ML17291A217
| ML17291A217 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 07/12/1994 |
| From: | WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17291A216 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9407190313 | |
| Download: ML17291A217 (23) | |
Text
REQUEST FOR AME NT, RELOCATION OF TECH@
CAL SPECIFICATION TABLES FOR INSTRUMENTRESPONSE TIMELIMITS ATTACHMENT3 TECHNICALSPECIFICATION PAGES and BASES CHANGES Reflecting Relocation of Instrumentation Response Time Limits to the FSAR 9407190313 940712 PDR ADOCK 05000397 P
ONTROLLED COPY INDEX LIST OF TABLES TABLE 1.2
- 2. 2. 1-1
- 82. 1. 2-1
- 3. 2. 3-1
- 3. 3. 1-1 PAGE SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY NOTATION.
1-9 OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS............................;..
1"10 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS..
2-4 UNCERTAINTIES USED IN THE DETERMINATION OF THE FUEL CLADDING SAFETY LIMIT..................
B 2-3 MCPR OPERATING LIMITS FOR RATED CORE FLOW............
Deleted REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION............
3/4 3-2
- 4. 3.1.1-1
- 3. 3. 2-1
- 3. 3. 2-2 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4 3-7 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION...............
3/4 3-12 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS........
3/4 3"16 4.3.2.1"1 3 ~ 3 ~ 3 1
- 3. 3. 3-2 ISOLATION SYSTEM IHSTRUMEHTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION.............
EMERGENCY CORE COOLIHG SYSTEM ACTUATIOH IHSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS 3/4 3-22 3/4 3"26 3/4 3-30
- 4. 3. 3. 1-1
- 3. 3. 4. 1-1 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATIOH INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS............
3/4 3-34 ATWS RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION...................................
3/4 3-38
- 3. 3. 4. 1-2 ATWS RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS........
3/4 3"39
- 4. 3.4.1" 1 ATWS RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP ACTUATION INSTRUMEHTATIOH SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS........;...
3/4 3-40 WASHINGTON NUCLEAR - UNIT 2 XX1 Amendmen't N~
I)
I 4t Pf
&ONTROLIED 'COPY 0 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3. 1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.1 As a minimum, the reactor protection system. instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be
- OPERABLE, APPLICABILITY:
As shown in Table 3.3.1-1.
ACTION:
b.
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirement for one trip system, place the inoperable channel(s) and/or that trip system in the tripped condition" within twelve hours.
The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirement for both trip systems, place at least one trip system"" in the tripped condition within 1.hour and take the ACTION required by Table 3.3. 1-1.
SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.3.1. 1 Each reactor protection system instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATIOH operations for the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.1.1-1.
4.3.1.2 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS and simulated automatic operation of all channels shall be performed at least once per 18 months.
4.3. 1.3 The REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each reactor trip functional unit shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months.
channel per trip system such that H times 18 months where H is the t specific reactor trip system.
Each test shall include at least one ll channels are tested at least once every tal number of redundant channels in a N<<)s.
J J.slsse ss e>>s CI 4n (sspsss I'" ~ss~"5
- An inoperable channel need not be placed in the tripped condition where this would cause the Trip Function to occur.
In these
- cases, the inoperable channel shall be restored to OPERABLE status within six hours after the channel was first determined to be inoperable or the ACTION required by Table 3.3.1-1 for that Trip Function shall be taken.
""Ifmore channels are inoperable in one trip system than in the other, place the tr ip system with more inoperable channels in the tripped condition, except when this would cause the Trip Function to occur.
WASHINGTON NUCLEAR - UNIT 2 3/4 3-1 AMENOMEHT N0.~9-
TABLE 3. 3. 1-2 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIMES FUNCTIONAL IT
- I.
Intermediat Range Monitors:
a.
Neutron ux - High b.
Inoperative
RESPONSE
TIME Seconds N.
.A.
2-Average Power Range itor":
a.
Neutron Flux - Ups le, Setdown b.
Flow Biased Simulate Thermal Power - Upscale c.
Fixed Neutron Flux - Up ale d.
Inoperative N.A.
< 0.09 N.A.
3.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure High Reactor Vessel Mater Level - Low, Lev 3
Main Steam Line Isolation Valve - Closur DELETED Primary Containment Pressure
- High Scram Discharge Volume Mater Level High a.
Level Transmitter b.
Float Switch 9.
Turbine Throttle Valve - Cl ure 10.
Turbine Governor Valve F
- Closure, Trip Oil Pressure -
w 11.
Reactor Mode Switch utdown Position 12.
< 0.55
< 1.05
< 0.06 N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
< 0.06
< 0.088 H.A.
N.A.
"Neutron de ctors are exempt from response time testing.
Response
time sha be measured from th detector output or from the input of the first electronic component the channel.
""Inc ding simulated thermal power time constant.
easured from start of turbine control valve fast closure.
LI f I
/
L
INsTNNNENTATIoN I'O~T~O Co 3/4.3. 2 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.2 The isolation actuation instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.2"1 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3.2-2 APPLICABILITY:
As shown in Table 3.3.2-1.
ACTION:
a.
With an isolation actuation instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3.2-2, declare the channel inoperable until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.
b.
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirement for one trip system:
1.
If placing the inoperable channel(s) in the tripped condition would cause an isolation, the inoperable channel(s) shall be restored to OPERABLE status within a) 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for trip functions common to RPS Instrumentation; and b) 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for trip funct'ions not common to RPS Instrumentation.
or the ACTION required by Table 3.3.2-1 for the affected trip function shall be taken.
OR 2.
If placing the inoperable channel(s) in the tripped conditions would not cause an isolation, the inoperable channel(s) and/or that trip system shall be placed in the tripped condition within a) 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for trip functions common to RPS Instrumentation; and b) 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for trip functions not common to RPS Instrumentation.
The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
C.
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirement for both trip systems, place at'least one trip system* in the tripped condition within one hour and take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.2-1.
"Place one trip system (with the most inoperable channels) in the tripped l
I condition.
The trip system need not be placed in the tripped condition when this would cause the isolation to occur.
WASHINGTON NUCLEAR - UNIT 2 3/4 3-10 Amendment No.~
t 1'4
~ >g D
CONTROLLED COPY INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.3.2. 1 Each isolation actuation instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations for the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.2.1-1.
4.3.2.2 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS and simulated automatic operation of all channels shall be performed at least once per 18 months.
4.3.2.3 The ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each isolation trip function shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months
- Each test shall include at least one channel per trip system such that 1
hannels are tested at least once every N times 18 months, where is he total number of redundant channels in a specific isolation trip stem
~<5ece.e e
g oa Q~)a~pcs a
Iw'xc~q>
Cr ceo p~a<c.
4c 5 gstJQ~
Me+pe Tab
-SHume~
-ee4age; u
s 3 and 4
qu>remen mental-ie ica pecification into a COLD WASHINGTON NUCLEAR UNIT 2 3/4 3-11 Amendment No. -i+9-
CONTROLLED COPY RIP FUNCTION ALA-He
RESPONSE
TIME Seconds 1.
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION a.
Low, Level 3
)
Low Low, Level 2
b.
Or ell Pressure
- High c.
Main earn Line 1) 0 ETED 2)
Pre ur e - Low 3)
Flow High d.
e.f.
g.
2.
SECONOARY CONTAINMENT ISOL TION Main Steam Li e Tunnel Temperature - H'gh Main Steam Line Tunnel h Temperature High Condenser Vacuum - Low Manual Initiation N.A. */< 13(a)A'A 13(a) 1 OA/< 13(a)AA
< 0.5"/< 13(a)""
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
a.
b.
C.
d.
Reactor Building Vent Ex a t Plenum Radiation - High(b)
Dwell Pressure
- High Reactor Vessel Water vel -
ow Low, Level 2
Manual Initiation
< 13(a)
< 13(a)
< 13(a)
H.A.
3.
REACTOR WATER CLEANUP STEM ISOLATION a 0 b.
C.
d.
e.f.
g.
h.
h Flow - High Heat Exchang Area Temperature - High Heat Excha er Area Ventilation 6 Temp. -
igh Pump Ar Temperature - High Pump ea Ventilation 6 Temp. - High SLCS nitiation Re tor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2
CU/RCIC Line Routing Area Temperature-igh RWCU Line Routing Area Temperature - High Manual Initiation
< 13(a)N N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
< 13(a)
A.
N.
N.A.
WASHINGTON NUCLEAR " UNIT 2 3/4 3"19 Amendment No. 112
<,'I h
1
CONTROLLED COPY ~
P FUNCTION
~ABL~&
~emcee
RESPONSE
TIME Seep s
5'.
R TOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM ISOLATION a 4 b.
C.
d.
e.f.
g.
h.l.
R Steam Line Flow - High RHR/
C Steam Line Flow - High RCIC St Supply Pressur e - Low RCIC Turb>
Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure -
igh RCIC Equipmen Room Temperature - Hig RCIC Equipment om b, Temperature -
igh RWCU/RCIC Steam Li Routing Are Temperature - High Drywell Pressure
- High Manual Initiation
< 13(a)
< 13(a)
< 13(a)
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
5.
RHR SYSTEM SHUTDOWN COOL G
MODE ISO ION a.
b.
C.
d.
e.f.
Reactor Vessel ater Level - Low, Lev 3
Reactor Ves (RHR Cut-in Permissive)
Pressu
- High Equip t Area Temperature - High Equ'ent Area Ventilation 6 Temp. - High utdown Cooling Return Flow Rate - High RHR Heat Exchanger Area Temperature - High Manual Initiation
< 13(a)
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.
N.A.
Washington Nuclear - Unit 2 3/4 3-20 Amendment No.
12
'T
.r
~
CONTROLLED COPY 4
~
MEHTATCC~ESVOHSSWWE-The isolation system instrumentation response time shall be measured a
orded as a part of the ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME.
Isolati system instr ntation response time specified includes the diesel ge ator starting sequence loading delays assumed in the acciden nalysis.
(b)Radiation detecto are exempt from response time t 1ng.
Response
time shall be measured fro etector output or the i of the first electronic component in the channel.
"Isolation system instrume'ntation r se time for HSIYs only.
Ho diesel generator delays assumed.
"*Isolation system instrumen ion response time associated valves except MSIYs.
FIsol ation syste nstrumentation response time specified for Trip Fun on ac atin h valve crau s all be added to isolation tl in each valve group to obtain SOLA N SYSTEM RESPOHSE or each valve.
-t-ice-deca-net-4n&ude-the-45me cond-Mme-d&ay-.
for each power operat auto ic primary containment isolation valve and secondary
'nment ventilation system automatic isolation valve e 3.6.5.-
MASHIHGTOH NUCLEAR - UNIT 2 3/4 3-21
~ 1
\\
I
'4
'\\
'dd
:,'".Q CONTROLLED. COPY ~
~
3 4.3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.3 The emergency core cooling system (ECCS) actuation instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3.3-2, APPLICABILITY:
As shown in Table 3.3.3-1.
ACTION:
a.
With an ECCS actuation instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3.3-2, declare the channel inoperable until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.
b.
With one or more ECCS actuation instrumentation channels inoperable, within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.3-1.
c.
With either ADS trip system "A" or "B" inoperable, restore the inoperable trip system to OPERABLE status:
- 2. Within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and reduce reactor steam dome pressure to less than or equal to 128 psig within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE RE UIREHENTS 4.3.3.1 Each ECCS actuation instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations for the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.3.1-1.
4.3.3.2 LOGIC SYSTEH FUNCTIONAL TESTS and simulated automatic operation of all channels shall be performed at least once per 18 months.
C'~4.3.3.3 The ECCS
RESPONSE
TIME of each ECCS trip function Saw~
htthd t tdhhthh thhhh th 18 months.
Each test shall include at least one channel per trip system such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific ECCS trip system.
Specs 1ca owing e next COLD SHUT u
n or OPERABILITY WASHINGTON NUCLEAR - UNIT 2 3/4 3-25 Amendment No. +6+~
~ CONT OVV ~
.TIMES-EC 1.
LOW P SURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM 2.
LOW PRESSURE OLANT INJECTION MODE OF RHR SYSTEM a.
Pumps A and B
b.
Pump C
3.
AUTOMATIC DEPRE RIZATION SYSTEM 4.
HIGH PRE E
CORE SPRAY SYSTEM 5.
L OF POWER
RESPONSE
TIM econds)
< 43
< 43 N.A.
< 27 N.A.
WASHINGTON NUCLEAR - UNIT 2 3/4 3-33
OcoNTRol L.ED coPY 3/4. 3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4. 3. 1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION The reactor protection system automatically initiates a reactor scram to:
a.
Preserve the integrity of the fuel cladding.
b.
Preserve the integrity of the reactor coolant system.
c.
Minimize the energy which must be adsorbed following a loss-of-coolant
- accident, and d.
Prevent inadvertent criticality.
This specification provides the limiting conditions for operation necessary to preserve the ability of the system to perform its intended function even during periods when instrument channels may be out of service because of main-tenance.
When necessary, one channel may be made inoperable for brief intervals to conduct required surveillance.
The reactor protection system is made up of two independent trip systems.
There are usually four channels to monitor each parameter with two channels in each trip system.
The outputs of the channels in a trip system are combined in a logic so that either channel will trip that trip system.
The tripping of both trip systems will produce a reactor scram.
The system meets the intent of IEEE-279 for nuclear power plant protection systems.
Specified surveil-lance intervals and surveillance and maintenance outage times have been determined in accordance with NEDC 30851 P, "Technical Specification Improve-ment Analyses for BWR Reactor Protection System,"
as approved by the NRC and documented in the SER (letter to T. A. Pickens from A. Thadani dated July 15, 1987).
The bases for the trip settings of the RPS are discussed in the bases for Specification 2.2.1.
The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the protective functions associated with each channel are com-pleted within the time limit assumed in the safety analyses.
No credit was taken for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable.
Response
time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel test measurement, provided such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined.
Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either (1) inplace, onsite or offsite test measur e
(2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times.
c~.,l, 7 WASHINGTON NUCLEAR " UNIT 2 8 3/4 3-1 Amendment No. ~
4s'~
t.
I ~
I
<<'s t,
p CONTROLLED COP INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4. 3. 2
. ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION This pecNizatioa censures the effectiveness of the instrumentation used to miti e the consequence of accidents by prescribing the OPERABILITY trip tpi~
i 1e f
1 yt
. e
- sary, o
channel may be ino rable for brief intervals to conduct required surveilla Some of th ip settings may have tolerances explicitly stated where both th ow values are critical and may have a substantial effect on safety.
The setpoints of other instrumentation, where only the high or low end of the setting have a direct bearing on safety, are established at a level away from the normal operating range to prevent inadvertent actuation of the systems involved.
Except for the MSIVs, the safety analysis does not address individual sensor response times or the response times of the logic systems to which the sensors are connected.
For D. C.-operated
- valves, a 3-second delay is assumed before the valve starts to move.
For A.C.-operated valves, it is assumed that the A.C. power supply is lost and is restored by startup of the emergency diesel generators.
In this event, a time of 13 seconds is assumed before the valve starts to move.
In addition to the pipe break, the failure of the O.C.-operated valve is assumed; thus the signal delay (sensor response) is concurrent with the l3-second diesel startup.
The safety analysis considers an allowable inventory loss in each case which in turn determines the valve speed in conjunc-tion with the 13-second delay. It follows that checking the valve speeds and the 13-second time for emergency power establishment will establish the response time for the isolation functions.
However, to enhance overall system reliability and to monitor instrument channel response time t ds he ola-tion actuation en onse time shal s
ed a recorde art o
e ISOLATION SYSTEM R
s resp, se<'I'r 4;~
/ SRfZ C/r~p/ee. 7, w&h-a-~~St s c servative an its Trip Se point u
within its specified Allowable Value is acceptable on the basis that the difference between each Trip Setpoint and the Allowable Value is equal to or less than the drift allowance assumed for each trip in the safety analyses.
3/4.3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION The emergency core cooling system actuation instrumentation is provided to initiate actions to mi ate the consequences of accidents that are beyond the ability of the oper 3
o control.
T' ci a
rovides the OPERABILITY requiremen s" t p setpoint hat will ensure effectiveness of the sys ms to provide essgn r
c on.
Although the instruments are listed
- system, in some cases the same instrument y
e a
ua ion signa to mor one stem a
same time.
$ reste
/~roEjets rfrc cPsrl aRaeea<l jal F444 c$ypj t4 7
r s
e an its Trip Setpoint but within its specified Allowable Value is acceptable on the basis that the difference between each Trip Setpoint and the Allowable Value is equal to or less than the drift allowance assumed for each trip in the safety analyses.
MASHIHGTOH NUCLEAR " UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-2
~ P P
1 I
I k
~
II r
h
'\\
a a
V