cesult, Ihe status of system operability with both trains inoperable could not be accurately reconstructed.
The failure to log and track the status of the standby liquid control system was identified as a violation of the equipment control process and Technical Specification 5 4 1 a h~w~v~r because of appropriate corrective actions, no response was requi~ed.
Maintenance wock conducted sellably with management oversight Maintenance work observed by the inspectors was conducted in a manner that ensured reliable, sale operation pI the station. More effective and frequent management observation of maintenance activities was observed.
05/27/1999 1999006 Prl: MAINT Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR2 NRC POS Prl: 3A Sec:
Ter'c Satisfactory testing program forthe control room emergency filtration system The licensee implemented a satisfactory tesgng program for the control room emergency filtrationsystem, The testing interval and method met Technical Specification requirements.
05/17/1999 1999007 Pri: MAINT Sec:
Oockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTON NUCLEAR2 l.icensee NEG Prl: 2B Sec: 3C Ter:
Interim repairs to turbine building roof not successful resulting electrical panel ffre d The licensee made comprehensive repairs to the turbine budding roof to prevent further rainwater intrusion into the turbine building. However. Interim protective measures. during installation, were not tptally successful since a sudden sainstorm resulted in a small lise In a lighting panel.
04/25/1999 1999004.03 Pri: MAINT Soc: PLTSUP Oockets Discussed:
05Q00397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR2 NRC NCV Prl: 2A Sec: 3A Ter:
Vlolatlons of Technical Specification 5.4.1: unsecured eyewash station and failure to post a CA plant housekeeping and material oondition were generally good; however, the inspectors found an unsecused portable eye wash station too cksse to the high pressure coro spray batteries in violation ol procedural requirements.
This is one exampte of a Severity Level IV violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, which Is being treated as a npncited violation and is in the Jtcensee's corrective action program as Psoblem Evaluation Request 299-0889 Radiological controts associated with the unloading ol fresh fuel were generally good and health physics oversight helped personnel maintain exposuce ALARA. However, the licensee faifed to post or mark a contaminated area as required by pcocedure.
This is one example ol a Seventy Level IVviolation of Technical Specf5cagion 5,4.1.a and is being treated as a noncfted violation. This defcfency is in the licensee's corrective action psogram as probtem Evaluadon Request 299-0718 Item Type (Compliance,Followup,Other), From 10/Ol/1998 To 0?/01/1999
Page:
6 of 12 08/23/1999 13:10:27 IR Report 3 Region IV WASH. NUCLEAR PROJECT United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Date Source Functional Area 04/11/1999 1999004 Prl: MAINT Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTON NUCLEAR 2 NRC NEG Prl: 2B Sec:
Ter:
Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description Procedural weakness for scaffold erection The inspectors Identified a procedure weakness that allowed potential interferences between scaffolding and instrument sensing lines to be evaluated by the craft erecting the scaffolding. This was inconsistent with other guidance in the procedure which required engineering evaluation and a 10 CFR 50.59 review<or potential Interferences between scaffolding and important.to-safety components.
At the close of the inspection, engineering was planning to revise the scaffolding procedure to ensure that potential interferences with instrument sensing lines wilt receive a similar degree of evatuation as other safety. related components 03/20/1999 1999002 Prl: MAINT Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTON NUCLEAR 2 NRC NEG Prl: 2B Sec: 3A Ter:
Licensee Identification of poor work planning.
During review of licensee. generated PERs. the inspector noted several instances ol poor pianning, coorifination and execution of maintenance activities. These resulted in: (1) safety related equipment being inoperable longer than was necessary, (2) safety. related equipment being unneccesarily rendered inoperable. (3) SFP temperature exceeding expected values, and (4) the potential for fire protection system compensatory measures to be inconectly sequenced.
Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR2 02/06/1999 1998025 Prl: MAINT NRC POS Prl: 3A Sec:
Sec: 3B Ter:
Maintenance personnel used good 3 way communications peer checking during SDV malntenanc personnel performing a surveillance test at the scram discharge volume limitswitches used good three.way communications, peer verification, procedure adherence and place. keeping. and ALARA(as low as reasonably achievable) practices.
01/29/1999 1998025 01 Prl: MAINT Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR 2 NRC VIOIV Prl: 3A Sec: 4B Ter:
Scaffolding Installed without a required evaluation and failure to properly adjust the scram valve limitswitch The first example of a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was identified because the licensee failed to perform the required evaluations for scaffolding that was supported by a non load bearing member of a Class 1
component.
The second example of a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a and plant procedures occurred because personnel failed to followthe written procedures for adjusting the outlet scram valve limitswitch. Because the licensee implemented appropriate corrective actions, no response was required. Maintenance personnel performance during control rod drive hydraulic control unit refurbshment demonstrated knowledge deficiencies in the proper use of, adherence to, and change of procedures.
In addition. mechanic's knowledge on the proper adjustment of hmit switches was insufficient and postmaintenance testing did not identity that the outlet scram valve limitswitch was improperly adjusted.
Because the licensee implemented appropriate corrective actions, no response was required.
10/07/1998 1998022.02 Pri: MAINT Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTON NUCLEAR2 NRC VIOIV Prl: 3A Sec: 2B Ter:
Failure of maintenance to perform SGT B testing In accordance with the written test procedure.
Maintenance personnel performance during Technical Specification required testing of the standby gas treatment system demonstrated knowledge defiidendes in the proper use of and adherence to procedures.
The failure in two instances to properly conduct the standby gas treatment system test was identified as a violation Technical Specification 5.4.1.a.
Planning and briefing for the work failed to ensure that all prerequisites were met prior to the start of the test, and procedure steps were not performed in sequence.
Since the licensee implemented appropriate corrective acfions, no response was required item Type (Compliance,FollowuP.Other), From 10/01/1998 To 07/01/1 999
Page:
7 of 12 08/23/1999 13:10:2T IR Report 3 Region IV WASH. NUCLEAR PROJECT United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANTISSUE MATRIX By'Primary Functional Area Date Source Functional Area 06/12/1999 199900T.02 Prl: FNG Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR2 Seg NCV Prl: 4C Sec:
Ters Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description Violations of Criterion IIIrelated to overcurrent relay set points; new fuel vault TS; and liftingbell for new fue A Severity Level IVviolation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control,'ith three examples was identified. This Severity Level IVviolation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (1) Incorrect overcurrenl relay selpoints were installed on tour Division II safety. related pump breakers when correct design information was available but not accurately translated into procedures (problem Evatuation Request 299-1193). (2) Technical Specification 4,3.1,2.b allowed less restrictive spacing oi new fuel assemblies in the new fuel vault than that required by plant procedures and analysis (Problem Evaluation Request 299-1238).
(3) Final Safety Analysis Report Section 9.1.1.3,2 stated, liftingbail willyield at a pull up force less than 1000 Ib,'owever, Siemens and ASEA Brown Boveri tuel kiting bails yield at a pull up force between 1500 and 1700 pounds (Problem Evaluation Requests 299-1289).
06/12/1999 1999007-03 Prl: ENG Licensee Sec:
Oockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR 2 URI Prl: 1A Sec: 3A Ter:
Analysis for potential effects on ABBfuel assemblies during long-term operation with missing or borken spr An unresolved item was identi5ed related to a new fuel manufacturing defect. The licensee identified missing external compression springs on hvo new fuel assemblies.
This item is unresolved pending NRC review ol lhe facilities resolution of this condition.
05/01/1999 1999004-04 Prl: FNG Sec:
Oockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTON NUCI.EAR 2 NRC URI Pr 'A Sec: 5A Ter:
violation of 10 CFR 50.59; Technical SPeclflcatlon Table 3.3.1.1-1 note (d) no longer applicable.
Technical Specification 3.3.6.1, Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation, Function 5, Residual Heal Removal Shutdown Cooling System Isolation, and the associated bases section were incorrect. The Technical Specifications were not updated when the controls for the outboard isolation valve were removed from the alternate remote shutdown panel.
In addition, the bases secbonincorrectly stated that there are four pressure switches associated vrith the reactor high pressure isolagon instrumentation, when only two exist. This issue is idenklied as an unresolved item because additional information is required in order to confirm the facilitywas originally licensed with only hvo pressure switches and to review the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation for the change 03/20/1999 1999002 02 Prl: ENG Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
'500039T WASHINGTONNUCLEAR2 NRC NCV Prl: 4B Sec:
Tef; Violations of Criterion III:Undersized pwr supply 8 Insuflicient penetration overcurrent protection In 1988, the licensee had installed an undersized power supply in the emergency diesel generator (EDG) speed jnteriock circuits. The Inspectors concluded that the marginal design ot the power supply did nol pose a significant nsk for common mode failure of the Divisions I and ll EDGs. However. the failure to correctly size the power suppty is one example of a noncited violation (NRC Enforcement Policy, Appendix C) of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix B.
Criterion III,'Design Control:
In 1998, the licensee discovered that the primary containment penetration for Valve RHR MO-9 did not meet the overcurrent protection requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.63, 'Penelration Assemblies in Containment Structures for UghtWater-Cooled Nudear Power Plants, Revision 0, as committed to in the WNp-2 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The failure to translate the design basis specified ln lhe license applicabon into the design of the facilityis one example of a noncited violadon (NRC Enforcemenl Policy, Appendix C) of 10 CFR perl 50, Appendix B, Criterion ill,'Design Control:
02/Ql/1999 1998025 Prl: ENG Sec:
Oockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR 2 NRC POS Prl: 3B Sec: 4B Ter.
PMT review Identified a need for a TS change.
The evaluation of postmaintenance testing required for the repair of Circulating Water pump C, Including any knpact on pant operations and Technical Speci5cation requirements, identified the need for a Technical Spedfication change. The licensee completed the repair and testing of Circulating Water pump C without Incident item Type (ComPliance,Followup,Other). From 10/01/1998 To 07/01/1999
Page:
8 of 12 08/23/1999 13:10:27 IR Report 3 Region IV WASH. NUCLEAR PROJECT United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Date Source Functional Area 12/07/1998 1998023;01 Prl: FNG Sec:
Oockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTON NUCLEAR 2 10/10/1998 1998021 Pri: ENG Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR2 Template ID Type Codes NRC VIOIV Prl: 4A Sec:
Ter:
NRC NEG Prl:4C Sec:
Ter:
Item Title Item Description LpCS out-of-service annunciator not In conformance with Final Safety Analysis Report.
The configuration of the low pressure core spray (LPCS) out.of.service annunciator did not conform to Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Figure 7.3 9, in that out of.service signals from Battery BI~ 1 ~ Diesel Generator 1 ~ and Service Water A were not supplied to the annunciator.
This design deficiency was not identified during ongoing efforts to review the accuracy of the FSAR. The failure to ensure that the design basis. as specified in the license application, was correctly translated into drawings was identified as a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B.
Criterion III~ 'Design Control.
However. because the licensee implemented appropriate corrective actions. no response was required.
The manual startup & shutdown of RCIC, followingthe March 1998 MSIVclosure, challenged operators The manual startup and shutdown of the reactor core isolation coobng system for level control, following the March 1998 main steam isolation valve dosure, challenged the operators.
The proceduralized method to control reactor vesse'I level by diverting reactor core isolation cooling liow through the test return line could not be accomplished because of valve design deficiencies. The method used to maintain the reactor core isolation cooling system test return line isolation valves decreased the reliabilityof the system and challenged the containment isolation function since the valves may not have closed against high differential pressure.
Unresolved Item 50-397/98005.05.
Involving exdusion of the reactor core isolation cooling test return line valves from the scope ol the maintenance rule, was determined not to be a violation of NRC requirements (EA 98 203) 10/07/1998 1998022 03 Prl: ENG Sec: MAINT Dockels Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR2 NRC VIOlV Prl: 4C Sec: 2B Ter:
P o ural guidance for Performance of SGT charcoal filterb g bypass le age test~ng of the standby gas treatment syste h
e procedure failed to Provide sufficient instructions for in)ecbo of th proper mixing in the filter plenum A vrolabon of Technical Specification 5 4 1 e was idenbfiied for the inadequate procedure.
As a result, dispersion of the challenge gas has not always been sufficient to challenge all portions of the charcoal fiiltersin order to verifyTechnical Specifcation bypass leakage requirements.
The inadequate p<<cedure did not result in a safety issue, as subsequent testing with proper challenge gas dispersion demonstrated compliance with Technical Specifications.
Since the licensee implemented appropriate corrective actions, no response was required 06/12/1999 1999007 Prl: PLTSUP Licensee POS Prl: 1A Sec:
Soc: 5A Oockets Discussed:
Ter:
05000397 WASHINGTON NUCLEAR2 Good radiological controls.
The inspectors observed that radiolo9ical controls were generally good and that the facilityappropriately idenblied an adverse trend in contractor radiation work practices.
05/27/1999 1999006 Prl: PLTSUP Sec:
Oockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR 2 NRC STR Ter:
Good radioactive effluent management program The licensee maintained a good radioactive eNuent management program.
Radioactivity In eNuent releases was Iow The Ilc ~e's radio cbve eNuent m% ling. a~ysis. md dose projection programmet the requirements of the Offsite Dose Calculation ManuaL ENuent radiation monitors were calibrated at intervals typically used by n~ear p wer faNlbes Qu~lty assurmM p r~el conducted a g~ audit of the radlMNve eNuen'I'~itoring progra ln 1998 The audit teami~uded a ted N~ sp~iist who prowded p dor~M-based findings and recommendabons.
The audit scope, whrie not completely comprehensive, provided kcensee management with good insights into the program performance.
Item Type (Compliance,Followup.Other), From 10/01/1998 To 07/01/1999
Page:
9 of 12 08/23/1 999 13:10:27 IR Report 3 Region IV WASH. NUCLEAR PROJECT United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Date Source Functional Area 05/27/1999 1999006.01 Prl: PLTSUP Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTON NUCLEAR 2 ID Template Type Codes Sec: 3C Ter:
NRC NCV Prl: 3A Item Title Item Description Effluent radiation monitor alarm setpolnt calculation error.
The radwaste and turbine building effluent radiationmonitor alarm setpoints were not calculated with Olfsite Dose Calculation Manual methodology in violation of Technical Specification 5.5.1. This Severity Level IVviolation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Problem Evaluation Request 299-1207.
The licensee had an opportunity to identity and correct the alarm setpoint problem in September 1995. but the corrective action program was weak and did not ensure that the problem was addressed completely 03/20/1999 1999p02.p3 Pri: PLTSUP NRC Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR2 NCV Prl: 3A Sec: 4B Ter:
Failure to ensure flame spread rate criterion was met for decontamlnable floor coverings.
A noncited violation (NRC Enforcement Policy, Appendix C) of a License Condition was identified in that the licensee failed to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the FSAR. Specifically. the licensee failed to ensure that decontaminable coatings used on floors in the reactor building had a flame spread rate less than 25. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as PER 299 0278.
Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR 2 03/18/1999 1999003 Prl: PLTSUP Licensee NEG Prl: 2B Sec:
Sec:
Ter:
Poor pre-job planning for refurbishing CRD hydraulic control units poor pre.job planning and preparation for control rod hydraulic control unit refurbishment caused a significant underestimation of projected man.hours and personnel exposure.
Specific licensee. identified deficiencies included not using a dedicated team as originally planned. ineffective mock.up training. no formal ALARA review of the job performed, inadequate procedural guidance, and ineffective use of industry experience.
03/18/1999 1999003 Prl: PLTSUP Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR 2 NRC POS Prl: 1C Ter:
Overall RP activities conducted well.
Overall ~ radiation protection activities were conducted well and demonstrated an improving trend. Decontamination of contaminated areas was effective in that the total number of contaminated areas was reduced from 77 to 56 since October 1998.
Radiological areas were controlled and posted as required.
Radiation work permits and radiological surveys were dearly written and provided accurate radiological conditions and established proper radiological controls. Portable radiation survey instrumentation and personnel contamination monitors were calibrated and response checked at the frequencies required by station procedures using National Institute of Standards and Technology traceable sources.
03/18/1999 1999003 Prf: PLTSUP Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR 2 NRC POS Prl: 1C Sec:
Ter:
Licensee efforts resulted In ALARAdose reduction The Senior Sits ALARACommittee was actively involved in reducing station dose by implementing short. and Iong.term initiatives. The station 3 year average exposures have shown a declining trend since 1996; the 3 year average dose dropped from 565 person.rem in 1996 to 303 person rem in 1998. The station established challenging dose goals of 203 and 53 person-rem for 1999 and 2000, respectively.
Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR 2 03/18/1999 1999003 Prl: PLTSUP NRC POS Prl: 2A Sec:
Sec:
Ter:
Good housekeeping ln contaminated areas Housekeeping in the radiological controlled area was good. Equipment was stored in an orderly manner, areas were tree of debris, and potentially contaminated trash was properly stored h labeled containers.
Item Type (Compliance,Followup.Other), From 10/01/1998 To 07/01/1999
Page:
10 of 12 08/23/1 999 13:10:27 IR Report 3 Region It/
WASH. NUCLEAR PROJECT United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Primary Functional Area Date Source Functional Area Template ID Type Codes Item Title Item Description p3/18/1999
'I999003 Prl: PLTSUP Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR2 NRC POS Pfl: 5A Sec:
Ter:
Thorough OA audits of RP program.
The licensee performed a thorough evaluation of the radiation protection progiamin the past 8 months as indicated by five quality assurance surveillances, two quality assurance technical assessments.
and six radiation protection depart ent self assessments These evaluations were protNng and ~prehensive and provided management with accurate Information on radiation protection program effectiveness.
03/05/tggg 1999001 Prl: PLTSUP Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR2 NRC POS Prl: 3A Sec:
Ter:
Security staffing and response to OSRE satisfactory On.shift statfing of secunty armed response personnel was in accordance w}th the minimum requirements of the physical security plan. During the OSRE, the licensee successfufiy demonstrated its ability to defend against the design basis threat.
02/05/tggg 1998025 Prl: PLTSUP NRC NEG Sec:
Sec:
Ter:
Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTON NUCLEAR 2 Plant material condition mixed Material condition of and housekeeping in areas toured was generally good. However, water was identified leak;ng from a flange below a control rod drive fi'ter housing. A contaminated area was not corn pfetet marked
$pezffcatiy yellow and magenta tape was not used on a small section of floor to designate a contaminated area.
p2/04/1999 1999001 Prl: PLTSUP Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR 2 NRC POS Prl: 1C Sec:
Ter:
Highlyeffective security program Implementation.
Security programimplementation continued to be highly effective in most areas.
An effecfive program for searching personnel. packages, and vehicles was maintained. The compensatory measures program was effectively implemented.
A highly effective lock and key control program was maintained and implemented, Changes to security programs and plans were reported to the NRC within the required time frame. Overall, Implementing procedures met the performance requirements in the physical security plan. The security statf correctly reported security events; event records were accurate and neat. An excellent training program was implemented.
Security program management was effective.
02/04/1999 1999001 Prl: PLTSUP Sec:
Dockets Discussedi 05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR 2 NRC STR Prl: 1C Sec:
Ter:
Excellent, Intrusive fitness for duty audit The annual audit of the Fitness. for.Duty Program was excellent. The audit.was intrusive and performance based.
12/15/1998 1998023.02 Prl: PLTSUP NRC Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR2 IFI Prl:4C Sec 2B Ter:
Kaowool fire seal not Installed per design.
The licensee did no1 effectively ensure that the fire seal for Containment Penetration X099 was ln accordance viith licensee drawings and not degraded, as evidenced by the loosely packed penetration seal that issued a warm gas.
Based on gas analysis, the licensee confirmed that gas was not from containment.
In addition, the Initial slow response to the inspectors'oncern of a warm gas issuing from a penetration was not commensurate with the potential safety significance of the finding.
item Type (Compliance,FotlowuP,Other),
From 10/01/1998 To 07/01/1999
Page:
11 of 12 08/23/1999 13:10:27 IR Report 3 Region IV WASH. NUCLEAR PROJECT United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT lSSUE MATRlX By Primary Functional Area Date Source Functional Area ID Template Item Title Type Codes Item Description 12/14/1998 1998023.03 Prl: PLTSUP Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR2 NRC VIOp/
Prl: 3A Sec:
Ter:
Security officer reading unauthorized material at SAS The inspectors found a security officer reading a magazine. unauthorized material. while on duty in the secondary alarm station (SAS). This was a violation of License Condition 2.E lor failure to meet the Commission. approved physical security plan; however, since the licensee implemented appropriate corrective actions, no response was
'equired.
12/08/1998
'l998023 Prl: PLTSUP Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLFAR 2 NRC NEG Prl: 5C Sec:
Ter:
Generally weak corrective actions for a contamination zone The immediale corrective actions associated with water leaking from an established contamination zone were adequate.
However, the corrective actions resulting from previous incidents were weak. as evidencedby water leaking from the contamination zone.
10/13/1998 1998022-04 Prl: PLTSUP Licensee NCV Sec:
Dockets Discussed:
05000397 WASHINGTONNUCLEAR2 Prl: 2A Sec: 2B Ter: 5A e o maintain PASS at the apporprlate priorityto ensure operabilltco 8
e o assign the appropriate priority for performing maintenance on post acodent sa lin switches was identified as a nonctted violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a and maintenance procedures, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the Enforcement Policy. Reliability and availability of the post accident sampling system had been adversely impacted by both repebtive limitswitch failures and untimely maintenance.
The low priorityplaced upon maintenance of the limitswitches left the system in a degraded condition for 10 months and inoperable for approximately 2 months, until the failure of a quarteriy operability surveillance elevated the issue.
Subsequent actions were more timely and comprehensive to address the reliabilityconcerns Item Type (Compliance,Fotlowup,Other), From 10/01/1998 To 07/01/1999
Page:
12 of 12 08/23/1999 13:10:27 IR Report 3 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANTISSUE NlATRIX By Primary Functional Area Legend Type Codes:
BU Bulletin CDR Construction DEV Deviation EEI Escalated Enforcement Item IFI Inspector lollow up item LER Licensee Event Report LIC Licensing Issue MISC Miscellaneous MV Minor Violation NCV NonCited Violation NEG Negative NOED Notice of Enforcement Discretion NON Notice of Non Conformance OTHR Other P21 Patt 21 POS Positive SGI Safeguard Event Report STR Strength URI Unresolved item VIO Violagon WK Weakness Template Codes:
1A Normal Operations 1B Operations During Transients 1C Programs and Processes 2A Equipment Condition 2B Programs and Processes 3A Work Perlormance 3B KSA 3C Work Environment 4A Design 4B Engineering Support 4C Programs and Processes SA Identification 5B Analysis 5C Resolution ID Codes:
NRC NRC Self Self. Revealed Ucensee Ucensee Funchonol Arecrtu OPS Operations MAINT Maintenance ENG Engineering PLTSUP Plant Support OTHER Other FEls are apparent violations of NRC Requirements that are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the General Statement f p Fnforcement Action (Enforcement Policy), NUREG.1600. However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the issuesi.dengf,~
b "
and Procedure for NRC modified when the final decisions are made.
y the EEls and the PIM entdes may be URls are unresolved items about which more information is required to determine whether the issue In question fs an adaptable il mayalsobea potential violation that isnollikelyto be considered for escalated enforcement action. However the NRC has not, di f.
"o o
o nce, or a vlolagon. A URI entries may be modified when the final condusions are made.
e inai conclusions on the issues, and the PIM Item Type (ComPliance,FollowuP.Other),
From 10/01/1998 To 07/01/1999
Page1 of 1 09/16/1999 08:35:05 ENCLOSURE 2
WASH. NUCLEAR PROJECT Inspection/Actit/ity Plan 09/01/1 999 - 03/31/2000 Units Ins ection Activit IP 73753 IP 81700 IP 40500 IP 84750 IP 86750 IP 40500 IP 83750 IP 82701 IP 37001 IP 93809 Title Inservice Inspection Physical Security Program For Power Reactors Effectiveness Of Licensee Process to Idenbfy, Resolve. And Prevent Problems Radioactive Waste Treatment. And Effluent And Environmental Monitoring Solid Radioactive Waste Management And Transportation Of Radioactive Mate Effectiveness Of Licensee Process to Idensfy, Resotve. And Prevent Problems Occupational Radiation Exposure Operational Status Ol The Emergency Preparedness Program 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation Program Safety System Engineenng Inspection (SSEI)
Number of NRC Inspectors / Individuais Planned Dates Start End Inspection Type 09/27/1999 10/25/1999 01/10/2000 Ot/IO/2OOO 01/10/2PQQ 01/24/2000 02/07/2000 02/28/2000 02/28/2000 02/28/2000 10/01/1999 Core 10/29/1999 Core pl/14/2000 Core 01/14/2000 Core 01/14/2000 Core 01/28/2000 Core 02/11/2000 Core 03/03/2000 Core 03/17/2000 Core 03/17/2000 Core This report does not indude INPO and OUTAGE activities.
This report shows only on.site and announced inspection procedures.